

The Indonesian Update

Monthly Review on Economic, Legal, Security, Political, and Social Affairs

Main Report

**Accountability Budget in the Prabowo Era:
How Should Government be Responsible?**

Economy

- The Analysis of the Single-Window Export Policy for Strengthening Indonesia's Economy
- The Analysis of the Policy on Foreign Exchange Earnings from Natural Resource Exports (DHE SDA) as an Effort to Support National Development

Laws

- The Pretrial of the Andrie Yunus Case and the Problem of Military Court Jurisdiction
- Women's Representation in Constitutional Court Decision Number 128/PUU-XXIV/2026

Social

- Strengthening Maternal and Child Health Protection in the Face of the Climate Crisis: A Policy Review
- Environmental Degradation and the Rising Risks of Infectious Diseases: Why Indonesia Needs a One Health Approach

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FOREWORD

The June 2026 edition of the Indonesian Update features a main report titled “Budget Accountability in the Prabowo Era: How Should the Government be Accountable?” This article discusses the importance of accountability in state financial management; particularly, amidst various efficiency policies and budget adjustments implemented by the government.

In the legal field, this edition contains two articles addressing institutional issues and representation in the Indonesian legal system. The article “The Pretrial of the Andrie Yunus Case and the Problem of Military Court Jurisdiction” examines the debate over the civilian judiciary’s authority to handle cases involving military personnel and highlights the challenges in ensuring the principle of equality before the law and the accountability of state officials. Meanwhile, the article “Women’s Representation in Constitutional Court Decision Number 128/PUU-XXIV/2026” examines the dynamics of women’s representation in electoral politics.

In the social sector, the Indonesian Update addresses public health issues, which are increasingly affected by environmental and climate change. The article “Reviewing Tips for Protecting Maternal and Child Health Threatened by the Climate Crisis” discusses the various risks faced by vulnerable groups due to climate change, including its impact on maternal and child health, and the importance of integrating health policies and climate adaptation. Furthermore, the article “Uncovering the Risks of Increasing Infectious Diseases on the Verge of Environmental Damage” examines the link between environmental degradation, ecosystem change, and the increasing risks of infectious disease spread.

In the economic field, this edition presents two analyses related to strategies for strengthening the national economy through trade policies and resource management. The article “Analysis of the One-Stop Export Policy for Strengthening the Indonesian Economy” discusses the potential and challenges of implementing an integrated export mechanism to improve efficiency, competitiveness, and coordination of national trade policies. Meanwhile, the article “Analysis of Foreign Exchange Policy from Natural Resource Exports (DHE SDA) as an Effort to Support National Development” examines the role of DHE SDA policy in strengthening economic resilience.

Through the monthly publication of the Indonesian Update, which raises various strategic and current issues, it is hoped that this report could contribute to policy makers in government institutions, business actors,

academics, researchers, think tanks, and civil society, both at home and abroad, to obtain contextual analysis of the political, legal, social, and economic dynamics in Indonesia, while enriching understanding of the challenges and direction of future public policy.

Happy reading.

Main Report

Accountability Budget in the Prabowo Era: How Should Government be Responsible ?

-Felicia Primaresti-



In the Prabowo Government, at least there is one anomaly, whose pattern is repetitive in the use of state budget. Amidst budget efficiency instructed directly by the President through the President Instruction No. 1/2025, Prabowo is committed to cutting the budget deemed to be inefficient and reallocating it to other posts of more priority .

Prabowo has been criticised for making a very big cabinet and inefficient priority programs, including Free Nutritious Meals (MBG) programme, which has caused National Nutrition Agency (BGN) Chair Dadan Hindayana to be arrested by Attorney General's Office on June 3, 2026 (BBC Indonesia, 3/6/2026). This means that many of his policies have violated his initial Cabinet decisions.

The Conversation Indonesia (26/5/2026) noted that for 1.5 years in office, Prabowo had done as many as 90 overseas visits. The public and policy have questioned how much money from the State Annual Budget (APBN) that had been used. The public has also asked the question about the use of APBN to purchase animals to be sacrificed at Eid ul Adha.

This article shall discuss how budget accountability and responsibility should be seen through the perspective of justice (Cameron, 2004). There should be clear about the uses of personal funding and APBN. Officials should be

transparent in using APBN and should be able to explain the results of the APBN uses.

The Debate on the Uses of the State Budget vs of Personal Funds

This section shall touch on the debate on the uses of APBN vs personal. In the context of the retreat in Magelang in October 2024; for example, Prabowo first conveyed that the activity in Magelang used his personal money ([Tempo.com](https://www.tempo.com) , 10/30/2024). Similar activities were also held in February 2025 in the form of leadership orientation conducted at Akmil Magelang. The activities used APBN in the amount of 13.2 billion rupiah ([Tribunnews](https://www.tribunnews.com) , 21/2/2025).

In May 2026, Prabowo caught public attention when he used

Rp. 100 billion of the APBN to buy 1,098 animals to be sacrificed during Eid ul Adha ([Kompas.com](https://www.kompas.com) , 28/5/2026). The Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI) and by the Chair of Commission III of the Indonesian House of Representatives, Habiburokhman, stated that use of APBN to procure the sacrifice animals was legitimate. According to him, the procurement can be classified the society welfare program. (INews, 28/5/2026).

There should be clear reasons for the uses of APBN. This is in line with Mitchell (1999) who states that the Government must maintain public trust and should betray public trust.

Prabowo, through Cabinet Secretary Teddy Indra Wijaya; for example, only explained that some parts of the overseas visits were financed by personal money (Kompas.id, 6/6/2026). In fact, in the perspective of public accountability, public accountability public should not be reduced to compliance to the rule of law (Cameron, 2004). The more important is whether the Government can provided answers to questions from the public regarding accountability.

Accountability Does Not Stop at Legality

If the Government only emphasizes the legality of the source of financing instead of explaining the urgency, purpose, and impact, then accountability will become a narrow procedural aspect. As a result, the public will question more about the Government's accountability.

This phenomenon shows the trend of the Government to frame public criticisms as mere technical and administrative issues. In the case of animal

sacrifice procurement and various cases involving the uses of APBN, the Government often only focused on the legality factors. This ignore more substantial dimensions; namely, setting the right priorities

amidst various problem economic and social issues faced by the society. In other words, legality is the minimum requirement of good governance but not enough for building legitimacy and trust.

In the framework of democratic accountability, Bovens (2007) distinguishes between *accountability as a virtue* and *accountability as a mechanism*. If the Government only responds with legal proofs, the accountability is only superficial.

Accoeding to a national survey by the Central Statistics Agency (2024), the Indonesian society was still burdened by expensive basic needs and health services. They also still needed jobs and economic stability.

The findings show the existence of gap between perceived priorities and government policies. In this context, the Government should not only explain that use budget, but it also need to show accountability.

In addition, focusing on legality has the potential to weaken the oversight function supervision. This could make the dialogue between the state and citizens become asymmetrical and not productive. O'Neill (2002) reminds us that public trust should not be built through formal guarantees but rather through openness.

Recommendations

Referring to the above analyses, the following are a number of recommendations that could be implemented by the stakeholders.

1. The Government through the Ministry of State Secretariat (Setneg) should publish policy narratives for all activities involving the President and the Public. The State Secretariat should not only publish the agenda and documentation of the President's activities. In the future , the State Secretariat through Presidential Decrees or at least internal policies must publish documents explaining the objectives of RPJMN and the President's priorities and expected results from every activity, including overseas visits and symbolic programs like the procurement of sacrifice animals. The documents should be accessible to the public, not only stored as internal archives .

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The public debate over the uses of budget in the Prabowo era is often stuck on the wrong question : is an activity financed by private funds or APBN. This article argues that that question has blurred more fundamental issues; namely, how officials should explain to the public why a policy has been taken: for who and with what results.

2. The DPR through Commission II and Commission XI must change the meeting format so that meetings could become substantial. DPR RI meetings should not only procedural. The meetings should be able to answer questions about the relevance of any programs and spending and the success indicators.success .
3. Civil society , academics , media and institutions must monitor budget systematically.

Economy

The Analysis of the Single-Window Export Policy for Strengthening Indonesia's Economy

-Putu Rusta Adijaya-



The Prabowo administration enacted Government Regulation (PP) Number 24/2026 concerning the Governance of Strategic Natural Resource Commodity Exports (PP 24/2026) on May 20, 2026. This policy is implemented to maintain domestic supply stability and national economic resilience, enhance value-added, ensure sustainable national development, and utilize natural resources for the greatest prosperity of the people. The policy is termed a “single-window export” system because the government regulates the export governance of all strategic natural resource (SDA) commodities, as stipulated in Article 2, paragraph (1). The strategic natural resource commodities currently subject to these export governance regulations are coal, palm oil, and ferro-alloys.

PP 24/2026 further clarifies that these strategic natural resource commodities are those that affect the livelihoods of the general public and serve the following functions. First, the allocation function; this applies to goods or services derived from state-controlled natural resources intended for utilization toward the greatest prosperity of the people. Second, the distribution function; this targets goods and/or services that are essential to the public but cannot be supplied by the market, either intermittently or continuously. Third, the stabilization function; this relates to goods and/or services that must be provided for the public interest—such as those concerning defense, security, monetary, and fiscal affairs—which require special regulation and oversight.

While this “single-window” export policy is expected to strengthen the national economy, its effective implementation faces various challenges and entails significant opportunity costs. Therefore, this article shall analyze the single-window export policy and offers recommendations for the administration of President Prabowo Subianto.

The Single-Window Export Policy: Governance Reform or Excessive Government Intervention?

According to data from the Coordinating Ministry for Economic Affairs cited by money.kompas.com (June 15, 2026), natural resource exports account for 60% of total national exports. The three largest export commodities currently are coal (contributing 8.65%), crude palm oil (CPO) (8.63%), and ferroalloys (5.82%).

In 2024, coal exports reached US\$30.49 billion, palm oil product exports totaled US\$27.76 billion, and ferroalloy exports amounted to US\$13.8 billion (money.kompas.com, June 15, 2026). In aggregate, the export value of these three commodities stood at US\$72.05 billion—or IDR 1,296.9 trillion, assuming an exchange rate of IDR 18,000 per US\$.

The Coordinating Ministry for Economic Affairs also stated that the State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) designated to carry out export activities for strategic natural resource commodities is PT Danantara Sumberdaya Indonesia (DSI) (ekon.go.id, May 31, 2026). The Government emphasized that this measure was taken “as a concrete commitment by the state to strengthen oversight, promote trade transparency, and optimize the management of Export Proceeds (DHE) for the sake of national economic resilience.” (ekon.go.id, May 31, 2026).

Following the enactment of Government Regulation (PP) No. 24/2026, several regulations concerning the three strategic natural resource commodities were issued, including: 1) Minister of Trade Regulation No. 15/2026 regarding Export Policies and Arrangements for the Strategic Natural Resource Commodity of Coal (PerMendag 15/2026); 2) Minister of Trade Regulation of the Republic of Indonesia No. 16/2026 regarding Export Policies and Arrangements for the Strategic Natural Resource Commodity of Palm Oil (PerMendag 16/2026); and 3) Minister of Trade Regulation No. 17/2026 regarding Export Policies and Arrangements for the Strategic Natural Resource Commodity of Ferroalloys (PerMendag 17/2026). All these regulations came into effect on June 1, 2026, as a follow-up to PP 24/2026.

As reported by [cnbcindonesia.com](https://www.cnbcindonesia.com) (June 10, 2026), Minister of Trade Budi Santoso explained that the policy aims to “strengthen the governance of strategic commodity trade while ensuring that the utilization of national natural resources yields more optimal economic benefits.” In other words, Government Regulation No. 24/2026 and its implementing regulations (Minister of Trade Regulations No. 15/2026, 16/2026, and 17/2026) aim to improve and foster the governance of strategic natural resource commodities and transparency, strengthen economic resilience, and deliver substantial, tangible welfare to the public.

Nevertheless, this “single-door” export policy has raised several concerns. First is the extent of government intervention, particularly regarding the designation of a single state-owned enterprise (SOE) to handle exports. Economic theory holds that government intervention in the market is warranted in specific situations—such as market failure, externalities (both positive and negative), information asymmetry, the provision of public goods, and, crucially, the presence of a monopoly.

In the context of exporting strategic natural resource commodities, Government Regulation (PP) 24/2026—issued to ensure domestic supply stability and optimize the management of export earnings (DHE)—rests on a solid normative legal foundation. However, there are concerns that the designation of PT Danantara Sumberdaya Indonesia (DSI) could foster rent-seeking practices. Didik J. Rachbini, a Senior Economist at the Institute for Development of Economics and Finance (INDEF), voiced this concern on investor.id (May 26, 2026), urging the Government to strictly oversee PT DSI to prevent the emergence of new forms of economic rent.

This sentiment was echoed by Dony Oskaria, the Chief Operating Officer (COO) of Danantara Indonesia, on [cnnindonesia.com](https://www.cnnindonesia.com) (June 13, 2026). He stated that PT DSI was established “to strengthen export oversight and prevent practices that have historically caused losses to the state, such as transfer pricing and under-invoicing,” and emphasized that DSI would not act as an intermediary or export “broker” that purchases commodities from companies only to resell them on the international market.

According to the rent-seeking theory proposed by Gordon Tullock (1967) and Anne Krueger (1974)—as cited on econlib.org (accessed June 17, 2026)—economic agents are said to engage in rent-seeking when they attempt to secure personal gain through the political arena. This is typically achieved by: 1) obtaining subsidies for produced goods; 2) securing subsidies based on membership in a specific social group; 3) having tariffs imposed on competing goods; or 4) obtaining special regulations that hinder competitors.

In other words, a state-controlled “single-window” export structure creates an incentive for business actors to pursue rents—such as administrative advantages—rather than competing on merit.

Furthermore, from the perspective of economic freedom, The Heritage Foundation’s *Index of Economic Freedom* (2026) identifies “trade freedom” and “investment freedom”—sub-components of the “market openness” pillar—as drivers of long-term economic growth. Data from 2026 indicates that Indonesia’s scores for trade freedom and investment freedom were 78.6 (“Mostly Free”) and 50.0 (“Mostly Unfree”), respectively. Meanwhile, Indonesia’s overall economic freedom score for the same period was 65.1 (“Moderately Free”).

According to the Heritage Foundation (2026), Indonesia’s trade freedom sub-component score remains relatively strong. However, if the single-window export policy lacks mechanisms for price transparency and optimal governance oversight, the score for this sub-component could decline.

This aligns with the views expressed by Milton Friedman (1962) in his book *Capitalism and Freedom*, where he explains that economic freedom is not merely an end in itself but also an “indispensable means” of achieving political freedom. This perspective stems from the fact that economic freedom influences whether power becomes concentrated or dispersed (Friedman, 1962). Consequently, if control over the export of strategic natural resources is concentrated in a single government-affiliated entity, the risk of “regulatory capture” increases—a concept defined either broadly as the process by which special interest groups influence state interventions, or narrowly as the process by which regulated monopolies manipulate the relevant state agency (Dal Bó, 2006).

Policy Recommendations

Referring to the analysis above, several policy recommendations are proposed for the administration of President Prabowo Subianto. These recommendations are not intended to overturn the “single-window” export policy already in place; rather, they serve as a call to reinforce institutional foundations, governance transparency, and economic freedom to achieve the policy’s objectives sustainably.

First, the Government—through the Coordinating Ministry for Economic Affairs, the Ministry of Trade, the Ministry of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), and the Ministry of Agriculture, in collaboration with relevant ministries/agencies and PT Danantara Sumberdaya Indonesia (DSI)—

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Recommendations regarding this single-window export policy include establishing a transparent, independent, and real-time pricing mechanism; ensuring that PT DSI's role does not lead to sales monopolization and act as a mere intermediary, or create a new monopoly entity; strengthening oversight of PT DSI to effectively mitigate the potential for regulatory capture; and conducting optimal, periodic monitoring and evaluation to measure and identify the successes and obstacles associated with the regulation's implementation.

must jointly establish a transparent, independent, and real-time pricing mechanism. This is necessary because PT DSI, as the SOE responsible for exports, has the authority to determine the selling prices of strategic natural resource commodities pursuant to Article 3, Paragraph (2) of Government Regulation (PP) Number 24/2026 concerning the Governance of Strategic Natural Resource Commodity Exports (PP 24/2026).

Beyond protecting business players, transparency regarding pricing and profit margin deductions within the natural resource export scheme is essential to maintaining market perceptions of Indonesia's trade openness and preserving the country's "trade freedom" score as assessed by The Heritage Foundation.

Second, all government elements must ensure that PT DSI's role does not result in a sales monopoly, nor turn it into a mere "middleman" or a new monopolistic entity. This is crucial to maintain space for private exporters and preserve market mechanisms for negotiations between them and buyers wishing to source from the private sector. Furthermore, the Commission VI of the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia (DPR RI)—which oversees State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs)—must diligently, transparently, and responsibly monitor PT DSI's performance to ensure it operates efficiently, effectively, and professionally while upholding integrity.

Third, all government elements, in collaboration with the Business Competition Supervisory Commission (KPPU) and independent audit bodies such as the Audit Board of the Republic of Indonesia (BPK), must strengthen oversight of PT DSI to effectively mitigate the risk of "regulatory capture" mentioned earlier.

Fourth, all government bodies relevant to Government Regulation (PP) 24/2026—including the Coordinating Ministry for Economic Affairs, the Ministry of Trade, the Ministry of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), the Ministry of Agriculture, and other related ministries and agencies—must conduct optimal, periodic monitoring and evaluation to measure and identify the successes and obstacles associated with the regulation's implementation. This evaluation process is expected to inclusively involve various stakeholders, such as academics, industry associations, and civil society. Such monitoring and evaluation are essential to mitigate practices of Corruption, Collusion, and Nepotism (KKN), which have long been structural institutional issues in Indonesia.

Economy

The Analysis of the Policy on Foreign Exchange Earnings from Natural Resource Exports (DHE SDA) as an Effort to Support National Development

-Putu Rusta Adijaya-



Increasing global uncertainty—driven by factors such as geopolitical conflicts and the resulting volatility in commodity prices—significantly impacts Indonesia’s economic conditions. As an economy that remains reliant on natural resource commodities like coal and crude palm oil (CPO), Indonesia also faces challenges regarding the domestic retention of foreign exchange earnings from natural resource exports (DHE SDA). Notably, the Coordinating Ministry for Economic Affairs stated (via money.kompas.com, June 15, 2026) that natural resource exports accounted for 60% of total national exports, with the coal sector contributing 8.65% and the CPO sector contributing approximately 8.63%.

In response to this, effective on 1 June 2026, the Government has implemented new a regulation concerning DHE SDA through Government Regulation (PP) Number 21/2026 regarding the Third Amendment to Government Regulation Number 36/2023 concerning Foreign Exchange Earnings from Natural Resource Exploitation, Management, and/or Processing Activities (PP 21/2026). According to the Ministry of Finance (fiskal.kemenkeu.go.id, May 31, 2026), this policy is part of the Government’s efforts to encourage domestic foreign exchange retention in order to strengthen national economic resilience and the stability of the national financial system.

Therefore, this paper shall analyze the policy on the repatriation of natural resource export earnings (DHE SDA) under Government Regulation

21/2026 and provide policy recommendations for the administration of President Prabowo Subianto.

The Rationale Behind the Natural Resource Export Earnings (DHE SDA) Policy (Government Regulation 21/2026) and Implementation Challenges

Referring to a summary from fiskal.kemenkeu.go.id (May 31, 2026), this policy is underpinned by several economic rationales. First, it aims to increase the retention of domestic foreign exchange earnings to bolster national economic resilience and strengthen the stability of the national financial system. Second, it seeks to maximize the benefits of natural resource export earnings for the national economy. Third, increased foreign currency liquidity helps support exchange rate stability and facilitates the financing of national development.

Fourth, beyond merely enforcing compliance, the policy offers incentives and rewards to business players who contribute to domestic economic stability by repatriating their natural resource export earnings to Indonesia. Fifth, it provides regulatory certainty and fiscal benefits to the business sector.

In international economic theory, as outlined by Krugman, Obstfeld, and Melitz (2022), exporting—defined as the sale of domestically produced goods and/or services to buyers in other countries—can increase the volume or supply of foreign currency in the domestic market. For instance, if export earnings (DHE) from Indonesia’s strategic commodities, such as coal and crude palm oil (CPO), are converted and held domestically, the supply of US dollars in the local foreign exchange market rises, thereby alleviating depreciation pressure on the Rupiah. Conversely, when exporters retain their export earnings abroad, the domestic supply of foreign currency becomes constrained, potentially driving volatility in the Rupiah’s exchange rate. Adequate foreign exchange reserves also serve to mitigate pressure on the Rupiah during periods of socio-economic or political turmoil that trigger capital outflows.

Furthermore, when export earnings from natural resources are held domestically, the resulting foreign currency supply can be utilized to meet import requirements, service foreign debt, or provide the monetary authority—Bank Indonesia—with the capacity to intervene in the market. Regarding imports, data from Statistics Indonesia (BPS) (June 2, 2026) indicate that the value of Indonesia’s imports from January to April 2026 reached US\$86.51 billion, marking a 13.40% increase compared to the same period in the previous year. During this January–April 2026 period,

non-oil and gas imports totaled US\$73.58 billion, while oil and gas imports amounted to US\$12.93 billion.

Nevertheless, the implementation of this natural resource export earnings (DHE SDA) policy faces several challenges. First, the requirement to place these earnings exclusively with state-owned enterprise (BUMN) banks introduces risks regarding interbank competition and trust. Restricting the receipt and placement of these earnings solely to BUMN banks is a key provision of Bank Indonesia Regulation Number 5 of 2026, which amends Bank Indonesia Regulation Number 7 of 2023 concerning Export Proceeds and Import Payment Foreign Exchange.

From the perspective of economic freedom, restricting foreign exchange placement to BUMN banks constitutes a market limitation that could potentially reduce interbank competition and create moral hazard. According to Yusuf Rendy Manilet, an economist at the Center of Reform on Economics (CORE) Indonesia (as cited on money.kompas.com, June 2, 2026), the amnesty provision in Article II, letter b of Government Regulation (PP) 21/2026 could give rise to moral hazard; if exporters currently under supervision are deemed to have fulfilled certain obligations under the regulations, business players might interpret the rules as negotiable in the future.

Regarding the issue of trust, reports from yarsi.ac.id (May 13, 2026) indicates that the outlook for four BUMN banks (BRI, BNI, Mandiri, and BTN) and BCA was downgraded from “stable” to “negative” by international rating agencies Moody’s Investor Ratings and Fitch Ratings. The downgrade in the BUMN banks’ outlook was driven by concerns over asset quality and profitability pressures (yarsi.ac.id, May 13, 2026).

Secondly, there is the challenge of policy effectiveness amidst the current high level of global uncertainty. The policy regarding the retention of natural resource export earnings (DHE SDA) cannot operate in isolation, as it is influenced by other policies—such as monetary and fiscal measures—as well as external conditions. Viewed through the lens of economic freedom, the Government’s reliance on the DHE SDA instrument reflects structural issues that require remediation, particularly the need to improve the investment climate. This is because Indonesia’s investment climate continues to face challenges such as regulatory complexity, bureaucratic inefficiency, and legal uncertainty (Chania, 2025).

Unless this administrative approach to DHE SDA is accompanied by structural reforms, the policy will merely provide short-term stabilization

There are several recommendations for the Prabowo Subianto administration regarding the policy on foreign exchange earnings from natural resource exports (DHE SDA). First, to gradually expand the channels for placing these earnings to include private banks that meet specific criteria. Second, to integrate the DHE SDA policy with broader structural reforms, particularly those aimed at improving the investment climate. Third, to promote a transparent, data-driven policy evaluation mechanism and establish performance indicators.

without sustainably strengthening Indonesia's economic resilience against external shocks.

Policy Recommendations

According to the analysis above, the following recommendations are proposed for the administration of President Prabowo Subianto. First, all government entities—such as the Coordinating Ministry for Economic Affairs, the Ministry of Finance, and Bank Indonesia—must collaborate to gradually expand the placement channels for Natural Resource Export Earnings (DHE SDA) to include private banks that meet criteria established by the Government and Bank Indonesia. This expansion of placement channels is expected to foster healthy inter-bank competition, maximize returns for exporters, and mitigate potential moral hazard.

Second, government entities must collaborate to integrate DHE SDA policies with broader structural reforms, particularly those aimed at improving the investment climate. In this regard, efforts to accelerate business licensing reforms and ensure legal certainty regarding contracts must be pursued in parallel.

Third, government entities and Bank Indonesia must promote a transparent, data-driven policy evaluation mechanism and establish performance indicators. Such transparency in evaluation is crucial not only for public accountability but also for providing regulatory certainty to the business community—a key rationale behind the issuance of Government Regulation (PP) No. 21/2026 itself. High levels of regulatory certainty will ultimately strengthen Indonesia's investment climate and export competitiveness in the long term.

The Pretrial of the Andrie Yunus Case and the Problem of Military Court Jurisdiction

-Afifah Fitriyani Oceanto-



Four months have passed since the acid attack against Andrie Yunus, an activist of the Commission for Missing Persons and Victims of Violence (KontraS) (BBC, 2026). Nonetheless, the case has attracted public attention not merely because of the ferocious attack suffered by the victim, but also because it has revived a more fundamental debate regarding the unfinished reforms of Indonesia's military justice system.

The debate heightened after the Jakarta Metropolitan Regional Police (Polda Metro Jaya) transferred the investigation of the acid attack against Andrie Yunus to the Indonesian Armed Forces Military Police Center (Puspom TNI) because the alleged perpetrators were active-duty military personnel (Kompas.id, 2026). Consequently, the case has been processed through the military justice system. This decision has drawn significant public criticism; particularly, because the Military Prosecutor's Office sought a sentence of only 2,5 years imprisonment, which many considered disproportionate to the severity of the harm suffered by the victim.

The dispute later on reached the South Jakarta District Court through a pretrial proceeding. In District Court Verdict Number 62/Pid.Pra/2026/PNJkt.Sel., the Court partially granted the applicant's petition and ordered the Metro Jaya Police (Polda Metro Jaya) to continue the legal process concerning the police report filed by the victim. This ruling is significant because it affirms that the transfer of a case to the Puspom TNI does not

automatically erase the police's obligation to investigate alleged ordinary criminal offenses. More broadly, the decision has reignited debate over the jurisdictional boundaries between civilian and military courts, as well as the implementation of the principle of civilian supremacy within Indonesia's criminal justice system.

This writing shall delve into how the legal framework of criminal jurisdiction regulates crime offenses committed by the members of the TNI and analyze how the pretrial ruling may be understood as a corrective measure against law enforcement practices that potentially depart from the principle of civilian supremacy.

Military and Civilian Jurisdictions over Ordinary Crimes Committed by Military Personnel

The principle of equality before the law constitutes one of the fundamental pillars of a state governed by the rule of law. It is enshrined in Article 27(1) of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. This provision affirms that all citizens are equal before the law and government without exception. In the context of criminal law enforcement, this principle requires that an individual's membership in a particular institution should not serve as a basis for differential legal treatment in relation to ordinary criminal offenses committed by that individual.

This provision is strengthened by the Decree of the People's Consultative Assembly No. VII/MPR/2000 on the Roles of the Indonesian National Armed Forces and the Indonesian National Police (Polri) (TAP MPR 6/2000). Article 3 Paragraph (4)(b) of TAP MPR 6/2000 stipulates that members of the TNI are subject to military jurisdiction for violations of military law, while violations of ordinary criminal law fall under the jurisdiction of the District Courts. A similar provision was subsequently incorporated into Article 65(2) of Law No. 34 of 2004 on the Indonesian National Armed Forces, which affirms that soldiers are subject to military courts for military offenses and to civilian courts for ordinary criminal offenses.

Nevertheless, Article 9 of Law No. 31/1997 on Military Courts continues to grant military courts jurisdiction over criminal offenses committed by members of the military. This provision has frequently been invoked to place all cases involving TNI personnel under military jurisdiction, including ordinary criminal offenses in which the victims are civilians.

In principle, this regulatory framework reflects the concept of functional jurisdiction, where the competent judicial forum is determined by the nature of the offense committed rather than solely by the status of the

offender (PSHK, 2026). The coexistence of these provisions demonstrates a continuing inconsistency within Indonesia's legal framework that has yet to be fully resolved by the legislature. However, when interpreted systematically, MPR Decree No. VII/MPR/2000 and subsequent legal instruments indicate a post-Reformasi legal policy orientation that places civilian supremacy as a guiding principle in civil–military relations.

Thus, according to principle of *lex posterior derogat legi priori*, the Military Act, as the recent legislation, and theoretically, serves as the main reference when determining jurisdiction over ordinary criminal offenses committed by military personnel. However, it must be understood in conjunction with the continuing applicability of specific statutory provisions and the broader principle of harmonization among laws and regulations.

Case Delegation and Joint Military-Civilian Court Mechanism

In addition to the jurisdiction matter, the Andrie Yunus case adds question on how police measure the delegation of cases to Puspom TNI. Build upon Article 14 Paragraph (1) (g) Act No. 2/2002 on the Polri are entrusted with the authority and responsibility to carry out criminal inquiries and investigations in accordance with the prevailing criminal procedural law.

With respect to criminal cases involving military personnel, Law No. 20/2025 on the Criminal Procedure Code (the New KUHAP) expressly regulates the mechanism of *koneksitas*, a special procedural framework governing cases that involve both military and civilian jurisdictions. Under Chapter XII, particularly Article 170, such cases are, in principle, to be examined and adjudicated by the civilian courts, unless the interest predominantly harmed is military. Furthermore, pursuant to Article 171 of the New KUHAP, investigations in *koneksitas* cases must be conducted jointly by investigators of the Polri and military police officers under the coordination of the public prosecutor and military prosecutor (*oditur militer*).

Still, in the Andrie Yunus cases, handling fully to Puspom TNI ([Kompas.id](#), 2026). This measure raises an issue because the transfer was carried out without applying the *koneksitas* mechanism as required under the New KUHAP. As a result, the investigation process, which initially fell within the authority of the police, was effectively discontinued, and the entire legal process was transferred to the military justice system.

This matter is prominent, given that the case concerns not only an ordinary criminal offense but also an attack against a human rights activist who was exercising oversight and criticism of public policy. When such a case is processed through the military justice system, concerns arise regarding the transparency and accountability of judicial proceedings, particularly because

the victim is a civilian and the public interests at stake extend far beyond the internal affairs of the military.

These concerns are not unfounded. Various monitoring reports by civil society organizations, including KontraS and LBH Pers, have consistently highlighted the limited public access to military court proceedings and the lack of a victim-oriented approach to sentencing in cases involving state officials. Empirical cases further illustrate these concerns. For instance, in the assault of a journalist in Madiun (Hukumonline.com, 2016), the matter was resolved through mediation and settlement rather than through criminal prosecution, raising questions about the adequacy of accountability and the deterrent effect of the legal process.

Similar concerns happen in a case involving violence against a journalist in Medan (Kompas.id, 2016), which was adjudicated before the Military Court I-02 Medan. In that case, the defendant was found lawfully and convincingly guilty of assault and was sentenced to three months' imprisonment. The sentence imposed was lower than the six-month term sought by the Oditur Militer (KBR, 2017), illustrating a disparity between prosecutorial demands and final judgments within the military justice system. From the perspective of civil society monitoring, such patterns of case resolution are often viewed as falling short of fully reflecting the principles of justice for victims and the standards of accountability expected in cases involving state officers.

As a result, the investigation process, which initially fell within the authority of the police, was effectively discontinued and transferred to the military justice system. This circumstance subsequently formed the basis of the pretrial application filed by the victim's legal counsel.

Violence against Human Rights Activists and the Challenges of Protecting Freedom of Expression

The Andrie Yunus case demonstrates that violence against a single activist affects not only the individual victim but also has the potential to undermine the broader climate of freedom of expression (Yayasan Keadilan dan Perdamaian Indonesia, 18/3/2026). As an activist actively engaged in public criticism and human rights advocacy, the acid attack against him raises concerns regarding the extent to which the state can guarantee the safety of individuals exercising their constitutional rights to express opinions and to scrutinize the exercise of public power. This is particularly significant given that the freedom of expression guaranteed under Article 28E(3) of the 1945 Constitution encompasses not only the freedom to speak, but also the freedom to express opinions without fear of intimidation or retaliation.

The Andrie Yunus case demonstrates that what is at stake is not only justice for the victim but also the assurance that every citizen can voice criticism and hold public authorities accountable without fear. Accordingly, transparent and accountable law enforcement is essential to ensuring that freedom of expression remains protected in a democratic state.”

Hereinafter, the adjudication of this case carries significance beyond the mere punishment of the perpetrators. What is at stake is not only justice for Andrie Yunus as an individual victim, but also the assurance that all citizens can voice criticism, engage in advocacy, and exercise oversight of public power without fear or threat.

Accordingly, the controversy surrounding the Andrie Yunus case highlights not only the challenges associated with the application of the *koneksitas* mechanism and the determination of jurisdiction, but also the broader importance of ensuring accountability in the handling of ordinary criminal offenses involving military personnel. Where the victim is a human rights activist exercising constitutionally protected rights to criticize public authorities and engage in advocacy, the need for a transparent legal process consistent with the principle of civilian supremacy becomes even more compelling.

Therefore, the pretrial ruling in this case should be viewed as an important opportunity to advance the reform of Indonesia’s military justice system while ensuring that the protection of freedom of expression extends beyond mere normative guarantees. Such protection must be realized through legal mechanisms capable of delivering justice for victims and providing legal certainty to the public in a transparent and accountable manner.

Recommendations

Referring to the analysis, the following recommendations are proposed:

- a. **The Indonesian National Police** should continue the investigation into the Andrie Yunus case in a transparent, thorough, and impartial manner to ensure accountability and prevent impunity; and
- b. **The Government and the House of Representatives** should promptly revise Act No. 31/1997 on Military Courts to expressly provide that ordinary criminal offenses committed by members of the Indonesian Armed Forces are subject to the jurisdiction of civilian courts, in accordance with the principles of civilian supremacy and equality before the law.

Laws

Women's Representation in Constitutional Court Decision Number 128/PUU-XXIV/2026

-Afifah Fitriyani Oceanto-



On 25 May 2026, the Constitutional Court (MK) delivered Decision Number 128/PUU-XXIV/2026 concerning the judicial review of Law Number 7/2017 on Elections, as last amended by Law Number 7/2023. The case examined the provision requiring at least 30% women's representation in the nomination of legislative candidates.

In its considerations, the Constitutional Court affirmed that the provision on women's representation could no longer be understood merely as an administrative requirement but rather as a legally binding obligation imposed on political parties in every electoral district. This affirmation is reinforced by strict legal consequences; namely the obligation of the General Elections Commission (KPU) to disqualify or strike out political parties that fail to comply with the requirement in the relevant electoral districts.

Accordingly, women's representation is no longer confined to the administrative stage of candidate nomination but has become an electoral requirement carrying legal consequences. This decision marks an important shift in the design of affirmative action in Indonesia, from an administrative instrument to a binding legal norm with enforceable obligations for political parties.

The Legal Framework of Women's Representation in the Electoral System

The legal framework for women's representation in Indonesia's electoral system rests on two main pillars: international legal legitimacy and the national constitutional foundation. Normatively, these two pillars indicate that the state already has adequate legal instruments to ensure women's representation in politics. However, in practice, these norms often remain at the level of administrative formality and have not fully functioned as corrective instruments for political representation inequality (Sampelan et al., 2026).

In international law, the principle of affirmative action is recognized through the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), which was ratified through Law No. 7 of 1984. Article 4(1) of CEDAW clearly provides for temporary special measures as a legitimate step to accelerate the achievement of substantive equality. Accordingly, affirmative action, including women's quotas in politics, is not a privilege, but a corrective mechanism for long-standing structural inequality.

At the national level, the constitutional basis can be found in Article 28H(2) of the 1945 Indonesian Constitution, which guarantees the right to special treatment in order to achieve equality and justice. This provision is further implemented in Act No. 7 of 2023 on Elections, which requires at least 30% women's representation in legislative candidate nominations by political parties. Its technical regulation is strengthened through General Elections Commission (KPU) regulations, including the implementation of a zipper system to ensure the distribution of female candidates within candidate lists.

However, the effectiveness of these norms largely depends on the commitment of political parties in their implementation. In practice, quota provisions are often treated merely as an administrative requirement rather than a substantive obligation. At this point, the issue of women's representation no longer lies in the absence of legal rules, but in the weak commitment of political actors to fulfill these constitutional mandates.

Contestation of Women's Political Representation

Although the legal framework is in place, the implementation of women's representation is still often treated merely as an administrative compliance requirement. This condition is driven by the weak legal consequences imposed on political parties that fail to meet the gender quota. Prior to Constitutional Court Decision No. 128/PUU-XXIV/2026, electoral

regulations did not provide sufficiently strong coercive force to address such non-compliance.

This situation has opened various avenues for manipulation, ranging from debates over numerical rounding that reduce the actual proportion of women’s representation to practices of symbolic candidacy. Political parties often engage in last-minute recruitment of female candidates ahead of registration deadlines and place them in non-competitive ballot positions, making women’s presence more formal than substantive (Ministry of State Secretariat of the Republic of Indonesia, 2024).

On the other hand, as one of the indicators of affirmative policy effectiveness, the level of women’s representation in the House of Representatives (DPR) shows a relatively consistent upward trend since the Reform era, although many political parties have still not met the 30 percent quota. The following data illustrate this dynamic.

Period	Number of Women Members	Percentage
1999-2004	45	9,0%
2004-2009	61	11,1%
2009-2014	101	18,10%
2014-2019	97	17,3%
2019-2024	118	20,5%
2024-2029	127	22,1%

Sources: *Perludem, 2024, dikutip dalam Epiphania dkk., “Keterwakilan Perempuan di Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Republik Indonesia (DPR RI) dalam Pemilu 1999–2024”, Journal of Laguna Geography, Vol. 4 No. 1, 2025.*

According to the data above, women’s representation in the Indonesian House of Representatives (DPR RI) has shown a general upward trend since the Reform era, increasing from 9.0% in the 1999–2004 period to 22.1% in the 2024–2029 period. However, this achievement still reflects a significant gap compared to the affirmative policy requiring political parties to ensure at least 30% women’s representation in legislative candidate nominations, as stipulated in Article 245 of Law No. 7 of 2017 on General Elections.

This can also be seen in Perludem (2024) data on disparities in women's seat acquisition in the 2024 DPR RI election by political parties, with the highest figures recorded by Partai Nasional Demokrat 30,4%, Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan 24,5%, and Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa 20,6%, while the lowest level of affirmative political implementation was found in Partai Keadilan Sejahtera at 17.0%. These figures indicate that women's representation within political parties still largely depends on the level of commitment of each individual party.

These various contradictions show that the legal framework for women's representation, despite having a strong philosophical foundation, loses its transformative power without strict and binding enforcement mechanisms. The inability of technical regulations to impose electoral sanctions for non-compliance has made affirmative legal instruments largely ineffective. Therefore, stronger implementing regulations are needed to ensure enforceable obligations.

Thus, intervention by the constitutional court becomes highly crucial to restore the integrity of political affirmative action and equal political opportunity, shifting it from a mere administrative requirement on paper into a legal mandate with real consequences for all election participants.

Quantity Does Not Necessarily Mean Substantive Representation

Although Constitutional Court Decision No. 128/PUU-XXIV/2026 strengthens the enforceability of affirmative action, stricter electoral sanctions do not automatically guarantee substantive women's representation. The problem does not lie solely in quota fulfillment but also in the still-unequal political structure and recruitment processes that have not fully adopted a gender equality perspective.

This condition results in women's representation being achieved quantitatively, but not necessarily accompanied by recruitment and political cadre-building processes that take into account quality, capability, and the strategic dimensions of transformative and impactful representation. For instance, when affirmative measures are fulfilled merely as an administrative requirement, women are also not placed in strategic leadership positions within political parties and are not substantively involved in decision-making processes. In addition, political recruitment and career advancement, as well as party institutionalization that is still based on personalization, mean that affirmative action does not produce substantive impact (Cakra Wikara, 2022).

In practice, the issue of women's representation does not stem solely from political parties but also from an electoral competition design that heavily relies on the logic of electability and vote acquisition. In such a system, parties tend to prioritize candidates who are considered most "electorally advantageous," which often results in women being placed in non-competitive positions or electorally unfavorable districts. As a result, fulfilling the 30% quota does not necessarily translate into an equal chance of being elected (Muda Bicara, 2026).

On the other hand, the dominance of male elites within party decision-making structures remains a key factor shaping candidate recruitment, the assignment of ballot positions, and the distribution of electoral districts. In this context, women are not placed on an equal footing from the earliest stages of nomination. This is further exacerbated by the weak and unsustainable system of women's political cadre development, meaning that women's political participation is often *ad hoc*, reactive, and limited to the period leading up to elections (Pandia et al., 2025, p. 776).

Moreover, the phenomenon of tokenistic candidacy remains a dominant pattern in party practices. Women are often included primarily to meet administrative requirements, rather than being seriously prepared as competitive electoral candidates. In this situation, political affirmative action risks shifting into mere formal compliance, where political parties only adjust to the minimum threshold of regulation without undertaking meaningful structural change.

In addition, the implementation of Constitutional Court decisions also faces its own challenges at the electoral administration stage. Without a uniform, firm, and consistent verification standard from the General Elections Commission (KPU), as well as without strict oversight, affirmative provisions risk being reduced once again into administrative formalities in a different form. Therefore, the development of a participatory oversight system and standardized verification procedures remains a key challenge.

Thus, the strengthening of sanctions through Constitutional Court decisions does not automatically resolve the root causes of women's underrepresentation. Internal reform of political parties and consistent implementation by election administrators remain necessary to ensure that women's representation does not stop at numerical fulfillment, but also carries political meaning.

The Constitutional Court's affirmation through Decision No. 128/PUU-XXIV/2026 indicates that non-compliance with women's quotas now carries real electoral consequences. Nevertheless, the greatest challenge remains rooted in political party culture, which still positions women as merely fulfilling administrative requirements rather than as equal and strategic political actors with substantive roles.

Recommendations:

Referring to the analysis, the following recommendations are proposed:

- a. The General Elections Commission (KPU) should immediately align its General Election Commission Regulations (PKPU) with Constitutional Court Decision No. 128/PUU-XXIV/2026 in a consistent and binding manner. The KPU must ensure that the requirement of at least 30% women's representation is understood as a legal obligation with clear electoral consequences, including administrative sanctions up to the disqualification or cancellation of political parties in electoral districts that fail to meet the requirement;
- b. Political parties must carry out internal reforms of their recruitment and women's cadre development systems. Political parties should treat the fulfillment of women's quotas as part of a sustainable and empowering cadre-building strategy, while also providing opportunities for women cadres to take on strategic positions within political parties as well as public office; and
- c. The Government and the House of Representatives (DPR) should evaluate and harmonize electoral regulations and ensure consistency between the Election Law, KPU regulations, and electoral oversight mechanisms so that Constitutional Court decisions can be effectively implemented and have enforceable force.

Social

Strengthening Maternal and Child Health Protection in the Face of the Climate Crisis: A Policy Review

-Made Natasya Restu Dewi Pratiwi-



Today, the climate crisis is no longer merely an environmental issue; it has evolved into a pressing public health challenge requiring concrete preventive action. In Indonesia, the impacts of climate change are experienced across society. Yet, they disproportionately affect women, children, older persons, low-income households, coastal communities, agricultural communities, and indigenous peoples whose environments and livelihoods are increasingly threatened by industrial development and extractive activities that degrade natural ecosystems.

These populations are often categorized as marginalized groups because they have lower adaptive capacity and resilience in responding to climate-related shocks compared with other segments of society. This vulnerability is largely driven by unequal access to information, resources, and opportunities for climate change mitigation and adaptation (National Development Planning Agency, 2025).

Recognizing these challenges, Indonesia's National Action Plan for Gender and Climate Change (Rencana Aksi Nasional Gender dan Perubahan Iklim/ RAN GPI) 2024–2030 identifies social, cultural, health, social protection, and child protection sectors as strategic priority areas for safeguarding vulnerable populations affected by climate change (Ministry of Women's Empowerment and Child Protection & Ministry of Environment and Forestry, 2025). The inclusion of health and social dimensions within the

RAN GPI framework represents a progressive step toward strengthening protection for communities facing climate-related risks.

However, despite this progress, maternal and child health protection remains an area requiring greater policy attention. Existing measures have yet to fully address the specific vulnerabilities experienced by mothers and children who are disproportionately exposed to climate-related health risks. Strengthening maternal and child health protection is therefore essential to ensure that climate policies effectively respond to the needs of those most affected.

This editorial critically examines the policy gaps that continue to hinder effective maternal and child health protection in the context of the climate crisis. Growing evidence suggests that climate-related hazards—including extreme heat exposure and worsening air pollution—can increase the risk of severe perinatal complications, gestational diabetes, preterm birth, and infant mortality, posing significant threats to the health and well-being of both mothers and children (Haq et al., 2025).

Health Risks and Socioeconomic Consequences for Vulnerable Mothers and Children

The impacts of climate change are not experienced equally. Factors such as gender, age, poverty status, disability, livelihood, and geographic location significantly influence the severity of climate-related risks and their consequences. For example, women living in disaster-prone coastal communities vulnerable to tidal flooding often face multiple and overlapping burdens. On the one hand, they are expected to continue fulfilling domestic responsibilities, including securing food and water and caring for children and older family members, despite increasingly difficult living conditions. On the other hand, they face heightened risks of gender-based violence in displacement settings, mental health distress resulting from the loss of homes and livelihoods, and increased vulnerability to labor exploitation.

Over the long term, the climate crisis may also undermine progress in reducing stunting and improving nutritional outcomes. Droughts, hydrometeorological disasters, environmental pollution, and disruptions to food systems can weaken food security, restrict access to safe water and sanitation, and contribute to deteriorating nutritional conditions. Without adequate protection measures, mothers and children in marginalized communities will continue to experience escalating social, economic, and psychological hardships.

Moreover, emerging evidence suggests that prolonged stress caused by climate-related crises may have intergenerational consequences. In the absence of adequate recovery mechanisms and psychosocial support, the trauma associated with climate impacts can be transmitted across generations, affecting the long-term well-being of families and communities (Donnel & Palinkas, 2024). The table below maps the major health risks and socioeconomic consequences faced by mothers and children who are most vulnerable to the climate crisis.

Table 1. Health Risks and Socioeconomic Impacts Affecting Mothers and Children Vulnerable to the Climate Crisis

Vulnerable Groups	Health Risks	Health and Socioeconomic Impacts
Pregnant women living in areas affected by rising temperatures and climate-related disasters	Preeclampsia, eclampsia, climate-sensitive pregnancy complications, mental health disorders, and malnutrition due to unstable food supply chains	Reduced productivity, disrupted access to maternal and reproductive health services, and increased domestic workload
Adolescent mothers, mothers from low-income households, and female breadwinners (women-headed households)	Malnutrition, chronic stress, increased exposure to vector-borne diseases such as dengue fever and malaria, and higher risk of pregnancy complications	Loss of income and assets, heightened vulnerability to exploitation and human trafficking, increased health-related household expenditures, persistent poverty, and limited access to social protection
Women fishers and wives of fishermen, including those who become heads of households following the death of their spouses due to occupational accidents	Exposure to extreme weather, elevated work-related stress, and increased risks of skin and reproductive health problems linked to poor sanitation and water quality	Exclusion from fisheries-related assistance because official identification records classify them solely as housewives; declining household income due to reduced fish catches and seaweed harvests; and increased reproductive, skin, and genital infections
Mothers and children with disabilities	Barriers to accessing healthcare services and disaster evacuation, and untreated illnesses resulting from inaccessible infrastructure	Social isolation, limited access to information, heightened risk of gender-based violence, and neglect during disasters

<p>Children from low-income households and those living in farming, fishing, Indigenous, rural, and coastal communities</p>	<p>Malnutrition, diarrhea, respiratory diseases, vector-borne diseases, stunting due to food insecurity, and harmful practices affecting reproductive health, such as child marriage and female genital cutting</p>	<p>School dropout, child marriage, sexual exploitation, violence, and loss of livelihoods resulting from the degradation of land and natural resources</p>
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Source: Compiled from various sources and the author's analysis.

Considering the risks and impacts identified above, efforts to protect maternal and child health in the context of the climate crisis should not focus solely on ensuring access to healthcare services. Policy interventions must also guarantee that all vulnerable groups have equal access to resources, meaningful participation in decision-making processes, control over relevant resources, and equitable benefits from development programs.

The Gender Analysis Pathway (GAP) framework could serve as an important instrument for assessing whether women, men, young people, persons with disabilities, and other marginalized groups have equal opportunities to access services, participate in decision-making and resource management processes, and benefit fairly from policy interventions.

The Indonesian Government has begun developing several promising initiatives to promote equitable opportunities for vulnerable populations. Minister of Health Decree Number HK.01.07/MENKES/777/2025 concerning the National Action Plan for Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation in the Health Sector represents a crucial step toward strengthening a climate-responsive health system. Likewise, the Climate-Resilient and Environmentally Sustainable Health Care Facilities (FAS-BIK-LIN) initiative mandated by the decree demonstrates the Government's commitment to building healthcare facilities capable of responding to climate-related disruptions through strengthened infrastructure, improved water, sanitation and hygiene systems, sustainable energy use, and enhanced human resource capacity.

However, when assessed through a GAP lens, these policy initiatives still require further optimization to prevent existing inequalities from widening. For example, in supporting FAS-BIK-LIN monitoring mechanisms that involve community health volunteers (cadres), the government must ensure adequate incentive schemes and access to capacity-building opportunities for participating cadres (Anton, 2024). Without sufficient compensation and support, vulnerable individuals serving as cadres risk shouldering additional

responsibilities that are neither adequately recognized nor remunerated. Such circumstances may ultimately undermine their financial security and psychological well-being.

Furthermore, Article 36 paragraph (5) of Law Number 17/2023 on Health explicitly mandates proportional compensation for health cadre services. Therefore, the Ministry of Health should take decisive action to ensure sustainable financing for cadre incentives through multiple funding sources, including the State Budget (Anggaran Pendapatan Belanja Nasional/APBN), Regional Original Revenue (Pendapatan Asli Daerah/PAD), and Village Funds. Failure to enforce this provision will perpetuate a situation in which health cadres continue to receive compensation that is disproportionate to their workload and contributions.

To make existing policies more actionable and accountable, the Government should also introduce a measurable participation indicator stipulating that at least 75% of aspirations and recommendations collected from vulnerable groups are reflected in the design and development plans of FAS-BIK-LIN facilities. This indicator should be incorporated into the technical implementation guidelines for Priority Area VI of the RAN GPI 2024–2030 concerning capacity building, knowledge management, and communication.

Introducing such an indicator is critical to ensuring that marginalized communities have meaningful opportunities to influence the design of health facilities based on their actual needs in responding to climate-related challenges. The perspectives and aspirations of vulnerable groups should be systematically documented and discussed through Village Deliberation Forums (Musyawarah Masyarakat Desa/MMD) during the process of identifying community health problems associated with climate change.

In addition, the Government's Climate-Healthy Village (DESA DESI) initiative has significant potential to become an important entry point for strengthening public education on climate-related health risks. The program can serve as a communication bridge between government institutions and grassroots communities, particularly vulnerable populations, by improving awareness of climate-sensitive diseases, promoting early recognition of warning signs, and expanding access to practical information on preventive measures.

These initiatives should continue to be strengthened through a more inclusive approach. Disaggregated data based on gender, age, disability status, and socioeconomic conditions must form the foundation for identifying the needs of vulnerable populations. The specific needs of pregnant women,

breastfeeding mothers, children, persons with disabilities, and communities living in coastal, rural, mining, and disaster-prone areas should be systematically assessed to ensure that interventions are responsive and appropriately targeted.

Furthermore, the paradigm of maternal and child health protection must move beyond approaches that place the responsibility for family health solely on women. Safeguarding family health, ensuring food security, maintaining environmental hygiene, and supporting climate adaptation efforts should be recognized as shared responsibilities. The principle that “men are allies” in advancing gender equality should be mainstreamed so that men actively participate in caregiving and family protection responsibilities, particularly during climate-related emergencies and crises.

Ultimately, strengthening maternal and child health protection in the face of the climate crisis requires stronger cross-sectoral coordination. The National Secretariat for the RAN GPI, particularly Working Group VI on Social, Cultural, and Health Affairs—led by the Ministry of Women’s Empowerment and Child Protection, the Ministry of Environment, and the Ministry of Forestry, with participation from the Ministry of Social Affairs, the Ministry of Health, and the National Population and Family Planning Agency—must ensure that gender equality, disability inclusion, and social inclusion principles become foundational elements of all climate mitigation and adaptation policies designed to protect mothers and children.

Policy Recommendations

The following recommendations are proposed to strengthen governance and improve maternal and child health protection in the context of the climate crisis:

- a. The National Secretariat of the RAN GPI, particularly Working Group VI on Social, Cultural, and Health Affairs, in collaboration with the Ministry of Home Affairs, should develop and disseminate technical guidelines for local governments to ensure that gender equality, disability inclusion, and social inclusion indicators are integrated throughout all stages of planning, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation.
- b. The Ministry of Health should strengthen the implementation of FAS-BIK-LIN by requiring comprehensive needs assessments for pregnant women, children, persons with disabilities, and other vulnerable populations as part of the design process for every health facility. In addition, health workers and community health cadres involved in

Social

The climate crisis is not merely an environmental threat, as it is a matter of social justice that determines who is protected and who is left behind. Therefore, effective maternal and child health protection could only be achieved when climate mitigation and adaptation policies guarantee equal access, participation, control, and benefits for those most affected by climate change, while securing the commitment of all stakeholders to leave no one behind.

climate-related monitoring and response activities should receive adequate incentives, labor protection, and capacity-building support to prevent disproportionate workloads and occupational burdens.

- c. The Ministry of Villages, Development of Disadvantaged Regions, and Transmigration should provide technical assistance to villages that have not yet implemented the DESA DESI initiative. Local actors should be equipped with the knowledge and skills necessary to educate mothers and children about climate-sensitive diseases and practical prevention measures that can be implemented at the village level.
- d. The Ministry of Home Affairs, regional governments, Civil Registration Offices, Social Affairs Offices, and Statistics Indonesia (Badan Pusat Statistik/BPS) should strengthen population data systems and administrative governance to ensure that women working in fisheries, agriculture, and other informal sectors have their economic roles formally recognized. Such measures are essential to prevent cases in which women fishers lose access to government assistance because their occupational status is not properly recorded within official administrative systems.

Social

Environmental Degradation and the Rising Risks of Infectious Diseases: Why Indonesia Needs a One Health Approach

-Made Natasya Restu Dewi Pratiwi-



Environmental degradation driven by unsustainable human activities—including deforestation for extractive industries and agricultural expansion, could trigger far-reaching consequences that extend well beyond ecological loss. Such activities not only damage ecosystems but also threaten the health and well-being of communities living in and around affected areas. For instance, a recent study identified an increase in malaria prevalence around the development site of Indonesia’s New Capital City (Ibu Kota Nusantara/IKN) in East Kalimantan, linked to large-scale deforestation and environmental change (Surendra et al., 2025).

The clearing of forests in East Kalimantan has deprived malaria-carrying mosquitoes of their natural habitats and food sources. As a result, mosquito populations have increasingly migrated closer to human settlements surrounding the IKN development area, heightening the risks of malaria transmission through mosquito bites. Furthermore, construction activities associated with the new capital have created additional mosquito breeding grounds through stagnant water accumulation and altered environmental conditions. Consequently, Indigenous communities and local residents living around the IKN area face heightened vulnerability to malaria transmission.

In response to these emerging challenges, adopting a One Health approach is essential to strengthening Indonesia’s resilience against infectious diseases

such as malaria and dengue fever amid the climate crisis, while also reducing the risks of future disease emergence driven by environmental degradation. The One Health approach promotes cross-sectoral collaboration by recognizing that human health, animal health, and environmental health are fundamentally interconnected.

Rather than treating health threats solely as medical issues, One Health emphasizes that protecting public health requires biodiversity conservation, sustainable environmental management, healthy spatial planning, and integrated disease surveillance systems that operate across sectors. Therefore, this editorial examines the governance gaps that Indonesia must address to better integrate public health protection with environmental conservation through the effective implementation of a One Health approach.

The Link between Environmental Degradation and Infectious Disease Risks

The increase in malaria cases around the IKN development area is not an isolated phenomenon. A growing body of evidence demonstrates that environmental degradation is a major driver of emerging infectious diseases. A 2023 report by the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), *The Loss of Nature and the Rise of Pandemics*, highlights how deforestation, land-use change, wildlife trade, and biodiversity loss increase the likelihood of interactions between humans and pathogen-carrying animals. As the natural boundaries separating humans from wildlife continue to disappear, the risks of pathogen transmission from animals to humans rises significantly.

This phenomenon is known as a disease spillover—the transmission of pathogens from animals to humans resulting from increased human–animal interaction caused by ecological disruption. From a social epidemiology perspective, spillover events are not random occurrences. Rather, they are the consequences of development decisions, environmental governance failures, and economic activities that fundamentally alter ecosystems while disregarding principles of sustainability.

Moreover, evidence suggests that biodiversity loss is one of the most significant environmental drivers of future infectious disease outbreaks, surpassing many other environmental risk factors (Rohr et al., 2024). As biodiversity declines and ecosystems become increasingly fragmented, opportunities for pathogen transmission from wildlife and environmental

reservoirs to humans increase substantially. Such transmission may manifest not only as the resurgence of existing diseases but also as the emergence of novel pathogens with potentially more severe health consequences.

Table 1. Examples of Disease Spillover Mechanisms Driven by Environmental Degradation

Human Activities	Impact on Ecosystems	Potential Diseases
Deforestation and land clearing	Wildlife lose their natural habitats and move closer to human settlements	Zoonotic malaria (<i>Plasmodium knowlesi</i>)
Wildlife trade	Direct human contact with animals carrying pathogens	COVID-19, Ebola, Nipah virus
Deforestation and wildlife hunting	Biodiversity decline may increase the emergence of new disease reservoir species	Emerging zoonotic diseases that have not yet been identified
Unsustainable urbanization	Creation of new habitats for disease vectors	Dengue fever, malaria
Climate change	Expansion of habitats and reproductive activity of mosquitoes and other disease vectors	Dengue fever, malaria, chikungunya

Source: Adapted from WWF (2023), WHO (2022), Ministry of Health (2023), and processed by the author.

The IKN case clearly illustrates how environmental change could create ideal conditions for increased infectious disease transmission. Forest clearing, large-scale construction activities, altered water systems, and the emergence of stagnant water bodies create favorable breeding habitats for *Anopheles* mosquitoes, the primary vectors of malaria. At the same time, the influx of construction workers and population movements associated with land development increases opportunities for disease transmission

across wider geographic areas. More broadly, these threats extend beyond malaria. Climate change, deforestation, and environmental degradation may also increase the risks of other vector-borne diseases, including dengue fever, chikungunya, and even the emergence of previously unknown zoonotic diseases.

Governance Gaps: Lessons from the New Capital City Development

From a social epidemiology perspective, disease risks are shaped not only by biological factors but also by the distribution of power, resources, and development decisions. In the case of the IKN, local communities and Indigenous peoples living near development sites are among the groups most vulnerable to increased malaria risk. Yet these communities often bear the greatest health burdens despite receiving the fewest economic benefits from the project.

This situation reveals a persistent disconnect between development priorities and public health protection. Although health risk assessments had previously warned of a potential increase in malaria transmission resulting from environmental change, preventive measures were not implemented at the same pace as development activities. As is often observed in Indonesia's health governance landscape, interventions tend to be mobilized after health problems emerge rather than before they occur (Pratiwi, 2025). Consequently, disease management continues to be characterized by a reactive rather than preventive approach.

Several governance weaknesses remain evident. First, Health Impact Assessments (HIAs) have yet to become a core instrument in development planning. Environmental impact assessments often place greater emphasis on physical and economic considerations than on health consequences, many of which only become visible over the long term (Kenny et al., 2025). Yet incorporating health impact assessments before development takes place is essential for safeguarding public health and preventing future financial burdens arising from disease outbreaks and health crises.

Second, research findings are frequently underutilized in development decision-making processes. Numerous studies have identified the potential risk of malaria transmission around the IKN area, yet mitigation measures have not kept pace with the speed of development. The emergence of malaria cases in the area demonstrates the consequences of failing to act on available evidence.

Third, investment in disease prevention continues to receive less attention

than investment in physical infrastructure. However, substantial evidence shows that the costs of preventing disease outbreaks are considerably lower than the economic losses incurred once outbreaks occur (World Bank, 2022). Investing in One Health approaches and preventing zoonotic diseases before they emerge is therefore far more cost-effective than bearing the social and economic consequences of outbreaks and pandemics that could have been avoided.

Current Policy Context

Indonesia has already demonstrated its commitment to institutionalizing a One Health approach through several policy initiatives. One example is the Minister of Health Decree Number HK.01.07/MENKES/777/2025 concerning the National Action Plan for Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation in the Health Sector 2025–2030, which promotes cross-sectoral collaboration in safeguarding human, animal, and environmental health.

Similarly, the establishment of the Indonesia Research Partnership on Infectious Diseases (INA-RESPOND) through the Decree of the Director General of Advanced Health Number HK.02.02/D/3167/2025 reflects the government’s commitment to strengthening evidence-based infectious disease research through the integration of public health, environmental health, and animal health data.

At the IKN level, the Government has also established a target of creating a malaria-free zone as part of its environmental health agenda and national strategic development priorities. This represents a positive effort to ensure that development does not come at the expense of public health (Nusantara Capital Authority, 2025).

However, future discussions regarding progress toward this target should not be limited to expert-driven consultations, as was the case during the focused discussions held in December 2025. Moving forward, grassroots communities—including indigenous peoples directly affected by development—must be meaningfully involved. Monitoring malaria trends in the IKN should be participatory and community-based. Without incorporating local knowledge and lived experiences, efforts to achieve a malaria-free capital risk overlooking local realities and failing to address the root causes of disease transmission.

Therefore, the greatest challenge is no longer the absence of regulations or policy commitments. Rather, it lies in ensuring that implementation is inclusive, participatory, transparent, and evidence-based. The government

must ensure that every large-scale development project is accompanied by publicly accessible health risk assessments from the earliest stages of planning. Furthermore, epidemiological and environmental research findings must serve as a foundation for development decisions rather than merely functioning as administrative requirements for obtaining permits.

Ultimately, the case of Indonesia's New Capital City offers a critical lesson: development and public health cannot be separated. When development proceeds without safeguarding ecological balance, the resulting health costs borne by communities and governments may far exceed the economic gains generated by the project itself. Over time, these costs may also place significant pressure on national fiscal sustainability.

Policy Recommendations

The following recommendations are proposed to strengthen governance and improve infectious disease prevention through the implementation of a One Health approach:

- a. The Ministry of Health should position INA-RESPOND as a gateway for integrated surveillance across human, animal, and environmental health sectors, particularly for mapping disease outbreaks and emerging health risks in high-risk areas such as regions affected by deforestation and mining activities. INA-RESPOND should collaborate with university research centers and civil society organizations to strengthen predictive research on diseases associated with deforestation, climate change, and environmentally destructive development practices.
- b. The Nusantara Capital Authority (Otorita Ibu Kota Nusantara) should establish a monitoring system for malaria and other vector-borne diseases that actively involves Indigenous peoples and local communities as part of its sustainable city development strategy. The One Health approach should be integrated into every stage of city planning and development, including spatial planning, water management, vector control, and the protection of Indigenous peoples' rights through inclusive and equitable mechanisms.
- c. The Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Forestry should strengthen collaboration with INA-RESPOND to identify and monitor disease risks in areas experiencing significant land-use changes driven by agricultural and livestock activities. Such collaboration would support the development of risk mapping systems and disease-based early warning mechanisms grounded in the principles of One Health.

Social

The One Health approach must be positioned as a cornerstone of sustainable development in Indonesia.

Protecting forests, conserving biodiversity, and strengthening health systems are not separate agenda items but mutually reinforcing priorities. Investing in One Health is therefore not merely a public health strategy—it is a strategic investment to prevent future infectious disease outbreaks, to reduce fiscal losses, and to protect the communities most vulnerable to environmental change.

- d. The Ministry of Home Affairs should strengthen the capacity of local governments to mainstream the One Health approach within regional development planning documents and disaster risk reduction frameworks developed by local disaster management agencies. Through this effort, health outcomes would be positioned not merely as consequences of development but as development objectives that must be actively achieved and monitored.
- e. The Ministry of Public Works should ensure that construction projects do not create new breeding grounds for disease vectors by establishing standards for drainage management, water stagnation control, and sanitation systems that incorporate findings from epidemiological studies and environmental health risk assessments. Such measures are essential to prevent future health burdens that may ultimately outweigh the economic benefits of infrastructure development.

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