
The Indonesian Update

Monthly Review on Economic, Legal, Security, Political, and Social Affairs



Main Report:

Interpreting the Nature of Homecoming and the Importance of Equitable Development

The economics

- Maintaining Indonesia's Economic Engine through Economic Freedom
 - Overseeing at the Corruption Eradication Policies in Indonesia

Law

- Human Rights and the Military: TNI Apologizes for the Torture of a Papuan
 - The Trend in Election Result Dispute Petitions to the Constitutional Court

Politics

- The Coalition-Opposition Dynamics in the Presidential System in Indonesia
 - Looking at Preparations for the 2024 Regional Elections
 - Examining Voter Participation in the 2024 Election





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FOREWORD

The April 2024 edition of the Indonesian Update raises a main report regarding urban development in Indonesia, which is expected to be able to reduce the flows of urbanization that occur almost every year after the Eid al-Fitr holiday. Apart from that, to prevent new problems, especially urban poverty, the Government needs to increase innovation and to make improvements in cities in Indonesia.

In the economic sector, the Indonesian Update highlights that global economic conditions in 2024 are predicted to experience a slowdown. One of reasons is the escalation of conflicts in the Middle East region. Indonesia also has the potential to have negative impacts of the conflicts. Next, we also discuss the overseeing policies to eradicate corruption in Indonesia. This is because of the significant impact of losses caused by corrupt practices economically, politically and socially. Even the United Nations (UN) predicted that the world paid US\$3.6 trillion every year for these corrupt practices, of which US\$1 trillion went to bribery and US\$2.6 trillion went to corruption (The Commonwealth, 15 May 2023). In addition, low-income countries also bear greater burdens from corruption than high-income countries.

In the legal field, the Indonesian Update raises the importance of upholding Human Rights (HAM) in military operations other than war (OMSP) carried out by the Indonesian Military (TNI). Human rights have existed side by side with the military, even in the international realm since 1949. It is not appropriate if human rights are always separated and considered "unimportant" in military operations. Next, we also discuss the trend of requests for disputes over election results to the Constitutional Court (MK). The existence of similar allegations of violations, especially regarding the election process, can also indicate procedures that must continue to be improved to adapt to current developments and conditions in the field.

In the political field, the Indonesian Update discusses the dynamics of coalitions and opposition in the presidential system in Indonesia after the 2024 elections. The results of the 2024 elections illustrate the potential for imbalance between the Government and the opposition, creating challenges in maintaining political stability and sparking various social dynamics in the future. Next, we look at preparations for holding simultaneous Regional Head Elections (Pilkada)



that will be held on November 27 2024. The Pilkada marks an important moment for Indonesian democracy, with 37 provinces and 508 districts/cities involved simultaneously. Active community participation in this process is crucial, while good implementations and supervision are the main prerequisites.

Then, we also discuss the fairly good level of voter participation in the 2024 elections. However, there are still notes for improvements in the implementations of the 2024 elections that must be addressed. These notes must of course be addressed by policy makers such as election organizers and the Government. Apart from that, election organizers must also open up space for participation for other stakeholders such as election participants, civil society organizations, academics and mass media to provide input for improving the election.

It is hoped that the monthly publication of the Indonesian Update with current themes will help policy makers in government and business institutions - as well as academic circles, think tanks and elements of civil society, both at home and abroad, to obtain actual information and contextual analysis about economic conditions, politics, social and law in Indonesia, as well as an understanding of public policy in Indonesia.

Happy reading.



Interpreting the Nature of Homecoming and the Importance of Equitable Development

Eid al-Fitr 1445 H, which falls on 10-11 April 2024, is an important celebration for Muslims. This once-a-year celebration is believed by most Indonesians to be the right time to gather together with family members. In addition, to realize this goal, people often make the moment of Eid al-Fitr and other religious holidays a place to return to their hometowns, especially for those who have been living overseas.

Interpreting the Essence of Homecoming

Eid al-Fitr celebration in Indonesia is synonymous with the tradition of homecoming. The tradition of homecoming on holidays emerged after the independence period (Historia.id, 9/5/2021). According to the Big Indonesian Dictionary (KBBI), homecoming is defined as (1) sailing, going, and (2) returning to your hometown.

In addition, in the historical context, according to Yuanda Zara's research, an academic of historical science from Yogyakarta State University, the term homecoming was first used in the Indonesian public space in 1983. The community previously used various terms to refer to these homecoming activities such as "going home to your hometown", "having a gathering with extended family", "halal bi halal" with family in the area, and so on (Historia.id, 9/5/2021).

The tradition of going home is not something that originated in Indonesia. During the Chinese New Year and Diwali holidays (in China and India, for example), hundreds of millions of working people make long journeys to celebrate these holidays with the families they have left behind for a year.

Mudik, which is simply interpreted as a journey home to return to your hometown, is the result of a mixture of various cultures/ traditions. However, Indonesians still see the celebration of holidays such as Eid al-Fitr as an important moment for each individual to gather with relatives.



The Development of the Number of Travelers from Year to Year


The data on people going home have increased every year. In the last five years, from 2019 to 2024, there has been a significant increase in numbers, especially after the end of the Covid-19 pandemic.

If we refer to the years of the pandemic; namely, 2020 and 2021, the decline in the level of people traveling home during the holidays in those years was due to the Large-Scale Social Restrictions (PSBB) policy. This policy made people have to limit the mobility of their homecoming trips (CNBC Indonesia, 8/4/2024).

In addition, if you look at the movement in the graph in 2022, there was an upward movement in people traveling home. This was due to the easing of the PSBB policy. This meant that even though public travel was permitted, they still had to follow travel safety rules, especially in preventing the increase in Covid-19 cases (including other COVID variants).

Figure 1:

Number of Travelers in the Last 5 Years (Million People)



Source: CNBC Indonesia, processed by the author, 2024

Furthermore, the graph above also shows the results of a survey by the Transportation Policy Agency (BKT) of the Ministry of Transportation (Kemenhub), which estimates that there are 193.6 million travelers, up 34 percent from the previous year. If detailed, the number of public transport passengers per mode of transportation ahead of H-4 Eid al-Fitr who used road transport was 224,880



passengers. This number increased by 18.94% compared to last year's 189,073 passengers and increased by 98.05 compared to normal daily movements (CNBC Indonesia, 8/4/2024).

Furthermore, in inter-island crossing transport, there were 315,374 passengers. This number has increased by 17.62% compared to last year's 268,124 passengers, as well as an increase of 1,037.02% compared to normal daily movements (CNBC Indonesia, 8/4/2024).

In the type of air transport, 320,240 passengers are known. This number increased by 20.62% if compared to the same period last year of 265,494 passengers, as well as an increase of 156.65% compared to normal daily movements. In the type of sea transport, there were 92,334 passengers. This number increased by 19.81% compared to last year's 77,069 passengers and increased by 95.52% compared to normal daily movements (CNBC Indonesia, 8/4/2024).

However, the increase in the number of travelers that occurred in 2024 was also followed by an increase in the number of accidents. The Indonesian National Police (Polri) recorded 213 traffic accidents during the Lebaran 2024 homecoming flows. From the available data, 23 people died and hundreds of others were injured (CNBC Indonesia, 8/4/2024).

The Homecoming and the Increasing Awareness of Migration in the Society

The increase in the number of people traveling to their hometowns may indicate the high rate of migration in Indonesia. Migration can be defined as the activity of moving a group of people from one region to another. The movement of people can aim to stay and live permanently or only temporarily.

In the context of temporary community movements, this type of movement can occur within a certain time such as daily, weekly, or monthly. This can be caused by conditions that require individuals or groups to stay temporarily related to work conditions (Kompas. com, 9/2/2022).

An example is construction laborers. These workers are often contracted by construction project contractors based on an agreed work time. With a predetermined work time, they return to their home area after ensuring that the work has been completed.

Referring back to the homecoming tradition in China, it is estimated that there are 290 million migrant workers from villages who migrate



to big cities and industrial centers. One-third of whom are in the workforce (revolutionary.org, 25/4/2023).

Therefore, in these communities, homecoming becomes an important form of ritual activity to be celebrated together, after family members work in overseas areas.

Similarly, some people choose to migrate to live and settle down, especially in large cities (even the capital). This type of community mobility is often referred to as the phenomenon of urbanization.

Urbanization as the mobilization of people to move generally comes from rural areas that are still experiencing inequality in development. Uneven development that results in low economic growth in rural areas can encourage these communities to urbanize.

In addition, people's assumptions about the degree of welfare between villages and cities can also be a reason for many people to choose to move and live in cities.

Development Inequality is the Root Cause of Urbanisation

Speaker of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) Bambang Soesatyo at the Indonesian Village Congress 2024 in Jakarta on Saturday (23/3) said that the number of people in urban areas was currently estimated to be more than in rural areas, which was around 52%. The figure is also predicted to continue to increase.

In addition, the Central Statistics Agency (BPS) predicts that the number of people living in urban areas in 2035 will increase by 66.6 per cent. Meanwhile, according to World Bank projections, the number of Indonesians living in urban areas will reach a level of 70 per cent by 2045 (detiknews.com, 24/3/2024).

At the 2024 Indonesian Village Congress, MPR Speaker Bambang Soesatyo also said that the increasing number of urban communities could be caused by unbalanced development in rural areas. According to him, cities are still a magnet that is full of attraction in encouraging the rate of urbanization (detiknews.com, 24/3/2024).

Still referring to the context above, the increasing enthusiasm of rural communities to move to cities every year can also be caused by the openness of opportunities. The openness of these opportunities can be in the form of business opportunities that encourage community economic independence, and opportunities to obtain decent work, including opportunities to increase access to various public service facilities such as health and education.



In addition, although BPS data for 2023 show that the percentage of the urban poor population in March 2023 was 7.29 percent, it decreased compared to September 2022, which was 7.53 percent. Meanwhile, the percentage level of the rural poor in March 2023 was 12.22 percent, a decrease compared to September 2022 which was 12.36 percent (BPS.go.id, 17/7/2023). However, this did not reduce the tendency of people to migrate, especially from villages to cities.

Furthermore, the Ministry of Villages, Development of Disadvantaged Regions, and Transmigration (Kemendes PDTT) through Regulation of the Minister of Villages, Development of Disadvantaged Regions, and Transmigration of the Republic of Indonesia Number 2 of 2016 has issued a government policy on the Village Development Index (IDM).

The Village Development Index (IDM) is a government policy program that establishes a guidance system for central, regional, and village governments in utilizing data and information. The IDM is one of the bases in the process of planning, implementing, monitoring, and evaluating village development. IDM is a tool used by the government to determine the status of village progress and independence.

The IDM is based on the accumulation of several dimensions such as the social dimension, economic dimension, and ecological dimension. The social dimension contains several measurement variables; namely, education, health, social capital, and settlements. Meanwhile, economic dimension contains several items of measured indicator variables such as the diversity of community production, access to trade centers and markets, access to logistics, access to banking and credit, and regional openness, and the ecological dimension. This dimension contains variable indicators measured such as environmental quality, natural disasters, and disaster response.

According to the official website of the Ministry of Villages, in 2023 it is known that there are 28751 or 38.63 percent of villages that have developed status. This number is the largest number obtained from the status of underdeveloped villages, which only amounts to 4382 or 5.89 percent. Similarly, the independent village status as the highest level that is expected to be achieved by the village is only 11456 or around 15.39 percent.

The inherent developing status explains that the village has potential resources but has not managed them optimally to improve



the welfare of the village community, including in improving the quality of human life and alleviating poverty. As for the status of underdeveloped villages, or pre-madya villages, this status explains that the village has potential resources but has not managed them, so it still experiences poverty in various forms.

Equitable Development is Key to Improving Welfare and Reducing Inequality

The Ministry of Finance had disbursed Rp54.71 trillion of village funds as of 13 October 2023. This amount of disbursed village funds was equivalent to 78.2% of the target of IDR70 trillion (bisnis.com, 22/10/2023).

In addition to the funds that have been determined, Minister of Finance Sri Mulyani also provided an additional IDR 2 trillion in village funds to 37 provinces in Indonesia. The hope is that village governments that receive additional funds can fund activities according to village priorities and handle natural and non-natural disasters, especially the handling of the El Nino disaster and its impacts such as drought, clean water difficulties, decreased agricultural productivity, and disease outbreaks (bisnis.com, 22/10/2023).

In that year, village funds were also more focused on economic recovery, improving human resources, and accelerating the elimination of extreme poverty. The allocation of village funds that year was also aimed at overcoming several problems, ranging from stunting, village economic development, and implementation of cash-intensive labor, to disaster management (bisnis.com, 22/10/2023).

With the description of the allocation of village funds, it should be expected to be able to fulfill the needs of the community in the village, especially in achieving village standards that are not only developed but also independent. However, the fact is that until now there are still many villages in Indonesia that have not received electricity supply as a source of lighting and roads. Electricity as a source of energy can be a means of lighting and can drive machines, especially in modernization in agriculture. Similarly, paved roads are an important infrastructure in building connectivity between villages and cities.

The importance of equity through village development has become a state mandate that should not only be carried out by the government but also through a process of collaboration and cooperation between



parties. This is because the implementation of development (both physical and non-physical) is not only the obligation of the state but also the shared responsibility of all parties.

This is also the case in the context of urban development in Indonesia. Urban development in Indonesia is expected to be able to reduce the flows of urbanization that almost occur every year after Lebaran. In addition, to prevent new problems, especially the occurrence of urban poverty, the government needs to increase innovation and make improvements to cities in Indonesia such as:

- Revitalizing Indonesian cities by reorganizing social-economic strategic areas to improve optimal public services. Local governments together with the Ministry of Public Works and Public Housing (PUPR) should collaborate in organizing urban spaces, especially renewing the physical vitality of infrastructure used in public services.
- 2. In the context of village development, the Ministry of Villages, the Coordinating Ministry for Human Development and Culture (Kemenko PMK), and the Ministry of PUPR should encourage increased collaboration and cooperation through cross-programs in improving the status level of the village development index (IDM). Collaborative work together is expected to increase the ability of villages to prosper their communities.
- Dewi Rahmawati Nur Aulia -

Urban development in Indonesia is expected to reduce the flows of urbanization that almost occur every year after Lebaran. In addition, to prevent new problems, especially urban poverty, the government needs to increase innovation and make improvements to cities in Indonesia.



Maintaining Indonesia's Economic Engine through Economic Freedom

Generally, global economic conditions in 2024 are forecasted to experience a slowdown. According to the "Global Economic Prospects January 2024" report by the World Bank, world economic growth is predicted to be only 2.4% in 2024, driven by tight central bank monetary policies, weakening trade due to supply chain disruption, inflation, climate change, geopolitical conflicts, and so on.

However, if we refer to the latest report by the International Monetary Fund entitled "World Economic Outlook: Steady but Slow: Resilience amid Divergence" (April 2024), economic growth is predicted to be 3.2% in 2024 due to economic activity, which is still resilient, there is development on the demand side and expansion on the supply side. However, the pace of economic growth is still relatively slow due to the long-term factors of the Covid-19 pandemic, Russia's invasion of Ukraine, and increasing geoeconomic fragmentation.

The existence of conflict is still one of the obstacles to the growth of the world economy, including Indonesia, this year. One of the global conflicts that occurred; namely, in the Middle East region, is currently being escalated. The reason is, on Saturday, April 13, 2024, Iran counterattacked Israel as a result of Israel's attack on the Iranian diplomatic complex in Damascus, Syria, in early April 2024.

Several expert opinions say that the Indonesian economy will be affected by the Iran-Israel conflict. Therefore, the current government and the elected government for 2024-2029, as well as all related stakeholders must be able to maintain Indonesia's economic engine, one of which can implement economic freedom optimally to face the challenges of global economic uncertainty. This article will try to analyze the impact of the Iran-Israel conflict on the Indonesian economy, efforts to spur economic freedom to encourage Indonesia's economic growth, as well as recommendations for the government.



The Impact of the Iran-Israel Conflict on the Indonesian Economy

The Iran-Israel conflict is predicted to burden the Indonesian economy in 2024. The Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources (ESDM) in CNBC Indonesia (April 16, 2024) said that the increase in domestic fuel oil (BBM) prices would be a consequence of the Iran-Israel conflict. This is because Indonesia still imports crude oil and fuel. According to data from the Central Statistics Agency (BPS) (March 15, 2024), the import value in February 2024 was US\$18.44 billion, consisting of non-oil and gas imports of US\$15.46 billion and oil and gas imports of US\$2.98 billion. Oil and gas imports also grew by 10.42% from the previous month.

If domestic fuel prices increase, this will push up domestic energy inflation and further reduce people's spending power. In addition, because Indonesia is still heavily dependent on fossil energy, such as oil, the costs of importing oil will further reduce the fiscal space of the limited State Revenue and Expenditure Budget (APBN).

Moreover, Indonesia's trade export foreign exchange to the Middle East region also has the potential to decrease. This is because many Indonesian oil and gas and non-oil and gas commodities are also exported to Middle Eastern countries. In general, palm oil is one of the commodities imported by many Middle Eastern countries with quite high value. Several other commodities are attached in Table 1.

Table 1. Several Indonesian Export Commodities to Middle Eastern Countries as of January 2024

Example of Commodities	Countries	FOB (US\$)
Coffee	Armenia	460.864
Soap and Detergent, Cleaning and Polishing Agents, Perfume and Cosmetics	Azerbaijan	158.442
Palm Oil	Bahrain	293.127
Annual Fruits	Iran	6.978.156



Example of Commodities	Countries	FOB (US\$)
Palm Oil	Yordania	1.097.714
Processed and Preserved Fish	Kuwait	1.154.527
Palm Oil	Lebanon	911.391
Palm Oil	Oman	6.491.942
Chocolate and Confectionery Foods	Qatar	269.139
Clove	Arab Saudi	2.402.614
Medicinal, Aromatic and Spice Plants	Syria	82.255
Palm Oil	Turki	1.919.864
Clove	Uni Emirat Arab	1.700.650
Palm Oil	Yaman	7.486.741

Source: Foreign Trade Export Statistics Bulletin by Commodity Group and Country January 2024, 2024, Central Bureau of Statistics. FOB is Free on Board. Processed by the Author.

As a result of the escalation of the conflict between Iran and Israel, the Indonesian Government through the Coordinating Ministry for Economic Affairs immediately prepared policies to mitigate the economic impact, such as rising oil commodity prices; disruption of wheat supply chains, production equipment and gold supply; as well as increasing cargo transportation costs due to this conflict (ANTARA, April 15, 2024). Basically, the Government is optimistic that the Indonesian economy can still grow at 5%, however, the Minister of National Development Planning (PPN)/National Development Planning Agency (Bappenas) for the 2016-2019 pe-



riod Bambang Brodjonegoro in ANTARA (April 15, 2024) said that Indonesia's economic growth would be around 4.6%-4.8% of the growth target of 5.2% due to the Iran-Israel conflict.

The Importance of Economic Freedom to Maintain Indonesia's Economic Engine

In general, the Indonesian economic freedom index by The Heritage Foundation (accessed April 17, 2024) is quite volatile. However, Indonesia's economic freedom index has been declining since 2021. In 2020, Indonesia's economic freedom index was 67.2 or the highest based on available data from 1996, then fell to 66.9 in 2021; 64.4 in 2022; and 63.5 in 2023 and 2024. The decline in Indonesia's economic freedom index was caused by a decline in rule of law indicators assessed by The Heritage Foundation, such as protection of property rights, government integrity, and judicial effectiveness.

The rule of law should be strengthened through collaboration and synergy between stakeholders in Indonesia. This is because the protection of property rights, government integrity, and judicial effectiveness can boost the Indonesian economy through increasing creativity and innovation in human resources, individual productivity, and even economic sustainability. The Heritage Foundation (accessed April 17, 2024) states that the rule of law must be able to provide a sense of security and guarantee to individuals to carry out economic activities.

The Heritage Foundation (accessed April 17, 2024) explains that protected property rights can provide individuals with a sense of security to improve their abilities, trade, entrepreneurship, save, invest and carry out other vital economic activities. Protection of property rights, including intellectual property, is important for Indonesia because the Indonesian economy is still dominated by the informal sector, including the creative economy sector and micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs), compared to the formal sector. According to data from the Central Statistics Agency (BPS) in dpr.go.id (August 30, 2023), informal workers in Indonesia are 83.34 million people or 60.12% of the total workers. Vice President Ma'ruf Amin in the Cabinet Secretariat (April 26, 2022) also said that as many as 90% of business actors in the creative economy sector did not have intellectual property protection.

Moreover, strengthening government integrity must also not be abandoned. According to Du et al. (2018), government integrity will also further increase the investment efficiency of listed companies, as happened in China. Apart from that, the government's



integrity in economic freedom can provide certainty and maintain the legal framework that has been or will be implemented and does not mean intervening with inflated policies that can actually distort the economy.

The final indicator of the rule of law according to The Heritage Foundation (accessed April 17, 2024) is the effectiveness of the judiciary. This means that the existing legal framework must be fair, efficient and function in accordance with its mandate to protect the rights of all citizens from unlawful actions. The existence of good judicial effectiveness will also increase healthy competition in the business world so that it can encourage innovation both in research and development, a dynamic and efficient market environment.

Recommendations

Indonesia still has many opportunities to increase economic freedom to encourage economic growth. There are several recommendations that can be offered.

First, the Government through the Ministry of Law and Human Rights should strengthen collaboration and work with law enforcement agencies such as the TNI/Polri, Corruption Eradication Commission, Supreme Court, and law-related stakeholders in maintaining and improving the rule of law that is fair, efficient and non-discriminatory.

Second, related to intellectual property rights, the Government through the Ministry of Communication and Information, the Ministry of Law and Human Rights, and the Ministry of Tourism and Creative Economy/Tourism and Creative Economy Agency, the Ministry of Cooperatives and SMEs, should further strengthen and emphasize regulations regarding intellectual property rights (IPR) as well as implementing policies to local governments more optimally.

Third, the Government, through the Financial System Stability Committee (KSSK), which consists of the Ministry of Finance, Bank Indonesia, the Financial Services Authority and the Deposit Insurance Corporation, must further increase collaboration to maintain financial system stability amidst uncertain global conditions. Healthy and stable financial system policies can encourage business interest, control inflation, and increase public confidence in the financial system in Indonesia.

- Putu Rusta Adijaya -

Global economic conditions in 2024 are predicted to experience a slowdown. One of them is due to the escalation of conflict in the Middle East region. Indonesia also has the potential to receive negative impacts due to this. Therefore, the Government needs to encourage economic freedom by increasing the rule of law, strengthening and reaffirming intellectual property rights regulations, and maintaining the stability of the financial system



Overseeing at the Corruption Eradicationz Policies in Indonesia

Presidential candidate and vice presidential candidate number two, Prabowo Subianto and Gibran Rakabuming Raka (Prabowo-Gibran), have been officially elected as President and Vice President for the 2024-2029 period announced by the General Election Commission (KPU) on Wednesday, March 20, 2024. According to General Election Commision (KPU) data in ANTARA (March 20, 2024), the number of votes obtained by Prabowo-Gibran was 96,214,691 votes, far superior to those of Anies Baswedan-Muhaimin Iskandar (AMIN) with 40,971,906 votes and of Ganjar Pranowo-Mahfud MD with 27,040,878 votes. The number of valid votes was 164,227,475 votes.

After being announced as the presidential candidate who won the election, Prabowo also reiterated several of his campaign promises with Gibran, as stated in the official vision document "Together Indonesia Progressing towards a Golden Indonesia 2045". One of the promises is related to eradicating corruption.

In this official document, Prabowo-Gibran has outlined the efforts to eradicate corruption. Eradicating corruption is included in the Asta Cita work program; namely, "Strengthening Political, Legal and Bureaucratic Reform, as well as Strengthening the Prevention and Eradication of Corruption and Drugs." Several efforts will be implemented in this program; namely, political reform consisting of four programs, legal reform with 20 programs, and governance reform consisting of 26 programs. Moreover, preventing and eradicating corruption is also on the agenda in Prabowo-Gibran's 17 priority programs.

Generally, corruption is a severe disease and has undermined and damaged the societies' cultural, political, and economic order (Amundsen, 1999). Deep-rooted corrupt practices also occur in Indonesia. These can be seen from the number of government and



private officials who were caught in criminal acts of corruption during 2004-2022. At the Highlights of the Commemoration of World Anti-Corruption Day 2023, President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) in the Cabinet Secretariat (December 12, 2023) outlined these numbers, including:

- 1. 344 members, including the heads of the House of Representatives (DPR RI) and the Regional Legislative Council (DPRD);
- 2. 38 ministers and heads of institutions;
- 3. 24 governors;
- 4. 162 regents and mayors;
- 5. 31 judges, including constitutional judges;
- 6. 8 commissioners from the KPU, the Commission for the Supervision of Business Competition (KPPU), and the Judicial Commission (KY), as well as
- 7. 415 people from the private sector and 363 people from bureaucrats.

This article will provide an analysis regarding the causes and consequences of corruption. Moreover, this article will discuss several corruption cases, the causes of corruption in Indonesia, and recommendations for corruption eradication policies that can be implemented for the upcoming 2024-2029 Government.

Corruption: Causes and Consequences

Corruption has broad and different definitions. Khan (1996) in Amundsen (1999) defines corruption as "behaviour that deviates from the formal rules of conduct governing the actions of someone in a position of public authority because of private-regarding motives such as wealth, power, or status." (Khan 1996:12). International institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund use "the abuse of public office for private gains" as the definition of corruption (Wei, 1999). This abuse of power also occurs in the private sector, and is not only to gain profits for personal interests, but also the interests of relatives, friends, family, and even political parties (Tanzi, 1998).

Corruption practices also consist of multiple forms, ranging from bribery, extortion, fraud, embezzlement, nepotism, cronyism, confiscation of assets and public property for personal gains to peddling or selling influence (Myint, 2000). According to Amundsen (2000), several other terms for bribery in the the society are sweeteners and grease money. This practice of sweetener money or facilitation money is the most common practice in Indonesia, even down to



the village level. For example, a village head candidate distributing a certain amount of money to village residents to elect him as village head is a form of bribery practice. This money can be considered a 'binding contract' to influence the community to choose the candidate as the village head.

On the other hand, the corrupt practice of nepotism (a corrupt practice carried out by those in power by favoring close relatives and family to hold strategic positions in order to secure a position of power) has been widely carried out by leaders whose powers are not limited (unrestricted president) (Amundsen, 2000). The absence of checks and balances on the structure and function of institutions can be one of the factors that encourages nepotism.

Seeing the abundant definitions and forms of corrupt practices, it is no surprise that corruption is caused by multidimensional factors. Enste and Heldman (2017) summarize the empirical literature on the causes of corruption found that: (1) democracy and political systems combined with other factors such as the duration of power and the quality of institutions; (2) institutional quality; (3) level of competition; (4) press freedom and justice; (5) culture where there is a strong influence of belief, religion, and power; (6) colonial heritage, primarily British colonies; and (7) the blessing of natural resources, as the causes with a strong effect on corrupt practices.

The existence of practical corruption has consequences both economically, politically, and socially. The United Nations (UN) estimated that the world paid US\$3.6 trillion annually for these corrupt practices, of which US\$1 trillion was due to bribery and US\$2.6 trillion through corruption (The Commonwealth, May 15, 2023). In addition, low-income countries also bore a heavy burden from corruption than high-income countries. Artificial Fiscal Intelligence in Laing (2023) stated that around 30% of the central government budget in low-income countries lost due to corruption compared to only 23% in developed countries.

If we look at the consequences from a political perspective, corruption creates instability, reduces public trust, weakens the legitimacy of institutions and leaders, and produces uncontrolled public policies and services (Amundsen, 1999). Moreover, corruption also has an impact on social conditions, such as setting back efforts for gender equality, reducing access to education, increasing sexual exploitation of women and inequality (Duri, 2020).



Indonesia has just faced another case of criminal acts of corruption. This corrupt practice occurred in the tin trading system in the PT Timah Tbk. mining business permit (IUP) area of 2015-2022. The Attorney General's Office (Kejagung) has also named 16 suspects. The value of temporary economic and environmental losses due to this corrupt practice is IDR 271 trillion (Bisnis.com, 1 April 2024).

Corruption cases in the extractive sector, such as tin, are detrimental to the country. For example, state losses from the corrupt practice of illegal tin smuggling amounted to IDR 5,714 trillion during 2004-2015, with an average tin loss of 32,473 tons per year (Indonesia Corruption Watch, April 1, 2024).

Furthermore, the trend of corruption cases in Indonesia also shows an upward trend. In the "Report on the Monitoring Results of Corruption Case Enforcement Trends in 2022" (2023) by Indonesia Corruption Watch, the number of corruption cases in 2019 was 271 cases and increased to 579 cases or an increase of 113.7% in 2022. The potential for state losses has also increased during that period. Even though the number of corruption cases in 2019 was lower than the previous year, the potential value of losses due to corruption in 2019 was much larger, namely IDR 8,405 trillion, and increase sharply to IDR 42,747 trillion in 2022.

If we look at the causes of corruption in Indonesia, several studies have found that the political system is corrupt and political parties are more corrupt because the majority of political parties are managed by a certain group of people or families (Syarif & Faisal, 2019), as well as corrupt government officials (Ibrahim, Yusoff, & Koling, 2018) are some of the causes of corruption in Indonesia. Corruption that occurs in government is partly caused by bad leadership (Prabowo, 2016).

Even though various antitheses of the factors summarized by Enste and Heldman (2017) and the factors above still exist due to differences in approaches and research methods carried out, the causes of corruption that occur in the world and in Indonesia are similar. As winners of the 2024 election contest, Prabowo-Gibran must be able to implement, oversee and maintain the reform of the corruption eradication work program because corruption is caused by multidimensional, interrelated factors.




Recommendations for Corruption Eradication Policies in Indonesia

According to the previous explanations, these are several policy recommendations for eradicating corruption that can be implemented by the upcoming 2024-2029 Government.

First, the Government, in this case the Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal and Security Affairs (Kemenko Polhukam), from central to regional levels, must be able to maintain and strengthen the democratic and political system in Indonesia. The Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal and Security Affairs must also bolster collaboration and synergy with several democratic institutions, such as the KPU, the General Election Supervisory Agency (Bawaslu), and the relavant civil society organizations. Strengthening the democratic and political system can be carried out through training, both reskilling and upskilling, education and knowledge related to democracy and corruption for ministry/institution employees and the community. If a weak democracy and political system is followed by the absence of checks and balances for those in power, and a lack of quality institutions, then the practice of corruption in Indonesia will continue to elevate.

The reason is, in a weak democracy and political system, the process of accountability, transparency and the supremacy of law will also be weak. Government effectiveness (which Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2010) define as "perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of civil servants and their level of independence from political pressure, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, as well as the credibility of the government's commitment to these policies") is also not accommodated and not applicable. In fact, there is a strong correlation between democracy and political systems and controlling corruption. This is clearly seen in the correlation between government effectiveness and corruption control in Graph 1.



Graph 1. Correlation Between Government Effectiveness and Corruption Control in 2022

Source: Data on Government Effectiveness and Corruption Control are from Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2010). R² is the coefficient of determination, which shows how much the Government Effectiveness variable influences Corruption Control. Countries in quadrant 1 (top right) are countries that also have a very high corruption perception index, while countries with a lowest corruption perception index are in quadrant 3 (bottom left).

Second, the Government, through the Ministry of Communication and Informatics (Kominfo) together with the Press Council, the Press Legal Aid Institute (LBH Pers), the National Human Rights Commission (Komnas HAM), as well as ministries/institutions and civil society organizations that support press freedom must strengthen synergy and cooperation in developing public policies that promote press freedom.

Kalenborn and Lessmann (2012) stated that press freedom could provide independent information to voters and could also evaluate the performance of politicians and leaders of government institutions. The existence of press freedom through the media also provides a forum for uncovering and investigating other types of corrupt practices, as well as being a supervisor and observer of government institutions. Disclosure of corruption cases through investigative journalism will later be able to collaborate with related legal institutions, such as the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) and the TNI/Polri.



Third, the Government, through legislative institutions (MPR, DPR, and/or DPD), must implement the pentahelix approach to the maximum to formulate the supremacy of law, such as seeking the issuance of Asset Confiscation Law, in dealing with corruption. Executive institutions must then be able to implement this law or other policies for handling corruption, supervised by related institutions, both civil society organizations and levels of the society. The judiciary must also be able to carry out trials that are effective, efficient and fair if the government is found to have violated the Constitution.

- Putu Rusta Adijaya -

Corruption is a severe disease in Indonesia. Many government officials, private individuals and bureaucrats have been caught in criminal acts of corruption. Corruption is also caused by multidimensional factors. Therefore, in eradicating corruption, the Government must be able to maintain and strengthen the democratic and political system, encourage press freedom, and implement the pentahelix approach to the maximum to uphold the supremacy of law, such as seeking the issuance of Asset Confiscation Law.



Human Rights and the Military: TNI Apologizes for the Torture of a Papuan

Last March (2024), a video of the torture of a local Papuan who was claimed to be a member of the Armed Criminal Group (*Kelompok Kriminal Bersenjata*/KKB) by several people who were seen wearing the attributes of the Indonesian National Army (Tentara Nasional Indonesia/TNI) was circulating on social media. The local Papuan was seen tied up in a drum and then beaten and kicked to cause injuries (kompas.id, 25/3/2024). This video sparked public outrage because the behavior of the perpetrators of the violence was considered inhumane.

Regarding the incident, Commander of the XVII/Cendrawasih Military Region Major General Izak Pangemanan, representing the TNI, expressed his apology for the confirmed torture committed by soldiers of the Raider 300/Siliwangi Infantry Battalion (kompas. id, 25/3/2024). Major General Izak Pangemanan said that what the soldiers did in the video was not following the *Standard Operational Procedure*, rules of engagement, and applicable military law that had been taught to TNI soldiers. In addition, Izak said that this act of violence "had tarnished efforts to handle conflict in Papua. Torture has never been a procedure of the TNI (kompas.id, 25/3/2024).

The torture incident and the response from the TNI above are reminders for the community of the approach to conflict resolution in Papua. This paper seeks to elaborate on the important points that Major General Izak has conveyed in his statement responding to the act of violence by TNI AD soldiers.

Human Rights and the Military

Indonesia is a state of law in accordance with the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia (1945 Constitution). As a state of law, state administration must be carried out in line with positive law. This includes military administration. Article 7 of Law No. 34/2004 on the TNI (TNI Law) states that the TNI's duties are to



uphold the sovereignty of the state, maintain the territorial integrity of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia under Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, and protect the entire nation and the entire homeland of Indonesia from threats and disturbances to the integrity of the nation and state.

In addition, Article 2 of the TNI Law also emphasizes that one of the TNI's identities is a professional army, which adheres to the principles of democracy, civilian supremacy, human rights, provisions of national law, and ratified international law. Military operations in Papua, according to the TNI Law, are categorized as military operations other than war. In the implementations, soldiers need to carry out their duties in accordance with the applicable Soldier Code of Ethics. It is quite clear that the TNI in carrying out its duties needs to be bound by law and to prioritize human rights.

The regulation of human rights in the military world is not something new or even alien. In international instruments, laws related to restrictions amid armed conflicts have been regulated in the Geneva Convention of 1949 (Geneva Convention), which has been ratified by Indonesia. Concerning cases of torture of local Papuans, Article 13 of the Geneva Convention requires that prisoners must at all times be treated humanely. Unlawful acts causing death or serious injury to the prisoners' health are prohibited. Article 14 of the Geneva Convention also emphasizes that prisoners have the right to maintain their dignity and honor as human beings in all circumstances. This is in line with the human rights of all Indonesian citizens regulated in Article 28I of the 1945 Constitution; namely, the right not to be tortured.

In general, the Geneva Conventions seek to protect parties who are not involved in the conflict such as civilians, health workers, and aid workers, as well as parties who are no longer involved in the conflict such as the wounded, sick, shipwrecked soldiers, and prisoners of war (icrc.org, 12/10/2010). The Geneva Convention is useful to prevent violations during conflict or war so that violators can be held accountable. With the Geneva Convention, it is expected that everyone in the hands of the enemy will not be killed, mutilated, tortured, treated cruelly, humiliated and degraded, taken captive, and subjected to unfair trials.

Reflecting on the situation in Indonesia, Adnan Buyung Nasution (2004) has stated something that is also in line with the objectives of the Geneva Convention. Adnan said that human rights were



about preserving one's dignity and honor. Therefore, the Geneva Convention and other instruments can prevent human rights violations such as those that occurred in the conflict era during the Old Order, New Order, and Post-Reformation, and hold the perpetrators accountable.

Furthermore, the National Commission on Human Rights (Komnas HAM) also has an instrument that elaborates on the right to be free from torture; namely, the Standard Norms and Regulations No. 10 on the Right to be Free from Torture, Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (SNR No. 10). SNR No. 10, which also refers to the United Nations Convention Against Torture, describes the elements of torture as cumulatively consisting of:

- a. inflicting severe physical or mental pain and suffering;
- b. intentional act or omission;
- c. with a specific purpose and
- d. with the consent or knowledge of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.

In addition, in Komnas HAM's activities, Komnas HAM has provided counseling for SNR No. 10 to the Indonesian Army, one of which was in 2023 (ditkumad.mil.id, 31/10/2023). This shows that Izak's statement in the previous chapter is correct, that the TNI has received briefings on the limits of behavior that violates human rights in military operations.

Referring to this discussion, although it is not too deep in explaining the points of prohibition and limitation in each regulation, it is enough to explain that in the administration of the military in Indonesia, it cannot be done arbitrarily. Human rights have existed alongside the military even in the international sphere since 1949. It is not right if human rights are always separated and considered "unimportant" in military operations. In addition to ensuring civilian protection, practicing human rights is important to maintain public trust and a positive image of the TNI. This is reflected in the incidents of torture of local Papuans discussed, how the community was outraged to witness the actions by members of the TNI. Izak himself stated that conflict resolution in Papua must be carried out correctly; namely, by creating good relations, good communication, and building public trust (kompas.id, 25/3/2024).



Recommendations

According to the above discussions, the following points are recommended:

- a. The need for a more comprehensive human rights approach education for all prospective TNI soldiers who are undergoing education;
- b. Optimizing the supervision of TNI soldiers who are in military operations according to the applicable hierarchy;
- c. As a state of law, laws and regulations and other legal instruments governing military discipline, codes of ethics, and limits on authority and action need to be fully complied with by all TNI personnel; and
- d. The need to provide understanding through forms of information dissemination or education to the community by the TNI, the Ministry of Law and Human Rights, the Ministry of Defense, and Komnas HAM that even in conflict, human rights need to be upheld.

Human rights have existed alongside the military even in the international sphere since 1949. It is not right that human rights are always separated and considered "unimportant" in military operations.

- Christina Clarissa Intania -



The Trend in Election Result Dispute Petitions to the Constitutional Court

In organizing general elections, there are several mechanisms to ensure that the elections are carried out in accordance with prevailing regulations and principles. One of the efforts is to submit a petition for a dispute over election results to the Constitutional Court. According to Article 24C paragraph (I) of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia (1945 Constitution), the Constitutional Court also adjudicates election result disputes in addition to constitutional review.

The function of the Constitutional Court to hear election result disputes has existed since its establishment in 2003. The function of adjudicating election dispute is further regulated in Law Number 24/2003 concerning the Constitutional Court as amended by Law Number 7/2020 (Constitutional Court Law); Constitutional Court Regulation Number 4/2018 concerning the Procedure in Dispute over the Results of the General Elections of the President and Vice President as amended by Constitutional Court Regulation Number 2/2024; Constitutional Court Regulation Number 2/2023 concerning Procedure in Dispute over the Results of the General Election of Members of the House of Representatives and the Regional House of Representatives;

Not only in Indonesia, the practice of the Constitutional Court adjudicating election disputes is also practiced in other countries such as Austria and Portugal. To further understand election result dispute petitions from time to time in Indonesia, this paper shall discuss the trend of election result dispute petitions to the Constitutional Court since its establishment until the last election; that is, the 2024 Elections.



The Number of Election Result Dispute Petitions in the Period of 2004 – 2024

Referring to the Election Dispute Case Recapitulation on the Constitutional Court's official website, the following is the distribution of the number of election result dispute petitions from 2004 to 2024 consisting of legislative elections and elections for presidential and vice-presidential candidates (presidential election):

Tahun	Jumlah	Amar Putusan
2004	44	Kabul – 15 Tolak – 13 Tidak diterima – 16 Tarik kembali – 0 Gugur – 0
2009	70	Kabul – 24 Tolak – 37 Tidak diterima – 8 Tarik kembali – 1 Gugur – 0
2014	297	Kabul – I Tolak – 291 Tidak diterima – 2 Tarik kembali – 2 Gugur – 0
2019	262	Kabul – 13 Tolak – 82 Tidak diterima – 122 Tarik kembali – 10 Gugur – 34

Source: mkri.id, April 14, 2024

As of this writing (14/4), only two election result disputes in 2024 have been registered; namely, the disputes over the presidential election results, and are currently undergoing the trial process. The data for legislative election result disputes cannot be seen yet because it has not been included in the Election Result Disputes Recapitulation on the official mkri.id website.



According to the table above, it can be seen that most election result disputes petitions were submitted in 2014. However, of the 297 petitions, 291 were rejected. Referring to the recapitulation, 297 petitions in 2014 consisted of election result disputes over the House of Representatives (DPR) and the Regional Representatives Council (DPRD) with as many as 262 petitions; the Regional Representatives Council (DPD) with as many as 34 petitions; and the President and Vice President as many as I application. The only petition that was accepted based on MK's recapitulation was the application for DPD level with decision number 03-30/PHPU-DPD/ XII/2014 (mkri. id, April 14, 2024). However, according to the editorial article of the Constitutional Magazine published by the Constitutional Court, there is a difference in the number with the official recapitulation on the mkri.id page with 903 incoming petitions. Furthermore, it was explained that the average number of petitions filed was based on (Constitutional Court, July 2014):

- a. the issue of vote counting by the National Election Commission (KPU), where the petitioners have a more precise count;
- b. money politics;
- c. impartiality of election organizers;
- d. claims that it passes the national threshold; and
- e. structured, systematic, and massive violations.

The lawsuit that caught the attention of the public at that time was filed by the presidential and vice-presidential candidate pair Prabowo Subianto - Hatta Rajasa (Prabowo - Hatta), arguing that there was structured, systematic, and massive fraud and vote differences that indicated irregularities in 52 thousand polling stations (bbc.com, 7/8/2014; tribunnews.com, 25/7/2014; Cahyaningrum, 2014). The Prabowo-Hatta pair claimed to have won the 2014 presidential election with 50.25% of the national vote (tribunnews.com, 25/7/2014). However, in the end, the Constitutional Court rejected their petition because it was not proven in court (tribunnews.com, 21/8/2014).

Then in 2019, 262 election result dispute petitions were listed in the Election Result Disputes Application Recapitulation (April 14, 2024). Election disputes in 2019 consisted of 10 petitions for the DPD level and the DPR and DPRD levels totaling 251 petitions. For the 13 granted petitions, all of them were from the DPR and DPRD level (mkri.id, April 14, 2024). One application came from the 2019 presidential and vice-presidential candidate Prabowo Subianto - Sandiaga Uno in Decision Number 01/PHPU-PRES/XVII/2019.



In the petition at the presidential and vice-presidential level, the argument also used was that there were violations of the presidential election that were structured, systematic, and massive. The fraud argued was in the form of police and intelligence non-neutrality; discrimination in treatment and abuse of law enforcement; abuse of bureaucracy and state-owned enterprises; abuse of state budgets and/or government programs; abuse of state-owned enterprises' budgets; and restrictions on media and press freedom. However, this application was rejected because it was not legally grounded (01/PHPU-PRES/XVII/2019, 2019).

Repeated Arguments

At the time of this writing (15/4), the 2024 presidential election result dispute trial is still ongoing at the Constitutional Court and will be decided on April 22, 2024. The legal teams representing each presidential and vice-presidential candidate pair Anies Rasyid Baswedan - A. Muhaimin Iskandar (Anies - Muhaimin) and Ganjar Pranowo - Mahfud MD (Ganjar - Mahfud) have both registered their petitions with case numbers 1/PHPU.PRES-XXII/2024 (Anies - Muhaimin Application) and 2/PHPU.PRES-XXII/2024 (Ganjar - Mahfud Application) respectively.

The arguments mentioned in Anies - Muhaimin's petition include the invalid acceptance of the Prabowo Subianto - Gibran Rakabuming Raka (Prabowo - Gibran) pair referring to KPU Regulation Number 19/2023 concerning the Ineligibility of Candidates for the General Election of President and Vice President; the paralysis of the independence of election organizers; nepotism to win the Prabowo - Gibran pair; the misuse of appointments of regional officials and mobilization of regional officials; the involvement of state apparatus; the intervention of the Constitutional Court; the President's invitation to the chairs of the coalition political parties at the Presidential Palace; the misuse of social assistance; and the increase in salaries and benefits of election organizers during critical moments. Then procedural violations were also mentioned, which included Voters List manipulation; ballots that had been voted for Number 2; vote reduction for Anies - Muhaimin; money politics; voting more than once; odd polling stations; children voting; and KPU fraud through the IT system and Sirekap (Application 1/PHPU.PRES-XXII/2024, 2024).

Then from the request of the legal representative of the Ganjar - Mahfud pair, the arguments used are more or less the same; namely, using the arguments of structured, systematic, and massive viola-



tions. In Ganjar - Mahfud's petition, it is stated that this structured violation was caused by a legal vacuum in the Election Law that does not regulate nepotism by the president and ineffective election law enforcement instruments. These ineffective law enforcement instruments based on the Ganjar - Mahfud Request are the absence of independence from the KPU in carrying out the 2024 Presidential Elections, the Election Organizer Honor Council protects the KPU by not implementing its own decisions, and the Election Supervisory Board (Bawaslu) is ineffective in resolving violations that have been reported. The next argument is the violation of election procedures before, during voting, and during vote counting (Application 2/PHPU.PRES-XXII/2024, 2024).

Reflecting on the previous chapter, the arguments used in the 2024 petition were also used in previous election result dispute petitions; namely, the existence of structured, systematic, and massive fraud committed in various ways. The violations that are always included in election result dispute petitions are also the problematic implementations of elections by the KPU; the non-neutrality of election organizers or other parties (e.g. officials and government); and counting problems. The arguments that are always the same can be indicated because there is no significant change in the implementations of the electoral process and/or there is an element of political interest that influences. However, this paper shall not further discuss the point of political interests affecting the election as raised in the petition.

Procedural errors of any kind are inevitable in the implementation of policies, including elections. However, elections are one of the direct manifestations of popular sovereignty, which is a characteristic of Indonesia. Thus, the existence of violations in elections can create distrust by the public of the election results, and it can be said that substantial democracy has failed (Nasir, 2020: 42). That is why Indonesia as a state of law in accordance with the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia supports the holding of elections by issuing legal instruments and implementation mechanisms to support the holding of direct, general, free, secret, honest and fair elections.

Mistakes and shortcomings may occur in the conduct of elections, but that does not mean they cannot be improved. The commonality of allegations of violations, especially concerning the electoral process, may also indicate that procedures need to be continually improved to adapt to the times and circumstances on the ground.



The need for targeted improvements and periodic evaluations are also necessary to improve the quality of electoral implementation so that the process can be understood, and the results respected by the public.

Recommendations

In response to the issues described above, the following recommendations can be considered:

- a. Further research by other academics regarding certain political motivations in each election so that it becomes an argument needs to be done as a refinement of this paper;
- b. The need for the KPU, Bawaslu, and other election organizing agencies to evaluate the systems used and mechanisms in organizing elections. It is important to evaluate its effectiveness and efficiency;
- c. To minimize errors or not understanding the election procedures in the field, there needs to be better information dissemination or counseling by the KPU assisted by civil society organizations;
- d. KPU and Bawaslu must maintain their independence and carry out their authorities, duties, and functions in accordance with applicable regulations and carry out the results of decisions that have been made with confidence; and
- e. Bawaslu needs to be firm in taking action against incoming reports of violations. The incoming reports need to be followed up following the procedures that have been made, not only for statistical purposes in the report.

- Christina Clarissa Intania -

Mistakes and shortcomings can occur in the implementations of elections, but that does not mean they cannot be improved. The existence of similar allegations of violations, especially related to the electoral process, can also indicate procedures that must be continuously improved.



The Coalition-Opposition Dynamics in the Presidential System in Indonesia

In a democratic country, especially in a presidential democracy, there are two things that are equally essential: a balanced composition between the government coalition and the opposition. The opposition plays an important role as a controller and balancer in the workings and implementations of government to prevent fraud (Sukarno, 2011). Ideally, in a presidential system, the structure should be in line with a two-party party system.

However, as stated by Bedjo Sukarno (2020), a political academic from Sriwijaya University in the Journal of Social Sciences Studies (KAIS), the system in Indonesia is more semi-presidential, because it has to deal with a multiparty party system. This has implications for many things, especially in the dynamics of dividing seats of power, which often ignores the importance of the role of the opposition. As a result, opposition space as the foundation for building an ideal democracy does not seem to have a place in the life of Indonesian political parties.

Furthermore, the imbalance between the government and the opposition also creates political instability, which has the potential to be detrimental to the democratization process. If the opposition does not have sufficient power to control or balance the government, the risks of abuse of power and violations of democratic principles will increase.

For example, this happens in North Korea where the Korean Workers' Party has strong hegemony and is the only political party in power (Britannica, 19/3/2024). Studies also show that North Korea's authoritarianism and the absence of an opposition role have led to many cases of human rights violations, corruption, educational backwardness and even economic backwardness due to massive doctrinization (Lee, 2024). Therefore, it is important for the Indonesian political system to develop mechanisms that ensure the role of the opposition is not only formally recognized, but also substantially respected.



Apart from that, it should also be noted that the existence of a strong and effective opposition is an indicator of the health of a country's democracy (Dahl, 1971). An opposition that can function optimally will be able to voice the aspirations and interests of the people who may not be represented by the government. Thus, the opposition is not just a political opponent, but is also an integral part of the democratization process that must be maintained and strengthened.

In at least two periods of Jokowi's administration, observations of the existence of the opposition showed an interesting phenomenon. As illustrated in its first period, the Great Indonesia Coalition (Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla 2014) gave rise to a strong alliance, involving a number of main political parties such as the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP), the National Democratic Party (Nas-Dem), the Golongan Karya Party (Golkar), the Conscience of the People (Hanura), National Mandate Party (PAN), National Awakening Party (PKB), United Development Party (PPP), and Indonesian Justice and Unity Party (PKPI). In its continuity, this coalition strengthens the dominance of the Jokowi government through a combination of established and solid forces.

Meanwhile, the opposition camp, which in the 2014 general election was known as the Red and White Coalition, consisted of parties such as the Greater Indonesia Movement Party (Gerindra), the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), the Democratic Party, and the Crescent Star Party (PBB). However, it should be noted that political dynamics are not static. There was a significant shift among the political parties that were initially part of the Red and White Coalition.

For example, PPP, PAN, and Golkar were originally part of the Red and White Coalition. However, they then decided to switch and join the Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla government. This shows that there are internal political dynamics in Indonesia, which may be influenced by various factors, such as political interests and party coalition dynamics.

Meanwhile, in his second period, political dynamics increasingly developed with the emergence of the Advanced Indonesia Coalition (Jokowi-Ma'ruf Amin 2019), which consisted of a coalition of parties that was 'fatter' than the previous coalition. This coalition involved a number of main political parties such as PDIP, Gerindra, Golkar, Nasdem, PKB, Democrat, PAN, PPP, Perindo, Berkarya Party, PSI, Hanura, PBB, and PKP. The existence of a coalition consisting of



various political parties reflected efforts to expand the support base and gain broader legitimacy in the government process.

However, at the same time, the 2019 elections also witnessed the emergence of the Adil Makmur Indonesia Coalitionz which supported the Prabowo-Sandiaga Uno pair. This coalition consisted of parties such as Gerindra, PKS, PAN, Democratic Party and Berkarya Party. However, there is a tendency that only PKS is able to survive as an opposition and does not join the government coalition. This shows complex political dynamics and diverse party strategies in determining their position on the political spectrum.

It is known that many political figures from the Prabowo-Sandi coalition later joined the Jokowi Government in 2019. Zulkifli Hasan, General Chair of PAN stepped in as Minister of Trade, Agus Harimurti Yudhoyono, who is the General Chair of the Democratic Party, is known to also hold the position of Minister of Agrarian Affairs and Spatial Planning. In fact, Prabowo-Sandi themselves also joined the government where Prabowo served as Minister of Defense and Sandiaga Uno as Minister of Tourism and Creative Economy.

The Dynamics of the 2024 Elections

In Law Number 17/2014 concerning the MPR, DPR, DPD and DPRD (UU MD3), it is stipulated that the Speaker of the DPR RI comes from the party that wins the election, while the Deputy Speakers of the DPR RI are occupied by the parties below him. This is regulated in Article 427D paragraph (I) letter b, which states that "The Speaker of the DPR is a member of the DPR who comes from the political party that has the first largest number of seats in the DPR". Meanwhile, the Deputy Speakers of the DPR RI are regulated in letter c, which reads "The Deputy Speakers of the DPR are members of the DPR who come from the political parties that have the second, third, fourth and fifth most number of seats;"

Looking at the 2024 legislative election results from the official release from the General Election Commission (KPU) on March 20 2024, there are at least five parties that are in the top five in the Parliament. The first one is PDIP, with a vote of 16.72%, followed by Golkar with a vote of 15.29%, the Gerindra Party with 13.22%, the National Awakening Party with 10.62% and the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) with 8.48%.



The vote acquisition data above reveals that the strength of the winning camp, which supported Prabowo-Gibran, is almost equal to the total vote acquisition of the parties supporting both Anies-Muhaimin and Ganjar-Mahfud. This balance gives rise to indications of the potential for weak opposition in the government led by Prabowo-Gibran. In fact, it is possible that the opposition could practically disappear, marginalized by the dominance of a strong government. These dynamics reflect complex political challenges at the national level, where positions of power and political influence continue to shift in accordance with political changes and social dynamics. Therefore, political strategy and collaboration between parties will be an important key in building sustainable political stability and facing various challenges in the future.

Recommendations

To avoid the possibilities above, here are several recommendations that can be considered%

- 1. The government and opposition parties need to increase dialogue and collaboration to reach agreement on policies that benefit all people. Thus, healthy political dynamics can be maintained and common interests can be fulfilled.
- 2. The public must be more actively involved in the political process, either through participation in elections, providing input to the people's representatives, or through various existing participation mechanisms. This can help increase people's representation in political decision making
- 3. Control institutions such as the DPR, KPK and other supervisory institutions must strengthen their authority and independence to supervise the government and ensure accountability in decision making.
- 4. Political leaders need to prioritize national interests above the interests of certain parties or groups. This requires collective awareness and commitment to working together for the progress of the nation and the welfare of society.

- Felia Primaresti -

The presence of a strong opposition is not only an indicator of the health of democracy, but it also ensures balanced representation in the political decision-making process. The 2024 elections illustrate the potential imbalance between the government and the opposition, posing challenges in maintaining political stability and dealing with various social dynamics in the future.



Looking at Preparations for the 2024 Regional Elections

According to General Election Commission Regulation (PKPU) Number 2/2024, it is certain that the Regional Head Elections (Pilkada) will be held on Wednesday, 27 November 2024. This year is an important momentum for the democratic process in Indonesia, where the Pilkada will be held simultaneously throughout the country, covering 37 provinces and 508 districts/cities. In the ongoing democratization process, the active participation of the community in determining their regional leaders is crucial.

Of course, this must also be balanced with thorough preparations from the organizers and good supervision. This is because, through Pilkada, every citizen has the right and opportunity to participate in determining the direction of development and leadership at the local level. Thus, Pilkada is not only a political event but also the main stage for the existence and strength of democracy in Indonesia.

At this time (16/4/2024), we are in the Notification and Registration of Election Observers stage, which started on 27 February 2024 and will end on 16 November 2024. Furthermore, on April 17 2024, District Election Committees (PPK), Voting Committees (PPS), and Voting Organizing Groups (KPPS) will be formed in all regions to prepare everything related to the implementations of the elections as a whole.

By paying attention to the experience from the 2024 elections, it is hoped that the implementations of the regional elections will be improved significantly. One area that needs special attention is the technical implementations of the campaign. There is a need for increased regulation and stricter enforcement of regulations to ensure that campaigns are carried out fairly and with integrity, as well as minimizing the potential for violations.

Apart from that, it was mentioned in the Policy Chatting Podcast (Ngobi) Episode 14, which presented Arfianto Purbolaksono (Re-



search and Program Manager of The Indonesian Institute), Christina Intania (Legal Researcher of The Indonesian Institute) and Felia Primaresti (Legal Researcher of The Indonesian Institute), that it was also important to increase women's participation in the regional election process. Concrete steps, such as providing support and training to female candidates, as well as strengthening policies that encourage balanced gender representation in all stages of regional elections, can help achieve this goal.

No less important is paying attention to accessibility for people with disabilities in all aspects of implementing regional elections. This includes providing disability-friendly physical facilities at polling stations, ensuring that Pilkada-related information is available in a variety of formats that are accessible to everyone, and actively involving the disabled community in the planning and implementation process.

Reflections from the 2024 Elections

Learning from the experience of the recent presidential and legislative elections, there were many lessons that can be learned to improve our democratic system, especially in the context of Regional Head Elections (Pilkada). One aspect that needs attention is the revision of legal instruments related to the implementations of regional elections. One example is that the information dissemmination and campaign process still feel less organized and effective (Perludem, 2023). In facing the upcoming regional elections, it is important to improve regulations related to this process so that they will be more focused and have a positive impact.

Apart from that, regulations related to regional elections must also be updated to pay more attention to accessibility in all stages. Starting from data collection to the voting process, it is important for the government and Pilkada organizers to ensure that all citizens have equal and easy access to participate in this democratic process. For example, experiences from the 2024 elections show the need for a special approach in collecting data on indigenous peoples who may not have official identification such as KTPs (The Indonesian Institute, 2023). Likewise with people with disabilities and the elderly, special efforts need to be made to ensure that they can be properly recorded and provided with adequate facilities to facilitate their participation in the election process (Kompas.id, 18/1/2024).

However, it is not just a matter of changing the rules, their implementations must also be improved. Experiences from previous elec-



tions show that it is not enough just to have good regulations, but implementers in the field must also really understand existing procedures and be able to implement them well. Considering that the regional elections this time will be held in 37 provinces, almost the same number as the previous elections, counseling and outreach must be carried out thoroughly to ensure that all parties involved can carry out their duties well.

By making these various improvements, it is hoped that the 2024 Pilkada can run more smoothly and democratically, as well as providing wider opportunities for all citizens to participate in determining the future of their region.

Recommendations

Thus, here are some recommendations that can be offered:

- The KPU as the election organizer should make regulatory improvements; namely, by increasing regulations related to the implementations of regional elections to ensure a more orderly and effective process, including more targeted outreach and campaigns.
- 2. Bawaslu and other supervisory organizations should strengthen supervision of the Pilkada process to ensure fairness, integrity and openness in its implementation.

The Regional Head Election (Pilkada) on November 27 2024 marks an important moment for Indonesian democracy, with 37 provinces and 508 districts/cities involved simultaneously. Active community participation in this process is crucial, while good implementations and supervision are the main prerequisites. "Through Pilkada, every citizen has the opportunity to participate in determining the direction of development and leadership at the local level, making it the main stage for the existence and strength of democracy in Indonesia.

- Felia Primaresti -



Examining Voter Participation in the 2024 Election

The General Election Commission (KPU) said that voter participation in the 2024 General Elections (Pemilu) reached a level of above 81 percent, exceeding the target of the 2020-2024 National Medium Term Development Plan (RPJMN); that is, a level of 79.5 percent (antaranews.com, 27/3/2024).

In detail, voter participation in the 2024 Presidential Elections (Pilpres) reached a level of 81.78 percent, or 164,227,475 valid votes. Not much different from the presidential elections, participation in the 2024 Legislative Elections (Pileg) reached a level of 81.42 percent, or 151,796,631 votes for DPR voters. This was revealed in the presentation delivered by KPU Chair Hasyim Asy'ari at the hearing (RDP) with the Commission II of the House of Representatives (DPR) (kompas.com, 25/3/2024).

If compared with the 2019 elections, the participation rate was still maintained at a level of 81 percent. According to KPU data, the voter participation rate in the 2019 presidential elections reached a level of 81.97 percent. Meanwhile, the voter participation rate in the 2019 legislative elections reached a level of 81.69 percent. Meanwhile, the target for voter participation in the 2019 elections at a level of 77.5 percent (bisnis.com, 14/6/2019).

The level of participation in the 2024 elections was a positive note amidst the issue of the neutrality of President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) and allegations of fraud in the elections. The shadow of low public participation due to the two issues above ultimately did not discourage people from voting.

The 2024 elections were contested by 18 national political parties and six local Acehnese parties who were determined to be participants in the legislative elections. Meanwhile, the presidential election was attended by three pairs of candidates; namely, Anies Baswedan and Muhaimin Iskandar, who were supported by the



Change Coalition with three supporting parties; that is, the National Democratic Party (Nasdem), the National Awakening Party (PKB), and the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS). Furthermore, the pair Ganjar Pranowo and Mahfud MD was supported by the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP), the United Development Party (PPP), the People's Conscience Party (Hanura), and the Indonesian Unity Party (Perindo).

Then, the Prabowo Subianto and Gibran Rakabuming Raka pair was supported by the Advanced Indonesia Coalition (KIM), which had seven party members; namely, the Greater Indonesia Movement Party (Gerindra), the Golongan Karya Party (Golkar), the Democratic Party, the National Mandate Party (PAN), the Indonesian Solidarity (PSI), Crescent Star Party (PBB), and Garuda Party.

Voter Participation in Elections in Indonesia

Indonesia has held elections 12 times since 1955. In the 1955 Legislative Elections, the voter participation rate reached a level of 91.4 percent. Meanwhile, the number of valid national votes reached 37.79 million votes, with 257 seats in the People's Representative Council (DPR). Entering the New Order era, elections were held again in 1971. In the 1971 legislative elections, the voter participation rate reached a level of 96.6 percent. This figure is the highest in history (Katadata, 21/6/2022).

The high voter participation at that time was not due to public awareness of the importance of elections, but because of the mobilization carried out by the New Order regime's political machine consisting of the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI), Golongan Karya (Golkar), and the bureaucracy to mobilize voters.

Voter participation in the New Order era was relatively low; namely, a level of 93.6 percent in the 1997 elections. The decline in participation in the 1997 elections was due to the strengthening of community groups who abstained from voting (the white group, or Golput). Golput itself was a political protest movement against national problems. The target of the protest from the abstention movement was the holding of elections (Sanit in Arianto, 2011).

Commenting on abstentions, Eep Saefulloh Fatah classified abstentions into four groups. First, technical abstainers, namely, those who due to certain technical reasons (such as family death, late arrival, etc.) are unable to attend the polling place, or those who vote incorrectly, so their vote is declared invalid (Arianto, 2011).



Second, technical-political abstainers, such as those who are not registered as voters due to their own fault or that of other parties (statistical institutions, election organizers). Third, political abstainers; namely, those who feel that they have no choice among the available candidates or do not believe that the elections would bring changes and improvements. Fourth, ideological abstainers, namely, those who do not believe in (liberal) democratic mechanisms and do not want to be involved in them either for reasons of religious fundamentalism or other political-ideological reasons (Arianto, 2011).

Suharto's resignation marked the birth of the Reform era. In this era, elections were held in 1999, with 48 political parties participating in the elections. The voter participation rate was also quite high, reaching a level of 92.7 percent. However, entering the 2004 and 2009 elections, participation levels had showed a decline. This decrease was due to the increase in the number of abstentions in the two elections. Furthermore, the election participation rate, especially legislative elections, again showed an increase to a level of 75.11 percent in the 2014 Elections. Then, in the 2019 Elections, the participation rate again increased to a level of 81.69 percent (Katadata, 21/6/2022).

2024 Voter Participation Analysis

Ramlan Surbakti (1992) mentioned two important variables that influenced the level of political participation, namely: first, the level of political awareness. Second, how government policies and government implementations were assessed.

Referring to these two variables, the 81 percent voter participation rate in the 2024 elections indicates the increasing political awareness of citizens regarding their rights and obligations. One of the rights and obligations of citizens in the political field is implemented through participating in elections.

Moreover, currently there are three candidate pairs and 18 parties competing, thereby encouraging voter political participation. The presidential and vice-presidential candidates as well as legislative candidates from 18 political parties encouraged voters to use their voting rights as citizens to fight for the candidate of their choice.

In the second variable, related to the assessment of government performance, although currently there is no incumbent like in the 2019 elections, there are candidates who represent the face of the



current government; for example, Prabowo Subianto, who is actually the Minister of Defense, and Gibran Rakabuming Raka who is President Jokowi's eldest son.

The assessment of the Jokowi Government certainly has an impact on the level of participation in voting to support the Prabowo-Gibran candidate pair. People who assess the Jokowi government's performance well will vote for the Prabowo-Gibran pair. Meanwhile, people who think that it is bad, and what is added is the issue of President Jokowi's neutrality will of course choose the other two pairs. This means that participation in the presidential and legislative elections will still be maintained at a level of 81 percent in the 2024 elections.

Conclusions

According to the explanations above, the level of political participation is influenced by the level of political awareness. Referring to the voter participation figures in the presidential and legislative elections in the 2024 elections, it indicates that citizens' political awareness is increasing regarding their rights and obligations. One of the rights and obligations of citizens in the political field is implemented through participating in elections.

If we look at it from a quantitative perspective, the figure of 81 percent has exceeded the 2020-2024 RPJMN target, which was 79.5 percent, of course this is worthy of appreciation. This achievement was the hard work of all parties from election organizers, election participants, government, mass media, to civil society organizations who continued to ensure that elections as an instrument of democracy were carried out in accordance with the constitution.

However, if you look at it from a qualitative perspective, of course there are still notes for improvements in the implementations of the 2024 elections that need to be addressed. The Election Supervisory Agency (Bawaslu) discovered 19 problems that occurred in the voting and counting of votes in the 2024 Elections. These findings were compiled from the results of patrols in 38 provinces through the Election Supervisory Information System (Siwaslu) application until Thursday (15/2/2024) at 06.00 WIB (katadata.co.id, 16/02/2024).

The following are the 19 problems identified by Bawaslu; namely: TPS were opened late; there were no visual aids (braille template);



Sirekap could not be accessed by election observers, witnesses and the public; voting logistics are incomplete; there are special voters who used their voting rights not in accordance with their e-KTP subdistrict domicile; Swapped ballots; companions for voters with disabilities did not sign the companion statemenst; KPPS does not explain the procedures for voting and counting votes; DPT notice boards were not installed around the TPS and did not contain voters who were marked as ineligible; the witness wore an attribute containing the elements or serial numbers of the candidate pairs/political partes/DPDs; Vote counting began before voting ends (katadata.co.id, 16/02/2024).

There was mobilization or efforts to direct voter choices (by the success team, election participants, and/or organizers); Witnesses could not show written mandate letters from the campaign team or election participants; Voters exercise their right to vote/vote more than once; intimidation of voters or election organizers at polling stations; inconsistency in the results of counting valid and invalid ballots with the number of voters who voted; TPS supervisors are not given a copy of the model C form; there are no witnesses, TPS supervisors and the public who can witness the vote counting process; and Intimidation of organizers (katadata.co.id, 16/02/2024).

Apart from Bawaslu's findings, there are also other notes such as the problem of differences in information dissemination and campaign periods, which have not been regulated and strictly enforced by election organizers. Next, there is the issue of using the Recapitulation Information System (Sirekap), which has sparked controversy in the process of recapitulating the vote count results.

The notes for improvements must of course be addressed by policy makers such as election organizers and the Government. Apart from that, election organizers must also open up space for participation for other stakeholders such as election participants, civil society organizations, academics and mass media to provide input for improving the election. This is so that elections in Indonesia can run well in terms of quantity and quality in the future.

- Arfianto Purbolaksono -

Ouantitatively, the level of voter participation in the 2024 Elections must be appreciated. However, there are still notes in the implementations of the 2024 elections that must be addressed. The notes for improvements must of course be addressed by policy makers such as election organizers and the government. Apart from that, election organizers must also open up space for participation for other stakeholders such as election participants, civil society organizations, academics and mass media to provide input for improving the election.





The Indonesian Institute (TII) is a Center for Public Policy Research that was established on 21 October 2004 by a group of young, dynamic activists and intellectuals. TII is an independent, non-partisan, non-profit institution, whose main funding stems from grants and contributions from foundations, companies, and individuals.

TII has the aim of becoming a main research center in Indonesia for public policy matters and has committed to giving contribution to the debates over public policies and to improving the quality of the planning and results of public policy by promoting good governance principles and public participation in the policy processes in Indonesia.

TII's visions are public policies in Indonesia which highly uphold human rights and rule of law, as well as involve participation of various stakeholders and practice democratic good governance principles.

TII's missions are to conduct reliable research that is independent and non-partisan and to channel the research to the policy-makers, the private sector, and academia in order to improve the quality of Indonesian policy-makers.

TII also assumes the role of disseminating ideas to the society so that they are well informed about the policies that will have a good impact on the people's lives. In other words, TII has a position to support the democratization process and the public policy reform, as it will be involved in the process.

The scope of the research and review on public policies undertaken by TII includes economic, social, political, and legal affairs. The main activities which have been conducted by **TII** in order to achieve our vision and mission, are: research, surveys, facilitation and advocacy through training and working groups, public discussions, public education, weekly editorial articles ("Wacana" or Discourses), Instagram Live Series and Space Twitter (Policy Talks and Initiative!), monthly analysis ("Update Indonesia" in Indonesian and "The



Indonesian Update" in English), mid-year policy analysis ("Policy Assessment"), annual policy analysis ("Indonesian Report"), and monthly discussion forum on policy issues ("The Indonesian Forum").

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RESEARCH ON ECONOMIC AFFAIRS

The economy tends to be used as an indicator of the success of the government as a policy-maker. Economy plays an important role as one of the fundamentals of national development. Limited resources have often caused the government to face obstacles in implementing economic policies that will optimally benefit the people. The increase in the quality of the people's critical thinking has forced the government to conduct comprehensive studies in every decision-making process. In fact, the studies will not be stopped when the policy is already in place. Studies will be continued until the policy evaluation process.

TII focus on economic issues, such as monetary policy and fiscal policy, as well as issues on sustainable development by using analysis which refer to economic freedom principles. Monetary issues will focus on the Indonesian Central Bank to maintain economic stability, both regarding inflation and exchange rate. Meanwhile, fiscal policy will focus on the discussions over the National Budget and infrastructure development both in the regions and in the cities. In relation to sustainable development, TII research is focusing on productivity, competitiveness, infrastructure development, and development gap. In addition, TII also upholds economic freedom principles in highlighting the importance of individual freedom and involvement of private sectors in increasing development and improving welfare in Indonesia.

The TII Economic Research Division is present for those who are interested in the conditions of the economy. The results of the research are intended to assist policy-makers, regulators, and donor agencies in making decisions. The research that TII offers: (1) Economic Policy Analysis; (2) Regional and Sectoral Prospects; and (3) Program Evaluation.



RESEARCH ON LEGAL AFFAIRS

According to stipulations in Law No. 12 Year 2011 on the Formulation of Laws and Regulations, every bill which will be discussed by the legislative and the executive must be complemented with academic paper. This stipulation is also confirmed in Law No. 15 Year 2019 on the Amendment of Law No. 12 Year 2011 regarding the Formulation of Laws and Regulations.

Therefore, comprehensive research is very important and needed in making a qualified academic paper. With qualified academic papers, the bills will have strong academic foundation both from academic and content aspects. Furthermore, academic paper also functions as an early tracking over possibilities of overlapping laws and regulations, so that revocation of local regulations or other related issues which can be caused by legal, economic, or political aspects in the future, can be minimized as soon as possible.

TII offers normative and legal research related to harmonization and synchronization of laws and regulations, especially in making academic papers, legal opinion on harmonization and synchronization of laws and regulations, and legislative drafting for the formulation of local regulations bill drafts or other laws and regulations. In addition, TII also offers openly research on other legal issues related to Constitutional Law and Public Administration, Human Rights, and Political Corruption.

RESEARCH ON THE POLITICAL AFFAIRS

The enactment of Law No. 23 Year 2014 on the latest regulation on the Local Government, has created different relations between the Central Government and the Local Government. Entering the era of Bureaucracy Reform, specification of division of affairs of the Central Government and the Local Government has increasingly demanded the implementation of good governance principles. The government is demanded to be adaptive and responsive towards public aspiration and services. Therefore, public policy research become more important for both the Central Government and the Local Government to analyse context and current issues in the regions. The government must also consider various actors whether political actors or bureaucrats, as well as public's aspiration and other non-state actor in policy processes.



In order to respond those needs, TII research in political affairs offer policy assessment on various policies which were already applied or will be implemented. TII will look at socio-cultural, economy, legal, and political aspects in assessing public policies. Our research will be useful to assist government in formulating policies which are in line with context, priorities, and people's aspiration. TII also offers various breakthrough of transformative policies according to existing contexts in particular and Open Government principles' implementation in general, in order to increase public participation in policy processes, particularly in the era of the openness of public information.

Political Research Division of TII provide analysis and policy recommendations in order to generate strategic policy in the strengthening of democracy and the establishment of good governance both at the national and local levels. Political research forms are offered by TII (1) Public Policy Analysis, (2) Media Monitoring, (3) Mapping & Positioning Research, (4) Need Assessment Research, (5) Survey Indicator.

RESEARCH ON THE SOCIAL AFFAIRS

Social development needs policy foundations that come from independent and accurate research. Social analysis is a need for the government, the businesspeople, academia, professionals, NGOs, and civil society to improve social development. Social analysis is important to identify strategic issues which are developing and to make the right stakeholders' mapping to promote significant change in the context of development, public policy, and democracy in Indonesia.

The Social Research Division is present to offer strong and valid recommendations to produce strategic, relevant, efficient and effective, and impactful policies, in addressing to existing various issues. For example, issues related to education, health, population, environment, women, children, and elderly. Social research that TII offers: (1) Social Policy Analysis; (2) Explorative Research; (3) Mapping & Positioning Research; (4) Need Assessment Research; (5) Program Evaluation Research; and (5) Indicator Survey.



PRE-ELECTION AND REGIONAL HEAD ELECTION

One of the activities carried out and offered by TII is a pre-election survey as well as a pre-election and regional head election. The reasons underlying the implementation of pre-election and regional head election surveys, namely: (1) A good election is a democratic process that can be arranged, calculated, and predicted in the resulting process; (2) Survey is one of the important and common discussions to measure, calculate, and predict how the process and results of the General Election and the Regional Head Election will take place, in accordance to the expectations of the candidates; (3) It is very important to win in the General Election and the Regional Head Election based on empirical, scientific, measurable and supportable data.

As one of the important aspects of a strategic candidate's election, the survey is useful for monitoring political power. In this case, the success team needs to conduct a survey for: (1) mapping the candidate's position in public perception; (2) mapping voters' desires; (3) publishing the most effective political machinery used as voters; and (4) Looking for the most effective medium for the campaign.

EVALUATION OF A PROJECT OR A PROGRAM

One of the activities that have been performed and experienced offered by TII is a qualitative evaluation of the projects and programs of non-governmental organizations and government. Evaluation activities are offered TII stages of mid-term evaluation of the project/program (mid-term evaluation) and also the final evaluation at the end of the project/program (final evaluation).

As we know, the evaluation is an important step in the implementation of a project or program. Mid-Term Evaluation of the project or program is intended to look at and analyze the challenges, the overall learning takes place during the project or program, and make recommendations for the continuity of the project or program. Meanwhile, the final evaluation allows us to view and analyze the outcomes and the lessons learned to ensure the achievement of all the objectives of the project or program at the end of the project or program.



THE INDONESIAN FORUM

The Indonesian Forum is a monthly discussion activity on actual issues in the political, economic, social, legal, cultural, defense, and environmental fields. TII organizes these forums as media for competent resource persons, stakeholders, policymakers, civil society activists, academicians, and the media to meet and have discussion.

Themes that have been raised were the ones that have caught public attention, such as migrant workers, social conflicts, domestic politics, and local direct elections. The main consideration in picking a theme is sociological and political reality and the context of the relevant public policy at the time that the Indonesian Forum is delivered.

It is expected that the public can get the big picture of a particular event as the Indonesian Forum also presents relevant resource persons.

Since its inception, the Indonesian Institute is very aware of the passion of the public to get discussions that are not only rich in substance but also well formatted, which support balanced ideas exchanges ideas and the equal involvement of the different elements of the society.

The discussions, which are designed to only invite a limited number of participants, do not only feature idea exchanges but also regularly offer policy briefs (policy recommendations) to relevant policymakers and also summaries to the participants, especially the media people and the resource persons at the end of each discussion. Therefore, the discussions will not end without solutions.



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LOCAL COUNCIL TRAINING

The roles and functions of local councils in monitoring local governments are very important. They need to ensure that participative and democratic policies will be espoused. Members of provincial and regent local councils are required to have strong capacity to understand democratization matters, regional autonomy, legislative techniques, budgeting, local Politics, and political marketing. Thus, it is important to empower members of local councils.

In order for local councils to be able to response every problem that will come out as a result of any policy implemented by the central government or local governments, the Indonesian Institute invites the leaderships and members of local councils to undergo training to improve their capacity.

WORKING GROUP

The Indonesian Institute believes that a good public policy process can be held with some engagement and empowerment of the stakeholders. The Indonesian Institute takes a role as one of mediator agencies to facilitate some forums in which the Government, Council Members, Private Sectors, NGOs and Academicians can meet in interactive forums. The Indonesian Institute provides facilitation on working groups and public advocacy.

The Indonesian Institute takes the role of mediator and facilitator in order to encourage the synergy of public policy work between the stakeholders and policy makers and also to have a synergy with funding agencies (donors).



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