

# The Indonesian Update

Monthly Review on Economic, Legal, Security, Political, and Social Affairs



## Main Report:

The Opportunities for Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC) Implementations in the ASEAN Region

### Law

- The Certainty of Human Rights Protection in the Confiscation of the Assets of Criminal Offenders ■
- The Urgency of Restricting the Powers of the Village Head in the Village Law ■

### Politics

- Examining Women's Issues in the Selection Process for Candidates for Legislative Members ■  
for the Candidates for Legislative Members for the 2024 Elections
- Observing Silon's Readiness in the Registration Stage for the Candidates ■  
for Legislative Members for the 2024 Elections
- Looking at the Performance of Ganjar Pranowo in Leading Central Java in Three Variables ■

### Social

- The Implementations of Religious Moderation Policy in Preventing ■  
the Practice of Religious Intolerance in Indonesia
- The Jakarta Government and the Anticipation of Urbanization Post-Homecoming Travels ■

# CONTENTS

---

FOREWORD .....	1
<b>MAIN REPORT</b>	
The Opportunities for Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC) Implementations in the ASEAN Region .....	3
<b>LAW</b>	
The Certainty of Human Rights Protection in the Confiscation of the Assets of Criminal Offenders.....	9
The Urgency of Restricting the Powers of the Village Head in the Village Law .....	12
<b>POLITICS</b>	
Examining Women's Issues in the Selection Process for Candidates for Legislative Members .....	15
Observing Silon's Readiness in the Registration Stage for the Candidates for Legislative Members for the 2024 Elections	18
Looking at the Performance of Ganjar Pranowo in Leading Central Java in Three Variables.....	22
<b>SOCIAL</b>	
The Implementations of Religious Moderation Policy in Preventing the Practice of Religious Intolerance in Indonesia	27
The Jakarta Government and the Anticipation of Urbanization Post-Homecoming Travels.....	32

INSTITUTIONAL PROFILE .....	36
RESEARCH PROGRAMS, SURVEY AND EVALUATION	38
PUBLIC DISCUSSION .....	42
TRAINING & WORKING GROUP FACILITATION ...	43

---

**Contributors :**

Ahmad Hidayah, Arfianto Purbolaksono, Dewi Rahmawati Nur Aulia, Galang Taufani, Nuri Resti Chayyani. Editor: Awan Wibowo Laksono Poesoro

---

# FOREWORD

---

The May 2023 edition of the Indonesian Update presents a main report on the opportunities for implementing the Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC) in the ASEAN region. As a center of economic growth, the increasingly advanced payment system in ASEAN also has the opportunity to contribute to it. One way is through CBDC. However, in reality, the financial inclusion gap is still a challenge amidst the opportunities that exist. In addition, the risks of implementing CBDC are still a challenge that must be seriously anticipated.

In the legal field, the Indonesian Update raises the urgency of ratifying the Asset Confiscation Bill. The bill, which has been discussed since 2006, is believed to be able to confiscate assets that are disproportionate to income or assets that are sources of additional wealth that cannot be proven. However, this leaves questions about how the mechanisms will be implemented, including in terms of human rights (HAM). Next, we discuss the revision of the Village Law (UU) to become a priority in the National Legislation Program (Prolegnas) for 2023. This has then sparked pros and cons in the society.

In the political field, the Indonesian Update looks at women's issues in the selection process for candidates for legislative members. The two main problems for women in the selection process for legislative candidates are that women are often only used as complements, and women do not get the electoral districts they really control or do not get strategic serial numbers. Next, we discuss the readiness of the Candidacy Information System, or Silon, in the registration stage for legislative candidates for the 2024 elections.

In addition, in the political field, we also discuss the performance of Ganjar Pranowo in leading Central Java through three variables; namely, the Human Development Index (IPM), Gender Development Index (IPG), and the percentage of poor people.

In the social field, the Indonesian Update raises the issue of implementing a policy of religious moderation in preventing the practice of religious intolerance in Indonesia. Furthermore, we also discuss the enforcement of seasonal population administration discipline, which is carried out after Eid to anticipate increasing poverty and crime in urban areas.

It is hoped that the monthly publication of the Indonesian Update with current themes will help policy makers in government and business institutions – as well as academics, think tanks and elements of civil society, both domestic and foreign, to obtain actual information and contextual analysis on economic, political, social, and legal conditions in Indonesia, as well as an understanding of public policy in Indonesia.

**Happy Reading.**

## The Opportunities for Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC) Implementations in the ASEAN Region

---

Countries around the world are currently trying to develop Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC), including Indonesia. CBDC is digital money whose circulation is controlled by the central bank. It is used as a legal tender to replace a currency. An CBDC will act as a digital representation of a country's currency. CBDC has fulfilled 3 (three) basic functions of money; namely, as a store of value, a medium of exchange, and a unit of account (Ministry of Finance, 14/2/2022). The application of CBDC is still in the research stage in Indonesia to examine the opportunities and challenges that will be faced in the future.

At the momentum of the Group of 20 (G20) meeting in Bali in 2022, Bank Indonesia, together with the central banks from Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia and the Philippines officially signed a Cooperation MoU in order to implement a digital payment system across the 5 countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). This was important to discuss further during the chairmanship of ASEAN 2023, which has the theme "Epicentrum of Growth" in May 2023 in Labuan Bajo.

Integrating the financial system in the region is important in the context of digital economic transformation in the financial sector. However, the implementations of CBDCs also still find controversy, as they can threaten privacy, financial security, and individual economic freedom. They can also pose exorbitant costs rather compared to their benefits.

This paper shall review the definition, benefits, opportunities and challenges of CBDC in ASEAN, as well as those who reject the Digital Rupiah payment system. The understanding of CBDC needs to be well and comprehensively disseminated so that people can see the benefits and threats of CBDC in the ASEAN region.

Digital Rupiah is Rupiah Money with a digital format that can be used as physical money (banknotes and coins), Electronic Money (chip and server-based), and money in Payment Instruments Using Cards / APMK (debit cards and credit cards) that we use today. The Digital Rupiah is issued only by Bank Indonesia as the Central Bank of the Republic of Indonesia.

If implemented, the Digital Rupiah will be a complement and is not intended to replace existing money that is circulated and used by the public today, including banknotes and coins. Like the functions of the rupiah, the Digital Rupiah functions as a medium of exchange, a means of storing value, and a unit of account.

### **The Benefits of CBDC**

There are several benefits to be gained if CBDC is implemented. One of them was presented by Fairi, Sahabuddin, and Jupriyanto (2021) in an article entitled “Analysis of the Application of Central Bank Digital Currency in a National Security Perspective”.

According to Fairi, Sahabuddin, and Jupriyanto (2021), one of the benefits that can be obtained from the implementations of CBDC is the reflection of state sovereignty, which is a form of state defense in the non-military field that focuses on maintaining rupiah sovereignty from the threat of the presence of private digital currency and various other privately controlled digital payment modes.

In addition, there is an aspect of efficiency in terms of printing banknotes and metal-type money. The presence of CBDC will be one of the payment alternatives that can be chosen by the public without eliminating the pre-existing payment instruments. As an alternative, CBDCs can reduce the dependence on banknote and metal-type money that are costly for printing and maintenance.

With CBDC, the government through Bank Indonesia can strictly control the circulation of money in and out. All transactions will be detected because each CBDC account uses a residence identity that is only owned by one person. Although currently the population identity has not fully functioned as a Single Identity Number (SIN), but with synergy between state institutions, it can be realized.

CBDCs can also be beneficial in terms of increasing financial inclusion. CBDCs can provide a public digital means of payment without requiring individuals to have bank accounts. CBDCs also have an impact on improving monetary policy. Some academics have suggested that by promoting financial inclusion, CBDCs could also improve monetary policy transmission.

Another advantage of the digital rupiah is lower operational and transaction costs, especially in remote areas, where physical money distribution is burdened with infrastructure problems. Digital rupiah can also be stored on smartphones, cards, or e-wallets, so it has a much higher level of efficiency.

Although it has many benefits, the findings of Fairi, Sahabuddin, and Jupriyanto (2021) noted that CDBC had risks that were likely to arise. First, there are security risks that occur if storing wealth in a digital form. By placing this wealth under the direct supervision of the central bank, it has risks of giving the central bank a great power to observe and potentially control individual finances. While this may be useful for intervention in cases of fraud or money laundering, it can undermine the privacy or even security of individual wealth if there are risks of central banks siphoning off or manipulating public CBDCs for fiscal policy agendas.

Second, there are risks of banking sector disintermediation. Individuals can move their money from deposits in commercial banks to CBDC ownership accounts. Such circumstances will weigh on profitability and may lead to more expensive or lower lending to the real economy. Another issue to consider is “run risks”. In times of crisis, bank customers can switch from deposits to CBDCs, which may be considered safer and more liquid. But in many countries of the world, despite the existence of CBDCs, depositors can also seek refuge in foreign currencies.

Third, CBDCs also imply costs and risks for central banks. CBDCs are prohibitively expensive for central banks and also pose risks to their reputation. Failure to fulfill any of the CDBC’s functions due to technological disruption, cyberattacks, or simply human error can damage the central bank’s reputation.

### **The Opportunities and Challenges of CDBD in ASEAN**

According to the definition and benefits of implementing CDBC, ASEAN member countries have the opportunity to realize a payment system with digital currencies in each country, such as the cross-border payment (QRIS) payment system that has been implemented in various member countries in ASEAN, such as Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Singapore (BI, 27/2/2023).


Before discussing further all the challenges, there are opportunities that can be used by ASEAN countries to implement CDBC in the region. This is in line with digital transactions that are most widely used by ASEAN residents, as found by the World Economic Forum.

According to a World Economic Forum (WEF) report, the most



popular digital financial service in ASEAN is online cashless transfer or payment services. Of the approximately 90,000 people surveyed, 46 percent of them have frequently used the service. There are also those who often use digital financial services to save, borrow money, invest, or for other purposes, but the proportion is smaller as shown in the chart.

**Chart 1. Types of Digital Financial Services Frequently Used by ASEAN Residents (July-August 2022)**



Source: World Economic Forum, 2022.

The graph shows that 46 percent of respondents make cashless payments. The high interest in non-cash payments for the ASEAN community is an opportunity that can be used as a consideration for the implementations of CDBC. In addition to opportunities, there are also challenges faced in realizing financial inclusion in ASEAN in the form of CDBC.

One of the challenges of realizing financial inclusion in ASEAN is the financial inclusion gap that is still clearly displayed. Minister of Finance Sri Mulyani said that the financial inclusion gap in question was the access to digital financial services, especially for MSME players (Kompas.com, 29/3/2023). According to World Bank data in 2021, there were still significant differences in the financial inclusion index among ASEAN member countries.

The lowest inclusion index was recorded at a level of 33 percent, while the highest level was in the range of 90 percent. The average financial inclusion index in ASEAN was 41 percent.

According to the data from the Global Financial Index, Cambodia and Laos had the lowest financial inclusion index, at levels of 33.39

percent and 37.32 percent, respectively. Meanwhile, the Philippines financial inclusion reached a level of 51.37 percent. Meanwhile, neighboring countries, such as Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand, had the highest financial inclusion indices. Malaysia was at a level of 88.37 percent, Singapore was 97.55 percent, Thailand 95.58 percent, and Indonesia reached 51.76 percent.

The high financial inclusion gap in the ASEAN region is an obstacle faced to realize an easier payment system for the ASEAN community. If the gap can be minimized properly, it will facilitate local transactions and realize more open trade between countries. In addition, local products produced by a country become more competitive even at the ASEAN level.

### **CDBC's controversy**

In addition to the risks mentioned earlier, CDBC has an issue that its implementations will have an impact on economic freedom. According to an article titled "CDBC: Assessing the Risks and Dispelling the Myths" in the Cato Institute written by Nicholas Anthony and Norbert Michel, CDBC has several risks that cannot be ignored, such as financial privacy, financial freedom, free markets, and cybersecurity.

The article also highlighted the rejection to CDBC. Anthony and Michel say that there is no reason for the federal government to issue a CBDC if the cost is so high and the benefits are so low. The Congress must ensure that the federal government does not issue CBDCs.

In the United States and abroad, the efforts to launch CBDCs are underway in an effort to strengthen government control over payment systems. However, a U.S. CBDC will eventually jeopardize the freedoms of Americans. Therefore, there should be no place for CBDCs in the American economy. The Congress should explicitly prohibit the Federal Reserve and Treasury Department from issuing CBDCs of any kind (Anthony and Michel, 2023).

### **Recommendations**

Considering the reviews that have been mentioned, such as the definition, benefits, and controversies of CDBC as a form of digital money as a means of payment, this paper shall encourage Indonesia through the ASEAN chairmanship, which carries the theme "Epicentrum of Growth", to encourage further discussions to consider the ratio of benefits to costs so that ASEAN truly becomes the center of growth in terms of a comprehensive payment system.

The holding of the ASEAN Summit in Indonesia in 2023 is a

momentum for ASEAN member countries to be more serious about increasing financial inclusion so that it is not too unequal. The central banks in ASEAN need to align the agenda to improve digital literacy and financial literacy of their people. The central banks also need to increase public education and awareness so that CBDC can be implemented.

Given the risks faced by one of them is individual financial freedom, central banks in ASEAN should emphasize their policy limits so as not to violate the privacy of their people in transactions. In this regard, clear regulations between the central banks and the public, as well as related mechanisms to anticipate CBDC risks, are important to ensure that the central banks remain within the corridors in maintaining the financial stability, while ensuring economic freedom, privacy and financial security of the public.

**- Nuri Resti Chayyani -**

*As a growth hub, ASEAN's increasingly advanced payment system also has opportunities to contribute. One of them is through the Central Bank Digital Currency (CDBC). However, in reality, the financial inclusion gap is still a challenge amid existing opportunities. In addition, the risks of implementing CDBC are also still a challenge that must be seriously anticipated.*

## The Certainty of Human Rights Protection in the Confiscation of the Assets of Criminal Offenders

---

In the midst of the disclosure of the fantastic amount of wealth of government officials, the urgency of ratifying the Asset Confiscation Bill (RUU) has been echoed again. The bill, which has been discussed since 2006, is believed to be able to confiscate assets that are disproportionate to income or assets come from sources of additional wealth that cannot be proven. However, this leaves questions about how the mechanisms will be implemented, including in terms of human rights.

The results of an opinion poll held by Kompas Research and Development on April 4-6 2023 showed that the majority of the public would like the Asset Confiscation Bill to be completed immediately. According to this survey, 82.2 percent of respondents considered that the Asset Confiscation Bill should be urgently discussed and enacted. In fact, 35.5 percent of respondents considered it very urgent (Kompas, 10/4/2023).

In the survey, only 12.1 percent and 1.5 percent of respondents considered that the Asset Confiscation Bill was not urgent and not very urgent to pass. The same survey also captured the aspirations of the majority of the public (78.5 percent) who agreed that the state had the right to seize state administrators' assets that were unreasonable and originated from illegal sources. This was in line with the main substance of the Asset Confiscation Bill; namely, assets obtained by state officials from unfair income, and could not be proven legally or suspected to be related to criminal assets, could be confiscated for the state (Kompas, 10/4/2023).

Furthermore, the majority of the public (87.9 percent) also believed that one of the reasons for rampant corruption in Indonesia was the inability of impoverishing corruptors. In line with that, as much as 8.6 percent and 52.7 percent of the public were very confident and confident that the Asset Confiscation Bill would become a strong

law to provide a deterrent effect for perpetrators of corruption (Kompas, 10/4/2023).

### **Asset Confiscation and Regulation**

As is well known, regulations related to asset confiscation are actually not new. In fact, there is no absence of instruments governing illegal asset confiscation related to corruption. Article 67 of Law Number 8/2010 concerning the Prevention and Eradication of Money Laundering Crimes (TPPU) states that law enforcement officials can apply to a district court to determine assets that are known, or reasonably suspected to be proceeds of crime, as state assets or returning to those who are entitled (Fernando, et al, 2022).

In fact, the Supreme Court has even made procedures for handling these illegal assets as set forth in Supreme Court Regulation (Perma) Number 1/2013 concerning the Procedures for Settlement of Applications for Handling Assets in Money Laundering Crimes and Other Crimes. Nevertheless, from 2013 to 2020, according to research by the Financial Transaction Reports and Analysis Center (PPATK), there were only four cases where illegal assets were confiscated using Article 67 Law No. 8/2010 in conjunction with Perma No. 1/2013; namely, one case related to narcotics and three cases related to fraud in a business email compromise (phishing) (Fernando, et al, 2022).

This fact shows that the implementations of existing regulations have not shown anything positive in its implementations. However, legal issues are not only based on the substance aspect. Quoting what was conveyed by an American Professor of Law, Lawrence Friedman (1975), legal issues are also related to law enforcement (structure) and legal culture (culture). Therefore, comprehensively, the facts on the ground show that there are problems in every aspect.

### **The Asset Confiscation Bill: the Mechanisms for Enforcement of Corruption vs Human Rights**

In principle, Article 9 of the Asset Confiscation Bill states that investigators or public prosecutors who carry out blocking and confiscation cannot be prosecuted civilly or criminally. Therefore, it becomes immunity for law enforcement officials in carrying out their duties. The following explains this in more detail.

As is well known, in the draft Asset Confiscation Bill, investigators can search for assets that can be confiscated from the police, pros-

ecutors, Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), National Narcotics Agency (BNN), and civil servants. Investigators can cooperate with institutions that carry out financial transaction analysis.

Therefore, if analyzed further, this has several problems. First, this concept actually has the potential to have deviations from law enforcement officials. This is related to how the oversight mechanisms and at the same time the potential for misappropriation by law enforcement officials (APH) in carrying out their authority.

Second, even though the existing procedural law tries to accommodate testing mechanisms for proving asset forfeiture, with a position that places victims of asset confiscation to carry out reverse burden of proof, victims of asset forfeiture will be even more disadvantaged if they receive arbitrariness from APH. In this case, anyone who has the potential to be considered as the perpetrator of a crime can be submitted as a person whose assets will be confiscated, including in relation to the arbitrariness of APH.

### **The Asset Confiscation and Human Rights Synchronization Law**

Thus, the Asset Confiscation Draft Law (RUU) must be able to accommodate interests related to matters related to the certainty of asset confiscation carried out by APH so that protection against potential misappropriation by law enforcement officials becomes appropriate.

This needs to be encouraged by the Government and the DPR by drafting a bill that places more emphasis on the stages of confiscation of assets that are capable of event mechanisms by providing oversight of APH, by providing references and studies in accordance with values that are in line with human rights principles (HAM). as contained in the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia and Law Number 39/1999 concerning Human Rights (HAM).

**- Galang Taufani -**

*There are three important tasks given by President of the Republic of Indonesia Joko Widodo to Dito Ariotedjo as the new Minister of Youth and Sports (Menpora), such as increasing achievements in the SEA Games and ASIAN Games; organizing sports competitions at every level; and improving the sports ecosystem in Indonesia. In addition, the new Menpora has also been tasked with pushing the Indonesian Parliament to hasten the ratification of the Sports Bill.*

## The Urgency of Restricting the Powers of the Village Head in the Village Law

---

Some time ago village heads throughout Indonesia staged demonstrations at the DPR building. They demanded a change in the village head's term of office from six years to nine years. The government and DPR responded positively to this demand. In fact, the Legislation Body and some members of the political party faction in the DPR have proposed that the Village Law (UU) be revised to become a priority National Legislation Program (Prolegnas) for 2023. This has sparked pros and cons.

President Jokowi responded to this pressure and admitted that he did not question every aspiration of the people. According to him, it can be submitted to the DPR. Village heads who are members of Papdesi (All-Indonesia Association of Village Government Apparatuses) previously came to Jakarta to demonstrate in front of the DPR RI Building. They demanded that the village head's term of office be replaced from six years to nine years in one term. They asked the DPR to revise the term of office stipulated in Law Number 6 of 2014 concerning Villages (CNNIndonesia.com, 24/1/2023). Konflik Hukum Pernikahan Beda Agama (PBA)

### **Pros and Cons of Village Head Term of Office**

Law Number 6 of 2014 concerning Villages provides the basics related to governance in village administration, one of which is the tenure of the village head. Article 39 of the Village Law stipulates that the tenure of a Village head is 6 years and a maximum of three terms can be served.

This is reinforced by the Decision of the Constitutional Court (MK) Number 42/PUU-XIX/2021 which further explains the limits on the powers possessed by the Village Head. On the other hand, similar conditions still spark conflict to reduce or even shorten the term of office. This can also be seen in the application for judicial re-

view at the Constitutional Court which is registered with Number 15/PUU-XXI/2023 which explains that it is not symmetrical with democratic conditions (mkri.di, 15/2/2023).

### **The Problem of the Power of the Village Head**

The strong and long power of the village head leaves at least some quite crucial problems. This can be seen from the negative excesses of the existence of power in terms of governance at the village level. This can be seen from one form of arrogance carried out by the village head, namely in the process of appointing village officials. The village head often appoints village officials who have political, kinship, or kinship ties with the village head. In terms of corruption cases that occurred at the village level, until 2022 there were 686 village heads who were caught up in village fund corruption. This shows that the current term of office of 6 years has created corrupt behavior, and the potential will be even higher if the term of office is extended (pshk.or.id, 24/1/2023).

This condition illustrates the existence of a situation that actually perpetuates the length of absolute and uncontrolled power. It is equivalent to three dollars with the view that the more powerful a person is, the more corrupt he has the potential to be.

### **The Urgency of Restricting Term of Office**

Several things that should be concluded are: First, the demand for an extension of the village head's term of office is something that must be anticipated because it creates room for great abuse of power. Second, the length of term of office and the periodization of the position of the village head has the potential to cause an institutional disaster, because this rule is contrary to democracy.

Therefore, a model and concept of constitutionalism and the importance of limiting powers are needed. This will have an impact on preventive measures so that abuse of authority does not occur in various aspects that originate from the power of the village head.

Instead of accommodating the large political interests of the village head, the Government and the DPR should again take into account the impact of demands for an extension of the village head's term of office and instead push for a revision that further limits the powers of the term of office. Several things that should be concluded are: First, the demand for an extension of the village head's term of office is something that must be anticipated because it creates room for great abuse of power. Second, the length of term of office and



the periodization of the position of the village head has the potential to cause an institutional disaster, because this rule is contrary to democracy.

Therefore, a model and concept of constitutionalism and the importance of limiting powers are needed. This will have an impact on preventive measures so that abuse of authority does not occur in various aspects that originate from the power of the village head.

Instead of accommodating the large political interests of the village head, the Government and the DPR should again take into account the impact of demands for an extension of the village head's term of office and instead push for a revision that further limits the powers of the term of office.

**- Galang Taufani -**

*Some time ago, village heads throughout Indonesia staged demonstrations at the DPR building and demanded a change in the tenure of village heads from six years to nine years. This sparked pros and cons.*

## **Examining Women's Issues in the Selection Process for Candidates for Legislative Members**

---

On April 24 2023, the general elections, which will be held in 2024, has entered the stage of nominating members of the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia (DPR RI) and the Regional House of Representatives (DPRD), both at the provincial and the district/city level. At this stage, political parties will submit a list of candidates for legislative members (caleg) to the General Elections Commission (KPU). Related to this, political parties must first carry out a selection process to determine who will contest the election. This stage is very crucial considering that Indonesia uses an open proportional election system, in which the public can see a list of candidates for legislative members (caleg) submitted by political parties, and this will determine the performance of political parties in elections (Hazan & Rahat, 2010).

Furthermore, the candidate selection processes within political parties are an important stage for female candidates. This is because the selection processes are one of the important functions of political parties in order to carry out their role as conduits between citizens and the state within the framework of political representation. If the selection systems used by political parties are clear, transparent and open, they will make it easier for female candidates to compete fairly with men to get electoral districts (dapils) and strategic serial numbers. By obtaining serial numbers and strategic electoral districts, the greater the chance for women to pass to the Parliament, which has implications for the number of women's representation in the Parliament.

There are two main problems for women in the nomination process within political parties. First, women are only a complement. It is undeniable that political parties often have difficulty in fulfilling the 30 percent quota of women on the list of candidates in an electoral district. As explained by Purbolaksono (2023) in his article entitled


“Challenges for Bacaleg Registration in the 2024 Elections”, he explained that one of the new Secretary Generals of Political Parties participating in the upcoming 2024 Election admitted that it was difficult to recruit legislative candidates. In fact, even though it has been carried out since August 2021, until now the party is still in the process of filling out the list of candidates. As a result, there is the potential for women to simply be named, even though these women do not have a mass base in their respective regions.

Second, women often do not get the electoral districts they really control or do not get the strategic serial numbers. In fact, getting serial number one is important considering that the majority of candidates who pass to the Parliament have serial number one. Not only that, women often do not even understand their constituencies, especially in the regions where the patriarchal culture is still strong, so it is very difficult for women to win in those constituencies.

### **Towards Meaningful 30 Percent Representation of Women in the 2024 Elections**

Since the affirmative policy was implemented in Indonesia in the 2004 elections, the number of women’s representation in the DPR RI has continued to increase. In fact, even though there had been stagnation in the 2009 and 2014 elections, the 2019 election results showed a significant increase in terms of women’s representation in the DPR RI. Here are the details:

**Graph 1. The Trend of Women’s Representation in the Indonesian Parliament (2004-2019)**



Source: Processed from various sources.

In order to continue to increase women's representation in the DPR RI ahead of the upcoming 2024 elections, there are several things that need to be done. One of them is strengthening the preparations of female candidates in facing the selection processes. Matland (2022) in his work entitled "Increasing Women's Political Participation: Legislative Recruitment and the Electoral System", said that there were three selections before entering the Parliament; namely, the stages of self-selection, selection by parties, and selection by voters.

At the stage of self-selection, the desire to advance in general elections is influenced by how big the winning percentage is, how friendly the political environment that will support, and how well the resources are owned for campaign purposes. Therefore, it is important for women at this stage to prepare social and financial capital, as well as choosing political parties that are friendly to women and support women's representation in the Parliament.

The second stage is the selection of political parties. Hidayah (2020) emphasizes that at this stage it is necessary to look at the culture within a political party to see whether the selection process is carried out in a clear, open and transparent manner. A clear, transparent and open system will make it easier for women candidates to compete fairly with men to get electoral districts and strategic serial numbers. By obtaining serial numbers and strategic electoral districts, the greater the chance to pass to the Parliament, which has the implications for the number of women's representation in the Parliament.

The third stage is selection by voters in elections. At this stage, it is important for women to prepare capital, both social and financial. Apart from that, special strategies also need to be prepared to be able to win elections, for example by forming successful campaign teams that have the capacity.

In addition to preparing for the selection process, women also need to increase their capacity as candidates for members of the Parliament who carry women's interests. This can be done by networking with civil society organizations that have a focus on fighting for gender equality. That way, if elected later, the women present in the Parliament will not just be numbers but will truly represent the aspirations of women.

**- Ahmad Hidayah -**

*The two main problems for women in the election process for legislative candidates are that women are often only used as complements and do not get the electoral district that they really control or the strategic serial numbers. Therefore, careful preparations before registering are solution so that women can qualify for the Parliament, which has an impact on increasing women's representation in the Parliament and on the efforts to support women's aspirations.*

## Observing Silon's Readiness in the Registration Stage for the Candidates for Legislative Members for the 2024 Elections

---

The General Elections Commission (KPU) issued regulations, including opening access to the Candidacy Information System, or Silon, for the registration of prospective members (candidates) for the DPR, Provincial DPRD, Regency/City DPRD, and DPD on 19 April 2023. KPU member Idham Holik said the KPU had issued two regulations regarding the candidacy of members of the DPR, Provincial DPRD and Regency/Municipal DPRD, as well as the Regional Representative Council (DPD). These two regulations are KPU Regulation Number 10/2023 concerning the Nomination of Members of the DPR, Provincial DPRD and Regency/City DPRD and KPU Regulation Number 11/2023 concerning the Nomination of Individual Election Contestants for DPD Members (Kompas.id, 19/4).

These two regulations require a number of documents to be prepared by prospective candidates when registering through Silon. These documents include electronic identity cards (KTP-el), photocopies of diplomas legalized by the competent authority, certificates of physical and mental health, and certificates from the district court in the jurisdiction where the candidate lives. The required documents are submitted to political parties (political parties) to be uploaded to Silon no later than May 14, at 23.59.

### **Silon Part of Open Election Data Practices**

Silon is part of the implementation of election open data in Indonesia. Silon was first used in the 2015 Simultaneous Elections and aims to collect data on individual candidates participating in the elections. Furthermore, Silon was developed in the stages of nominating Members of the DPR, Provincial DPRD and Regency/City DPRD for the 2019 Simultaneous Elections.

The use of Silon is carried out by uploading the data on the requirements for submitting prospective candidates and the data on the requirements for prospective candidates submitted by political par-

ties. To do this upload, KPU, Provincial KPU and Regency/City KPU prepare accounts for each political party operator (Sari, 2022).

The use of Silon is believed to be easy for political parties to use, who only need to prepare the data soft file of the requirements in question to be uploaded to Silon. The use of this application does not require certain skills, because it can be done by a designated operator as long as he or she is capable of operating a computer. In addition, this application uses the Indonesian language. Thus, it does not require the ability to understand application work in information technology languages, which often use English. Silon can also be cost effective because of the availability of softcopy data stored in the application, so it does not require other data storage space (Sari, 2022).

As part of open data practices, Silon must comply with open data principles such as; 1) timely, meaning available as quickly as needed to be useful; 2) granular, meaning that it is available at the most satisfactory level of detail; 3) freely available on the internet, meaning available without monetary limitations; 4) complete and in-bulk, meaning available in its entirety, without omission; 5) analytic, meaning that it is available in a machine-readable digital format that can be easily analyzed; 6) non-proprietary, meaning in a format where no entity has exclusive control; 7) non-discriminatory, meaning that it is available to every individual or organization without restrictions; 8) license-free, meaning open for reuse and redistribution for any purpose; and 9) permanently available, meaning available via a stable internet location for an unlimited period of time (NDI-OEDI, 2015).

The nine principles of openness of election data must be applied to all types of election data, including Silon as an information system created by the KPU during the registration stage for prospective legislative candidates. However, the implementations of Silon as part of open data practices is often faced with several challenges, as follows.

### **Silon Challenges ahead of the 2024 Elections**

According to the annual report of the Indonesian Institute, Center for Public Policy Research (TII) entitled “Looking at the Implementations of Open Election Data Disclosure ahead of the 2024 General Elections and Simultaneous Local Elections” (2022), the problems of lack of infrastructure are still found, both in the form

of provision of computer equipment and an internet network that is uneven and in the form of the lack of security devices for data storage. These conditions are often found in the districts. Of course, this issue is not only the responsibility of the KPU but also involves ministries and other state institutions that are supposed to support solving the problem of digital inequality in Indonesia.

Furthermore, another challenge is the limited human resources (HR) skilled in information technology (IT) within the KPU. The lack of skilled personnel is due to the lack of capacity building within the KPU's internal human resources in the context of digitizing election data in order to support the openness of election data. Increasing the internal capacity of the KPU, both at the central and at the regional levels, is important, considering that the KPU as the organizing body implements an open election data policy. It is hoped that by increasing the capacity of human resources at the KPU, there will be a change in the capacity of human resources who are executors of open election data so that the policy can be implemented according to its objectives, especially in increasing public participation and the capability of election organizers in order to encourage elections with integrity in Indonesia (TII, 2022).

In addition to the two aspects above, another challenge is the readiness of political parties in filling Silon. Member of the Board of trustees of the Association for Elections and Democracy (Perludem) Titi Anggaraini said that there had been rumors that political parties used the services of jockeys to fill out the list of prospective legislative candidates (bacaleg). Titi said that the filling of the Silon should have been carried out by an officer appointed by the party. Technically the process took place internally within the party ([www.metrotvnews.com](http://www.metrotvnews.com), 6/5).

In response to this, the Election Supervisory Body (Bawaslu) hopes that the KPU will provide election supervisors with Silon access for registering candidates for DPR, Provincial DPRD, Regency/City DPRD. This is important so that Bawaslu can supervise the conformity of documents and the completeness of registration files for prospective legislative candidates at both the national and the regional levels. However, Bawaslu member Totok Hariyono revealed that as of Thursday (4/5) only 21 provinces had access to Silon; nine provinces have not been able to access and four provinces have not submitted progress. Even up to 4 May 2023, the menu for legislative candidates on the Silon application which contains electoral district information, serial number, photo, candidate's name and NIK does not appear on the Silon application ([www.bawaslu.go.id](http://www.bawaslu.go.id), 4/5).

In addition, this supervision is carried out to minimize the occurrence of disputes, because it is one of the duties of Bawaslu in carrying out prevention. Bawaslu should be able to observe together the requirements for registration and be able to anticipate if there are deficiencies. Also, if there are files that need to be given suggestions for improvement. However, Totok stressed, regarding information that was excluded by the KPU, Bawaslu would follow the regulation ([www.bawaslu.go.id](http://www.bawaslu.go.id), 4/5).

### **Recommendations**

Responding to some of the challenges above, the KPU as the election organizer needs to take several steps to anticipate that this problem does not recur in the future.

Some of these steps include, first, encouraging the KPU to increase human resource capacity so that it can support the implementations of election data transparency. In this case, KPU can also work with other parties, such as the IT community or relevant private parties, universities, as well as civil society organizations that focus on election and democracy issues and open data. Apart from that, it is also necessary to ensure that there is a process of sharing knowledge between KPU employees so that employee rotation does not become an inhibiting factor.

Second, encouraging the improvement of KPU IT infrastructure and internet distribution through the Ministry of Communication and Informatics so that it can support the implementations of open election data in the context of elections. Third, encouraging the KPU to intensify outreach to political parties regarding the use of Silon so that there are no problems in the process of filling Silons carried out by officers from political parties. Fourth, encouraging Bawaslu to collaborate with civil society groups in monitoring Silon so that it can run in a transparent and accountable manner.

**- Arfianto Purbolaksono -**

*Silon is part of the implementations of election data openness (open data) in Indonesia. The use of Silon can ideally encourage political parties to increase their transparency and accountability, as well as a means of providing public information, especially information related to legislative candidates for voter considerations*




## Looking at the Performance of Ganjar Pranowo in Leading Central Java in Three Variables

After waiting for the presidential candidate to be nominated by the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP), on April 21, 2023, Ganjar Pranowo was finally declared as the presidential candidate from the PDIP. The declaration made by the PDIP attracted enough public attention. In addition to the fact that the name Ganjar Pranowo has indeed been widely discussed as one of the potential candidates for the 2024 presidential elections (Pilpres), this declaration interesting as it was made one day before Eid al-Fitr.

The declaration of Ganjar Pranowo as the candidate promoted by PDIP is considered a tactical step by PDIP in saving Ganjar Pranowo's electability, which has decreased significantly as a result of his statement regarding the rejection of the Israeli national football team which would participate in the U-20 World Cup in Indonesia on 23 March 2023. In fact, when it was simulated with the names of the other three presidential candidates, Ganjar Pranowo, who has always been in the top place, has now been passed over by Prabowo Subianto, who was previously in the second place. The following were the results of a survey conducted by the Political Indicators agency on April 8-13 2023 regarding the trend of support for the three presidential candidates.

**Graph 1. Trends in Support for the Two Presidential Candidates with the Highest Electability (in %)**



Source: Political Indicator Survey Release on 8-13 April 2023.


After being declared by the PDIP, several political parties have begun to provide support for Ganjar Pranowo, such as the People's Conscience Party (Hanura), which has declared its support for Ganjar Pranowo on April 22 2023, and the United Development Party on April 26 2023. Previously, the Indonesian Solidarity Party (PSI) has also declared its support for Ganjar Pranowo since October 3, 2023.

With the declaration of Ganjar Pranowo as the presidential candidate from PDIP, as well as the existence of several political parties that have provided their support, it is almost certain that Ganjar Pranowo will be one of the presidential candidates in the upcoming 2024 Presidential Elections. With a track record as a regional head, this paper shall show the performance of Ganjar Pranowo when he serves as the Governor of Central Java.

### **Ganjar Pranowo's Performance in Leading Central Java**

Looking at Ganjar Pranowo's performance when leading Central Java, this paper shall use three variables. The first variable is the the Human Development Index (IPM), which is a measuring tool to explain how the population can access development results in obtaining income, health, education, and so on. During his tenure as the Governor of Central Java since 2013, the HDI of Central Java Province has increased. On average, the HDI growth for Central Java Province was at a level of 0.53 since 2013. This figure was slightly higher if you look at the increase in the national average HDI which was at 0.51.


**Graph 2. Central Java Province Human Development Index 2013-2022**



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics for Central Java Province.

The second variable to look at is the Gender Development Index (IPG). The Gender Development Index (IPG) is an indicator that measures the achievement of human development by considering gender aspects. This indicator is used to see whether women can play an active role in economic and political lives. According to the data from the Central Statistics Agency (BPS), Central Java Province's GDI tends to increase, although there were several declines, such as in 2016 and 2019. Even so, the GPI in Central Java has always been higher than that in the National GPI since being led by Ganjar Pranowo in year 2013.


**Graph 3. Gender Development Index of Central Java Province 2013-2022**



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics for Central Java Province.

The third variable observed is the percentage of poor people. In 2022, according to BPS data, Central Java would become the second poorest province on the island of Java after the Special Province of Yogyakarta. However, Central Java Province is not included in the top ten poorest provinces in Indonesia. Furthermore, since being led by Ganjar Pranowo in 2013, the percentage of poor people in Central Java Province has decreased. Although, in 2020 it had increased due to the Covid-19 pandemic.

**Graph 4. Percentage of Poor Population in Central Java Province 2013-2022**



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics for Central Java Province.

Looking at the three variables described above, it can be said that Central Java Province has indeed experienced developments since being led by Ganjar Pranowo, although the numbers show that there has been no significant development. However, there were several successes for Ganjar Pranowo during his tenure as the Governor of Central Java; for example, Ganjar Pranowo was named an exemplary Team Activator for the Acceleration of Regional Financial Access (TPAKD) from the President of the Republic of Indonesia in 2017. The Provincial Government of Central Java was considered successful in promoting young entrepreneurs and MSMEs in advancing the economic sector (Suwardi, 2018).

Not only that, Ganjar Pranowo is also considered to have produced a breakthrough in the agricultural sector by issuing the Farmer's Card Program, which is giving cards to farmers with the aim of increasing the welfare of farmers through the distribution of subsidized fertilizers. Not only fertilizer, the Farmer's Card Program also helps the Central Java provincial government to allocate agricultural production facilities to target farmers who are classified as poor. In addition, the Farmer Card Program has also been linked to the Indonesian agricultural system. The aim is to stabilize the prices of agricultural commodities when there are price fluctuations in the market (Suwardi, 2018).

Looking at the development figures in Central Java Province and some of his successes during the leadership of Central Java, as a presidential candidate in the upcoming 2024 year, Ganjar Pranowo needs to capitalize on this in order to win voters' votes. Further-

more, work programs that are considered successful in Central Java need to be modified so that they can be applied at the national level and included in the Work Program for Presidential Candidates in the 2024 Presidential Elections.

- **Ahmad Hidayah** -

*Ganjar Pranowo needs to show his success as governor of Central Java in order to attract voters in the upcoming 2024 presidential elections. Furthermore, work programs that are considered successful in Central Java need to be modified so that they can be applied at the national level and included in the Work Program for Presidential Candidates in the 2024 Presidential Elections.*

## The Implementations of Religious Moderation Policy in Preventing the Practice of Religious Intolerance in Indonesia

---

During the beginning of the year until the eve of Eid al-Fitr 2023, a number of events of intolerance and discrimination have again harmed the situation of religious harmony in Indonesia. President Joko Widodo's statement at the National Coordination Meeting (Rakornas) of regional heads and the Regional Leadership Communication Forum (Forkopimda) on January 17, 2023 also turned out to be ineffective in the field. At the National Coordination Meeting, there were six presidential directives; namely, inflation, the handling of extreme poverty, the handling of stunting, investment, the bureaucracy of the regional budget (APBD) and regional component level (TKDN), urban planning, political stability and security, and religious tolerance. President Joko Widodo stressed the importance of strengthening religious tolerance in each region by providing freedom in carrying out worship (Kesbangpol Bengkalis.go.id, 17/1/2023). However, there are still practices of dissolution of worship that have occurred recently, such as the dissolution of church congregation worship carried out by the head of RT in Lampung Province, (BBC Indonesia, 19/3/2023).

The practice of discriminating against minority groups in religious contexts in the form of banning the construction of worship also still occurs. For example, the banning of the development of the Parish Church of Saint Joseph in Tanjung Balai Karimun, the case of the Prohibition of the construction of worship in Cilegon (Banten province) and similar cases that occurred in other parts of Indonesia. These are some cases that have arisen in the public sphere from the many practices of discrimination and intolerance so far. Not infrequently the practice of discrimination and intolerance has also been experienced by certain groups (sects/ denominations) in Islam due to differences in the determination of fasting month and holidays among Islamic organizations.

### **Exclusivism and Radicalism are the Roots of Intolerance**

Lembaga Survei Indonesia (LSI) recently released the findings of a national survey on extreme violence, tolerance, and religious life in Indonesia. The study, conducted in 2022, explained that extreme violence (KE) and tensions between groups still occurred in Indonesia. Indonesia as a large nation consists of various tribes, religions, cultures and other ethnicities. The magnitude of diversity and the potential for conflicts that continue to arise have created homework to the government in building tolerance and openness to the diversity of the society.

The findings of the LSI survey were also in line with the release of the findings carried out by the Setara Institute on the tolerant city index (IKT). Nationally, the average IKT score from 2015 to 2022, which was between (4) and (5), indicated that Indonesia was still experiencing stagnation in the management of tolerance in Indonesian cities.

Being exclusive and blind fanaticism in religious practice have become obstacles in building religious harmony tolerance. Exclusivism as an understanding tends to indoctrinate every believer believes that the teachings held by his group is the only truth. Excessive exclusivity of a group can trigger Inter-and intra-group conflict if followed by blind fanaticism.

This attitude will close the dialogue space to new narratives that are considered to threaten the stability of the ideology or understanding of the group. According to the head of Balitbang-Diklat Kementerian Agama Abd Rahman Mas'ud in the Annual Conference of Religious Colleges Student in Indonesia (ACCROSS) in 2015, organized by the Student Executive Council (DEMA) UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta, exclusivism could also be drawn to the extreme point with acts of violence, both intellectual, psychological and physical against anyone that was considered different. Blind fanaticism has become a major obstacle in fostering mutual respect between religious communities. Furthermore, the extreme misunderstanding of a group towards diversity (not only in religion) has also given birth to the seeds of radicalism among its adherents.

### **The Practice of Religious Moderation in Preventing Intolerance In Indonesia**

Tolerance is an important component of psychological well-being to be applied in the life of a pluralistic society. The attitude of tol-

erance among religious people will only grow if there is openness to accept and interact socially with each other. This is in line with the results of research conducted by Aziz Maulana on tolerance between religious communities in Jungjang Village, Arjawinangun District, Cirebon (2021). The results of the study explained that the harmony of the Junjang Village community, which consisted of various religions (Islam, Christianity, Protestant Catholicism, Hinduism, and Buddhism), occurred due to social interactions through daily activities. Interactions between community groups will open up opportunities to get to know and understand each other. The importance of cultivating Tepo seliro attitude in religious life is considered to be able to create harmony and solidarity between community groups.

In Indonesia, the good practice of religious moderation can be seen in one of the educational institutions located in Medan, North Sumatra (Yayasan Sultan Iskandar Muda (SIM) Medan). This educational institution was founded by Sofyan Tan, a young Chinese man from Sunggal village in 1987. The implementations of religious moderation in the Foundation has been carried out by using multicultural curriculum content. This learning curriculum basically teaches religious moderation to students so that they can coexist in a spirit of tolerance and respect for diversity. In addition, the implementations of multicultural education in the Foundation have been carried out through various steps, such as interfaith prayer in teaching and learning activities and the establishment of various houses of worship to honor the worship of each religious believer (Kemenag.go.id).

On the other hand, local governments also need to be encouraged to take initiative steps to create harmony and tolerance by making policies related to the implementations of a pluralistic community life. This is in line the inevitability that each region has the potential for social conflict that is the responsibility of local governments. One example is the Provincial Government of the Special Region of Yogyakarta (DIY), which has a policy of community tolerance in the form of local regulations (Perda). The regional regulation is Kulon Progo regency, Regional Regulation Number 13/2022 concerning the implementations of community tolerance, is based on the many cases of religious intolerance that occur in the community, so the government has made a legal umbrella to create a harmonious and peaceful life for the people of Kulon Progo.



Meanwhile, at the national level, the efforts to encourage religious moderation can be seen when the Ministry of Religious Affairs in 2022 launched the Year of tolerance. The declaration of the year of tolerance by the government has not been fully understood by the public. The launching of the year of tolerance can be a momentum in gluing and reaffirming the importance of developing tolerance attitudes in the nation and state. In this case, religious moderation has four strengthening indicators that are priority programs in the National Medium-Term Development Plan (RPJMN 2020-2024). One of them is tolerance. In addition, other program indicators are violence, national insight, and friendly traditions. The urgency of religious moderation in the RPJMN is also based on the theological foundation that every religion teaches love, harmonious life, and is full of tolerance and equality.

Religious moderation as a concept of life policy echoed by the government explains about how individuals practice religion with no exaggeration. Religious moderation aims to mediate the extremes of understanding multi-interpretive teachings in religion to move to the middle, back to the essence of religious teachings; namely, humanizing humans.

Those who practice their religion are righteous. Being fair means putting everything in its place while carrying it out precisely, well and as quickly as possible. While the balanced attitude means always being in the middle between the two extremes. In the context of worship; for example, a moderate believes that religion is doing devotion to God in the form of carrying out His teachings that can be done by glorifying humans. Groups or individuals with an extreme understanding of religious teachings are often trapped in religious practices in the name of God just to defend the Almighty, but instead ignoring the human aspect. Religious people in this way tend to have a willingness to kill their fellow human beings “in the name of religion”. In fact, taking care of one’s own human life is part of the core of religious teachings. Therefore, the application of religious moderation is important for every religious community, not only as a practice in practicing their religion, but also as a form of capital in preventing divisions among the diversity of society.

Although the Ministry of Religious Affairs Still proclaims religious moderation as a standard of wise living, however, local governments should take the initiative to make policy measures that are still within their competence, as done by the Government of Kulon Progo (Special Region of Yogyakarta), to prevent the practice of in-

tolerance in the region. In addition, the Ministry of Religious Affairs through the initiative to launch the Year of Tolerance also needs to involve various parties to realize efforts to increase public awareness for religious moderation. Furthermore, the Ministry of Education, Culture, Research, and Technology, also needs to be involved to encourage the improvement of religious literacy through educational curricula, as this can also be an effective way to increase the spirit of tolerance.

**- Dewi Rahmawati Nur Aulia -**

*Religious moderation aims to mediate the extremes of understanding multi-interpretive teachings in religion to move to the middle, back to the essence of religious teachings; namely, humanizing humans.*

## The Jakarta Government and the Anticipation of Urbanization Post-Homecoming Travels

---

Coordinating Minister for Human Development and Culture (Coordinating Minister for PMK) Muhadjir Effendy in his speech highlighted the phenomenon of urbanization of migrant communities to DKI Jakarta after Eid Al-Fitr 2023.. According to him, urbanization requires large capital, not only determination. It also needs competitive skills and knowledge. In addition, the Coordinating Minister for PMK stated that anyone had the rights to move to the capital. But, it certainly cannot be done without capital, such as skills, knowledge capital, and others (Sindonews, 28/4/2023).

The phenomenon of post-homecoming urbanization is not new to the capital. DKI Jakarta as the country's capital and economic center still draws the attraction of people from various regions to get jobs in order to improve welfare. The capital is still the center of attraction of people who dream of living in economic sufficiency and adequate social facilities.

The Jakarta Population and Civil Registration Office (Disdukcapil) said that the number of migrants entering the capital had increased significantly in the last three years. In 2020, the number of migrants was known to be at a level of 112,814. Then in 2021 there was an increase in the number of immigrants by 18.55 percent with a figure reaching 139,740 people. In the first half of 2022, the DKI provincial government recorded an increase in migrant communities of 7.92 percent with 151,752 people. From the population data in the net consolidated Data (DKB) of the second semester of 2022, it was known that the number of Jakarta residents was 11,317,271 (Kompas, 14/2/2023).

Data collected by Disdukcapil DKI Jakarta also revealed that there were 30,000 to 40,000 possible potential numbers of migrant communities arriving in the capital after Eid al-Fitr in 2023 (Kompas, 15/4/2023).

In addition, Disdukcapil also said that there were 865 people who would enter the capital after Eid al-Fitr. The number consists of 848 permanent migrants, while the remaining 17 are types of non-permanent migrations.

### **The DKI Jakarta Government's Policy and the Enforcement of Population Administration Discipline Operations**

The importance of population data collection by conducting justice operations according to the Acting Governor of DKI Jakarta, Heru Budi Hartono, is to order to match the data and validate the information owned by the community. However, in 2019 in the era of Governor Anies Baswedan, this operation was later changed to the term population development service. In addition to the mention view that the term was considered negative, according to Anies Baswedan, the capital is a place that must be able to be reached by all levels of the society. However, Population Administration operations are still carried out through population development services and are carried out by reporting from the RT level to the local village level.

The implementation policy of population administration (justisi) operations is basically Local Regulation Number 22/2015 originating from Konawe regency, South Sulawesi province. However, the policy was adapted and implemented in various regions in various situations (including regulating the use of masks to prevent the transmission of Covid-19) (Kompas, May 6, 2023). According to the results of the reference search on this matter, the justisi operation is defined as a series of legal actions carried out by the government in the framework of maintaining public order as well as actions on suspected violations of regulations containing criminal elements.

This operation of disciplining the administration of the population also cannot necessarily be carried out directly, but it requires a number of indications of certain precarious situations; for example, if there is a real disturbance of Public Order, allegedly violating the provisions of legislation. However, this is not or has not been handled by the Indonesian National Police (Polri) or police investigators so that it must be handled by the Rukun Tetangga (RT)/ Rukun

Warga (RW) kelurahan assisted by the Municipal Police (Satpol PP) and other emergencies.

The enforcement of seasonal population administration discipline carried out after Eid al-Fitr has been carried out to anticipate the increase in poverty and crime in urban areas. People who migrate to cities with a lack of education and skills become one of the sources of social disorder; for example, the emergence of slums, chaos in Population Administration, and the increasing crime rates including collective crimes.

Data from the DKI Jakarta Provincial Social Service showed that the DKI Jakarta Provincial Government had 4,576 people with social welfare problems (PMKS) during 2020. Meanwhile in 2021, the number of PMKS amounted to 5513. The data showed an increase of 937 PMKS over the past year. This means that the increase in the number of people with social welfare problems may come from immigrant communities that do not have the basic skills and proper education. The lack of skills and education has made these people live in pre-prosperous economic conditions.

### **The Importance of Equitable Distribution of Welfare throughout Indonesia**

The increasing number of migrants after returning to the capital every year shows that the problem of equitable distribution of public welfare is still not resolved. This is in line with the results of Asep Fikri Nur Arif and Nunung Nurwati's research (2022) on "the influence of the concentration of the Indonesian population on the island of Java on public welfare", which explained that the concentration of the Indonesian population on the island of Java reached 56.10%, which was influenced by many factors.

The study noted that one of the main factors was the pull factor; namely, Java island which has better facilities compared to other regions. The uneven distribution of the population can reduce the level of public welfare. This will increase the number of unemployed because there are fewer jobs available compared to job seekers, thus increasing the level of crime, which is forced to be done to meet basic needs, such as food.

The importance of equitable distribution of welfare in all regions of Indonesia, which is not centralized only in Java, needs to be encouraged to be a solution in overcoming the welfare gap between regions. The acceleration of development, both infrastructure and

non-infrastructure, is important by involving all elements of government, private sector, and the society.

In the demographic sphere, delaying the age of marriage, education to increase public awareness about reproduction, and the challenges of population explosion, and regulating migration into a region can become some possible solutions.

**- Dewi Rahmawati Nur Aulia -**

*The enforcement of seasonal population administration discipline carried out after Eid al-Fitr has been carried out to anticipate the increase in poverty and crime in urban areas. People who migrate to cities with a lack of education and skills are one of the causes of social irregularities, such as the emergence of slums, chaos in Population Administration, and increasing crime rates including collective crimes.*

**THE** **INDONESIAN INSTITUTE**  
C E N T E R F O R P U B L I C P O L I C Y R E S E A R C H

**The Indonesian Institute (TII)** is a Center for Public Policy Research that was established on 21 October 2004 by a group of young, dynamic activists and intellectuals. TII is an independent, non-partisan, non-profit institution, whose main funding stems from grants and contributions from foundations, companies, and individuals.

**TII** has the aim of becoming a main research center in Indonesia for public policy matters and has committed to giving contribution to the debates over public policies and to improving the quality of the planning and results of public policy by promoting good governance principles and public participation in the policy processes in Indonesia.

**TII**'s visions are public policies in Indonesia which highly uphold human rights and rule of law, as well as involve participation of various stakeholders and practice democratic good governance principles.

**TII**'s missions are to conduct reliable research that is independent and non-partisan and to channel the research to the policy-makers, the private sector, and academia in order to improve the quality of Indonesian policy-makers.

**TII** also assumes the role of disseminating ideas to the society so that they are well informed about the policies that will have a good impact on the people's lives. In other words, TII has a position to support the democratization process and the public policy reform, as it will be involved in the process.

The scope of the research and review on public policies undertaken by TII includes economic, social, political, and legal affairs. The main activities which have been conducted by **TII** in order to achieve our vision and mission, are: research, surveys, facilitation and advocacy through training and working groups, public discussions, public education, weekly editorial articles ("Wacana" or Discourses), Instagram Live Series and Space Twitter (Policy Talks and Initiative!), monthly analysis ("Update Indonesia" in Indonesian and "The

Indonesian Update” in English), mid-year policy analysis (“Policy Assessment”), annual policy analysis (“Indonesian Report”), and monthly discussion forum on policy issues (“The Indonesian Forum”).

**Contact Details :**

**The Indonesian Institute, Center for Public Policy Research**

Jl. HOS. Cokroaminoto No. 92,

Menteng, Jakarta Pusat - 10310

Ph. (021)315-8032

[contact@theindonesianinstitute.com](mailto:contact@theindonesianinstitute.com)

[www.theindonesianinstitute.com](http://www.theindonesianinstitute.com)



## RESEARCH ON ECONOMIC AFFAIRS

The economy tends to be used as an indicator of the success of the government as a policy-maker. Economy plays an important role as one of the fundamentals of national development. Limited resources have often caused the government to face obstacles in implementing economic policies that will optimally benefit the people. The increase in the quality of the people's critical thinking has forced the government to conduct comprehensive studies in every decision-making process. In fact, the studies will not be stopped when the policy is already in place. Studies will be continued until the policy evaluation process.

TII focus on economic issues, such as monetary policy and fiscal policy, as well as issues on sustainable development by using analysis which refer to economic freedom principles. Monetary issues will focus on the Indonesian Central Bank to maintain economic stability, both regarding inflation and exchange rate. Meanwhile, fiscal policy will focus on the discussions over the National Budget and infrastructure development both in the regions and in the cities. In relation to sustainable development, TII research is focusing on productivity, competitiveness, infrastructure development, and development gap. In addition, TII also upholds economic freedom principles in highlighting the importance of individual freedom and involvement of private sectors in increasing development and improving welfare in Indonesia.

The TII Economic Research Division is present for those who are interested in the conditions of the economy. The results of the research are intended to assist policy-makers, regulators, and donor agencies in making decisions. The research that TII offers: **(1) Economic Policy Analysis; (2) Regional and Sectoral Prospects; and (3) Program Evaluation.**

## RESEARCH ON LEGAL AFFAIRS

According to stipulations in Law No. 12 Year 2011 on the Formulation of Laws and Regulations, every bill which will be discussed by the legislative and the executive must be complemented with academic paper. This stipulation is also confirmed in Law No. 15 Year 2019 on the Amendment of Law No. 12 Year 2011 regarding the Formulation of Laws and Regulations.

Therefore, comprehensive research is very important and needed in making a qualified academic paper. With qualified academic papers, the bills will have strong academic foundation both from academic and content aspects. Furthermore, academic paper also functions as an early tracking over possibilities of overlapping laws and regulations, so that revocation of local regulations or other related issues which can be caused by legal, economic, or political aspects in the future, can be minimized as soon as possible.

TII offers normative and legal research related to harmonization and synchronization of laws and regulations, especially in making academic papers, legal opinion on harmonization and synchronization of laws and regulations, and legislative drafting for the formulation of local regulations bill drafts or other laws and regulations. In addition, TII also offers openly research on other legal issues related to Constitutional Law and Public Administration, Human Rights, and Political Corruption.

## RESEARCH ON THE POLITICAL AFFAIRS

The enactment of Law No. 23 Year 2014 on the latest regulation on the Local Government, has created different relations between the Central Government and the Local Government. Entering the era of Bureaucracy Reform, specification of division of affairs of the Central Government and the Local Government has increasingly demanded the implementation of good governance principles. The government is demanded to be adaptive and responsive towards public aspiration and services. Therefore, public policy research become more important for both the Central Government and the Local Government to analyse context and current issues in the regions. The government must also consider various actors whether political actors or bureaucrats, as well as public's aspiration and other non-state actor in policy processes.

In order to respond those needs, TII research in political affairs offer policy assessment on various policies which were already applied or will be implemented. TII will look at socio-cultural, economy, legal, and political aspects in assessing public policies. Our research will be useful to assist government in formulating policies which are in line with context, priorities, and people's aspiration. TII also offers various breakthrough of transformative policies according to existing contexts in particular and Open Government principles' implementation in general, in order to increase public participation in policy processes, particularly in the era of the openness of public information.

Political Research Division of TII provide analysis and policy recommendations in order to generate strategic policy in the strengthening of democracy and the establishment of good governance both at the national and local levels. Political research forms are offered by TII **(1) Public Policy Analysis, (2) Media Monitoring, (3) Mapping & Positioning Research, (4) Need Assessment Research, (5) Survey Indicator.**

## RESEARCH ON THE SOCIAL AFFAIRS

Social development needs policy foundations that come from independent and accurate research. Social analysis is a need for the government, the businesspeople, academia, professionals, NGOs, and civil society to improve social development. Social analysis is important to identify strategic issues which are developing and to make the right stakeholders' mapping to promote significant change in the context of development, public policy, and democracy in Indonesia.

The Social Research Division is present to offer strong and valid recommendations to produce strategic, relevant, efficient and effective, and impactful policies, in addressing to existing various issues. For example, issues related to education, health, population, environment, women, children, and elderly. Social research that TII offers: **(1) Social Policy Analysis; (2) Explorative Research; (3) Mapping & Positioning Research; (4) Need Assessment Research; (5) Program Evaluation Research; and (5) Indicator Survey.**

## PRE-ELECTION AND REGIONAL HEAD ELECTION

One of the activities carried out and offered by TII is a pre-election survey as well as a pre-election and regional head election. The reasons underlying the implementation of pre-election and regional head election surveys, namely: (1) A good election is a democratic process that can be arranged, calculated, and predicted in the resulting process; (2) Survey is one of the important and common discussions to measure, calculate, and predict how the process and results of the General Election and the Regional Head Election will take place, in accordance to the expectations of the candidates; (3) It is very important to win in the General Election and the Regional Head Election based on empirical, scientific, measurable and supportable data.

As one of the important aspects of a strategic candidate's election, the survey is useful for monitoring political power. In this case, the success team needs to conduct a survey for: **(1) mapping the candidate's position in public perception; (2) mapping voters' desires; (3) publishing the most effective political machinery used as voters; and (4) Looking for the most effective medium for the campaign.**

## EVALUATION OF A PROJECT OR A PROGRAM

One of the activities that have been performed and experienced offered by TII is a qualitative evaluation of the projects and programs of non-governmental organizations and government. Evaluation activities are offered TII stages of mid-term evaluation of the project/program (mid-term evaluation) and also the final evaluation at the end of the project/program (final evaluation).

As we know, the evaluation is an important step in the implementation of a project or program. Mid-Term Evaluation of the project or program is intended to look at and analyze the challenges, the overall learning takes place during the project or program, and make recommendations for the continuity of the project or program. Meanwhile, the final evaluation allows us to view and analyze the outcomes and the lessons learned to ensure the achievement of all the objectives of the project or program at the end of the project or program.

## THE INDONESIAN FORUM

**The Indonesian Forum** is a monthly discussion activity on actual issues in the political, economic, social, legal, cultural, defense, and environmental fields. TII organizes these forums as media for competent resource persons, stakeholders, policymakers, civil society activists, academicians, and the media to meet and have discussion.

Themes that have been raised were the ones that have caught public attention, such as migrant workers, social conflicts, domestic politics, and local direct elections. The main consideration in picking a theme is sociological and political reality and the context of the relevant public policy at the time that the Indonesian Forum is delivered.

It is expected that the public can get the big picture of a particular event as the Indonesian Forum also presents relevant resource persons.

Since its inception, the Indonesian Institute is very aware of the passion of the public to get discussions that are not only rich in substance but also well formatted, which support balanced ideas exchanges ideas and the equal involvement of the different elements of the society.

The discussions, which are designed to only invite a limited number of participants, do not only feature idea exchanges but also regularly offer policy briefs (policy recommendations) to relevant policymakers and also summaries to the participants, especially the media people and the resource persons at the end of each discussion. Therefore, the discussions will not end without solutions.

## LOCAL COUNCIL TRAINING

The roles and functions of local councils in monitoring local governments are very important. They need to ensure that participative and democratic policies will be espoused. Members of provincial and regent local councils are required to have strong capacity to understand democratization matters, regional autonomy, legislative techniques, budgeting, local Politics, and political marketing. Thus, it is important to empower members of local councils.

In order for local councils to be able to response every problem that will come out as a result of any policy implemented by the central government or local governments, the Indonesian Institute invites the leaderships and members of local councils to undergo training to improve their capacity.

## WORKING GROUP

The Indonesian Institute believes that a good public policy process can be held with some engagement and empowerment of the stakeholders. The Indonesian Institute takes a role as one of mediator agencies to facilitate some forums in which the Government, Council Members, Private Sectors, NGOs and Academicians can meet in interactive forums. The Indonesian Institute provides facilitation on working groups and public advocacy.

The Indonesian Institute takes the role of mediator and facilitator in order to encourage the synergy of public policy work between the stakeholders and policy makers and also to have a synergy with funding agencies (donors).

**Executive Director**

Adinda Tenriangke Muchtar

**Research and Program Manager**

Arfianto Purbolaksono

**Board of Advisors**

Rizal Sukma

Jaleswari Pramodawardhani

Ninasapti Triaswati

Debra Yatim

Abd. Rohim Ghazali

Saiful Mujani

Clara Joewono

**Researcher of Economy Affairs**

Nuri Resti Chayyani

**Researcher of Law Affairs**

Galang Taufani

**Researcher of Political Affairs**

Ahmad Hidayah

**Researcher of Social Affairs**

Dewi Rahmawati Nur Aulia

**Program and Supporting Staff**

Gunawan

**Administration Officer**

Amelia

**Finance Officer:** Rahmanita

**IT Staff :** Usman Effendy

**Desain dan Layout**

Siong Cen

Jl. HOS. Cokroaminoto No. 92,  
Menteng, Jakarta Pusat - 10310  
Ph. (021) 315-8032  
[contact@theindonesianinstitute.com](mailto:contact@theindonesianinstitute.com)  
[www.theindonesianinstitute.com](http://www.theindonesianinstitute.com)

