

The Indonesian Update

Monthly Review on Economic, Legal, Security, Political, and Social Affairs



Main Report:

The Optimism and Challenges to the Indonesian Economy in 2023

Law

Understanding the Interlocking Problems of the Job Creation Perppu ■

The Problems with the Contents of the RKUHP ■

Politics

A New Round of Resolving the Cases of Past Human Rights Violations ■

The Phenomenon of Politicians Switching Political Parties in Indonesia ■

Considering the Electoral System in Indonesia ■

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FOREWORD

The January 2023 edition of the Indonesian Update raises a main report on optimism and challenges for the Indonesian economy in 2023. Indonesia may be optimistic due to the achievements it has achieved in 2022. However, there are a number of challenges looming in 2023 that should be watched out for, especially in the monetary and fiscal sectors.

In the legal field, the Indonesian Update raises Government Regulation in Lieu of Law Number 2/2022 on Job Creation (Perppu Cipta Kerja), which was issued on 30 December 2022. Next, we discuss the polemics over the Draft Criminal Code (RKUHP), which requires concrete steps from legislators to evaluate the Criminal Code and to change the multiple interpretations of the articles in the Criminal Code. Furthermore, legislators must open up space for meaningful public participation in order to improve the Criminal Code, which does not threaten the space for civil liberties in Indonesia.

In the political field, the Indonesian Update raises the issue of President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) admitting that there were 12 incidents of serious human rights (HAM) violations that had occurred in the past. This has marked a new chapter in solving serious human rights cases in the past. Next, we discuss the phenomenon of politicians changing political parties in Indonesia. In addition, we review the discourse on changing the proportional electoral system from an open list to a closed list. However, whatever the model of the electoral system that will be implemented, the most important thing that needs to be done is to improve the internal democracy quality of political parties.

It is hoped that the monthly publication of the Indonesian Update with current themes will help policy makers in government and business institutions – as well as academics, think tanks and elements of civil society, both domestic and foreign, to obtain actual information and contextual analysis on economic conditions, political, social, and legal in Indonesia, as well as an understanding of public policy in Indonesia.

Happy Reading.

The Optimism and Challenges to the Indonesian Economy in 2023

Starting the New Year 2023, Indonesia's economic conditions are still struggling to recover from the downturn caused by the Covid-19 pandemic. What's more, global and local uncertainties that are increasingly evident are things that must be faced by the government and society.

A number of world financial institutions, such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank (ADB), project Indonesia's economic growth to be in the range of 4.7 to 5.1 percent in 2023 (setkab.go.id, 6/12/2022). This was conveyed by the Coordinating Minister for the economy in his statement after the Plenary Cabinet Meeting on Tuesday (06/12/2022) at the President's Office, Jakarta.

The basis for this projection is based on the risks of handling COVID-19 that has increased; the acceleration of vaccination that is quite good; the function of the State Revenue and Expenditure Budget (APBN) as a *shock absorber* that supports commodity prices that have increased sharply; and Group events, such as G20.

Even though the IMF projects that 2023 will be a difficult year for the economy, Indonesia still has opportunities, so optimism is high. Revenue from the revenue budget is expected to increase due to an increase in excise tax policies, such as excise on tobacco products and excise on sweetened drinks.

In addition to excise revenue from the state revenue side, spending in 2023 is also expected to maintain economic resilience from global threats. This was conveyed by the Minister of Finance, Sri Mulyani, in a Cabinet Meeting at the Presidential Palace some time ago.

Sri Mulyani revealed that the achievements in 2022 were quite optimistic. This is because, even though one-third of the world's countries are expected to experience a recession, Indonesia will be using the 2023 State Budget as the driver for recovery.


Among them is food security spending projected at IDR 104.2 trillion to maintain food security and stability. The spending on the social protection sector is IDR 476 trillion, equivalent to what was spent in 2022 as protection for the community.

In terms of energy, the government has allocated IDR 341 trillion, which aims to keep the shocks that occur in the energy sector remain conducive so that energy production and its resilience are maintained and running. In terms of infrastructure, the government has prepared IDR 392 trillion. Meanwhile, the spending on non-Covid health is planned at IDR 178 trillion, and the education budget is maintained at IDR 612 trillion (Ministry of Finance, 16/01/2023).

The Achievements of the 2022 State Budget

The optimism that emerges is part of the achievements of the state budget for 2022. The realization of Indonesia's state budget at the end of 2022 amounts to a deficit of IDR 237.7 trillion.

Table 1. Comparison of Realization of the 2021 and 2022 State Budgets as of 14 December 2022



Source: Ministry of Finance, 2022.

The Ministry of Finance (Ministry of Finance) report shows that the performance of the State Revenue and Expenditure Budget (APBN) until December 14 2022 experienced a deficit of IDR 237.7 trillion, down 61.5 percent from the same period the previous year (year-on-year / yoy).

The APBN deficit ahead of the end of the year was recorded to be equivalent to 1.22 percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). According to Sri Mulyani in the Press Conference on Our State Budget on Tuesday (20/12), this deficit was much smaller than that indicated or planned as stated in Presidential Regulation Number 98.2022. The deficit stated in the Presidential Decree is IDR 840.2 trillion.

Despite the deficit, Sri Mulyani said, the primary balance in this year's APBN still recorded a surplus of IDR 129 trillion. In line with these conditions, budget financing was recorded to have decreased by 28.5 percent on an annual basis (yoy) to IDR 469.8 trillion, lower than IDR 656.8 trillion as of 14 December 2022.

This deficit situation, financing that has decreased drastically, and the drastic reduction in the deficit illustrate that our APBN is becoming healthier again. In line with these conditions, Indonesia still has an excess of budget financing (SILPA) of IDR 232.2 trillion until December 14, 2022. This figure was higher than SILPA in the same period in 2021, which amounted to IDR 39.4 trillion.

In terms of state revenue, until the end of December 14 2022 it was recorded at IDR 2,479.9 trillion from the 2022 State Budget target in Presidential Decree No. 98 of 2022 of IDR 2,266.2 trillion. Meanwhile, state spending was recorded at IDR 2,717.6 trillion or 87.5 percent of the state budget.

The PPKM Repeal

The next attitude of optimism has come from government policy, which has revoked the Implementations of Restrictions on Community Activities (PPKM). This policy was conveyed at the Merdeka Palace on Friday (30/12/2022) by President Joko Widodo.

The PPKM regulations contained in the Instructions of the Minister of Home Affairs Numbers 50 and 51/2022 have been officially revoked so that there are no more restrictions on crowd and community movements. This decision was taken based on a study, taking into account the pandemic situation that was gradually decreasing in Indonesia.

Indonesia is one of the four G20 countries that have not experienced a wave of pandemics for 10 consecutive months after reaching a peak of the mutation wave of 56,000 cases per day in July 2021 and the peak of the Omicron mutation trend of 64,000 cases in February 2022. The President added that, apart from controlling the pandemic situation, the revocation of the PPKM was based on the high coverage of the population's immunity and the achievement of the Covid-19 vaccination (Kominfo, 30/12/2022).

The repeal of the PPKM policy will certainly move the Indonesian economy into a positive direction, especially in the transportation and tourism sectors. It is possible that the projected economic growth will grow by more than 4.5 percent in 2023.

In addition, the business sector will also experience an increase. The restrictions on people's movement that were imposed had hampered people's mobility, especially in terms of transactions in the retail sector, wholesale trade, and especially retail trade. Moreover, the food and beverage, restaurant and accommodation sectors will increase. This has seen an increase since the third quarter of 2022.

Challenges Ahead

Minister of Finance Sri Mulyani said that there were three challenges to Indonesia's economy in 2023 that needed to be seriously mitigated. Among them are rising interest rates, global inflation, and weakening exports (cnnindonesia.com 2/12/2022). Also, the state budget deficit that must return to three percent also needs to be managed carefully.

According to Sri Mulyani, until next year central banks in major countries will still raise interest rates to reduce inflation. One of them is the Federal Reserve, which will impact the strength of the dollar and the yields on its government bonds.

This situation will have an impact on the release of foreign funds to or from Indonesia. This is because investors prefer to place their funds in countries with higher interest rates.

Second, inflation due to rising energy prices will have an impact on people's purchasing power. The reason is that oil prices are still shrouded in uncertainty in the midst of the endless Russian-Ukrainian war, the meeting of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), and the Group of Seven (G7) plans to set oil prices.

This purchasing power is a risk that must be maintained by the government so that the economy remains resilient. In addition, public consumption is the main driver for the Indonesian economy. This means that consumption must still be able to grow by more than 5 percent so that the economy can reach as high a level as it is now.

Third, the weak global economy has affected export performance. If the economies of trading partner countries weaken, then Indonesia's exports will fall and cannot be as high as they are today. This is where government policy must be very precise.

The Minister of Finance also revealed that the high export volume this year was due to two volume problems, one of which was the high demand for Crude Palm Oil (CPO) in China, US, Europe and Japan. If the world is experiencing an economic slowdown, export demand will definitely fall and commodities' prices will not be as high. This is the third factor to continue to monitor our growth prospects for next year.

The next challenge is the 2023 state budget deficit, which has returned to normal as before the pandemic. Minister of Finance Sri Mulyani in her press statement at the Presidential Office, Jakarta, on Thursday, 1 December 2022, ensured that next year's state budget deficit would be below 3 percent, in accordance with statutory provisions (setneg.go.id, 1/12 /2022).

Sri Mulyani said that the 2023 state budget deficit was targeted to get smaller; namely, IDR 598.2 (trillion) or 2.84 percent. This consistently implements Government Regulation in Lieu of Law (Perppu) Number 1/ 2020 or Law Number 2 of 2020; namely fiscal consolidation in which in 2023 the deficit must be kept below a level of 3 percent of GDP.

Thus, the Minister of Finance is targeting that state revenues in 2023 to reach IDR 2,463 trillion, originating from tax revenues of IDR 2,021 trillion, non-tax state revenues (PNBP) of IDR 441.4 trillion, and grants of IDR 0.4 trillion. Meanwhile, next year's state spending will reach IDR 3,061.2 trillion, consisting of central government spending of IDR 2,246.5 trillion and transfers to the regions of IDR 814.7 trillion.

Recommendations

Considering the optimism and challenges that have been described, in order to achieve the growth target or even keep growth stable, there are several things that need to be done by the government in strengthening the policies being implemented.

First, the Ministry of Finance and financial institutions must always coordinate to maintain the country's monetary side, both in terms of balance of payments and currency exchange rates. This can be done by implementing regulations that have been passed, such as the Omnibus Law in the financial sector.

Second, Bank Indonesia together with government officials at the regional level need to keep the inflation rate stable. Apart from controlling inflation from the smallest side of the government, this can strengthen fiscal decentralization by increasing the role of the Regional Inflation Control Team (TPID).

Third, the Ministry of Trade together with the Ministry of Cooperatives and SMEs need to strengthen synergy to keep exports increasing. This is also important to anticipate the occurrence of a windfall effect or vice versa like the beginning of 2022.

Fourth, because the state budget regulation regarding the budget deficit already has to return to 3 percent of GDP, the budget allocation to the sectors most in need must be made based on the most important project priorities. In addition to increasing state revenues, what needs to be done is savings by wisely reallocating expenditure stalks to expenditures that are productive and in favor of people's welfare.

Starting in 2023, Indonesia can be optimistic because of the achievements that have been obtained in 2022. However, there are several challenges looming in 2023 that should be watched out for, especially in the monetary and fiscal sector."

- Nuri Resti Chayyani -

Understanding the Interlocking Problems of the Job Creation Perppu

Towards the end of 2022, President Joko Widodo gave a year-end gift to the people of Indonesia. The gift was Government Regulation in Lieu of Law Number 2 of 2022 concerning Cipta Kerja (Perppu Cipta Kerja), which was issued on December 30, 2022. President Jokowi was deemed not to respect the law in issuing the policy (Sujatnika, 2023). The government claims that the Job Creation Perppu has been prepared to replace Law Number 11 of 2020 concerning Cipta Kerja (UU Cipta Kerja), which was declared conditionally unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court (*Mahkamah Konstitusi* / MK) through the Constitutional Court Decision Number 91/PUU-XVIII/2020 (dpr.go.id, 2 /1/2023). The issuance of the Job Creation Perppu is the government's failure to understand the substance of the *a quo* MK decision.

In the verdict section, the Panel of Constitutional Justices stated that the formation of the Job Creation Law was contrary to the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia (1945 Constitution). However, because what was problematic was the process of discussing it up to its approval, the MK gave two years to the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia (DPR RI) together with the President as the legislator to make improvements to the Job Creation Law. This means that the changes to the Job Creation Law should be ratified by November 25 2023. If these changes were not made, the *a quo* law will be declared completely unconstitutional.

After almost a year of time given by the MK to make improvements to the Job Creation Law, the Legislative Body (Badan Legislasi / Baleg) of the DPR RI had not yet confirmed when the discussions on the revision of the Job Creation Law would begin. Deputy Chair of the Baleg of the House of Representatives of Indonesia Republic (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Republik Indonesia* / DPR RI) Achmad Baidowi said that until now his party was still waiting for the faction's decision in the DPR RI to start discussing the Job Creation Law (kontan.co.id, 9/8/2022). Problems then arose when the In-

Indonesian Parliament was quicker to ratify Law Number 13/2022 concerning the Second Amendment to Law Number 12 of 2011 concerning the Establishment of Legislation (UU P3). However, when the DPR RI had not started discussing the changes to the Job Creation Law, President Joko Widodo instead issued a Perppu on Job Creation, which he claimed had complied with the orders from the *a quo* MK decision.

A Government Regulation in lieu of Law is a form of statutory regulation that applies in the legal norm system in Indonesia. The term government regulation as a substitute for law is entirely a provision contained in Article 22 Paragraph (1) of the 1945 Constitution which reads, “*Dalam hal ihwal kegentingan yang memaksa, Presiden berhak menetapkan peraturan pemerintah sebagai pengganti undang-undang.*” As a substitute for a law, it means that a Perppu has the same level and position as a law, therefore the content of the Perppu must be the same as the content of the law. (Kansil, 2007).

The provisions contained in Article 1 Number 4 of Law Number 12/2011 concerning the Formation of Legislation provide the definition, “*Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-Undang adalah Peraturan Perundang-undangan yang ditetapkan oleh Presiden dalam hal ihwal kegentingan yang memaksa.*” According to the provisions contained in Article 22 Paragraph (1) of the 1945 Constitution and Article 1 Number 4 of the *a quo* law, the President must fulfill the provisions related to matters of coercive urgency (*hal ihwal kegentingan yang memaksa*) before issuing a Government Regulation in Lieu of Law.

It is not an easy thing for a President to be able to issue a Perppu. The reason is, that there are several requirements or conditions that must be met in order to issue a Perppu. According to Jimly Ashidique (2007), there are three material requirements in determining a Perppu, namely:

1. There is an urgent need or act reasonable necessity;
2. The time available is limited (limited time) or there is a time crunch;
3. There are no other alternatives available or according to reasonable reasoning (beyond reasonable doubt) other alternatives are not expected to be able to overcome the situation, so the stipulation of a Perppu is the only way to overcome this situation.

If these three conditions have been met, the President as the Head of Government will automatically have the constitutional authority to regulate matters desired in order to carry out the functions of administering the state and the wheels of government he leads. In addition to these theoretical requirements, there are also other considerations that must be fulfilled by a President before issuing a Perppu.

Regarding the interpretation of the phrase regarding the urgency that compels, the Constitutional Court Decision Number 138/PUU-VII/2009 has stipulated three requirements that must be met before the President can issue a government regulation in lieu of law, namely:

1. There is a situation; namely, an urgent need to solve the problem legally quickly based on the law;
2. The required law does not yet exist so there is a legal vacuum, or there is a law but it is not sufficient;
3. The legal vacuum cannot be overcome by making laws procedurally because it takes quite a long time, while the urgent situation requires certainty to be resolved immediately.

According to the weighing section of the Job Creation Perppu, there are several reasons that are considered to have met the parameters as a compelling urgency so that it gives authority to the President to enact the a quo perppu. Global dynamics caused by rising energy and food prices, climate change, and supply chain disruptions have caused a decline in world economic growth and an increase in inflation that will have a significant impact on the national economy.

MK Decision Number 138/PUU-VII/2009 basically stipulates three requirements that must be met before the President can issue a Perppu, but the reasons for the urgent need and the existence of a legal vacuum as contained in the Job Creation Perppu need to be reviewed. Furthermore, the main problem that needs to be noted is President Jokowi's way of circumventing the order of the Constitutional Court Decision Number 91/PUU-XVIII/2020 to make formal improvements to the Job Creation Law. Therefore, there are two things that must be done by the President and the DPR RI to be able to overcome the tangled problems resulting from the issuance of the Job Creation Perppu.

First, in forming a Perppu, the President should pay close attention to and analyze properly the elements of urgency that compel as the basis for issuing the Perppu objectively. The President must

again fulfill the order of MK Decision Number 91/PUU-XVIII/2020 to make formal improvements to the Job Creation Law.

Second, in giving approval and decisions on the Perppu that has been formed by the President, it is best if the DPR RI, which has the authority to reject or accept the Perppu, can conduct an in-depth study of the Perppu Cipta, so that the results can be expected to bring justice and benefits to all Indonesian people. We should not let the ratification of the Job Creation Perppu contradict the orders of the Constitutional Court Decision Number 91/PUU-XVIII/2020 and result in legal uncertainty.

- Hemi Lavour Febrinandez -

The Job Creation Law must be corrected in accordance with the orders from the Constitutional Court Decision Number 91/PUU-XVIII/2020. The problems with the legislation of the a quo law cannot be resolved simply by issuing a Perppu.

The Problems with the Contents of the RKUHP

The House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia (*Dewan Perwakilan Republik Indonesia* / DPR RI) approved the Draft Criminal Code (*Rancangan Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Pidana* / RKUHP) as a law through level II decision-making conducted by the DPR RI in the 11th Plenary Session of the Period II in the Year 2022-2023. Regarding protests from various groups, Deputy Speaker of the Indonesian Parliament Lodewijk F. Paulus said that those who were dissatisfied could take legal steps to the Constitutional Court (*Mahkamah Konstitusi* / MK) (dpr.go.id, 6/12/2022). This statement from the Deputy Chair of the DPR RI emerged because throughout the discussion process until ratification, the RKUHP draft received a lot of criticisms and rejections from various civil society groups in Indonesia.

We need to remember that the idea of reforming the national criminal law had started since the holding of the First National Law Seminar in Semarang in 1963, where one of the agenda items was to discuss the RKUHP. The enthusiasm to change the Criminal Code was inseparable from efforts to reduce the influence of the Dutch colonial government in Indonesia, because the *a quo* penal code was actually the Dutch government's *Wetboek van Strafrecht*, which had been in effect in Indonesia during the colonial period. However, the ratification of the RKUHP at the end of 2022 will not fully bring happiness to the members of the legal community.

A number of civil society organizations that have joined the National Alliance for Criminal Code Reform have criticized the decision of the government and DPR RI to pass the RKUHP because it still contains a number of controversial articles. Chair of the Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation (*Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia* / YLBHI), Muhammad Isnur criticized the Indonesian Parliament and the government because the ratification of the draft law was deemed rushed and did not involve public participation (cnnindonesia.com, 6/12/2022). In addition, the substance of the RKUHP also

contains articles that have multiple interpretations that can undermine civil liberties in Indonesia.

Several articles contained in the new Criminal Code tend to only provide protection to those in power and have the potential to become tools to imprison people who are critical of various state policies. An example is the provision in Article 218 of the Criminal Code relating to attacking the honor or dignity of the president and/or vice president. This offense is clearly problematic because it does not provide clear indicators regarding when someone is considered to have attacked the honor of the president and/or vice president. In the end, we will soon see that critics of government policies are then threatened with criminal prosecution because they are deemed to have attacked the honor of the president.

This insult offense has actually been declared unconstitutional through the Constitutional Court Decision Number 013-022/PUU-IV/2006. Therefore, it becomes a question itself why legislators are still trying to revive these articles. The Court in its decision has explained that the President and Vice President has the right to be respected in a protocol manner, but the two leaders chosen by the people cannot be given privileges that differentiate their positions from other citizens.

The Constitutional judges also explained that the article related to insulting the President and Vice President negated the principle of equality before the law, and could threaten the freedom of expression and opinion. The Court's considerations are inseparable from Indonesia's position to uphold the democratic rule of law and to place supreme sovereignty in the hands of the people. Then, the Constitutional judges also indicated that the Criminal Code no longer contained similar provisions. However, legislators have revived this problematic legal norm in the new Criminal Code.

This offense does not only regulate insulting the president or vice president in a physical space, as already existed in the Criminal Code, as the Constitutional Court had annulled through its decision. However, there are also weighted criminal charges if the act is carried out on social media. Article 219 of the RKUHP provides for criminal charges in the form of imprisonment for a maximum of four years and six months or a maximum fine of category IV. This provision only adds to the confusion regarding regulation regarding cyber crime in Indonesia.

Article 219 of the Criminal Code that regulates aggravating penalties if the insulting of the president is committed by using information technology means the article can be used as a strengthening basis for authorities to use articles that have multiple interpretations contained in Law Number 11/2008 concerning Information and Electronic Transactions (ITE Law). Previously, the DPR RI and the Government had promised to remove the multi-interpretation article in the ITE Law, but it seems that this was just a lip service, as there has been the introduction of a new article in the Criminal Code that is far more dangerous. This is clearly a setback in democracy and a serious warning of growing threats to freedom of expression and civil liberties of the Indonesian society.

It must be remembered that the article on insulting the president or vice president that was adopted by the DPR RI together with the government in the Criminal Code under the pretext of harmonizing law and the development of the digital world is actually an obsolete rule inherited from the Dutch East Indies colonial government. The basic argument used to use the rule of law was for the benefit of the Dutch colonial government against Indonesia. With the monarchy system it adheres to, the Netherlands demands absolute and absolute obedience to its Queen in colonial countries, including Indonesia.

After Indonesia's independence, the Criminal Code, which originated from *Wetboek van Strafrecht*, was declared valid with several changes through several laws, including the article on insulting the ruler. The words "*President or Vice President*" were introduced to replace the Dutch Rulers; namely, the Queen or the Governor General and the Dutch Rulers in the Dutch East Indies regions. Against this historical background, the use of articles on insulting the president or vice president is no longer relevant to Indonesia, which claims to be a democratic country that protects the rights of its citizens.

Setting criminal provisions related to cybercrime is a matter that is quite complicated. In addition to the space for the application of criminal provisions to virtual actions, the classification of sanctions must also be prepared carefully. Does the act cause personal loss or cause wider and measurable losses in the social environment of the community?

If the article that is considered problematic in the Criminal Code is implemented, it is certain that law enforcement officials will act recklessly in the name of maintaining the dignity of a legitimate gov-

ernment. This can be seen from how the problems that have so far been caused by multiple interpretations of the articles in the ITE Law and the existence of a virtual police have ultimately restricted people's movement in the digital space. Therefore, concrete steps are needed from legislators to evaluate the Criminal Code and to change the multiple interpretations of the articles in the Criminal Code.

The government, together with the DPR RI as legislators, must carry out an independent review of substances that are considered problematic by various civil society groups in Indonesia. Even though the RKUHP will eventually remain in force, legislators must open up space for meaningful public participation in order to improve the KUHP so that it does not threaten the space for civil liberties in Indonesia.

"The RKUHP polemics require concrete steps from the legislators to evaluate the Criminal Code and to change the multiple interpretations of the articles in the Criminal Code. Furthermore, the legislators must open up space for meaningful public participation in order to improve the Criminal Code that does not threaten the space for civil liberties in Indonesia."

- Hemi Lavour Febrinandez -

A New Round of Resolving the Cases of Past Human Rights Violations

On Wednesday, 11 January 2023, President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) received a report from the Team for the Settlement of Serious Human Rights Violations (PPHAM) at the Merdeka Palace, Jakarta. On this occasion, President Jokowi acknowledged that gross violations of human rights (HAM) had occurred in various events in the country (setneg.go.id, 11/1/2023).

President Jokowi deplored the occurrence of gross human rights violations in a number of incidents; namely: 1) the 1965-1966 incidents; 2) the mysterious shooting events in 1982-1985; 3) the Talangsari Incident in Lampung 1989; 4) The Rumoh Geudong and Post Sattis incidents in Aceh in 1989; 5) the incidents of forced disappearances of persons in 1997-1998; 6) the May 1998 riots; 7) the Trisakti and Semanggi I - II 1998-1999 incidents; 8) the witchcraft shaman murders in 1998-1999; 9) the KKA intersection incident in Aceh in 1999; 10) the Wasior incident in Papua 2001-2002; 11) the Wamena Incident in Papua 2003; and 12) the Jambo Keupok incident in Aceh 2003 (setneg.go.id, 11/1/2023).

President Jokowi also expressed his deep sympathy and empathy for the victims and their families. For this reason, the government will try to restore the rights of victims in a fair and wise manner. In addition, the President added, the government would make serious efforts to prevent gross human rights violations from occurring in the future. The President also instructed the Coordinating Minister for Politics, Law and Security (Menkopolhukam) Mahfud MD to oversee this matter (setneg.go.id, 11/1/2023).

The government step is a new chapter in the efforts to resolve cases of human rights violations in Indonesia. Previously, the cases of human rights violations had always been hampered in their settlements. The following section will review this.

The Slow Completion of Human Rights Violations Cases

The settlements of cases of past human rights violations have always been slow in their completion. In fact, as we all know, there is already a legal umbrella that states that the settlements of serious human rights cases can be carried out through the Ad Hoc courts, as mandated in Law Number 26/2000 on Human Rights Courts. However, after going through several changes of government in the Reform era, this has not been implemented. The reason was that the investigation case files prepared by the National Human Rights Commission (Komnas) had been returned by the Attorney General's Office because they did not meet the requirements for an investigation.

In 2020, President Jokowi highlighted the slow performance of the Attorney General's Office. At that time, Jokowi asked the Attorney General's Office to resolve unresolved cases of past human rights violations. The Attorney General then responded to this by creating the Special Team to Solve Alleged Serious Human Rights Violations, or Timsus HAM (liputan6.com, 30/12/2020). However, until 2021, the team has not made any changes to the settlements of cases of human rights violations.

Junior Attorney General for Special Crimes (Jampidsus) Ali Mukartono, said that there were no cases that could be followed up through the judicial channel because Komnas HAM did not comply with the instructions given by the AGO, both formal and material requirements. In fact, the Coordinator of the Special Human Rights Team, who is also the Director of Serious Human Rights Violations at the Attorney General's Office, Yuspar, proposed to the government to resolve it through the non-judicial channel (mediaindonesia.com, 4/5/2021). The absence of progress in resolving cases of human rights violations continues to this day.

The Commissioner for Monitoring and Investigation of the National Human Rights Commission, Amiruddin Al Rahab, said that there had been no new developments in the resolution of the 1998 human rights violations, including the rape cases. According to him, the Komnas HAM investigation results were re-submitted to the Attorney General last year. Previously, the case files had been returned by the Attorney General's Office to Komnas HAM because they were considered incomplete (voaindonesia.com, 15/5/2022).

Amiruddin added that his institution had also met President Joko Widodo to discuss cases of past human rights violations, including the 1998 incidents in December 2021. Komnas HAM said that the President should pay attention to cases of human rights violations. This is so that the victims and the victims' families will get justice and legal certainty. Amiruddin said the President said he would take new steps in handling the cases of past human rights violations. However, there have been no further developments after the meeting at the end of last year (voaindonesia.com, 15/5/2022).

Furthermore, apart from going through the judicial channel or the human rights courts, the settlements of human rights violations can also be carried out through non-judicial channels or outside the courts. The settlements of human rights violations outside the courts will be done through reconciliation.

Previously, Indonesia had Law Number 27/2004 on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (UU KKR). However, before this law was fully implemented, in 2006, the Constitutional Court (MK) annulled it, because it was considered to be contrary to the 1945 Constitution. The cancellation of the TRC law was recorded in the Constitutional Court (MK) Decision Letter No. 006/PUU-IV/2006. According to the decision, the cancellation of the TRC Law was carried out in accordance with the results of a judicial review of a number of articles contained in the legislation product (indonesia.go.id, 16/12/2019).

The judicial review of the TRC Law was filed on 28 March 2006 by eight people from non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and victims of past human rights violations. They were the Institute for Community Studies and Advocacy, the Commission for Disappearances and Acts of Violence (KontraS), Solidaritas Nusa Bangsa (SNB), Imparsial, the Research Institute for Victims of the 65th Incident, the Institute for the Struggle for Rehabilitation of Victims of the New Order Regime, and the activist kidnapping victims, as well as victims of the 65 incidents (indonesia.go.id, 16/ 12/ 2019).

With the cancellation of the TRC Law, the settlements of cases of human rights violations using non-judicial channels have also reached a dead end. Nevertheless, the Jokowi administration is trying to offer settlements outside the courts by prioritizing reconciliation to resolve cases of gross human rights violations.

During the MPR Annual Session on 16 August 2022, President Jokowi revealed that he had signed Presidential Decree Number 17/2022 concerning the Formation of the Team for the Non-Judicial Resolution of Past Serious Human Rights Violations (PPHAM). Furthermore, the PPHAM Team has completed its duties and issued recommendations, which will be followed up by the government.

The Coordinating Minister for Politics, Law and Security (Menko Polhukam) Mahfud MD stated that President Jokowi would issue a Presidential Instruction (Inpres) to 17 ministries and non-ministerial government agencies to finalize the PPHAM Team's recommendations. According to Mahfud, the Ministry of Public Works and Public Housing will be assigned to build infrastructure in several locations where past gross human rights violations had occurred. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Law and Human Rights have met with the victims of past gross human rights violations who have been living abroad (kompas.com, 17/1/2023).

It is hoped that the PPHAM Team's recommendations will be followed up by the government, not just a mere discourse. These recommendations must be implemented and can also bring justice to the victims of past human rights violations.

However, even though the non-judicial channel has been running, it is hoped that the completion of the judicial channel must still be pursued. We should not let the efforts to resolve cases of human rights violations never reveal the truth. Without disclosing the truth and providing legal certainty, it is like forcing the families of the victims to forget about the gross human rights violations that befell their families.

Recommendations

Therefore, considering the issues above, there are several important recommendations. First, encouraging the government and the House of Representatives (DPR) to remain committed to resolving the cases of past gross human rights violations through the courts.

Second, encouraging the Attorney General's Office and Komnas HAM to work together in a professional manner to complete the investigations of the cases of past gross human rights violations. Third, encouraging the Coordinating Ministry for Politics, Law and Security (Kemenko Polhukam) and Komnas HAM to supervise, evaluate and control the implementation of each recommendation from the PPHAM Team in a transparent manner to the public.

Fourth, encouraging Komnas HAM and the Ministry of Education, Culture, Research and Technology to provide space in historical documents on the nation's journey so that the cases of human rights violations do not become taboo and closed. This will serve as a reminder for future governments that state mistakes have occurred in the past. Fifth, encouraging Komnas HAM to facilitate the reconciliation process so that victims can go through the phase of accepting reality and forgiving the perpetrators of human rights violators.

- Arfianto Purbolaksono -

The resolution of the cases of past gross human rights violations has entered a new phase after the government, through President Jokowi, acknowledged that gross human rights violations that had occurred in various incidents in the past. In addition, the government is trying to carry out non-judicial settlements by issuing a Presidential Instruction to provide justice for the victims of past human rights violations.

The Phenomenon of Politicians Switching Political Parties in Indonesia

Ahead of the 2024 Simultaneous General Election (Election), a number of politicians are starting to change uniforms. For example, former Governor of East Java Soekarwo switched parties from the Democratic Party to the Golkar Party (Tempo.co, 4/12/2022). Previously, on 6 August 2022, Tuan Guru Bajang (TGB) Muhammad Zainul Majdi officially became a cadre of the Perindo Party, where previously he was a cadre of the Golkar Party (Republika, 08/08/2022).

The phenomenon of politicians changing parties is not just happening this time, as it is a common thing after in the Reform era. Quoting a statement from Denny JA Indonesian Survey Institute (LSI) researcher Ardian Sopa, the phenomenon of politicians changing parties has gradually grown. In fact, according to Titi Anggraini from the Board of Trustees of the Association for Elections and Democracy (Perludem), 2019 was a year with quite high intensity regarding the phenomenon of politicians changing parties in Indonesia (Aprimayanti & Pasha, 2021).

According to research results from Aprimayanti & Pasha (2021), of the 16 political parties participating in the 2019 elections, 14 of them were involved in the movement of politicians. Of these, eight registered political parties were abandoned by their cadres, and 11 political parties became new homes for politicians who changed political parties. Here are the details:

Table 1. Politicians Switching Political Parties in the 2019 Elections

No.	Partai Politik yang ditinggalkan	Jumlah Politisi yang keluar	No.	Partai Politik yang Dituju	Jumlah Politisi yang Masuk
1	Hanura	14	1	Nasdem	27
2	PAN	7	2	PAN	4
3	PPP	6	3	PDIP	2

No.	Partai Politik yang ditinggalkan	Jumlah Politisi yang keluar	No.	Partai Politik yang Dituju	Jumlah Politisi yang Masuk
4	Demokrat	6	4	Berkarya	2
5	Gerindra	5	5	PKS	1
6	Golkar	4	6	Perindo	1
7	PKB	2	7	PBB	1
8	Nasdem	2	8	PKB	1
			9	Gerindra	1
			10	Demokrat	1
			11	Garuda	1

Source: Aprimayanti & Pasha (2021).

From Table 1 above, it can be seen that the Hanura Party was the political party most abandoned by its cadres. Furthermore, 8 out of 14 politicians from the Hanura Party moved to the Nasdem Party. According to the data from research by Aprimayanti & Pasha (2021), of the 27 politicians who joined the Nasdem Party ahead of the 2019 elections, the majority were from the Hanura Party; namely, eight people. In addition, of the 27 politicians, 20 of them were the members of the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia (DPR RI) for the 2014-2019 period, and four people served as regional heads. The reasons for politicians to change political parties will be explained in the next section.

The Reasons for Politicians to Switch Political Parties

The movements of politicians from one political party to another are due to several reasons. The first one is the vacancies of political party positions. Vacant positions in political parties are often seen as political opportunities to expand access. For example, politicians who are in smaller political parties accept offers to move to larger political parties to see greater political opportunities in the bigger political parties. Or, politicians who are in larger political parties choose to move to smaller political parties because they will get higher positions in the smaller political parties (Aprimayanti & Pasha, 2021).

The second reason is the access to policies and powers. Most politicians desire to be able to influence policies and be influential in

political parties. Therefore, a number of politicians switching political parties is because they get incentives from other political parties, both material or non-material. The non-material context here can be in the form of an authority within the other political parties, even though the positions held are similar to those in the previous political parties. For example, a politician who serves as a member of the Election Winning Body (Bappilu) in political party A moves to political party B and is still given the same position. However, the politician switches political parties because he or she has more authority to allocate resources in political party B, if compared to when he was in political party A (Aprimayanti & Pasha, 2021).

The third reason is electoral gain; namely, the advantage a politician can get when changing political parties in the form of expanding access to voters and votes. In addition, there are also politicians who switch political parties because the new political parties guarantee their election more. For example, a politician moves from party A to party B because political party B is considered bigger and has a greater chance of passing the parliamentary threshold (PT) compared to political party A (Aprimayanti & Pasha, 2021).

The fourth reason is ideological differences. According to Ware (1996), one of the reasons for politicians switching political parties is ideological beliefs (solidarity incentives). For example, Aprimayanti & Pasha (2021) in their research explains that Fauzi H. Amro's move from the Hanura Party to the Nasdem Party was not only due to the internal conflict of the Hanura Party at that time, but because the Nasdem Party at that time brought new values into Indonesian politics.

The fifth reason is that there is a certain purposive incentive. This can be interpreted as creating a new political party. There are several examples in post-reform Indonesia, such as Wiranto who founded the Hanura Party, while previously he was a cadre of the Golkar Party; Surya Paloh who founded the Nasdem Party was previously a cadre of the Golkar Party; Hary Tanoesoedibjo who founded the Perindo Party was previously a cadre of the Nasdem and Hanura Parties, and Anis Matta who founded the Gelora Party was previously a cadre of the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS).

The Weak Identity of Political Parties

If examined more deeply, the root of the phenomenon of politicians changing political parties is the weak identity of political parties in Indonesia. The public tends to find it difficult to distinguish one political party from another based on ideology. Therefore, it is important for political parties to have clear identities based on real and

implementable vision, mission and program, so the differentiation of political parties in Indonesia is formed.

In addition, the electoral system in Indonesia that uses an open list proportional system is also one of the reasons why politicians in Indonesia easily switch political parties. The reason is that through the model of an open list proportional electoral system, elections in Indonesia are candidate centric. The public tends to vote for candidates they know, not because of the political party ideologies. For example, Fauzi H. Amro's move from the Hanura Party to the NasDem Party did not affect his vote acquisition. In fact, it tended to increase. This is because the public knows Fauzi H. Amro better than it knows his political party.

The most important thing that needs to be done to minimize the movements of politicians is to strengthen the political party recruitment system. The function of political recruitment and education need to be carried out seriously by political parties so that politicians do not easily switch political parties.

- **Ahmad Hidayah** -

The root of the phenomenon of politicians changing political parties is due to the weak identity of political parties in Indonesia. In addition, the electoral system in Indonesia, which is candidate-centric, is also one of the reasons why politicians easily switch political parties. The most important thing that needs to be done to minimize the movement of politicians is to strengthen the political party recruitment system and strengthen political education within political parties.

Considering the Electoral System in Indonesia

Some time ago, the Chair of the General Election Commission of the Republic of Indonesia (KPU RI), Hasyim Asy'ari, said that there was a possibility that the 2024 Legislative General Election (Pemilu) would implement a closed list proportional system (Kompas.tv, 29/12/2022). This statement has also elicited reactions from various parties. For example, the Secretary General of the Nasdem Party, Johnny G. Plate, said that the Chair of the KPU was offside (a violation in football where an attacking player goes too far and crosses the line of the last defender). Furthermore, Johnny G. Plate said that the KPU should focus on and comply with the current laws and regulations and not be tempted by political interests from certain political parties (cnnindonesia.com, 30/12/2022).

Not only the Nasdem Party that has refused, the Crescent Star Party (PBB) through its General Deputy Chairperson; namely Sukmo Harsono, said that changing the electoral system to a closed list proportional one gave concerns to small parties. Sukmo Harsono saw from the internal perspective of political parties that with a closed list proportional system, the authority of those who would sit in the Parliament would be determined by administrators at the central level. Therefore, Sukmo Harsono was worried that later it would be difficult for small parties to convince their recruits to run for the small parties because of the fear that old cadres would be prioritized. (Detik.com, 30/12/2022).

On a similar note, the Indonesian Solidarity Party (PSI) also rejected the idea of changing the electoral system to a closed list proportional one. Through a spokesperson for PSI, Ariyo Bimmo, it said that a closed list proportional system would dampen the development of young people in political parties and only benefit the party elites. Apart from that, an open list proportional system is also a form of progress for Indonesian democracy (Detik.com, 30/12/2022).

Although it has been rejected by a number of political parties, the discourse on a closed list proportional system has received sup-

port from the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP). The PDIP secretary general, Hasto Kristiyanto, stated that a closed list proportional system could reduce election costs (Tempo.co, 30/12/2022). Based on the statements of various political parties, it can be said that each electoral system has its own advantages and disadvantages and is closely related to the interests of political parties.

There is no perfect electoral system

Basically the electoral system consists of four models; namely, the majority system (one electoral district, one representative), proportional (one electoral district has several representatives), mixed systems, and other systems (Norris, 2004). Since the first election in 1955, Indonesia has used a proportional system. The proportional election system is intended to create a balance between the acquisition of valid votes and the candidates or political parties that obtain these valid votes. That is, if a candidate or political party gets a total of 40% of the votes, then that candidate or political party will also get 40% of the seats out of the total seats in the Parliament. In this system, one constituency provides more than one seat (IDEA, 2016).

The proportional system generally consists of two forms; namely, a closed list proportional system and an open list proportional system. In a closed list proportional system, there are only political party symbols on the ballot. Whereas an open list proportional system does not only display the symbols of a political party on the ballot, but also displays the names of the candidates (Labolo & Ilham, 2015). Both of these systems have been used in Indonesia; namely, the closed list proportional system used during the Old Order and the New Order, while the open list proportional system has been used after in the Reform era; namely, the 2004 elections.

Every proportional system, whether closed or open, has advantages and disadvantages. The advantage of the closed list proportional system is that it makes it easier for voters. This is because there are only political party symbols on the ballot. Furthermore, by displaying only the symbols of political parties, it is hoped that this will differentiate political parties. While the disadvantages of a closed list proportional system include only benefiting certain elites in political parties. This is because, with the current internal democracy of political parties in Indonesia that is exclusive, the determination of candidates is in the hands of a number of political party elites (Hidayah, 2019), candidates who will sit in Parliament will only be

people who have close ties with party elites. In addition, a closed list proportional system is considered more profitable for large political parties because they already have a clear mass base.

The open list proportional system also has advantages and disadvantages. The advantages of an open list proportional system include opening opportunities for each candidate. This is because voters can choose their candidates directly because the names are already available on the ballot. In addition, this system is also considered to be able to provide hope for new parties and smaller parties who often recruit candidates who already have popularity.

The drawback of an open list proportional system is that it makes it difficult for voters because there are too many candidate names on the ballots. Furthermore, an open list proportional system is also considered to be more candidate centric, thus impacting the pragmatism of political parties in carrying out the recruitment function.

The Improvement of Internal Democracy of Political Parties

If we look at the challenges of elections in Indonesia, there are too many political parties. The ballot paper makes it difficult for voters because it contain many candidate names, so it is difficult to find differences between political parties. The elections are too candidate-centric, which gives rise to the pragmatism of political parties. Then, changing the electoral system into the close list proportional system can be an option to be reviewed. Therefore, it is important for the government together with the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia (DPR RI) to review the electoral system in Indonesia again.

In addition, it is also important for political parties to prepare for all possibilities. If the electoral system is carried out proportionally closed, then the most important thing that must be done by political parties is to improve the internal democracy of political parties. This can be done by establishing clear internal mechanisms for political parties regarding who will sit in the Parliament.

On the other hand, if the electoral system continues to use an open list proportional system, then political parties need to improve the system of recruitment and selection of candidates for legislative members. We should not let political parties only recruit candidates who only have popularity and electability, without considering capability and integrity.

- Ahmad Hidayah -

The discussion of changing the proportional electoral system from open to closed list needs to be reviewed again. However, whatever the model of the electoral system that will be implemented, the most important thing that needs to be done is to improve the internal democracy quality of political parties.



THE INDONESIAN INSTITUTE

CENTER FOR PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH

The Indonesian Institute (TII) is a Center for Public Policy Research that was established on 21 October 2004 by a group of young, dynamic activists and intellectuals. **TII** is an independent, non-partisan, non-profit institution, whose main funding stems from grants and contributions from foundations, companies, and individuals.

TII has the aim of becoming a main research center in Indonesia for public policy matters and has committed to giving contribution to the debates over public policies and to improving the quality of the planning and results of public policy by promoting good governance principles and public participation in the policy processes in Indonesia.

TII's visions are public policies in Indonesia which highly uphold human rights and rule of law, as well as involve participation of various stakeholders and practice democratic good governance principles.

TII's missions are to conduct reliable research that is independent and non-partisan and to channel the research to the policy-makers, the private sector, and academia in order to improve the quality of Indonesian policy-makers.

TII also assumes the role of disseminating ideas to the society so that they are well informed about the policies that will have a good impact on the people's lives. In other words, **TII** has a position to support the democratization process and the public policy reform, as it will be involved in the process.

The scope of the research and review on public policies undertaken by **TII** includes economic, social, political, and legal affairs. The main activities which have been conducted by **TII** in order to achieve our vision and mission, are: research, surveys, facilitation and advocacy through training and working groups, public discussions, public education, weekly editorial articles ("*Wacana*" or Discourses), monthly analysis ("*Update Indonesia*" in Indonesian and "**The Indonesian Update**" in English), mid-year policy analysis ("Policy

Assessment”), annual policy analysis (“Indonesian Report”), and monthly discussion forum on policy issues (“The Indonesian Forum”).

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RESEARCH ON ECONOMIC AFFAIRS

The economy tends to be used as an indicator of the success of the government as a policy-maker. Economy plays an important role as one of the fundamentals of national development. Limited resources have often caused the government to face obstacles in implementing economic policies that will optimally benefit the people. The increase in the quality of the people's critical thinking has forced the government to conduct comprehensive studies in every decision-making process. In fact, the studies will not be stopped when the policy is already in place. Studies will be continued until the policy evaluation process.

TII focus on economic issues, such as monetary policy and fiscal policy, as well as issues on sustainable development by using analysis which refer to economic freedom principles. Monetary issues will focus on the Indonesian Central Bank to maintain economic stability, both regarding inflation and exchange rate. Meanwhile, fiscal policy will focus on the discussions over the National Budget and infrastructure development both in the regions and in the cities. In relation to sustainable development, **TII** research is focusing on productivity, competitiveness, infrastructure development, and development gap. In addition, **TII** also upholds economic freedom principles in highlighting the importance of individual freedom and involvement of private sectors in increasing development and improving welfare in Indonesia.

The TII Economic Research Division is present for those who are interested in the conditions of the economy. The results of the research are intended to assist policy-makers, regulators, and donor agencies in making decisions. The research that TII offers: **(1) Economic Policy Analysis; (2) Regional and Sectoral Prospects; and (3) Program Evaluation.**

RESEARCH ON LEGAL AFFAIRS

According to stipulations in Law No. 12 Year 2011 on the Formulation of Laws and Regulations, every bill which will be discussed by the legislative and the executive must be complemented with academic paper. This stipulation is also confirmed in Law No. 15 Year 2019 on the Amendment of Law No. 12 Year 2011 regarding the Formulation of Laws and Regulations.

Therefore, comprehensive research is very important and needed in making a qualified academic paper. With qualified academic papers, the bills will have strong academic foundation both from academic and content aspects. Furthermore, academic paper also functions as an early tracking over possibilities of overlapping laws and regulations, so that revocation of local regulations or other related issues which can be caused by legal, economic, or political aspects in the future, can be minimized as soon as possible.

TII offers normative and legal research related to harmonization and synchronization of laws and regulations, especially in making academic papers, legal opinion on harmonization and synchronization of laws and regulations, and legislative drafting for the formulation of local regulations bill drafts or other laws and regulations. In addition, **TII** also offers openly research on other legal issues related to Constitutional Law and Public Administration, Human Rights, and Political Corruption.

RESEARCH ON THE POLITICAL AFFAIRS

The enactment of Law No. 23 Year 2014 on the latest regulation on the Local Government, has created different relations between the Central Government and the Local Government. Entering the era of Bureaucracy Reform, specification of division of affairs of the Central Government and the Local Government has increasingly demanded the implementation of good governance principles. The government is demanded to be adaptive and responsive towards public aspiration and services. Therefore, public policy research become more important for both the Central Government and the Local Government to analyse context and current issues in the regions. The government must also consider various actors whether political actors or bureaucrats, as well as public's aspiration and other non-state actor in policy processes.

In order to respond those needs, **TII** research in political affairs offer policy assessment on various policies which were already applied or will be implemented. **TII** will look at socio-cultural, economy, legal, and political aspects in assessing public policies. Our research will be useful to assist government in formulating policies which are in line with context, priorities, and people's aspiration. **TII** also offers various breakthrough of transformative policies according to existing contexts in particular and Open Government principles' implementation in general, in order to increase public participation in policy processes, particularly in the era of the openness of public information.

Political Research Division of **TII** provide analysis and policy recommendations in order to generate strategic policy in the strengthening of democracy and the establishment of good governance both at the national and local levels. Political research forms are offered by **TII** **(1) Public Policy Analysis, (2) Media Monitoring, (3) Mapping & Positioning Research, (4) Need Assessment Research, (5) Survey Indicator.**

RESEARCH ON THE SOCIAL AFFAIRS

Social development needs policy foundations that come from independent and accurate research. Social analysis is a need for the government, the businesspeople, academia, professionals, NGOs, and civil society to improve social development. Social analysis is important to identify strategic issues which are developing and to make the right stakeholders' mapping to promote significant change in the context of development, public policy, and democracy in Indonesia.

The Social Research Division is present to offer strong and valid recommendations to produce strategic, relevant, efficient and effective, and impactful policies, in addressing to existing various issues. For example, issues related to education, health, population, environment, women, children, and elderly. Social research that **TII** offers: **(1) Social Policy Analysis; (2) Explorative Research; (3) Mapping & Positioning Research; (4) Need Assessment Research; (5) Program Evaluation Research; and (5) Indicator Survey.**

PRE-ELECTION AND REGIONAL HEAD ELECTION

One of the activities carried out and offered by **TII** is a pre-election survey as well as a pre-election and regional head election. The reasons underlying the implementation of pre-election and regional head election surveys, namely: (1) A good election is a democratic process that can be arranged, calculated, and predicted in the resulting process; (2) Survey is one of the important and common discussions to measure, calculate, and predict how the process and results of the General Election and the Regional Head Election will take place, in accordance to the expectations of the candidates; (3) It is very important to win in the General Election and the Regional Head Election based on empirical, scientific, measurable and supportable data.

As one of the important aspects of a strategic candidate's election, the survey is useful for monitoring political power. In this case, the success team needs to conduct a survey for: **(1) mapping the candidate's position in public perception; (2) mapping voters' desires; (3) publishing the most effective political machinery used as voters; and (4) Looking for the most effective medium for the campaign.**

EVALUATION OF A PROJECT OR A PROGRAM

One of the activities that have been performed and experienced offered by TII is a qualitative evaluation of the projects and programs of non-governmental organizations and government. Evaluation activities are offered TII stages of mid-term evaluation of the project/program (mid-term evaluation) and also the final evaluation at the end of the project/program (final evaluation).

As we know, the evaluation is an important step in the implementation of a project or program. Mid-Term Evaluation of the project or program is intended to look at and analyze the challenges, the overall learning takes place during the project or program, and make recommendations for the continuity of the project or program. Meanwhile, the final evaluation allows us to view and analyze the outcomes and the lessons learned to ensure the achievement of all the objectives of the project or program at the end of the project or program.

THE INDONESIAN FORUM

The Indonesian Forum is a monthly discussion activity on actual issues in the political, economic, social, legal, cultural, defense, and environmental fields. TII organizes these forums as media for competent resource persons, stakeholders, policymakers, civil society activists, academicians, and the media to meet and have discussion.

Themes that have been raised were the ones that have caught public attention, such as migrant workers, social conflicts, domestic politics, and local direct elections. The main consideration in picking a theme is sociological and political reality and the context of the relevant public policy at the time that the Indonesian Forum is delivered.

It is expected that the public can get the big picture of a particular event as the Indonesian Forum also presents relevant resource persons.

Since its inception, the Indonesian Institute is very aware of the passion of the public to get discussions that are not only rich in substance but also well formatted, which support balanced ideas exchanges ideas and the equal involvement of the different elements of the society.

The discussions, which are designed to only invite a limited number of participants, do not only feature idea exchanges but also regularly offer policy briefs (policy recommendations) to relevant policymakers and also summaries to the participants, especially the media people and the resource persons at the end of each discussion. Therefore, the discussions will not end without solutions.

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LOCAL COUNCIL TRAINING

The roles and functions of local councils in monitoring local governments are very important. They need to ensure that participative and democratic policies will be espoused. Members of provincial and regent local councils are required to have strong capacity to understand democratization matters, regional autonomy, legislative techniques, budgeting, local Politics, and political marketing. Thus, it is important to empower members of local councils.

In order for local councils to be able to response every problem that will come out as a result of any policy implemented by the central government or local governments, the Indonesian Institute invites the leaderships and members of local councils to undergo training to improve their capacity.

WORKING GROUP

The Indonesian Institute believes that a good public policy process can be held with some engagement and empowerment of the stakeholders. The Indonesian Institute takes a role as one of mediator agencies to facilitate some forums in which the Government, Council Members, Private Sectors, NGOs and Academicians can meet in interactive forums. The Indonesian Institute provides facilitation on working groups and public advocacy.

The Indonesian Institute takes the role of mediator and facilitator in order to encourage the synergy of public policy work between the stakeholders and policy makers and also to have a synergy with funding agencies (donors).

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