

# The Indonesian Update

Monthly Review on Economic, Legal, Security, Political, and Social Affairs



## Main Report : The Improvement of the Special Narcotic Penitentiaries

### Politics

- The Fifth Amendment and the Momentum to Strengthen the Presidential System
- Wikileaks and Moral Delegation of the SBY Administration

### Social Issues

- Criticizing the Handling of the Social Conflict Law
- A Look at the National Education System
- Lessons Learned from the Japan Earthquake and Tsunami for Indonesian Risk Disaster Preparedness

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## FOREWORD

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Indication of the involvement of some penitentiary officials has been proven. The arrests the Head of the Special Narcotics Penitentiary of Nusakambangan, Marwan Adli, two employees of the penitentiary, and a convict named Hartoni have proven the indication. The National Narcotics Agency (BNN) arrested them for allegedly maintaining illegal network of prison drug dealers and international drug dealers. (*Kompas*, March 9, 2011).

Before the Marwan case was revealed by the BNN, in 2010 BNN also arrested Surya Bahadur Tamang, the alleged illegal drug dealer who allegedly controlled of trade at the Special Narcotics Penitentiary of Nusakambangan. Last February, BNN also arrested Yoyok, an inmate from the *Besi* Penitentiary, Nusakambangan.

Learning from the series of events, the Minister of Justice and Human rights, Patrialis Akbar, should not miss some details again. Working closely with BNN, the Ministry must soon make a breakthrough such as intensive checking of all narcotics prison officials, not only in Nusakambangan, but in all narcotics prisons in this country.

This edition the Indonesian Update also raises some important topics in several fields. On politics, it talks about the Fifth Amendment and the momentum to strengthen the presidential system and about the *Wikileaks* and SBY moral deligitimation. On social affairs, it discusses the Bill on Social Conflict handling and the look at the national education system. Another theme is the lessons learned from the earthquake and tsunami in Japan for disaster preparedness in Indonesia.

The regular publication of the Indonesian Update with its actual themes is expected to help policy makers in the government and the business sector, academicians, and international think tanks get actual information and contextual analyses on economic, political, social, and cultural developments in Indonesia.

***Happy reading!***

## The Improvement of the Special Narcotic Penitentiaries

*Problems faced by this nation seem never to be well resolved.  
As time goes by, case after case in turn emerges to the surface.  
One of them is a narcotic case that continues to post  
a threat to the younger generation.*

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The narcotics' problem at this time has reached an alarming stage. The narcotics' distribution has entered the sterile areas of prisons, allegedly involving officials in the process of smuggling then into penitentiaries.

### **Narcotics in Penitentiaries**

Indication of the involvement of some penitentiary officials has been proven. The arrests the Head of the Special Narcotics Penitentiary of Nusakambangan, Marwan Adli, two employees of the penitentiary, and a convict named Hartoni have proven the indication. The National Narcotics Agency (BNN) arrested them for allegedly maintaining illegal network of prison drug dealers and international drug dealers. (*Kompas*, March 9, 2011).

Hartoni was arrested by the police at a house in the Nusakambangan assimilation centre in late February for the ownership of 318 grams of *shabu-shabu*. Previously, he was sentenced to eight years of imprisonment by the Court of Banjarmasin after being caught red-handed carrying around 2,000 ecstasy pills from Surabaya in 2006. He was once detained in a prison in Banjarmasin. In 2007, he was transferred to Nusakambangan.

The dismantling of the narcotics' business networks in the Special Narcotics Penitentiary of Nusakambangan preceded the issuance of the data from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs about citizens of Indonesia (WNI) captured abroad. The data also include the phone numbers of Indonesian citizens from who were caught in one of the countries in Latin America.

After being examined, there were links of communications between those Indonesian citizens and inmates in Nusakambangan. Citizens who were caught acted as couriers of the narcotics. It was shocking that drug couriers in Latin America could communicate with inmates in Nusakambangan.

Before the Marwan case was revealed by the BNN, in 2010 BNN also arrested Surya Bahadur Tamang, the alleged illegal drug dealer who allegedly controlled of trade at the Special Narcotics Penitentiary of Nusakambangan. Last February, BNN also arrested Yoyok, an inmate from the *Besi* Penitentiary, Nusakambangan.

The alleged involvements of penitentiary employees and officials have increasingly created some concerns. They are supposed to act as supervisors in prisons instead of 'taking part' in the distribution of narcotics. Selling narcotics has increasingly become a source of side income for some corrections officers and officials.

Head of BNN, Gories Mere, believes that narcotics syndicates have been operating from prisons as the the prisons are regarded as the safest place for to hide from law enforcement officials. Drug dealers were free to regulate the distribution of narcotics from the prison, selling them to young children as the potential customers.

The rise in prison drug syndicates has also been caused by the existence of the sense of mutual needs between the officers and inmates. The "take and gift" relations have been flourishing. The Director General of Corrections, Untung Sugiyono, has acknowledged that prison officials might have been tempted to raise their income to make ends meet by selling services to inmates who are in need of narcotics. As many as 41,600 people from all over Indonesia are drug user inmates who are dependent on narcotics (*Kompas*, March 11, 2011).

### **The Improvement of the Special Narcotics Penitentiaries**

Some people argue that the prisons today are a haven for some prison officers and drug dealers. The key is money. The illegal narcotics business is what has tempted them to swallow money involved. And in prisons, it is easier to maintain the business as long as the prison officials approve.

The government seems very slow in reforming the prisons. The number of prisons that has exceeded the prison capacity has worsened the problem. The lack of moral integrity of some prison officers and the insufficient salary level could be the factors that have contributed to the fact that some of prison officers are seeking for additional funding and income.

But, whatever the pretext, the function of prisons should be returned to its original one. The improvement and reform of the penitentiary officials must be done strictly through a process of effective supervision. Officials who violate rules must be immediately removed and brought to justice. The court also must provide more severe penalties for violations by rogue penitentiary officers in order to have a deterrent effect.

Continuous monitoring should be carried out in reforming the prisons, and not just when some problems get the media spotlight. Without monitoring, Indonesia's penitentiaries will only be a nest of rogue officers and officials to take personal advantages from the abuse of power. Meanwhile, the dealers who are also former narcotics criminals will be the kings of the prisons, which are supposed to be facilities where they can be rehabilitated after violating the law.

The Marwan Adli case has shown that the government has not also fixed the narcotics prisons. The Head of the Special Narcotics Penitentiary of Nusakambangan was arrested for allegedly receiving bribes from international narcotics syndicates. In addition to tightening the oversight, the government should also improve the concept of the narcotics prisons.

This dirty practice was not the first. In August last year, BNN also revealed an international opium syndicate controlled by the inmates of the same prison. The inmates used a satellite phone to control the distribution of *shabu-shabu* and ecstasy in China and Indonesia.

The Ministry of Justice and Human Rights seemed to be doing nothing in facing these narcotics problems. No officers have been subjected to sanctions. It would be impossible for inmates to freely use a satellite phone unless he or she cooperates with the wardens. After several raids conducted by BNN officers, the authorities finally revealed the involvement of the Head of the prison.

Learning from the series of events, the Minister of Justice and Human rights, Patrialis Akbar, should not miss some details again. Working closely with BNN, the Ministry must soon make a breakthrough such as intensive checking of all narcotics prison officials, not only in Nusakambangan, but in all narcotics prisons in this country. Officers that are found guilty should be immediately dismissed. The Ministry can also rotate the suspicious officers.

The breakthrough must be followed by the setting up of a more stringent system of supervision. Closing the distribution of narcotics in the prisons is not easy. Illicit goods could be smuggled through a variety of ways, from being tucked into the food to being stored in a sanitary napkin. The improvement of surveillance system will reduce the entry of narcotics. For example, installing cameras in every corner of the prison, conducting a sudden inspection, and carrying out drug tests periodically to cover the entire prison population.

The Ministry of Law should immediately clarify the allotment of narcotics prisons. The special prisons should be occupied by the makers, dealers, and drug dealers. Users or addicts who are not involved in this illegal trade networks should not put in there. They should be included in rehabilitation centers. If they are mixed, this would invite the emergence of the drug business in prisons.

What happens if the prisoners have been acting as drug dealers and drug addicts? This is clearly more complicated. The prisoners should be punished, but at the same time they must also be cured from the dependence on narcotics. Certainly, we need high prison heads and prison officers who have high moral integrity to achieve this goal.

— Endang Srihadi —

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## The Fifth Amendment and the Momentum to Strengthen the Presidential System

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A group of senators in the House of Regional Representatives (DPD) in the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) of the Republic of Indonesia have finalized the proposed changes to the five manuscripts of the 1945 Constitution. If the previous proposal only involved the strengthening of the functions and authority of the DPD, the latest proposal is more comprehensive.

The proposal of this constitutional amendment encompasses three central issues, namely strengthening the presidential system, strengthening representative institutions, and strengthening regional autonomy. Another proposal that has emerged is the one to accommodate individual candidates or independent candidates in the design of the Fifth Amendment to the 1945 Constitution.

### **The independent candidates**

This proposal was not new in Indonesia's political discourse. At least, this issue had also been debated before the Presidential Elections in 2009, and the discourse of the independent candidates will be again debated before the Presidential Elections in 2014.

This proposal is strengthened because the netting (selection) processes of the presidential candidates in political parties are not transparent and tend to be oligarchic and transactional. Therefore, the proposal of independent president candidates is a protest and correction to the selection mechanisms in the political parties.

At this point, the independent presidential candidates still need to open their chances. However, the submission requirements should be at the same weight as the provisions of political parties, such as the independent presidential candidates should also obtain a support from a few percent of the voter turnout in some areas.

However, more serious problems that need to be prepared are how to run the government if an independent candidate wins

the elections. The election involving independent presidential candidates without the strengthening of constitutional devices in the presidential system would only be putting the president elected in a trap that facilitates the occurrence of deadlock when he or she must cooperate with the parliament.

The proposal of having independent presidential candidates should be placed within the framework of strengthening the presidential system. Therefore, the proposal that allows independent presidential candidates through a constitutional amendment should be in one package with the constitutional devices of strengthening the presidential system, such as the right of veto for the President and the arrangements of parliamentary institutions by strengthening the institutional functions of the DPD and the simplified configuration the DPR.

### **Presidential veto**

The presidential government system actually gives leeway to the President to compile and run government agenda. Therefore, to strengthen the position of President in the functioning of checks and balances in parliament, the President needs to be supplemented with the right of veto.

The veto right is a presidential right in the field of legislation that is used to validate or reject a bill that is submitted by the Parliament (DPR and DPD) to the President.

With this conception, the President can use the veto right to reject a bill that has been deliberated by the Parliament. However, the Parliament can also annul (override) the veto with the support of a majority of the DPR (about two-thirds of the seats in the Parliament).

In the United States, which adopted a system of separation of powers, although presidential institutions and legislative and judicial branches of the government can control each other, these three institutions cannot dominate each other. The President has a veto that can cancel the proposed legislation proposed by the Congress.

Although the President only has the support of the minority in the Congress, the President cannot imposed by the Congress. Moreover, the Constitution guarantees the tenure of a President in full force (fixed term), so he or she will not easily be stopped in the middle of the road, as often happens in the parliamentary system.

### **Strengthening of DPD**

While the DPD should be given the legislation authority at the same weight as the DPR, that is the authority of legislation that includes the process of ratification of the bill into law as the DPR does (pure of bicameral). If the DPD is given full authority in the field of legislation, the institutional DPD serves as a counterweight to DPR in the legislative process.

The institutional strengthening of DPD will encourage checks and balances in the parliamentary institutions. Thus, it can avoid the occurrence of excessive authority of one institution in the parliament, like it has been shown by the DPR today.

In addition, the strengthening of the DPD will allow the operation of a double check system and the opening of opportunity mechanisms of layered discussions of each legislative product in the Parliament.

### **The simplification of the House of Representatives**

Although the freedom to establish political parties remains open, to the context of the effectiveness of the presidential system, it should be immediately pushed into a simpler multiparty system, even into a “two-party” in the Parliament. Because in daily politics, the President is dealing with parties in the Parliament, not to all electoral parties. Therefore, what need to be simplified into a system of “two-party” are the parties in the Parliament.

The increased level of parliamentary threshold in the 2014 Elections could be a constitutional instrument to simplify the Parliament. If the parliamentary threshold consistently is applied, the number of political parties will continue to decrease naturally until the ideal number of about 4-5 parties in the Parliament.

A further necessary simplification of factions should be done through the tightening of requirements for the establishment of a minimum factional threshold. Ideally, there should only be about 2-3 factions in the DPR for the administration to run more effectively.

Therefore, the proposed Fifth Amendment to the 1945 Constitution is the momentum to strengthen the presidential system through constitutional instruments: a veto right for the President and the arrangements of parliamentary institutions through the strengthening of the institutional functions of the DPD and the simplification of the DPR.

— **Hanta Yuda AR** —

*The proposal of independent candidates should be placed within the framework of strengthening the presidential system. The proposal should be one package with the strengthening of presidential system constitutional devices, such as the right of veto for the president and the arrangements of parliamentary institutions through the strengthening of the institutional functions of the DPD and the simplification of DPR configuration.*

## Wikileaks and Moral Delegitimation of the SBY Administration

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Australian newspapers “The Age” and “Sydney Morning Herald” on 11/3/2011 reported data from *Wikileaks* containing information from diplomatic cables of the United States Embassy (US Embassy) in Indonesia. The publication of this information coincided with the visit of Vice President Boediono to Australia.

The data was preliminary data from about 3,059 diplomatic cables, which according to the *Wikileaks*, were obtained from the US Embassy in Jakarta. The data that were reported by the two Australian newspapers contained some of the following:

1. SBY had been reported to intervene in the process of investigation into the alleged corruption by Taufik Kiemas in 2004 through Hendarman Supandji, the Deputy Attorney General for Special Crime
2. Jusuf Kalla, the Vice President, bribed the Golkar cadres with a large amount of money (more than US\$ 6 million) to win the General Chairmanship of the Golkar Party in the 2004 Elections.
3. SBY ordered Head of BIN Syamsir Siregar to spy on Yusril Ihza Mahendra, the then Justice and Human Rights Minister, when Yusril carried out a secret trip to Singapore to meet a Chinese businessman. The Age emphasized Yusril’s position as the Bulan Bintang Party chair, which was considered as a political rival of SBY. SBY also spied on Wiranto as the presidential candidate from Golkar, and Syamsir Siregar branded Wiranto as a terrorist mastermind.
4. *Wikileaks* also said when holding a meeting with the Democratic Party Chair in 2006 he had conveyed his disappointment for not being able to develop business. He felt that he must leave some inheritance for his children. In this context, American diplomats noted that there was a relationship between SBY and Tomy Winata, which provided funds for SBY through TB Silalahi and M Lutfi.

5. The document also mentioned that the role of Ani Yudhoyono was very large in influencing SBY's policy and in taking advantage of her political position through financial gains.

### **Not a new story**

The *Wikileaks* data of course shocked the people of Indonesia. Such information is actually not new, as in 2009 George Aditjondro had issued a book titled "Cikeas Octopus", which explored the political and business scandals involving Yudhoyono and his family.

With the information about of abuse of power by SBY, the allegations of power abuses by Yudhoyono and the Democratic Party have reemerged, including the Antasari Azhar case and the sensational case of Century Bank bailout.

About the *Wikileaks* data, the US has issued a formal statement that they regretted about the leakage of the secret communications. The statements came out of the U.S. Secretary Hillary Clinton and U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia Scott Marciel. U.S. Embassy explained that the leaked information was not an official U.S. foreign policy.

From the U.S. official statements, we should conclude that the U.S. Embassy did not declare that the information was true or not. It did not confirm or deny. In addition to the leakage in diplomatic cables, the newspapers also mentioned that the U.S. Embassy information was obtained from a resource person who was close to the palace, such as TB Silalahi, among others. At least, the leakage shows us the U.S.' perspective on Indonesia.

We understand that the information has not been through a verification process by the US Government. It was regarded only as raw information sent by US diplomats to Washington. Even so, we are also not in a position to reject the truth that is possibly contained in the *Wikileaks* information.

One of the revealed truths was a statement of Jusuf Kalla, confirming the information that he gave some money to the local leadership boards of the Golkar Party in the Congress of the Golkar Party, although the amount was not exactly the same as stated by *Wikilekas*, as it was too large. At least, this gives us some understanding that the information disseminated by *Wikileaks* was not completely a lie.

### **Moral deligitimacy**

To address this issue, the government should not lead public opinion to the level of narrow nationalism by stating that the Australian media intend to spread negative sentiments towards Indonesia.

It is true that this information is morally damaging the image of SBY and his family, but it cannot be said that it is also damaging the dignity of Indonesia as a whole.

If we closely look, many state leaders have become the victims of *Wikileaks* reporting. In addition to SBY, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, French President Nicolas Sarkozy, Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, Prime Minister of Russia Vladimir Putin, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi, and Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad have also been reported negatively by WikiLeaks.

Therefore, SBY should regard such a case as a form of control from the Indonesian people and the world to his government so that he will be more careful in carrying out any policies, avoiding a situation of power abuse as accused by the Australian media.

After all, the Indonesian people believe in the old saying that “if there is smoke, then there is fire”. Therefore, SBY is expected to provide some proof that what *Wikileaks* has said was not true so that the SBY government does not have to undergo moral delegitimation that fosters distrust of the people towards their own government.

— **Benni Inayatullah** —

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## Criticizing the Handling of the Social Conflict Law

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Everybody still remembers the mass conflicts in Cikeusik, Temanggung, Ciketik, Bangil, and recently in Cibitung. The audio and visual reporting about violence toward some minority groups has appeared in our media.

According to Ichsan Malik, a post-graduate lecturer in the Faculty of Psychology at the University of Indonesia, who founded Institut Titian Perdamaian (the Peace Building Institute), conflict is one of the normal things in our life.

Conflict is often started with inter-party tensions, then developing into a crisis when limited violence is involved and culminating in mass violence.

### **Conflict mapping in Indonesia**

A sociologist from the University of Indonesia, Thamrin Amal Tamagola, in the third part of the series of the Indonesian Forum, on 3<sup>rd</sup> March 2011, explained that a conflict mapping in Indonesia is highly associated with an ethnic distribution mapping in Indonesia.

Indonesia has approximately 656 ethnics. 547 of them are in the eastern part of the country, and half of the ethnics of Eastern Indonesia are in Papua. It means that the greatest potential conflicts are in Papua.

The other map of conflict is based on residency. The concentration of Indonesian residency is in downtown. Urbanization keeps on flowing and characterizes by the fact that 2/3 of the residents are young people who do not go to school or are unemployed. This unemployed young will be conflict starters and implementers.

### **The Background of the PKS Bill**

Amidst a series of recent social conflicts, the Indonesian House of Representatives (DPR) proposed the deliberations of a law on conflicts. The law is called as Bill of Social Conflict Handling (RUU PKS). Now, the bill that consists of 11 chapters and 59 articles is still in the preparation stages in the DPR, which include hearing sessions (RDP) with some experts.

According to Basuki Tjahaya Purnama, a member of the Preparation Body of the Bill of Social Conflict Handling from the Golkar Faction, the initiative emerged as the DPR believed that there has been an ambiguity on the government part when handling this social conflict.

The government has been using the military approach -- as has been used to deal with vertical conflicts, such as separatist movements from NKRI-- to solve the social conflicts in Banjarmasin, Jakarta, Poso, Ambon, Ciketing, and Pasuruan.

This approach is not in line with ways of handling social conflict regulated in Law No. 24/2007 on Disasters, which are called social disasters. However, the handling of social (disasters) conflicts, offered by the law, is not suitable as this law is dominated by the Handling of the Natural Disaster Paradigm.

In social disasters, there are identified conflict groups, including the country and its instruments, as actors. In natural disasters, there is no component called the actors, as there are only victims. As to the integration threat component, natural disasters will not threat national integration, but social disasters will threat community social cohesion.

### **Criticizing Bill of PKS**

Responding to the DPR initiative to deliberate this Bill, Jaleswari Pramodhawardani, the moderator of the Indonesian Forum discussion, who is also an advisor to the Indonesian Institute said that the implementation of conflict handling in this bill might involve the TNI and Polri. Moreover, this Bill would overlap with the TNI Law, Reserve Components Law, etc.

Agreeing with Jaleswari, Thamrin said that the term “conflict handling” is inappropriate, as it will be associated with handling a conflict after it has occurred. Yet, the Bill also regulates the management of conflict before and after it has occurred. Thus, concretely, Thamrin proposed that the name of the Bill changed into the Bill of Social Conflict Management.

Substantially, the PKS Bill set things that should be taken by the government before a conflict occurs as preventative measures so that a mass conflict will not occur. In relation to this, actually there are existing public policies targeted to prevent conflict.

One of them was the issuance of Law No. 8 of 1985 on Social Organizations (*ormas*), whose implementation was set out in Government Regulation (PP) No. 18/1986. In the PP, the general provisions on organizations and how to respond to community organizations that disrupt public order and security have been set out.

However, the Law and PP have the repressive atmosphere because it was published in the New Order era. In this Law, organizations that are considered to disturb public order and security will be immediately disbanded. In reality, they are not immediately disbanded, but only quite frozen.

If it still wants to be dissolved, according to the draft Amendment to Law No. 8/1985 by the Minister of Domestic Affairs, it should provide strong evidence to the court when requesting the dissolution. The court is considered as a fair arena, because the administrators are concerned organizations that can conduct self-defense.

The spirit to revise this law to make it more democratic has also echoed in the Parliament. The evidence, the Bill on the Amendment of Law No. 8 in 1985, has been included in the list of priority programs of national legislation (*Prolegnas*) 2011.

Another example of actions taken by the government to prevent conflicts is through the issuance a Joint Ministerial Regulation (PBM) of the Minister of Religion and the Minister of Home Affairs No. 9 and 8/ 2006 on the Guidelines for the Implementation of Regional Head Task/Deputy Head of the Maintenance of Religious Harmony amongst Religions' Followers (*Ummah*), the *Ummah* Empowerment Forum on Religious Harmony, and the Construction of Houses of Worship.

But, the PBM has been assessed to be benefitting only religious circles, especially in the establishment of houses of worship, which will eventually lead to a conflict. A concrete example for this was the conflict arising from the construction of churches in Ciketing, East Bekasi, some time ago.

Government has a different opinion and assumes that the PBM is still very relevant, and it even wants to upgrade the status of the PBM to the Law on Religious Harmony amongst *Ummah* by entering it into the 2011 *Prolegnas*.

The inclusion of the Bill on Social Conflict Handling, the Bill on Amendments to Law No. 8 of 1985, and the Bill on Religious Harmony into the 2011 *Prolegnas* will raise concerns that there will be overlapping laws.

To answer these concerns, all parties who are involved in the formulations, assessments, and discussions of the three products of these laws should sit together to synchronize all the three substances to avoid overlapping in the legislation and also to save state money. In addition, it is also important for public officials or law enforcement officers not to be confused by the similarity of these acts.

— **Lola Amelia** —

*Conflict is an everyday thing. Conflict management needs to be done as a preventative measure towards mass physical violence. Thus, what Indonesia needs is a rule to manage a conflict, rather than the rule to handle it.*

## A Look at the National Education System

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On 1<sup>st</sup> March 2011, the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), launched the 2011 Education for All (EFA) Global Monitoring Report. According to the data, the Education Development Index of Indonesia is 0.934.

This index ranks Indonesia in the 69<sup>th</sup> position. This is a setback from the country's position in 2010, when Indonesia was placed in the 65<sup>th</sup> position of 127 countries surveyed. The decrease in EDI was not in line with achievement claim of the country's MDGs 2010, especially with its second goal; that is, to reach basic education for all, which was launched by the government in late 2010.

### **The conflicting findings between the 2011 EDI and the 2010 Indonesian MDGs Report**

The 2011 EDI and the 2010 Indonesian MDGs should have similar conclusions, as they used the same indicators. The indicators included the net enrollment rate in primary schools; the net enrollment rate in junior high schools, the proportion of pupils who reach grade 5; the proportion of pupils starting in grade 1 who complete primary school; the proportion of pupils starting in grade 1 who complete nine years of basic education; and the literacy rate of the age group of 15-24 year old.

UNESCO states that one of the indicators that has led to the decrease in the Indonesian EDI was the high dropout rates at the primary school level. They reported that there were as many as 527,850 children, or 1.7 percent of the 31.05 million children in primary schools (SDs) dropping out each year. It also shows that the number of students, who only get primary school education, has increased. Primary school graduates who could not be accepted into junior high schools reached a level of 720,000 students, or 18.4% of primary school graduates each year.

These conclusions are very different from those of the 2010 Indonesian MDGs report, which claimed that there was a decline in dropout rates, especially at the elementary school level. In fact, the proportion of pupils starting in grade 1 who graduate elementary school increased to 93 percent. With these figures, according to the Indonesian government in an official report of MDGs, there is internal efficiency of primary education each year as indicated by the decrease in school dropout rates and by the increase in the numbers of student who continue from the SD / MI level to the SMP / MTs level.

How should we respond to these conflicting findings? Which one should we trust? In order not to jump into a conclusion and hastily respond, let us look closely at what efforts that have been done by the government in achieving the second goal of MDGs, which also mean something for the EFA achievement.

### **The policy of achieving universal primary education**

*The first policy* is a policy that is stipulated in Section 31 Paragraph 4 of the 1945 State Constitution and in Article 49 Paragraph 1 of Act No. 20/2003 on National Education System. According to both laws, the allocation of 20% is outside the salaries of educators and education services.

However, according to the Indonesian Forum for Budget Transparency (FITRA) and the Indonesian Corruption Watch (ICW), 20% of the funds were used to pay teacher salaries, travel expenses, and allowances of teachers. As for the improvement of the quality of education itself, the government has only spent about eight percent of the total education funding per year.

*The second policy* is the School Operational Assistance program (BOS) since 2005. In the last six years, the government claimed that the unit cost of BOS has continued to increase. By 2010, the number of students receiving the BOS will reach 43.7 million students, with a total allocation of Rp 19.26 trillion. The initial purpose was to reduce or even eliminate the practice of levy for operational costs in schools. But in reality, the parents still bear the operational costs, such as books, uniforms, construction money, etc.

In addition, ICW also noticed that there are allegations of mis-administration in the distribution and use of BOS funds, so the BOS is often late for to be cashed out, disrupting the learning process in schools.

*The third policy*, the Poor Students Scholarship program (BSM). The purpose of this program is to enhance the ability of the poor in their child-level primary and junior secondary. Each student will receive a scholarship of Rp 60.000 IDR/pupil/year. Scholarship recipients are poor students in 157 districts of disadvantaged areas and border areas in 27 provinces.

The problem for this program is that there are no clear indicators of students who are categorized as poor students. So, in some areas, for example in North Sumatra, an indicator of poor students that is used to determine the beneficiaries is a poor certificate granted by a Village Chief/ Head of village residence. According to the Governor of North Sumatra, H Syamsul Arifin SH, the data on the number of poor students has not been accurate.

### **Conclusions and recommendations**

Based on the description above, it should be appreciated that the government has set up various policies that in terms of substance are fairly good programs. However, the implementations of such programs have been unsuccessful due to the inaccuracies of the reference data in planning, the program inequalities in all areas, and the corruption by the program implementers.

Actually, there is one simple step that can be taken by the government. The move is the involvement of the community since the beginning of the program planning. Concretely, in the planning, the government not only should it use data from one party, such as BPS, it should also use data derived directly from the public, including also a list of all educational needs of society.

This step will streamline the national education policy in order to achieve the second goal of MDGs or to increase the value of the education development index of Indonesia. In addition, and most importantly, this step will make the policy of the national education system match with the real needs of the people of Indonesia.

*Involving the community since the early planning stages of the national education system is absolutely necessary. So, the national education system is aimed at answering the real needs of the Indonesian society, not merely a patchwork that is reactive in nature.*

— **Lola Amelia** —

## Lessons Learned from the Japan Earthquake and Tsunami for Indonesian Risk Disaster Preparedness

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The earthquake and tsunami that struck Japan on March 11, 2011 have caught the international community's attention. The world's attention has not only been directed to the damages and victims.

The world has also been admiring for the Japanese people for their natural disaster preparedness. Countries and nations of the world have recognized that there are many things that they can learn from the Japanese.

The 11 March 2011 earthquake has become *triple* disasters for Japan. First, the earthquake that destroyed the cities and villages, the tsunami that hit the coastal areas, and the nuclear disaster that gas posed the danger of radiation that can be deadly.

Experts in Japan also admitted that the quake of 8.9 on the Richter scale that struck the northeastern region of Japan was already predicted, but they did not know that the severity would exceed than it was predicted.

Some of the things arising and can be noted as lessons learned from how the Japanese people are facing and overcoming these triple disasters. *Firstly*, in relation to the natural disaster preparedness (*risk preparedness*), routine exercises of emergency response preparedness and disaster evacuation is really important. This was supported by the culture of discipline in all areas in daily life.

*Second*, the handling of the impact of natural disasters (*risk mitigation*), that is how the authorities of individual countries and communities act and take measures that minimize the impact and damage and the number of victims of the natural disasters.

*Third*, disaster communications and disaster management by the media and state authority (*risk communications*). *Fourth*, the risk of a nuclear power plant (NPP).

The lessons learned are very important for Indonesia, considering that there is a high risk of natural catastrophic events in many parts of Indonesia.

As a country that also has a high level of vulnerability to natural disasters (volcanic eruptions, earthquakes, tsunamis, floods, and others), Indonesia should also have well preparedness to face the risks of natural disasters, which can occur any time.

### **Risk preparedness**

The preparedness towards natural disasters in the Japanese society has been proven very good. As reported, when the earthquake and tsunami struck, the Japanese public was still calmed and disciplined in conducting safety measures. School children, people at homes, employees at offices, visitors at shopping centers and public places were still disciplined.

For example, they lined up one by one in the evacuation routes. People who had managed to evacuate themselves to any vehicles creating a massive congestion on highway, but they drove orderly, so the evacuation went smoothly. All of this is integrated with the character of a nation, which has a high culture of discipline.

The well ordered behaviour like that is rarely to be found in the Indonesian society, especially in a state of disaster. Usually, most of the people will be panicking, frenzied, and chaotic. Each one would be trying to save his or her own life.

Some events in Indonesia have shown that often the numbers of fatalities rose due to panicking during evacuation, in which many people had been killed or trampled. Some examples are in the incidents of fire or chaotic public crowds like at musical concerts.

Logistical preparedness and disaster risk training programmes are also still needed by the Indonesian people. Learning from the Japanese community that really realizes that their country is very prone to earthquake, they keep some emergency supplies at each exit door in the house, such as a bag containing bottles of water, flashlights and batteries, anti-fire helmet, which are ready to be brought at any time a disaster occurs. Readiness requires constant discipline. Such preparation is necessary and should always be done.

In the Indonesian society, natural disaster preparedness is often treated as a temporary practice. People talk about it only when a disaster strikes. When the situation is normal, then the readiness practices are forgotten.

The Indonesian people should really have a natural disaster preparedness system, which is implemented with a regular discipline. Learning from Japan, such discipline is also supported by public trust to the system that is reliable.

For example, the community must have “*trust*” that standing in line will facilitate the orderly evacuation and minimize the chaos. They also need to believe that buildings are earthquake resistant, so it is still reliable when the citizens have to patiently wait for evacuation.

### **Risk mitigation**

The efforts to minimize the damages and number of victims that have been demonstrated by the Japanese community and authorities can serve as lessons learned for the people of Indonesia.

Some of the hard efforts have been very risky’ for example, some senior workers at the Fukushima nuclear power plant have put their lives at risk in order to prevent the severe impacts from the disasters.

Another lesson is the attentiveness of the government’s mobilized *Search and Rescue* (SAR) teams from each prefecture. They have been deployed to affected areas.

Government officials, including the Prime Minister, appeared on television to personally coordinate disaster relief and convey accurate information about what has happened and what will likely to happen next.

Meanwhile, in Indonesia, we miss those important things. Government officials recently issued a statement that was not sympathetic, as it disturbed the victims and undermined the disaster efforts.

### **Risk communications**

Another thing that caught the world's attention is how the news and communications about disasters in Japan have been handled. The Japanese media do not put an emphasis on the negative side of the disasters and the victims.

On the contrary, the media report with the spirit of optimism. The suffering of the victims is not being excessively exposed in the media - television, radio, and print. The media is constantly broadcasting the government's messages to every citizen to remain vigilant, informing them about the tips to deal with natural disasters and about the 24 hour call center numbers.

In Indonesia, it seems that the media are more interested in covering the images of victims and terrible destructions, rather than the information to build optimism and to support the minimization of the damages.

### **Nuclear Power Plant**

There is another thing to be learned related to the Indonesian government's idea to continue to build nuclear power plants, including the Muria nuclear power plant. Even the Japanese people, who are very advanced in technology, have been quite overwhelmed with this nuclear disaster.

What about Indonesia, whose technology and human resources still need to be improved? Hopefully, all the above mentioned things can serve as the lessons learned.

— **Antonius Wiwan Koban** —

*The earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear disasters that hit Japan on March 11, 2011 have served as lessons learned for the nations of the world in regards to natural disaster preparedness and mitigation. Indonesia, which is also prone to various natural disasters, should also learn a lot about disaster preparedness.*



# THE NDONESIAN INSTITUTE

CENTER FOR PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH

**The Indonesian Institute (TII) is a** Center for Public Policy Research that was established on 21 October 2004 by a group of young, dynamic activists and intellectuals through the initiative of Jeffrie Geovanie. Its current Executive and Research Director is Anies Baswedan, and the Program Director is Adinda Tenriangke Muchtar.

**TII** is an independent, non-partisan, non-profit institution, whose main funding stems from grants and contributions from foundations, companies, and individuals.

**TII** has the aim of becoming a main research centre in Indonesia for public policy matters and has committed to giving contribution to the debates over public policies and to improving the quality of the planning and results of public policy in the new era of democracy in Indonesia.

**TII's** missions are to conduct reliable research that is independent and non-partisan and to channel the research to the policy-makers, the private sector, and academia in order to improve the quality of Indonesian policy-makers.

**TII** also assumes the role to disseminate ideas to the society so that they are well informed about the policies that will have a good impact on the people's lives. In other words, TII has a position to support the democratization process and the public policy reform, as it will be involved in the process.

The scope of the research and review on public policies undertaken by TII includes economic, social, and political factors. The main activities have been conducted in order to achieve vision and mission based on research, surveys, training, public discussions, policy brief, and weekly analysis.

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## Research on the Business and Economy

### Business Analysis

The business sector needs a comprehensive analysis in order to minimize the potential risks, while at the same time increasing the value of its business. Business analysis is a solution in corporate strategic planning to make reliable decisions. The TII Business Policy Research Division is present to provide company leaders with practical recommendations on the decision-making process.

Research that TII offers are: **(1) Company Financial Analysis**, which encompasses financial analysis and financial risk analysis. **(2) Corporate Planning Consultancy**, which includes economic and industrial research, business valuation, and brand valuation. **(3) Strategic Marketing Analysis**, which encompasses strategic marketing and *Corporate Social Responsibility* (CSR) program design.

### Research on the Economy

The economy tends to be used as an indicator of the success of the government as a policy-maker. Limited resources have often caused the government to face obstacles in implementing economic policies that will optimally benefit the people. The increase in the quality of the people's critical thinking has forced the government to conduct comprehensive studies in every decision-making process. In fact, the studies will not be stopped when the policy is already in place. Studies will be continued until the policy evaluation process.

The TII Economic Research Division is present for those who are interested in the conditions of the economy. The results of the research are intended to assist policy-makers, regulators, and donor agencies in making decisions. The research that TII offers: **(1) Economic Policy Analysis; (2) Regional and Sectoral Prospects; and (3) Program Evaluation.**

## Research on the Social Affairs

### Social Research

Social development needs policy foundations that come from independent and accurate research. Social analysis is a need for the government, the businesspeople, academia, professionals, NGOs, and civil society to improve social development. The Social Research Division is present to offer recommendations to produce efficient and effective policies, steps, and programs on education, health, population, environment, women and children.

Social research that TII offers: **(1) Social Policy Analysis; (2) Explorative Research; (3) Mapping & Positioning Research; (4) Need Assessment Research; (5) Program Evaluation Research; and (5) Indicator Survey.**

## Political Survey and Training

### Direct General Election Survey

One of the activities that TII offers is the pre-direct election surveys. There are sundry reasons why these surveys are important (1) Regional direct elections are democratic processes that can be measured, calculated, and predicted. (2) Surveys are used to measure, calculate, and predict the processes and results of elections and the chances of candidates. (3) It is time to win the elections using strategies based on empirical data.

As one of the important aspects in the strategies to win the elections, surveys can be used to prepare political mapping. Therefore, campaign teams need to conduct surveys: (1) to map the popularity of candidates in the society (2) to map the voters' demands (3) to determine the most effective political machinery that will act as a vote getter; and (4) to find out about the most effective media to do the campaign.

### Local Council Training

The roles and functions of local councils in monitoring local governments are very important. They need to make sure that participative and democratic policies will be espoused. Members of provincial and regent local councils are required to have strong capacity to understand democratization matters, regional autonomy, legislative techniques, budgeting, local Politics, and political marketing. Thus, it is important to empower members of local councils.

In order for local councils to be able to response every problem that will come out as a result of any policy implemented by the central government or local governments, the Indonesian Institute invites the leaderships and members of local councils to undergo training to improve their capacity.

## Released!

### INDONESIA REPORT 2010

The Indonesian Institute, Center for Public Policy Research (TII) has released our annual publication of INDONESIA 2010. This book is one of publications of TII that consists of Report on Indonesia in 2010. Indonesia Report has been published by TII annually since 2005. It is available in Bahasa Indonesia.

#### TOPICS IN INDONESIA 2010:

- Section 1. Yudhoyono Presidency, Joint Coalition Secretariat, and the Government in Hostage.  
Author: **Hanta Yuda AR**
- Section 2. Adjustment of Special Autonomy for Aceh and Papua.  
Author: **Aly Yusuf**
- Section 3. Breaking Down Conflicts between Indonesia-Malaysia  
Author: **Benni Inayatullah**
- Section 4. Problems of Mitigation of Natural Disasters  
Author: **Endang Srihadi**
- Section 5. The Roles of State in Religious Tolerance.  
Author: **Antonius Wiwan Koban**

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
PDF version can be downloaded in TII website  
[www.theindonesianinstitute.com](http://www.theindonesianinstitute.com)

Printed version can be purchased, Rp 70.000,- per buku (112 pages).  
**The price included courier fee.**

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3. Please state your Full Name, Complete Address, and Phone Numbers, and E-mail Address that can be contacted.

If you are interested to buy Indonesia Report in series' package from various years starting from 2005, please kindly contact Ms. Rahmanita.



INDONESIA 2010 is an annual report produced by The Indonesian Institute, Center for Public Policy Research on economic, social, and political situations in Indonesia that is published regularly in the beginning of each year. INDONESIA 2010 consists of report and analysis on social and political situations in Indonesia in 2010. Generally, the whole analyses describe situations, evaluations, and policy recommendations. In addition, the reports also provide prediction for 2011.

There are five articles in Indonesia 2010 ini. In political section, the first analysis is on Government and Coalition of Parties; second analysis is on Special Autonomy of Aceh and Papua. In International Relation affairs, the highlighted topic is on Conflicts between Indonesia-Malaysia. Whereas in social section, there are two reports. One on Mitigation of Natural Disasters and second on Religious Tolerance.

Why we selected those topics? It is because of the degree of importance of those issues. Those topics also represent series of interesting moments that happened in 2010. In short, gaining public attention. Therefore, policy makers can use those topics as important notes for 2011.

Hope Indonesia 2010 can be used optimally by policy makers, private sectors, mass media, strategic institutions, academicians, students, et cetera.

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