
The Indonesian Update

Monthly Review on Economic, Legal, Security, Political, and Social Affairs



Main Report:
The Masses and Health Threats in the 2020 Pilkada

Economics

- Economic Stimulus Policy Analysis: A Case Study on the Indonesian MSME Sector
- The Implications of the DKI Jakarta PSBB Volume II

Legal

- Reviewing the Continuity of the 2020 Pilkada
- The Revision of the Constitutional Court Law: Was it Transactional?

Politics

- Encouraging the Expansion of State Civil Apparatus E-Kinerja Utilization
- The Polemics over the Issue of the Resurrection of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI)

Socia

- The Accuracy of COVID-19 Data and Policy-Making
- Examining the Direct Cash Assistance Policy for Formal Workers
- The Portrait of Sexual and Reproductive Health Services during a Pandemic •





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FOREWORD

The September 2020 edition of the Indonesian Update raises the main report on the violations of a number of prospective candidates in the registration stage of the 2020 Regional Head Election (Bapaslon) candidate pairs (Pilkada). Violations in this stage are due to crowds, which should have been avoided, in order to grow the image of the regional head candidates. It could be seen that the existing health protocol in PKPU 6/2020z in conjunction with PKPU 10/2020, is not able to be an anticipatory instrument for the implementations of Pilkada in times of health crisis.

In the economic field, the Indonesian Update discusses the analysis of economic stimulus policies for the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSME) sector after the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in Indonesia. In addition, we discuss the implications of the COVID-19 pandemic for the economic sector after the implementations of the Large-Scale Social Restrictions (PSBB) policy in DKI Jakarta.

In the legal field, the Indonesian Update discusses the sustainability of the 2020 Pilkada amid the increasing spread of the COVID-19 virus. This will very much depend on community discipline, candidate compliance and organizer readiness in obeying the health protocol. In addition, we discuss the Revision of the Constitutional Court Law (MK Law), which was passed on September 1, 2020. There are several things that should be concerned about in the process of its formation. One of them is related to the discussion process, which has set a record in the history of the formation of legislation.

In the political field, the Indonesian Update discusses the use of government electronic systems that have had a positive impact during the COVID-19 pandemic. A number of public services can now be accessed online. However, the facts on the ground still show that there are a number of public services that still have to be delayed. This is an issue that must be resolved because the shift work system is not fully effective. Apart from that, we also discuss the polemics over the issue of the rise of the PKI. This issue has become a political commodity propagated by certain individuals or groups in order to fulfill their political interests.

In the social sector, the Indonesian Update raises the importance of accurate COVID-19 data to be a priority for the Central and Regional Governments so that policy making during the Covid-19 period is made to accurately approach public



needs. In addition, we discuss the steady direct assistance policy for formal workers during the COVID-19 pandemic. Furthermore, we also discuss the portrait of vulnerable sexual and reproductive health services in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic.

The monthly publication of the Indonesian Update with actual themes is expected to help policy makers in government and business institutions - as well as academics, think tanks, and elements of civil society, both at home and abroad, to obtain actual information and contextual analysis of economic conditions. political, social, and legal in Indonesia, as well as an understanding of public policy in Indonesia.

Happy Reading.



The Masses and Health Threats in the 2020 Pilkada

Right now, the General Election Commission (KPU) is in an unfortunate position. The 2020 Regional Head Elections (Pilkada) in extraordinary conditions is polluted, first of all, by the prospective participants. Even though, it was the electoral interests of the participants that accommodated by the KPU.

General Election Commission Regulation Number 6/2020 (PKPU 6/2020), is one of the proofs on the accommodation effort. In fact, this provision has also been revised through PKPU 10/2020. Improvements are carried out to ensure the implementation of Pilkada is able to minimize the potential transmission of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19).

However, the registration stage for prospective pairs of candidates (bapaslon) shows another fact. Crowds of masses that should have been avoided were even organized, in order to establish strong image of support for candidates.

It can be seen, from conditions above, that the existing health protocols in PKPU 6/2020 *jo* PKPU 10/2020 are not able to be an anticipatory instrument for the implementation of Pilkada in times of health crisis. The threat of the crowd presence also continues at the determining candidate pairs (paslon) and the campaign stages.

The Risks of Crowds

In the previous publication of Indonesian Update, August 2020 edition, the author wrote about crowds. Especially with regard to its potential presence in the registration stage. This potential has actually been tried to be suppressed by the KPU, through the health protocol in PKPU 6/2020 *jo* PKPU 10/2020.

This has became critical because the crowd is able to transmit



emotions, which has an impact on the possibility of the mass quantity enhancement as long as the crowd is active (Blumer, 1946 in Neal, 1993; Lv et al, 2018).

However, crowd risks are not just a matter of its existence. Crowds on the electoral agenda are often deliberately prepared and formed, one of which is to engage in violent strategies that aimed at threatening the opposition. This, for example, will affect voter turn out in a region (Klopp and Zuern, 2007: 137).

Mueller (2008) even explains that the emergence of the masses with violence that seems spontaneous is actually motivated by elite interests in their constituents. Whether it is to attract, politicize, and mobilize a larger constituency.

Then, the appearance of the crowds has became dangerous. Physical interactions, which are strictly avoided in pandemic conditions, are going to get worse when they occur in chaotic situations. Ideally, the conditions should be anticipated on stages that still presents face-to-face activities.

The Violations in the Candidate Registration Stage

Unfortunately, the assumption about mass attendance was verified during the registration period that held on September, 4 to 6. The General Election Supervisory Agency (Bawaslu) on its official website recorded 243 violations committed by the bapaslon in connection with the presence of the crowd.

Suspected bapaslon committing violations came from various regions. These areas include Pahowatu Regency, Surakarta City, and Bukittinggi City. With various alleged violations, ranging from mass processions, not wearing masks, to music concerts (Kompas, 5/9; Media Indonesia, 5/9; republika.co.id, 6/9; suara.com, 7/9).

The Ministry of Home Affairs (Kemendagri) then responded by sending 72 warning letters to the incumbent in regional areas suspected of having violated health protocol. This was conveyed by Minister of Home Affairs (Mendagri) Tito Karnavian in the evaluation agenda for the 2020 Pilkada stages with the Commission II of the House of Representative of the Republic of Indonesia (DPR RI), KPU, Bawaslu, and the Honorary Council of Election Comission (DKPP) on September 10.

What happened at the moment of registration was a violation of several provisions. From an administrative perspective, the crowds that appeared had violated the provisions of PKPU 6/2020 *jo* PKPU 10/2020 concerning the Implementation of Pilkada in the Non-Natural Disaster Period of COVID-19.



Article 49 Paragraph (3) PKPU 6/2020 has stipulated that only the chairperson and secretary or other designation from political parties, coalition of political parties, and bapaslon or independent bapaslon, are allowed to attend when a bapaslon registers.

Apart from administrative provisions, crowds in the candidate registration stage were also suspected of violating other regulations. For example, Presidential Instruction Number 6/2020 (Inpres 6/2020) concerning The Discipline Improvement and Law Enforcement of Health Protocols.

Inpres 6/2020 regulates that those who violate the implementations of the health protocol will be sanctioned, starting from an oral or written warning, social work, administrative fines, to termination or temporary closure of business operations.

It does not stop at the crowd. The allegations of violation of health protocols were also present because a number of bapaslons who were positive for COVID-19 still registered themselves directly (republika.co.id, 7/9). Obviously, this violates Article 50A paragraph (4) PKPU 10/2020 which does not allow positive COVID-19 candidates to attend the KPUD office.

The record of a positive candidate for COVID-19 is also quite worrying. After the number reached 60 when the KPU reported it in the evaluation agenda last September 10, the most recent information shows the addition of three candidates who are also COVID-19 positive (republika.id, 16/9).

This concern still persists. Because, the agenda for determining candidate pairs on September 23, 2020 also has great potential to bring in a large crowd. This is followed by a campaign period starting from September 26 to December 5, 2020.

What went wrong?

There have been many notes given by various parties in responding the crowd phenomenon at the 2020 Pilkada candidate registration stage. Starting from the lack of socialization and coordination between stakeholders, to the absence of strict sanctions for parties who violate health protocols.

Mendagri Tito Karnavian explained two possibilities that would cause the masses to gather at the time of registration for the bapaslons. First is a show of strength. This first assumption positioned the bapaslons are understand about the prohibition of crowding in PKPU 6/2020 jo PKPU 10/2020. Unfortunately, the



will to show strength has outperformed the obligation to comply with health protocols.

Meanwhile, the second possibility placed the bapaslons as party that has not been exposed to information about health protocols in the 2020 Pilkada. This is what the Mendagri then directed to the issue in regard to the lack of socialization of regulations by the organizers.

The second point of the Mendagri's analysis raises further questions. How is it possible for participants who 'with real intention' to compete in the 2020 Pilkada have not know the rules of the game that already announced by the organizers?

Simply put, playing without knowing the exact rules leads to rule breaking. Then, candidates for the 2020 Pilkada should also actively find out how they play. This is because the implementations of regulations will be significant if all parties independently show their intention to be involved in enforcing them.

On the other hand, conditions during the pandemic have also prompted a number of regions to issue regional regulations (perda) on health protocols. On the same evaluation agenda, the Mendagri reported that the majority of the 270 regions who run the 2020 Pilkada had issued perda on compliance with health protocols.

At the provincial level, all regions have made perda on compliance with health protocols. At the district level, 63 percent of regions already have health protocol perda (83 regions not yet stipulate, 141 regions already stipulated). Meanwhile, 4 cities have not made perda on health protocols, while 33 cities have made them.

At least, from this fact we can draw a conclusion. Who are the candidates that really prioritize the interests of the community, and which ones still insist on displaying symbols of strong support through the manifestation of crowds. Of course, the second candidate is not the right choice to lead the region, because it does not show sensitivity to the health crisis condition.

Some bapaslons argue that they cannot control the euphoria of the masses that voluntarily show support. In fact, this statement shows the inability of the bapaslon to continue its participation in the 2020 Pilkada. Moreover, the campaign stage which is about to start still presents a number of physical interaction methods.

Notes

The conditions for doing the 2020 Pilkada are so pity. In fact, the Hearing Meeting (RDP) on May 27, 2020 produced three very



optimistic points regarding the implementation of the Pilkada during the pandemic, namely:

- 1. Approved the election day for Pilkada on 9 December 2020.
- 2. All stages of the Pilkada are guided by health protocols and democratic principles.
- 3. A more specific proposals for budget allocations from the KPU

The first point is approved by the KPU on the condition that both the health protocol and budget can be met. Meanwhile, the second point was also strengthened by the coordination between the organizers and (at that time) the COVID-19 Task Force.

Seeing the unfulfilled requirements from the RDP on May 27, 2020, is not the option to postpone the implementation of the 2020 Pilkada become more realistic? Apart from the fact that the implementation of the 2020 Pilkada stages failed to maintain the mandate of the RDP points, continuing the implementation has the potential to present two opposite extremes: public health and the embodiment of democratic principles through the electoral agenda.

The moment of determining the candidate pairs on September 23 can actually be an indicator, is the implementation of the 2020 Pilkada still good to be proceed or not?

If the same phenomenon is repeated, it is clear that the health issue and the embodiment of democratic principles cannot be carried out simultaneously in the Indonesian electoral context during the health crisis. In this condition, the evaluation that has been carried out by the 2020 Pilkada stakeholders will only be suitable if it is followed by postponing the next election stages again.

The delay will certainly have an impact on the availability that the organizers have. Therefore, it becomes important to recalculate the implementation time. So the comission has sufficient time to complete implementation instruments, including stronger health protocols.

It is also worth remembering that Article 201A paragraph (3) of Government Regulation in lieu of Law Number 2/2020 (Perpu 2/2020) which was promulgated in Law Number 6/2020, allows the KPU to postpone another delays. As long as the KPU decision, regarding the postponement determination, is approved by the Government and also the DPR RI (Article 122A paragraph (2)).

Finally, another question comes up regarding the orientation of the 2020 Pilkada stakeholders. Will they agree if the KPU proposes



another postponement? Perhaps this is the KPU's biggest challenge if it wants to propose a postponement.

- Rifqi Rachman -

Candidates for the 2020 Pilkada should actively seek out the provisions that bind them to contest. This is because the implementations of regulations will be significant if all parties independently show their intention to be involved in enforcing them.



Economic Stimulus Policy Analysis: A Case Study on the Indonesian MSME Sector

The Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) sector is one of the sectors hardest hit after the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in Indonesia. This is because, in running their business, MSMEs in Indonesia are still based on direct sales / purchases. According to the data recorded from the Ministry of Communication and Information (Kemenkominfo), of a total of 64 million MSME players, only 9.4 million MSME players have online sales programs, marketing their products online. This means that there are still 54.6 million non-online MSME players (Jawa Pos, 2020). Meanwhile, the social restriction policy that requires physical activity reduction has disrupted MSME business activities.

The Impact on MSMEs

Furthermore, according to data from the Ministry of Cooperatives and Micro and Small Enterprises (KemenkopUKM), during the COVID-19 pandemic, there were around 37,000 MSMEs that were very seriously affected. This is indicated by: 56 percent of MSME actors reported a decrease in sales, 22 percent reported problems in the financing aspect, 15 percent reported problems with the distribution of goods, and 4 percent reported difficulties in getting raw materials (The Jakarta Post, 2020). One of the MSME sectors that is most affected is the UMKM sector that is engaged in the provision of accommodation and food and beverages in the tourism sector.

This has also been confirmed by data processed by P2E LIPI (in Bahtiar and Saragih, 2020), which show that the impact of the decline in tourism on MSMEs engaged in micro-food and beverage businesses reached 27 percent. Meanwhile, the impacts on small food and beverage businesses was 1.77 percent, and on medium enterprises was 0.07 percent. In addition, MSMEs in the wood and



rattan handicraft sector, especially for making souvenirs, were also affected. Small businesses in the wood and rattan handicraft sector experienced a decline of 1.77 percent, and the medium enterprises experienced a decline of 0.01 percent.

Not only MSMEs in the tourism sector, MSME actors in general has also experienced a similar thing. A survey conducted by Smesco Indonesia with 722 MSME respondents on March 31 - April 20 2020 showed that 35.6 percent of MSME players in the food processing sector experienced a drastic drop in turnover. Then, 13.8 percent in the craft sector, 16 percent in the fashion sector and the other sectors, such as restaurants, services, manufacturing, agriculture, coffee shops, pastries, trade, and others (Kontan.co.id, 2020).

The disruption of the activities of MSMEs in Indonesia cannot be ignored. The reason is that, so far, MSMEs are one of the backbones of the Indonesian economy. In terms of employment, MSMEs were able to absorb around 97.01 percent of the total employment in Indonesia. MSMEs in the micro business sector were able to absorb 89 percent of the workforce, in the small business sector were able to absorb 4.84 percent of the workforce, and the medium sector were able to absorb 3.13 percent of the workforce (KemenkopUKM, 2018).

In terms of contribution to Gross Domestic Product (GDP), according to KemenkopUKM data, MSMEs have contributed IDR 8,573.9 trillion or 57.8 percent of Indonesia's GDP in 2018 (KemenkopUMK, 2018). Of course, the disruption in the MSME sector will have a further impact on the other sectors of the economy. Therefore, the MSME sector must be saved in order to stop its domino effect on other economic sectors.

Government Policy Responses

To mitigate the impacts and consequences resulting from disruption of MSMEs in Indonesia, the government has prepared several mitigation measures. In general, the government has put together efforts to save MSMEs in the National Economic Recovery Program (PEN), which is regulated in Government Regulation Number 43/2020 concerning Amendments to Government Regulation Number 23/2020 concerning Implementation of the PEN Program.

For the UMKM post, the Government has allocated a budget of IDR 123.47 trillion, which is spread over several stimulation programs: an interest subsidy of IDR 35.28 trillion; a placement of funds for restructuring of IDR 78.78 trillion; a spending for guarantee ser-



vices (IJP) of IDR 5 trillion; guarantees for working capital of IDR 1 trillion; Final Income Tax for MSMEs borne by the government (DTP) of IDR 2.4 trillion; as well as investment financing to cooperatives through the Revolving Fund Management Agency (LPDB) of the Ministry of Cooperatives and UKM of IDR 1 trillion (Ministry of Finance, 2020).

Furthermore, the PEN program has been included in the relevant Ministerial regulations. For example, according to the Regulation of the Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs Number 6/2020, the government continues to strive to maintain economic stability in the MSME sector through financial stimuli. One of the stimuli provided is the relaxation of principal installments and interests of the small business credit margin (KUR) for debtors and prospective KUR recipient debtors that are affected by COVID-19.

This form of relaxation is in the form of exemption from payment of KUR interests / margin installments and the postponement of KUR principal installments for a maximum period of 6 months, starting from April 1, 2020 to December 31, 2020. The relaxation can also take the forms of KUR restructuring, which consists of an extension of the KUR period, the addition of the KUR ceiling limit, and the delay in fulfilling the administrative requirements for the KUR restructuring until the end of the COVID-19 set by the government.

Second, the above policy has also been strengthened by the existence of the Financial Services Authority Regulation (POJK) No. 11 / POJK.03 / 2020, which states that credit restructuring or financing of credit can be given to debtors before or after being affected by COVID-19. This credit restructuring mechanism can take many forms, starting from lowering interest rates, extending time, reducing principal arrears, reducing interest arrears, adding credit facilities, to converting credit to temporary equity participation.

Current Implementations

The application of these policies can be dissected one by one. In general, according to updated data as of 6 August 2020 from the Ministry of Finance's website, the realization of the PEN budget for MSMEs has only reached IDR 32.5 trillionz or 26.4 percent of the IDR 123.46 trillion allocation. In detail, the placement of government funds in banks to channel working capital loans has been fully realized, amounting to IDR 30 trillion. Then, the LPDB investment financing of Rpl trillion has been implemented throughout its budget.



The realization of the UMKM KUR interest subsidy specifically for COVID-19 conditions was IDR 1.3 trillion, or only 3.7 percent of the total budget of IDR 35.28 trillion. Furthermore, the Final PPh for UMKM DTP was IDR 200 billion, or equal to 8.4 percent of the total ceiling of IDR 2.4 trillion. Meanwhile, the realization of UMKM support in the first semester of 2020 was IDR 30.22 trillion. At the beginning of the third quarter of 2020, there was an increase in absorption in July 2020 to Rp31.2 trillion, up 0.98 percent compared to January-June 2020. Then, on August 6, 2020, Rp32.51 was realized, or an increase of 1.31 percent on a monthly basis. In accumulation, there is still IDR 90.97 trillion in the MSME stimulus budget that has not been absorbed.

Meanwhile, data compiled from the Financial Services Authority (OJK) shows that banking restructuring until August 18, 2020 has reached IDR 857 trillion. The credit restructuring was distributed to 7.18 million debtors consisting of 5.76 million MSME debtors with total restructuring reaching IDR 354.26 trillion and 1.42 million non-MSME debtors with total restructuring reaching 502.47 trillion. This figure is quite close to the potential MSME credit potential that may have to be restructured, which is IDR 546.7 trillion with a total of 12.55 million MSME debtors. That way, the total restructuring realization has reached 54.32 percent of the total MSME credit potential that will be restructured (Kontan.co.id, 2020).

From the results of the current implementation, it can be seen that MSME actors have proposed more for the credit restructuring process to banks rather than submitting programs formulated in PEN for MSMEs. Why is that?

It should be noted that MSMEs affected by COVID-19 are MSMEs that have been running their businesses long before the COVID-19 pandemic. This means that MSME actors have carried out the process of developing their businesses; for example, by borrowing credits from banks or other financial institutions long before the pandemic. At this point, we understand that they have carried out a process of borrowing and lending between banks and MSMEs to meet their business funding. From the funding options, it turns out that MSME actors have borrowed more from commercial banks outside the KUR program. This can be seen from the far greater absorption of the bank credit restructuring program (54.32 percent) compared to the absorption of the KUR interest subsidy (3.7 percent).

Furthermore, the second reason for the low realization of the PEN stimulus for MSMEs is more from the supply side. In this case, MSMEs are given a stimulus to revive their businesses, such as giving KUR to tax relief. The problem is that MSME players are currently experiencing disruption due to not being able to transform their business models to survive the COVID-19 pandemic. Their business cycles have stopped. They have lost cash flows they should have gotten from their daily businesses. Because MSMEs do not have cash flows, the next effect is that they cannot pay the credit installments. Therefore, MSME players will be more inclined to choose a stimulus for credit restructuring rather than a stimulus to revive their businesses.

It should also be noted that the current conditions, especially from the demand side, are on a sharp decline. This has clearly been confirmed by the data on the decline in Indonesia's economic growth, which experienced minus 5.32 percent on an annual basis and minus 4.19 percent on a quarterly basis. Household consumption has dropped to minus 6.51 percent on a quarterly basis and minus 5.51 percent annually in the second quarter of 2020, whereas in the same quarter last year, household consumption grew 1.74 percent on a quarterly basis and grew 5, 18 percent on an annual basis. In fact, the share of household consumption to GDP is still greater than the others; namely, 57.85 percent (BPS, 2020).

The implication is that MSMEs are currently holding back their productions rather than having to produce because there is no purchasing power from the demand side. Logically, that is why MSME actors apply for new credits through the KUR subsidy schemes or ask for tax relief amid the currently declining purchasing power of the public. In the logic of thinking of MSME actors, it is better now to ask for relief for extending credit payments rather than proposing a stimulus to reopen their businesses. Therefore, it is not surprising that the stimulus for restructuring of bank credits has become more popular among MSMEs than the PEN stimulus program for MSMEs.

Policy Recommendations

To mitigate the above problems, there are several recommendations that can be made by the government, including:

The Ministry of Cooperatives and Small and Medium Enterprises (KemenkopUKM) must immediately encourage the transformation of the UMKM business model from conventional to online-based. This is a step that must be taken considering that the



- end of the COVID-19 pandemic cannot be ascertained. Therefore, MSME players must be encouraged to carry out business transformations that are more adaptive to current conditions.
- 2. KemenkopUKM can collaborate with the Association of UMKM Players to create an incubation program, training, and assistance for MSMEs affected by COVID-19 to transform their business models to adapt to this pandemic. The models can be various. For example, academy or training programs for MSMEs to transform their business.
- 3. In the midst of the current situation, the Ministry of Finance (Kemenkeu) must reformulate the PEN program for MSMEs to make MSME businesses survive in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic compared to the MSME business expansion program.

- M. Rifki Fadilah -

The Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) sector is one of the sectors hardest hit after the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in Indonesia, as out of a total of 64 million MSME players, only 14.68 percent of MSMEs have online sales programs or market their products online. This means, there are still 85.32 percent of non-online MSME actors. Meanwhile, the social restriction policy that requires reducing physical activities has disrupted MSME business activities.



The Implications of the DKI Jakarta PSBB Volume II

After implementing the Transitional Large-Scale Social Restrictions (PSBB) policy, the number of COVID-19 cases in Indonesia has increased rapidly. From Covid19.go.id data (09/09/2020), the number of positive cases of COVID-19 in Indonesia has reached 203,342 cases, with 145,200 recovered cases and 8,336 dead cases. This figure has almost doubled sharply when compared to the number of cases before the implementation of the Transitional PSBB policy. The numbers of positive cases of COVID-19 as of 7 September 2020 in DKI Jakarta reached 47,397 cases, followed by East Java Province with 35,941 cases, and Central Java Province with 15,615 cases (Ministry of Health, 2020).

The above facts show that DKI Jakarta Province accounts for one third of new cases in Indonesia. As a result, if taken in the aggregate, the number of positive cases of COVID-19 in Indonesia has also increased sharply. Why has the number of positive cases in DKI Jakarta increased so rapidly? First, the number of cases can jump sharply in correlation with the increasing number of people who are tested for polymerase chain reaction / PCR. As of September 9, 2020, 716,776 people in DKI Jakarta have taken this test. That way, it is not surprising that the number of positive cases of COVID-19 in DKI Jakarta is increasing sharply.

Apart from that, after the implementation of the PSBB easing in DKI Jakarta, community activities have gradually returned to the baseline conditions before the implementation of the PSBB policy. This is also confirmed by the Google Mobility Report data, which show that after the re-opening, community mobility activities increased rapidly, especially in June. Then, they stagnated in July and slowed down in August. On the one hand, the easing of the PSBB policy had a positive impact on the economy. For example, people could go back to work; business people could resume their businesses; and shops could start returning to normal activities.



Furthermore, the Transitional PSBB policy had difficult consequences. The risks of doing activities outside the home carried a greater potential for contracting the COVID-19 virus. Even though the government has implemented regulations regarding health protocol, the next problem is the low level of public awareness to comply with these health protocol rules. For example, in DKI Jakarta Province, a simple health protocol, such as wearing masks, had been violated by 101,401 offenders. This situation also occurred in other provinces, such as West Java, where there were 590,858 violators. Then, in Central Java Province, there were 14,000 violators.

DKI Jakarta PSBB (Again) and Its Implications.

Therefore, to reduce the positive number of COVID-19 in Indonesia, the government must first address the largest component that contributes to positive cases of COVID-19 in Indonesia. With this logic flow, the policy of the DKI Jakarta Provincial Government to implement the PSBB Total policy is one of the policy shortcuts to curb the positive number of COVID-19 in Indonesia.

Of course, this policy has implications that are not easy. As DKI Jakarta is implementing the PSBB Total policy again since September 14, then the economic recovery process in the short term will be hampered. All indicators of economic reversal will again turn negative. Most people will return to their homes. This means that work, production, shopping, and other economic activities must be forced to stop again. These conditions will certainly have a broad impact on the economy as a whole, especially DKI Jakarta to become the supporting center of the Indonesian economy.

Furthermore, at least 70 percent of the money in circulation is in Jakarta. Then, from the 2019 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) data, DKI Jakarta contributed 17.93 percent to Indonesia's GDP, or IDR 2,840.33 trillion. This means that the PSBB Total policy will be reintroduced in DKI Jakarta with the potential to cause serious economic shocks. In the second quarter of 2020, DKI Jakarta's regional GDP had recorded a figure of minus 8.22 percent. This means, if forced to stop again, it is not impossible that the regional GDP growth of DKI Jakarta will again experience negative growth. This will in turn make the national economy also deteriorate. At this point, a dichotomy debate between the economic and health sectors will reappear.



However, it should be noted that a policy cannot please all parties. If we are looking for a policy that pleases everyone, there are two things we can do. First, never make policies, or make policies that cannot be implemented because they have to accommodate too many parties. Policymakers cannot please all parties in making policies. What can be done is to make policies that provide the greatest benefits to all parties.

From the explanations above, it should be noted that the economic sector cannot run fully as long as the health sector cannot be overcome. As long as a vaccine has not been found, health protocol must still be implemented. It is possible that the strict PSBB policy will also be reinstated. The implication is that the economy will not operate 100 percent. The next round, if this is continued, the economic recovery will also be hampered. Therefore, to solve the economic crisis, we need to first solve the health crisis. Thus, the trade off between economy and health will not occur.

Policy Recommendations

Starting from the description above, here are some recommendations that policy makers can take to make the PSBB policy a success without bringing a heavy trade off to the economy.

First, to make this PSBB Total policy run successfully, the DKI Jakarta Provincial Government must closely monitor the citizens of DKI Jakarta. The DKI Jakarta Provincial Government can coordinate with the mayors and the most micro stakeholders in society, such as the heads of the RT / RW to closely supervise the implementations of the DKI Jakarta Total PSBB. Thus, this PSBB policy can run effectively. In addition, because in the current PSBB Total policy, the government has provided some concessions for several business sectors, the DKI Jakarta Provincial Government must also remain firm in enforcing the rules, giving strict sanctions to violators of health protocol rules. Without strengthening law enforcement, the health protocol has a gap to be violated.

Second, it should also be noted that the PSBB policy will be biased towards middle and lower class groups of the society that have no other choice but to carry out activities as usual. The total PSBB will force most people to work from home. Thus, business people, workers, and other related parties will lose the opportunity cost they get if they work / do activities outside the home. Therefore, the Provincial Government of DKI Jakarta and the Ministry of Social Affairs must provide incentives for their citizens to stay



at home. In the next round, instruments for providing social assistance, whether in the form of Direct Cash Assistance (BLT), basic foodstuff, pre-employment cards, family hope programs, or other electrical assistance must be given continuously.

The provision of social assistance must be extended at least until mid-2021, considering that it is not yet certain whether the CO-VID-19 pandemic will end next year. Even if we wait for the vaccine to be mass produced in early 2020, Basri (2020) projects that it will take about one year to ensure that at least 25 million people are vaccinated. Therefore, during that process the health protocols still have to be implemented. As a result, the economy is not in a full employment position. The implication is that there are still 50 percent both workers, business people, and other related actors who lose quite a large opportunity cost. Therefore, the government must continue to provide compensation to them.

Third, the Provincial Government of DKI Jakarta must intensify the PCR tests again in DKI Jakarta, especially in areas that have a fairly high density. The high density level provides a greater potential for transmitting the CVDI-19 virus because the social distancing health protocol is not fulfilled. By intensifying the PCR tests, the DKI Jakarta Provincial Government can identify how many of its citizens are infected by this virus. Thus, the DKI Jakarta Government can also take steps, such as asking infected citizens to stay alone / isolate independently at home. Meanwhile, those who are not infected can carry out normal activities with strict health protocols.

- M. Rifki Fadilah -

The economic sector cannot run fully as long as the health sector cannot be overcome. As long as a vaccine has not been found, the health protocol must still be implemented. *It is possible that the* strict PSBB policy will also be reinstated. The implication is that the economy will not operate 100 percent. The next round, if this is continued, the economic recovery will also be hampered.



Reviewing the Continuity of the 2020 Pilkada

The developments of the Coronavirus Disesase-2019 (COVID-19) have been increasingly worrying. As of 12 September, the number of cases in Indonesia has exceeded 214,746 cases (kawalcovid.com, 12/09). On 12 June, or three months earlier, it was still at 36,406 cases (worldometers.info, 12/09).

Interestingly, the Government's position, represented by the Co-ordinating Minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs (Menkopolhukam), Mahfud MD, has not seen the developments as a convincing enough reason to postpone the Regional Head General Elections (Pilkada). On the other hand, he perceives this agenda as a constitutional agenda, which could become a problem if it is not implemented as scheduled (kompas.id, 11/09).

This is certainly an irony in itself, especially since the facts in the field have also shown that many prospective regional heads have tested positive for COVID-19. This is in line with the data collected by the General Elections Commission of the Republic of Indonesia (KPU RI) during the three-day registration period, showing that as many as 63 registered candidates for regional heads have tested positive for Covid-19 infection (news.detik.com, 10/09).

From what has been monitored so far, there are at least several members of the Indonesian KPU and Regional KPU (KPUD) who have reportedly tested positive for COVID-19. These include member of the Indonesian KPU Evi Novida Ginting, the Chair of the Gresik KPUD, and the Chair of the Riau KPUD. Ad-hoc election supervisors in several regions have also tested positive for Covid-19. In Boyolali Regency alone; for example, it was recorded that 20 supervisors at the sub-district level and 76 supervisors at the sub-district / village level had been infected by Covid-19 (national.kompas.com, 11/09).



The number of cases seen is, of course, far from final. The number will still increase. It could be an iceberg phenomenon. Thus, the continuity of the simultaneous regional elections that will be held on December 9 should be questioned again. After seeing the Government's various failures to prevent the spread of COVID-19, will the implementations of the Pilkada be still worth continuing or should they be postponed?

Implementation Challenges

Apart from the empty optimism of the Government, whether or not the Pilkada should be continued will greatly depend on community discipline, compliance of candidate pairs, and the readiness of organizers to obey the Covid-19 health protocol. These three variables will be the main keys in determining the final outcome of Pilkada in the midst of a pandemic, whether they will make Pilkada a blessing in disguise or they will turn Pilkada into a disaster.

The three variables are very important in the two final stages of Pilkada; that is, the campaign and voting stages. Unfortunately, even before the two stages, the three variables have been undermined. On the first day of the candidate registration period, some candidate pairs involved large crowds long convoys.

The Gibran Rakabuming Raka and Teguh Prakosa pair involved a large crowd of about a thousand people when they registered at KPU Solo. Also, the incumbent candidates for the Regent and Vice Regent of Karawang Cellica Nurrachadiana and Aep Syaepuloh also invited a big crowd when registering with the KPU of Karawang Regency. Eri Cahyadi and Armuji did the same during the registration for the Surabaya Mayor election (cnnindonesia.com, 06/09).

Even tho, long before the registration stage was opened, KPU had enacted KPU Regulation No. 6/2020, which emphasizes the main-streaming of health and safety principles in the implementation of all follow-up stages of the Pilkada in accordance with the Covid-19 health protocol. (Article 5 paragraph (2).

The regulation also applies to every activity, including delivering documents and / or physical equipment (Article 5 paragraph (4) letter c), by prohibiting unauthorized parties from being physically present and / or gathering at the place where the documents are submitted. (Article 8 letter e).



A Regulatory Gap

The large crowds during the registration period did not only show the organizers' failures in enforcing the regulations. These also show the lack of information dissemination on the health protocol, including the prohibition of having a large crowd in every stage of Pilkada.

In addition, this has also been caused by inadequate legal instruments in terms of disciplining candidate pairs and the society. KPU Regulation No. 6/2020 above does not include strict sanctions for the violations.

Article 11 Paragraph (2) PKPU No. 6/2020 only states that every party deemed to have violated the protocol and prohibition will be given a warning to immediately follow the provisions. Furthermore, Paragraph (3) states that if the person concerned continues to ignore it, then the party may be subject to "sanctions in accordance with statutory provisions."

The sound of such provisions, of course, brings its own confusion. It is almost certain that so far there are no related regulations that at least specifically regulate the types of sanctions for election violations in a pandemic situation. For this reason, the lack of clarity of sanctions is of course the same as re-negating the entire rule that emphasizes the health protocol and the crowd prohibition itself.

Inputs

During the two crucial stages later, large crowds could be found again. In fact, the crowds could be a lot bigger, creating bigger risks of the spread of COVID-19. Thus, the compliance of candidate pairs and community discipline need to be promptly enforced. If not, then there is no other way but postponing the 2020 simultaneous regional elections.

Concretely, this can be done by re-encouraging the readiness of organizers to respond to similar situations and by revising or issuing regulations that contain clarity on sanctions related to violations of these provisions. The sanctions can take the form of regressive administrative sanctions.

For example, the organizers could return the registration documents to the candidates or withdraw the candidacy approval letter that will be issued later on 23 September 2020. Meanwhile, for the



community, voters or supporters, the sanctions can be in forms of fines or social work.

- Muhammad Aulia Y Guzasiah -

Whether or not Pilkadas are continued will depend on the discipline of the community, the compliance of candidate pairs, and the readiness of organizers to obey the Covid-19 health protocol. These three variables will be the main keys in determining the final outcome of Pilkada in the midst of a pandemic, whether they will make it a "blessing in disguise" or they will turn it into a disaster.



The Revision of the Constitutional Court Law: Was it Transactional?

The revision of the Law on the Constitutional Court (MK Law), which was passed on Tuesday (1/9) yesterday, was unusual. There were several things that should at least be concerned about in the process of its formation. One of them was related to the discussion process, which set a new record in the history of the formation of legislation in Indonesia.

If the public thinks that the revision of the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) Law was the fastest, then the revision of the Constitutional Court Law was actually much faster. The process of discussing the KPK Law only took 12 days at the end of 2019. Meanwhile, the discussion process for the revision of the Constitutional Court Law only took seven days, as it was first discussed on Monday (24/8).

The substance of the revision, if we pay close attention, is very political. This was because at the same time, the Constitutional Court was handling several judicial reviews, such as the judicial reviews of the Corruption Eradication Commission Law, the Minerba Law, the COVID-19 Pandemic Financial Stability Law and so on. In the revision process, the House of Representatives (DPR) and the Government only focused on the minimum age and tenure for judges and on regulating the term of office of the Constitutional Court leadership.

Previously, a term of office was five years, and a judge could be reelected for another term. Now, there is only one term of 15 years. As for the minimum age limit for appointment, it has now been raised to 55 yearsz with a maximum age limit of 70 years. Previously, the minimum age limit was set at least 47 years, with a maximum limit of 65 years.



Meanwhile, for the term of office of the leader, it is determined that he or she can now serve for five years. Previously, he or she could only serve for 2 years and 6 months. Interestingly, all the points of revision that have been passed apply retroactively through transitional articles. This means that the regulation is transactional in nature, as it applies to the judges who have served since the previous period.

Of course, this is a concerning development. Oligarchic power has begun to influence to the Constitutional Guardians. After the KPK, it has undermined the Constitutional Court. The hope for a democratic rule of law seems to be getting further away. The seeds of reform that have previously been fought are now being undermined by the social institutions themselves.

The Importance of Revision

The revision should have included more important points, such as strengthening institutional anti-corruption, upholding judge ethics, and adding some powers, including the powers to deal with constitutional complaints and constitutional questions. The revision would have been much easier to accept, because such matters have long been recommended through academic studies and by various civil society groups.

On the other hand, the revision of the Constitutional Court Law has also failed to address the needs and institutional strengthening of the Constitutional Court itself. The standardization of judge selection so far does not have clear patterns and indicators from the three proposing institutions; namely the DPR, Government and the Supreme Court (MA).

The previous law only stated that the nominations should be carried out in a transparent and participatory manner, and be submitted through an objective and accountable selection from each of these institutions. In fact, nominations and submissions are sometimes contrary to the norms. Sometimes the process is carried out behind closed doors and without significant public participation. An example was when the Supreme Court proposed Anwar Usman, and the President proposed Hamdan Zoelva in the previous period.

Until now, it is only the DPR that has clearer regulations or rules (tatib), which standardize the recruitment pattern of MK judges. This has raised several questions. Is this the prerogative of the leaderships of the institutions? Should the public just accept the



nomination of candidates? What if there is a candidate who is not a statesman? Matters like this should be more urgent to be discussed by legislators.

Another issue is related to the supervision of the Cnstitutional Judges themselves. Since Constitutional Judges Akil Mochtar and Patrialis Akbar were caught in a corruption case, it seems that there has been no significant change regarding the supervision of MK judges. In fact, even though they are constructed as statesmen who control the constitution, the Constitutional Court judges are essentially human beings who are vulnerable and vulnerable to opportunities for corruption.

Unfortunately, the ethical supervision in the Constitutional Court does not always run smoothly without problems. The KPK raised a number of problems in the supervision of the Constitutional Court judges. Among other things, the weak maintenance of the Constitutional Court code of ethics, the absence of rules regarding conflicts of interest in the Constitutional Court, and insufficient ethical principles in guiding the ethics and behavior of the Constitutional Court judges (KPK, 2019).

Preventing Transactional Hurdle

What is then ratified in the revision points of the Constitutional Court Law, of course, must become material for correction and mutual attention. Regarding the minimum age and length of term of office, it does not mean that it is completely bad. However, judicial institutions such as the Constitutional Court are basically different from other state institutions. To be able to maintain independence and impartiality from the liquidity of the political dynamics of a regime, the tenure of the Constitutional Court judges should not be determined based on periodically elected state institutions.

However, so that there is no accusation that this revision was initiated as a form of "gift" or mere political bartering, then its enforcement should be prospective in the future for prospective MK judges in the next period. At least this can be considered as a fair way to avoid conflicts of interest and maintain the objectivity of constitutional judges.

In addition, there is still a need for a clear evaluation and monitoring mechanism against the higher and stricter ethical standards of the existing state positions. This is deemed necessary as a form of accountability for a long term in carrying out the function of the



guardian of constitution. If not, then this will be tantamount to slipping the Constitutional Court into the abyss of abuse of power, as Lord Acton's statement, which has always been echoed, "Power tends to corrupt; absolute power corrupts absolutely."

- Muhammad Aulia Y. Guzasiah -

To refute accusation that this revision was initiated as a form of "gift" or mere political bartering, the enforcement of the Constitutional Court Law should be prospective in the future for prospective MK judges in the next period. At least this can be considered as a fair way to avoid conflicts of interest and to maintain the objectivity of constitutional judges.



Encouraging the Expansion of State Civil Apparatus E-Kinerja Utilization

The Central Government's move to utilize the government electronic system or e-government (e-gov) has had a positive impact during the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. Several public services can now be accessed online. Nevertheless, the facts on the ground still show that several public services still have to be delayed. This is also an issue that must be resolved because the shift work system is not fully effective. Moreover, currently, COVID-19 is also increasing in government clusters.

To reduce the impact of disrupted public services, internal adjustments to the work system of the State Civil Service (ASN) need to be made. One of them is by encouraging the wider use of e-Kinerja in Indonesia. E-Kinerja (E-Performance) is not something new in the development of the use of e-gov in government circles. Several ministries/agencies (K / L) and local governments (Pemda) have implemented this system. How can efforts be made to increase the use of this system amid a pandemic?

To Get to Know E-Kinerja and its Challenges

To implement the provisions of Article 78 of Law Number 5/2014 concerning ASN, on April 26, 2019, President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) signed Government Regulation (PP) Number 30/2019 concerning Civil Servants (PNS) (setkab.go. id, 20/05/2019). PNS Performance Appraisal as intended, according to this PP, is carried out in a PNS Performance Management System consisting of performance planning; implementation, performance monitoring, and performance coaching; performance assessment; follow-ups; and PNS Performance Information System.



To realize the practice based on the PP, the National Civil Service Agency (BKN) has made strategic steps; namely, developing the use of e-Kinerja. E-Kinerja does not only apply to employees who are civil servants, but also all ASNs. E-Kinerja is a form of adaptation in the use of technology to support better quality performance in serving the public. Through E-Kinerja all forms of assessment can be input directly using the system provided. According to BKN (bkn.go.id, 2020), the benefits to be achieved through this system are first, measuring, and monitoring ASN performance periodically. Second, as reference data for the provision of performance allowances received by employees. Third, mapping employee performance in the context of a merit system.

E-Kinerja supports a more effective mechanism in carrying out the preparation of Job Analysis (ANJAB) and Workload Analysis (ABK). For example, in Banda Aceh. Assistant III Pemko Banda Aceh, M. Nurdin S. said that the existence of e-Kinerja was able to reduce the number of civil servants from 7483 in 2007 to 5957 in 2014 (ekinerja.bpks.go.id, 20/11/2014).

Another positive impact was felt by the Banyuwangi Regency Population and Civil Registration Service (Disdukcapil). Mukti et al. (2019) in the journal entitled "Application of an E-Performance Based Performance Appraisal System to Employee Work Performance through Job Satisfaction as an Intervening Variable at Disdukcapil Banyuwangi Regency" states that e-Kinerja has a positive and significant effect on employee job satisfaction. This arises because of a good perception of the well-structured assessment standards in the organization to assess employee performance.

The National Civil Service Agency has also established a coaching clinic to help employees understand e-Kinerja. The coaching clinic is a service in the form of consultation class to improve ASN's ability in implementing e-Kinerja applications (bkn.go.id/coaching-clinic, 2020). Even though in a number of K/L/Pemda this e-Kinerja system has worked well, it is still not practiced well enough in a number of K/L/Pemda.

In practice, e-Kinerja has encountered many fundamental challenges. The proliferation of e-gov in government circles has not been matched by sustainable use and supervision. A number



of applications between units also tend to stand independently within the scope of K / L / Pemda. For example, if you look at the bkn.go.id homepage, you will find a number of applications that can actually be integrated. The background factors include the lack of goodwill among public officials due to resistance in making changes and the region's unpreparedness.

E-gov is on the big agenda of bureaucratic reform. Bureaucracy is closely related to the red tape label or red tape. There are so many regulations and levels that complicated performance is still the shackle for making massive changes through e-gov. E-Kinerja, which seeks to overhaul the current system, requires great attention so that it can overwhelm the bureaucracy in Indonesia and make it more professional.

Several Recommendations

The development of the use of e-Kinerja amid a pandemic is an urgency. Several efforts need to be made as acceleration steps.

First, BKN as the leading sector in ASN management needs to expand the target scope of e-Kinerja utilization in several Pemda to support the National ASN Talent Pool. The National ASN Talent Pool is a reference for agency succession plans, employee career development, competency development, promotions, and transfers (tirto.id, 05/08/2019). This program integrates various e-Kinerja systems owned by K / L / Pemda.

Since the beginning of 2020, BKN has been actively providing information dissemination related to e-Kinerja through the ASN e-Kinerja Piloting Project Team which targets 37 local governments (sidaknews.com, 16/07). In the information dissemination carried out, the existence of assessment indicators and performance appraisals were also important points to be conveyed, because of the high subjectivity of assessments carried out manually through Employee Performance Targets (SKP).

Second, to review and form a readiness ecosystem. To be able to reduce the resistance to system change, mapping the condition of the local government needs to be prioritized to measure the level of readiness in practicing e-Kinerja. There are at least three things; that need attention. First, there should be a legal umbrella. A system can work if it has a legal umbrella capable of sustaining it significantly over a long period of time.



The existence of legal umbrellas at the regional government level also shows goodwill and evidence of the commitment of regional leaders. For example, in Banda Aceh, the existence of a Mayor Regulation (Perwali), which has been continuously adjusted since the existence of e-Kinerja in 2012, has become an important foundation so that the e-Kinerja policy can be implemented in a sustainable manner (acehtrend.com, 29/03/2016).

Furthermore, secondly, the internet technology network infrastructure in the area. Currently, not all regions in Indonesia have internet access. The survey of the Indonesian Internet Service Providers Association (APJII) (2019) states that the penetration of internet users in Indonesia reached 64.8% in 2018. In this case, the Ministry of Communication and Information (Kominfo) as the leading sector, needs to strive for equal distribution and internet access.

Finally, reviewing the quality of ASN owned and/or accelerated by generation Y employees (millennial). E-Kinerja needs to be supported by adaptive ASN characters. This character is usually attached to generation Y employees. The journal entitled "Millennial in the Bureaucracy: Acceleration of Millennial Employees in Government Agencies" by Juwari et al. (2020) stated that generation Y has an important role in the bureaucracy and can collaborate with a bureaucratic character that is rigid, regulation-based, and difficult to change. The journal also found that the millennial characters who are connected or attached to internet technology are an urgency in the big design of bureaucratic reform.

Encouraging the expansion of the use of e-Kinerja ASN is not easy, especially amid a pandemic like this. Commitment and clear coordination among all K/L/Pemda are the main foundations so that this system can run. BKN as the leading sector must be able to strengthen its capacity to reach many strategic actors to realize the expansion of the utilization and integration of this e-Kinerja system. In the end, it is hoped that this system will create a more professional, transparent, and impactful assessment climate for maximum public services.

- Vunny Wijaya -

The expansion of the use of e-Kinerja needs to be maximized amid a pandemic. Several efforts need to be made as acceleration steps. BKN as the leading sector must be able to strengthen its capacity to reach many strategic actors to realize the expansion of the utilization and integration of this e-Kinerja system.



The Polemics over the Issue of the Resurrection of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI)

Entering September, one of the news stories that often appear in the mass media is the commemoration of the event of the September 30, 1965 Movement. The murder of six Army generals and one Army officer on the night of September 30 at Lubang Buaya sparked a bloody conflict that ended with a regime change from the Old Order to the New Order government.

The warning against the event that occurred 55 years ago has become a controversy because the issue of resurrection of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) has become a political issue that overshadows national political dynamics of the country.

Even in 2020, the 212 Alumni Brotherhood (PA 212), which is part of the Anti-Communist National Alliance (ANAK) NKRI, is planning to watch the film G30S / PKI together. The event will be held simultaneously nationally on September 30, 2020. This event will be held to remind Indonesians about the danger that communist ideology still threatens Indonesia. PA 212 claims that there are indications of the danger of communism in Indonesia (cnnindonesia. com, 31/8).

The Issue of PKI Awakening in the Middle of Political Dynamics and Perceptions of the Indonesian Society

The issue of the rise of the PKI does not only happen this year. The narrative of the rise of the PKI has often been echoed in recent years.

The Governor of the National Defense Institute (Lemhanas) of the



Republic of Indonesia, Lt. Gen. TNI (ret.) Agus Widjojo said that the issue of the existence and resurrection of the PKI was merely a rumor. This issue has become a commodity for the interests of certain groups. According to Agus, because the Indonesian nation has a history related to the PKI, the PKI issue is an issue that is quite easy to use by certain parties in perpetuating their interests. Through the PKI issue, stakeholders will easily provoke the public (cnnindonesia.com, 15/10/2018).

Historian from the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI) Asvi Warman Adam said that the issue of the rise of the PKI or communism in Indonesia was revived to restore the glory of the New Order ahead of the 2024 Presidential Elections (tribunnews.com, 7/7/2020).

Asvi (2020) states that there are parties with an interest in reviving the issue of communism. They are part of the New Order regime that wants to re-establish the regime. This has been mixed with different interests; for example, when there was a demonstration of the HTI (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia). Through these demonstrations, HTI want to show its existence by saying they were actually fighters to destroy communism.

Even though according to Asvi (2020), there has been a TAP MPRS Number XXV / 1966 concerning the Dissolution of the PKI and the Prohibition of Communism in Indonesia since 12 March 1966. Until now, the TAP MPRS has never been revoked. Thus, it can be said that the rise of the PKI is only a hallucination.

Based on the explanations above, it can be said that this issue was deliberately put up by certain groups to achieve their political interests. So, what is the issue of the rise of the PKI in the perceptions of the Indonesian people? The following is an overview of the results of a survey on public perceptions from a number of survey institutions, trying to see the people's perceptions of this issue.

In 2017, according to the results of the Saiful Muljani Research and Consulting (SMRC) survey, the issue of the resurrection of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) was not widely believed by the public. In the survey, it was found that 86.8 percent of respondents did not believe that the PKI was on the rise. Only 12.6 respondents believed. More specifically, among those who believed that the PKI was on the rise, 39.9 percent said that the party had threatened



the state. Only 15.5 percent of them said that the PKI threat was still latent, or had not become a real threat at this time (tirto.id, 29/9/2017).

Furthermore, in 2018, there was a survey conducted by LIPI in nine provinces; namely, West Java, DKI Jakarta, Central Java, DI Aceh, East Java, North Sumatra, South Sulawesi, DI Yogyakarta and Banten. The survey stated that 54.1% of respondents knew about news related to the PKI. Of that number, 42.8% believed the truth of the news circulating on social media (mediaindonesia.com, 4/12/2018).

The survey results confirmed the PoliticaWave survey data, which monitored a number of social media via Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, Youtube, as well as several other sites and social media from August to December 2017. The survey results stated that the type of fake news that circulated the most on social media throughout the survey period was related to the issue of the rise of the PKI. The number of hoaxes circulating on social media related to the issue of the PKI's revival reached more than 200 thousand or 95.3 percent (cnnindonesia.com, 10/2/2018).

According to the survey results, it can be said that some people still believe in the issue of the rise of the PKI. Most of the people who believe in this issue mainly live in big cities. Meanwhile, the information channel to spread this issue is through social media.

Massive information through social media affects the views of the public, especially social media users, on this issue. The explanation of this influence can be reviewed through the media system dependancy theory. This theory assumes that individuals in fulfilling their needs for information become dependent on certain media and make the media of choice important for themselves (Littlejohn and Foss, 2008).

Individuals who have relied on one media, in this case social media, will be affected cognitively, affective, and behaviorally. Therefore, it is not surprising that most users who have relied heavily on information obtained through social media will be affected by the issue of the rise of the PKI.



The PKI Awakening Issue: Between Propaganda and Resolving the 1965 Human Rights Case

According to the exposure in the above, it can be said that the issue of political awakening has influenced public perceptions. Although on the other hand, this issue is deliberately rolled out by individuals and groups at certain moments in order to fulfill their political goals. Seeing this, it can be said that this issue is part of political propaganda.

Propaganda itself according to Harold D. Laswell (1937) is a technique to influence human activities by manipulating their representations. The issue of the rise of the PKI as propaganda has been carried out by making the opinion as if the PKI has risen again. This opinion has then been echoed over and over again so that some people believe it.

This is of course contrary to the fact that the PKI as a party organization no longer exists. Quoting Asvi Warman Adam's opinion above, TAP MPRS Number XXV / 1966 regarding the Dissolution of the PKI and the Prohibition of Communism precludes the possibility of the birth of PKI in Indonesia.

Thus, referring to the opinion of Laswell (1937) and Asvi (2020), this issue is a propaganda echoed for manipulation by a number of parties for the sake of political interests, both in the electoral arena for mass mobilization and for attacking political opponents.

Director of Indonesian Political Indicators Burhanudin Muhtadi said that the issue of the PKI was often used in the lead-up to political moments, such as the 2019 presidential elections. This is because communism is one of the three groups most hated by the society, including Muslim groups. Burhan said that the PKI issue was part of identity politics to exploit the emotions of the masses (medcom .id , 23 September 2017).

In line with Burhan, political observer from Gadjah Mada University (UGM) Arie Sudjito assessed that the issue of the rise of the PKI was too far-fetched. Arie said the issue was deliberately raised again to create unrest in the society. In addition, the issue was deliberately blown ahead of the political year (cnnindonesia.com, 7/3/2019).

On the other hand, the commemoration of the September 30, 1965 Incident also reminds this nation that there are problems that have



not been resolved until now; namely, the cases of human rights violations (HAM) in 1965-1966.

The exact number of victims after the 1965 tragedy is unknown. A report by the National Commission on Human Rights (Komnas HAM) on 23 July 2012 found that the various violence after the September 30, 1965 incident constituted gross human rights violations. The number of victims according to Komnas HAM is in the range of 500 thousand to 3 million (tempo.co, 18/4/2016).

Until now, Komnas HAM has submitted the 1965 human rights report to the Attorney General's Office. However, the status of the Komnas HAM report is still at a standstill because the case files do not meet the formal and material requirements. In fact, there is already a legal umbrella, which states that the settlement of serious human rights cases can be done through the *Ad Hoc* court, as mandated in Law No. 26 I/2000 concerning Human Rights Courts. However, after going through several changes in government during the Reformation era, this has still not been implemented.

Closing

The September 30, 1965 incident has always been a political issue that has often emerged in recent years. This issue has become a political commodity propagated by certain individuals or groups in order to fulfill their political interests.

One side that is very different from the resolution of human rights violations after September 30, 1965 is often deliberately buried to be resolved. In fact, completing cases of human rights violations in 1965 is important in order to provide the truth, which in the end will bring justice to the victims.

Therefore, the second term of President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) 's administration is expected to bring progress in the development of the settlement of cases of human rights violations in 1965 and other cases of gross human rights violations. It is very important that past human rights violations be resolved and be followed by the reconciliation of all parties, both now and in the future.

- Arfianto Purbolaksono -

The September 30, 1965 incident has always been a political issue that has often emerged in recent years. This issue has become a political commodity propagated by certain individuals or groups in order to fulfill their political interests.



The Accuracy of COVID-19 Data and Policy-Making

The domino effect of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19), which has pushed through a number of priority areas, including the economy, has made the New Habit Adaptation (AKB) policy executed by a number of Local Governments (Pemda). A significant increase in the number of positive patients has been inevitable during the last few weeks. However, taking into account a number of websites both at the Central Government and Pemda, public confusion has occurred in a number of regions due to data unsynchronization.

The Importance of COVID-19 Data Accuracy

Since its establishment, the Task Force for the Acceleration of Handling COVID-19, which is the direct arm of President Joko Widodo (Jokowi), has provided a lot of information and guidance regarding the prevention and handling of COVID-19 through the covid19. go.id website. The task force consists of a number of team members, including a director, implementers, and experts. The Taskforce has been replicated in Pemda.

With various policy directives from the Central Government, Pemda, consisting of the Provincial Government (Pemprov) and Regency / City Government (Pemkab / Pemkot), have also made websites centers for COVID-19 information. However, entering the sixth month, the accuracy of the COVID-19 data continues to be questioned because there are still unsynchronized data on the number of positive cases.

For example, the dispute between the Surabaya City Government and the East Java Provincial Government (Jatim). According to the Coordinator of the Surabaya COVID-19 Task Force Prevention, Febria Rachmanita, the level of data unsynchronization has



even reached above 50 percent (republika.co.id, 18/06). After being traced, the existence of multiple names and addresses was the cause. Several data have not been updated, so individuals who are no longer domiciled in Surabaya are still recorded.

Data unsynchronization has also occurred in the Semarang City Government. The spokesman for the Central COVID-19 Task Force, Wiku Adisasmito, announced that Semarang City was the region with the highest active cases; that isz 2,317 cases (kompas. id, 31/08). However, data from the Semarang City Government showed a total of 489 active cases. The difference is 1,828 cases. The Head of the Semarang City Health Office (Dinkes), Abdul Hakam, said that his team collected all data related to COVID-19 directly from several referral hospitals in Semarang City.

Data unsynchronization also occurs in mortality rates. Koalisi Warga (Coalition Citizen) to Lapor COVID-19 noted that the death rate from COVID-19 reached 2.5 to 4.2 times what the Government reported. According to their observations, the data on deaths reported by the Government have not yet referred to the World Health Organization (WHO) guidelines. The COVID-19 Task Force report should include all suspected and confirmed COVID-19 data (laporcovid19.org, 05/09).

The Head of the Data and Information Center of the Ministry of Health (MoH's Pusdatin), Didik Budijanto, said that data discrepancies could occur because the calculation of the closing time for the calculations had not been agreed upon by several agencies or Ministries / Institutions (K / L). Didik said the incoming data was verified repeatedly. The data collection flow starts from National Institute of Health Research and Development, Ministry of Health (NIHRD, MoH) network laboratory compiled in Jakarta (covid19. go.id, 28/04).

Furthermore, the data are validated and verified by the NIHRD to be sent to the Public Health Emergency Operating Center (PHOEC) of the MoH to be validated and re-verified (covid19. go.id, 28/04). PHOEC also receives data from the Health Office regarding epidemiological tracking of each region concerned. Furthermore, PHOEC forwards the data to the MoH's Pusdatin, which is then verified and re-validated. The data that are owned by Pusdatin, which are stored in the data warehouse system, are also integrated with the COVID-19 Task Force system.



In the era of evidence-based policy-making, accurate data should be the basis for policy-making by the Central Government and Pemda. Accurate data is the key so that policy execution can be made precisely as close to public needs as possible.

According to Ima Mayasari, a Lecturer at the Faculty of Administrative Sciences at the University of Indonesia (FIA UI), evidence-based regional policies allow the Government to select, fund and implement public programs more strategically, supported by a more comprehensive road map (kumparan.com, 12/11/2018). In other words, data accuracy in policy-making can support the effectiveness of Government performance. However, the obligation of the Government is to always provide as accurate information as possible by cooperating with public participation.

Recommendations

As an effort to improve data accuracy, the COVID-19 Task Force implementation team needs to deepen case tracking. This requires a review of each local government, especially if there is data unsynchronization with a high difference. All data in the Center come from different health entities due to the existence of several health facilities, such as Community Health Centers (Puskesmas) and hospitals.

Observing the situation in Surabaya, case tracking needs to prioritize the existence of reliable population data. If the population data is entered incorrectly from the start, this will affect the quality of the report which can affect the inaccuracy of the data. The Directorate General of Population and Civil Registration, Ministry of Home Affairs (Kemendagri) needs to make efforts to improve the reliability of population data amid data collection on COVID-19 cases.

In addition, as an extension of the Government's arm, Puskesmas are expected to widen their capacity in tracing people who are suspected of having close contact with positive patients. This also needs to be accompanied by more accurate data recording in coordination with the head of the Rukun Tetangga (RT) and the head of the Rukun Warga (RW). Accurate patient data recording is also expected to be a priority for other health facilities such as hospitals so that multiple patient data problems and so on can be prevented.



The existence of accurate COVID-19 data, apart from being a basis for policy-making, is expected to provide more comprehensive information. As mentioned by the Citizens' Coalition, that the reporting of cases is not by WHO guidelines, so the existence of more comprehensive data and supported by better data classification is expected to be the basis for the development of various research related to COVID-19.

- Vunny Wijaya -

The accuracy of COVID-19 data needs to be a priority for the Central and Local Governments. It is intended that policymaking during the COVID-19 period be made to accurately approach the public's needs.



Examining the Direct Cash Assistance Policy for Formal Workers

At the end of last August, the Central Government officially disbursed a budget for direct cash assistance for formal workers. The provisions regarding the program are stated in the Minister of Manpower Regulation Number 14/2020 concerning Guidelines for Providing Government Assistance in the Form of Wage Subsidies for Workers / Laborers in Handling the Impact of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19). The regulation states that the criteria for receiving wage subsidies are Paid Workers or formal workers who work, both in private companies and State / Regional Owned Enterprises (S/ROE), and actively pay a premium of IDR 150,000 per month or less. In other words, workers who receive the stimulus earn less than IDR 5 million.

To date, the data from the Social Security Administration (SSA) for Employment (BPJS Ketenagakerjaan) show that there are at least 15.7 million formal workers who are the target beneficiaries. The cash stimulus is then implemented by means of a direct transfer mechanism to workers' accounts with a budget of around IDR 37.7 trillion. The realization is that the program is distributed for 4 (four) months, with each monthly amount reaching Rp. 600,000, which will be transferred every 2 (two) months until December 2020.

In its implementation, the policy echoed by the National Economic Recovery and Transformation Task Force tries to reach groups of formal workers who are still registered in the company. On the other hand, these workers experience changes in conditions that affect their income, both due to wage cuts and withholding wages due to being laid off. On the other hand, formal workers also face economic difficulties, which ultimately make them hold back consumption at both the individual and the household level. This then has an impact on the aggregate demand conditions.



The patterns of crisis turmoil that occurred in various economic structures eventually prompted the government to launch a subsidy program for formal workers in the form of cash transfers. Many countries have taken this policy to deal with the financial crisis affecting workers' conditions. In the next section of the paper, we will briefly describe the implementation of wage subsidies in various countries and its relation to programs in Indonesia.

Temporary Wage Subsidy Scheme for Formal Workers

The Wage Subsidy scheme, named "BLT untuk Pegawai", is actually not far from the concept of Temporary Wage Subsidy. This policy is not a new instrument to stem the impact of the economic crisis on the labor market in various countries. Many of these instruments were developed from a program that was launched earlier in Germany, which was known as *Kurzarbeit* or short-term worker assistance. In France, this subsidy scheme is known as *activité partielle* or partial unemployment. In the UK and the United States, the mechanism is known as *Furloughing* for workers. Meanwhile, Japan named their program the *Employment Adjustment Subsidy*.

Based on the experience of the global financial crisis occurred in 2007 to 2008, temporary wage subsidies could prevent mass layoffs, help companies to retain their skilled workers, and promote economic recovery. For example, during the global financial crisis at that time, a program launched in Argentina called REPRO or *Productive Recovery Program* was able to save hundreds of thousands of workers. Likewise in Germany, the short-time work program had helped around 580,000 workers.

Besides, this subsidy is projected to have a positive impact on the world of work, this program is actually directed at household economic conditions. In reality, this program is expected to reduce inequality caused by the economic crisis, encourage household consumption, and increase aggregate demand (International Labor Organization, 2020). This is confirmed in Read (2020), which states that supporting household incomes, especially low-income families, will prevent income uncertainty and increase consumption even when social restrictions are still in effect.

In times of the COVID-19 crisis like today, various countries are considering a Temporary Wage Subsidy scheme. In several developing countries, especially ASEAN countries, the implementations of similar programs varies in frequency, budget and duration. The following table shows examples of ASEAN countries implementing Temporary Wage Subsidy programs.



Table 1. ASEAN Countries Implementing Wage Subsidies No. Countries Program Start Duration Amount of Benefit

No.	Negara	Dimulai	Durasi	Besaran
1	Malaysia	April	6 months	It depends on the number of workers per company. For example: a company with more than 200 workers will receive a subsidy of RM \$ 600 per month (IDR 2.15 million). Less than 75 workers will earn RM \$ 1,200 per month (IDR 4.3 million).
2	Vietnam	April	3 months	\$ 77 per month (Rp1.14 million).
3	Indonesia	August	4 months	IDR 600 thousand per month.
4	Cambodia	April	One off- wage	It is awarded to workers in the garment and textile industry with a proportion of assistance from the government of \$ 40 (Rp.600 thousand) and industry of \$ 30 (IDR 450 thousand).
5	Phillipines	April	2 months	Only intended for workers in the MSME sector with a subsidy of around 5000-8000 peso per month (around IDR 1.5 million - IDR 2.5 million).
6	Thailand	April	3 months	For workers who are not registered with the Social Security System (SJS), they receive THB 5,000 per month (IDR 2.3 million). For those who have registered, the amount of subsidy per employee is around 50% of the total wage, a maximum of THB 15,000 per month (IDR 7 million) if the company holds wage retention.

Source: ILO (2020), compiled from various sources.

The application of the Wage Subsidy above is a possible alternative. The review from C. Eugene Steuerle from the Urban Institute (2020) explains that the Temporary Wage Subsidy policy has at



least three elements to consider. *First*, because of their temporary nature, the program will only pose a much smaller budget challenge in the long term. Second, the program seeks to keep workers in their economic structure in crisis situations. *Finally*, the benefits of the program will be distributed to clear targets, namely workers, so as to minimize inaccuracies in program disbursements.

In Indonesia, policies for formal workers such as wage subsidies were not widely echoed before. The social assistance stimulus package is more for groups with certain vulnerability characteristics, such as the Family Hope Program, the Basic Food Program, electricity discounts or the Village Fund Cash Direct Assistance. Unfortunately, the absence of a policy response to the characteristics of the formal labor market actually portrays the gaps.

For example, until July 31, 2020, the number of workers who had been laid off reached more than 3.5 million workers (Ministry of Manpower, 2020). Among them, 1.1 million formal workers were temporarily laid off and 380,000 thousand others had to be laid off. Here, even formal workers face an uneasy blow. Then, the Temporary Wage Subsidy program was presented by the Government of Indonesia, even though the aim of the program was more towards accelerating consumption of individuals and households of formal middle-low income workers during the COVID-19.

Even so, the implementation of this policy is still under supervision. To date, the Ministry of Manpower has recorded the number of beneficiaries who have received wage subsidies, as can be seen in the following table.

Table 2. Wage Subsidy Disbursement Period 1 (September-October)

No.	Batch of Disbursement	Number of Recipients per Batch
1.	Batch I	2.5 million recipients
2.	Batch 2	3 million recipients
3.	Batch 3	3.5 million recipients
	Total	9 million recipients

Source: Ministry of Manpower (2020).



Of the total number of beneficiaries that have been verified, there are around 6.7 million target beneficiaries who have not received assistance. In addition, records from BPJS Ketenagakerjaan, there were 1.77 million submitted participant data that did not meet the criteria set out in Ministry of Manpower Regulation 14/2020 above. This was revealed based on a note from the Ministry of Manpower (2020), which stated that the obstacles in the process of disbursing assistance were due to data problems. There are many issues around duplicate accounts, inactive account numbers, and accounts that do not match the National Identity Number. These data constraints ultimately complicate the verification process and affect the ongoing process of aid disbursement. In this case, there are some implementation notes in the next section to support the program running as expected.

Improving the Implementations

The existence of a Temporary Wage Subsidy policy implemented in Indonesia is at least able to provide a new picture of social assistance for formal workers. The implementations of this policy are expected to be able to complement other policy interventions aimed at restoring the socio-economic impacts of the pandemic. Currently, while ensuring the program disbursement, the process continues through the improvements to the administration system that is more accountable.

First, apart from aiming at increasing household consumption during times of crisis, it would be better in the future that this program should be clarified with the aim of keeping workers in their economic structure. When direct subsidies are provided to workers, companies should try to reduce the worst economic risks to workers to a minimum, such as laying off workers temporarily, cutting wages or even terminating employment.

Second, ensuring that the coverage of the program reaches the target beneficiaries as a whole. This is done by reducing barriers to determining program requirements and budget allocations, although priority is still given to the industrial sectors most affected by social restrictions. To ensure that many workers are the beneficiaries of this program, provide alternatives for companies and workers to be able to correct data or register for the program through BPJS Ketenagakerjaan formally. In the future, this will promote income protection and worker relations with companies.



Lastly, along with the implementations of the program, which will continue until December, further strategies need to be taken into account even though the program has ended. Wage subsidies are a relatively new program in Indonesia, so this policy requires significant attention, both in the forms of an evaluation of the program regarding the impact on workers and the program's influence as a complementary instrument of other interventions. With the above studies, it is hoped that in the future there will be many developments in social protection systems in times of crisis in the future.

Wage subsidies for formal workers in Indonesia are expected to complement other social safety net instruments to reverse the socio-economic impact on workers.

-Nopitri Wahyuni-



The Portrait of Sexual and Reproductive Health Services during a Pandemic

The dramatic changes that have occurred throughout the pandemic have also touched on the aspects of sexual and reproductive health services. Currently, the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic has placed women and children in crisis situation. When large-scale social restriction and lockdown policies are implemented to ward off the spread of the virus, the reports on the numbers of gender-based violence at home cases, child marriages, female genital mutilation cases and unwanted pregnancy cases are increasing.

This is a fundamental issue related to gender aspects and the performance of essential health services during times of crisis. The high occupancy rates of health facilities, travel restrictions and prerequisite for medical examinations have delayed access to sexual and reproductive health services. Learning from cases of the spread of the outbreak in the past, the level of gender inequality with the coverage of health issues includes sexual and reproductive rights and services as an important highlight, especially how women deal with difficult conditions in a health crisis situation.

In the Ebola epidemic that occurred in West Africa in 2014-2015, women and girls had difficulties in accessing health services. Studies show that the impact of the pandemic will not only affect the health of mothers and children throughout the crisis but also in the long term. This was revealed in a study published in The Lancet Global Health (2017), which showed that the health conditions of mothers and children decreased dramatically during the Ebola epidemic. The epidemic had resulted in various delays in services for women with pregnancy complications, adversely affecting the risks of spontaneous abortion and bleeding.



Financial and structural barriers regarding services are also very influential (Chattu & Yaya, 2020). Socio-economic imbalances in health services still occur and make it more difficult for groups of households with socio-economic vulnerabilities to add to the rural geographic context. In the end, the recovery of maternal and child health services is not entirely optimal, especially when it is carried out without a clear intervention.

Apart from Ebola, records from the Zika epidemic in Latin America in 2015-2016 also leave important reflections regarding similar conditions. There are significant differences related to gender relations in these areas; namely, women do not fully have control over sexual and reproductive conditions, access to adequate health services, and sufficient financial resources to go to health facilities to check the conditions of their pregnancy.

Furthermore, notes from Human Rights Watch (2017), the Zika epidemic also presents a blurry portrait of the provision of basic information on reproductive health and barriers to accessing contraceptive methods. Areas that are at risk of contracting Zika will tend to have difficulty accessing working contraceptives and essential health services (Davies & Bennett, 2016). Ultimately, many women and girls have had to face difficulties in avoiding unwanted pregnancies, even several years after the epidemic ended (Napravnik & Soltani, 2020).

On the other hand, good practice occurred in the H1N1 outbreak or Swine Flu that broke out in various countries in 2009-2010. Early identification of the susceptibility of pregnant women to the risks of viral transmission, such as the high number of pregnant women entering the hospital, the need for medical equipment, and the high mortality rate, ultimately help provide a priority pathway for pregnant women to get vaccines faster (Gupta, 2020).

Seeing the various lessons learned about the various health crises above, it is also important to look back on how the COVID-19 pandemic also requires a similar attention. In the Indonesian context, the data from the Indonesian Association of Obstetrics and Gynecology (POGI), as many as 13.7 percent of pregnant women are more easily infected with COVID-19 than those who are not undergoing pregnancy. The data provide the basis for further research and criticism of the provision of sexual and reproductive health services during times of crisis.



Some Issues to Note

The context of this paper discusses gender inequality and sexual and reproductive health services during a pandemic. Before describing some of the issues, we all need to look at the projections from the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), which state that there will be approximately seven cases of unwanted pregnancy in various developing countries when lockdowns are implemented for the past six months. This occurs because approximately 47 million women in 114 low and middle income countries cannot use modern contraceptives (UNFPA, 2020).

In Indonesia, the projection of unwanted pregnancy cannot be ignored either. According to the data from the National Population and Family Planning Agency (BKKBN) in 2020, there has been a decrease in the number of contraceptive users by about 40 percent during the COVID-19 pandemic. The closure of various health services, ranging from Integrated Family Planning-Health Service Posts, Community Health Centers to hospitals, has been one of the triggers for delayed services.

With an estimated number of up to 2.5 million couples of child-bearing age who do not use contraceptives with the lowest pregnancy percentage of around 15-20 percent, there will be at least an increase in the pregnancy rate of 370,000 to 500,000 new pregnancies (BKKBN, 2020). The problem is that the possibility of an unplanned pregnancy will add to the socio-economic burden during the pandemic and the transition to the aftermath.

In addition, the consequences of an unwanted pregnancy will actually have a very bad impact on the health conditions of the mother and child. Even if contraceptives are available, the high number of unwanted pregnancies will lead to a high risk of abortion, bleeding or miscarriage. According to records from UNFPA (2020), this case will increase the risks of maternal death in which in the end many children will be born and grow up without mothers.

Still related to the above issues, the pandemic also reveals other realities related to child marriage. Notes from UNFPA, it is estimated that there are 13 million children who will get married, depending on how long the lockdown is applied. In Indonesia, there are at least 34,000 applications for marriage dispensation that have entered the religious courts as of June 2020. In fact, 97 percent of the dispensation applications have been granted. In other words, marriages are permitted to be conducted (Ministry of Women's Empowerment and Child Protection, 2020).



It cannot be denied that economic factors are an important factor in the high rate of child marriage. Moreover, in the context of a pandemic, the economic crisis has caused poverty levels to taper in various low-income countries, where the rate of child marriage is still very high. The low socio-economic situation, in the end, will make families formed from child marriages a vulnerable community group as well.

Research also shows that child marriages and teenage pregnancy are closely related. About 90 percent of births from teenage pregnancies in developing countries occur to girls who have married or have had sex. In most cases, as noted by Girls Not Brides, child marriages are the cause of pregnancy at an early age, which in many cases are also followed by unwanted pregnancy. The problem is that the pregnancy conditions increases the risks of pregnancy complications and infant mortality, which very often occur in the context of child marriage (The Global Partnership to End Child Marriage, 2020). This of course must get mutual attention, especially from the government and related service institutions.

What Can Be Done?

To respond to the above problems, there are several things that need to be considered. The various contexts of the problems mentioned above are actually inseparable from how access to sexual and reproductive health services can still be provided in the midst of a crisis. Primarily, the government must recognize that sexual and reproductive health services are one of the most important health service needs. That way, various barriers to access must be trimmed so that services can still reach the target target.

What can be done first is to ensure that access to various information about these services is available, both digitally and non-digitally, spread across various basic health facilities. In addition, the optimization of online-based services, such as telemedicine in the aspects of sexual and reproductive health, must also be done to assist service accesses in dealing with existing health services. At the same time, the function of community-based health-care services is also urgently needed to make this information available to families who are not covered by technology or access to available services.

Then, the interventions carried out must also cut down existing financial barriers to accessing services. In Indonesia, there needs to be an application of telemedicine in collaboration with the Health



Social Security Administration. Thus, the public can access consultations related to sexual and reproductive health quickly and easily without high frequency of visits to health facilities. It is hoped that this approach can be applied comprehensively in health centers in Indonesia to reduce barriers to access to basic services during the pandemic and to reduce gender disparities in health services in the future.

-Nopitri Wahyuni -

Breaking down structural and financial access barriers is a major challenge that must be addressed in the provision of sexual and reproductive health services during a pandemic.





The Indonesian Institute (TII))is a Center for Public Policy Research that was established on 21 October 2004 by a group of young, dynamic activists and intellectuals. TII is an independent, non-partisan, non-profit institution, whose main funding stems from grants and contributions from foundations, companies, and individuals.

TII has the aim of becoming a main research center in Indonesia for public policy matters and has committed to giving contribution to the debates over public policies and to improving the quality of the planning and results of public policy by promoting good governance principles and public participation in the policy processes in Indonesia.

TII's visions are public policies in Indonesia which highly uphold human rights and rule of law, as well as involve participation of various stakeholders and practice democratic good governance principles.

TII's missions are to conduct reliable research that is independent and non-partisan and to channel the research to the policy-makers, the private sector, and academia in order to improve the quality of Indonesian policy-makers.

TII also assumes the role of disseminating ideas to the society so that they are well informed about the policies that will have a good impact on the people's lives. In other words, TII has a position to support the democratization process and the public policy reform, as it will be involved in the process.

The scope of the research and review on public policies undertaken by **TII** includes economic, social, political, and legal affairs. The main activities which have been conducted by **TII** in order to achieve our vision and mission, are: research, surveys, facilitation and advocacy through training and working groups, public discussions, public education, weekly editorial articles ("Wacana" or Discourses), monthly analysis ("Update Indonesia" in Indonesian and "**The Indonesian Update**" in English), mid-year policy analysis ("Policy



Assessment"), annual policy analysis ("Indonesian Report"), and monthly discussion forum on policy issues ("The Indonesian Forum").

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RESEARCH ON ECONOMIC AFFAIRS

The economy tends to be used as an indicator of the success of the government as a policy-maker. Economy plays an important role as one of the fundamentals of national development. Limited resources have often caused the government to face obstacles in implementing economic policies that will optimally benefit the people. The increase in the quality of the people's critical thinking has forced the government to conduct comprehensive studies in every decision-making process. In fact, the studies will not be stopped when the policy is already in place. Studies will be continued until the policy evaluation process.

TII focus on economic issues, such as monetary policy and fiscal policy, as well as issues on sustainable development by using analysis which refer to economic freedom principles. Monetary issues will focus on the Indonesian Central Bank to maintain economic stability, both regarding inflation and exchange rate. Meanwhile, fiscal policy will focus on the discussions over the National Budget and infrastructure development both in the regions and in the cities. In relation to sustainable development, TII research is focusing on productivity, competitiveness, infrastructure development, and development gap. In addition, TII also upholds economic freedom principles in highlighting the importance of individual freedom and involvement of private sectors in increasing development and improving welfare in Indonesia.

The TII Economic Research Division is present for those who are interested in the conditions of the economy. The results of the research are intended to assist policy-makers, regulators, and donor agencies in making decisions. The research that TII offers: (1) Economic Policy Analysis; (2) Regional and Sectoral Prospects; and (3) Program Evaluation.



RESEARCH ON LEGAL AFFAIRS

According to stipulations in Law No. 12 Year 2011 on the Formulation of Laws and Regulations, every bill which will be discussed by the legislative and the executive must be complemented with academic paper. This stipulation is also confirmed in Law No. 15 Year 2019 on the Amendment of Law No. 12 Year 2011 regarding the Formulation of Laws and Regulations.

Therefore, comprehensive research is very important and needed in making a qualified academic paper. With qualified academic papers, the bills will have strong academic foundation both from academic and content aspects. Furthermore, academic paper also functions as an early tracking over possibilities of overlapping laws and regulations, so that revocation of local regulations or other related issues which can be caused by legal, economic, or political aspects in the future, can be minimized as soon as possible.

TII offers normative and legal research related to harmonization and synchronization of laws and regulations, especially in making academic papers, legal opinion on harmonization and synchronization of laws and regulations, and legislative drafting for the formulation of local regulations bill drafts or other laws and regulations. In addition, TII also offers openly research on other legal issues related to Constitutional Law and Public Administration, Human Rights, and Political Corruption.

RESEARCH ON THE POLITICAL AFFAIRS

The enactment of Law No. 23 Year 2014 on the latest regulation on the Local Government, has created different relations between the Central Government and the Local Government. Entering the era of Bureaucracy Reform, specification of division of affairs of the Central Government and the Local Government has increasingly demanded the implementation of good governance principles. The government is demanded to be adaptive and responsive towards public aspiration and services. Therefore, public policy research become more important for both the Central Government and the Local Government to analyse context and current issues in the regions. The government must also consider various actors whether political actors or bureaucrats, as well as public's aspiration and other non-state actor in policy processes.

Research Programs, Survey and Evaluation



In order to respond those needs, **TII** research in political affairs offer policy assessment on various policies which were already applied or will be implemented. **TII** will look at socio-cultural, economy, legal, and political aspects in assessing public policies. Our research will be useful to assist government in formulating policies which are in line with context, priorities, and people's aspiration. **TII** also offers various breakthrough of transformative policies according to existing contexts in particular and Open Government principles' implementation in general, in order to increase public participation in policy processes, particularly in the era of the openness of public information.

Political Research Division of TII provide analysis and policy recommendations in order to generate strategic policy in the strengthening of democracy and the establishment of good governance both at the national and local levels. Political research forms are offered by TII (1) Public Policy Analysis, (2) Media Monitoring, (3) Mapping & Positioning Research, (4) Need Assessment Research, (5) Survey Indicator.

RESEARCH ON THE SOCIAL AFFAIRS

Social development needs policy foundations that come from independent and accurate research. Social analysis is a need for the government, the businesspeople, academia, professionals, NGOs, and civil society to improve social development. Social analysis is important to identify strategic issues which are developing and to make the right stakeholders' mapping to promote significant change in the context of development, public policy, and democracy in Indonesia.

The Social Research Division is present to offer strong and valid recommendations to produce strategic, relevant, efficient and effective, and impactful policies, in addressing to existing various issues. For example, issues related to education, health, population, environment, women, children, and elderly. Social research that TII offers: (1) Social Policy Analysis; (2) Explorative Research; (3) Mapping & Positioning Research; (4) Need Assessment Research; (5) Program Evaluation Research; and (5) Indicator Survey.



PRE-ELECTION AND REGIONAL HEAD ELECTION

One of the activities carried out and offered by **TII** is a pre-election survey as well as a pre-election and regional head election. The reasons underlying the implementation of pre-election and regional head election surveys, namely: (1) A good election is a democratic process that can be arranged, calculated, and predicted in the resulting process; (2) Survey is one of the important and common discussions to measure, calculate, and predict how the process and results of the General Election and the Regional Head Election will take place, in accordance to the expectations of the candidates; (3) It is very important to win in the General Election and the Regional Head Election based on empirical, scientific, measurable and supportable data.

As one of the important aspects of a strategic candidate's election, the survey is useful for monitoring political power. In this case, the success team needs to conduct a survey for: (1) mapping the candidate's position in public perception; (2) mapping voters' desires; (3) publishing the most effective political machinery used as voters; and (4) Looking for the most effective medium for the campaign.

EVALUATION OF A PROJECT OR A PROGRAM

One of the activities that have been performed and experienced offered by TII is a qualitative evaluation of the projects and programs of non-governmental organizations and government. Evaluation activities are offered TII stages of mid-term evaluation of the project/program (mid-term evaluation) and also the final evaluation at the end of the project/program (final evaluation).

As we know, the evaluation is an important step in the implementation of a project or program. Mid-Term Evaluation of the project or program is intended to look at and analyze the challenges, the overall learning takes place during the project or program, and make recommendations for the continuity of the project or program. Meanwhile, the final evaluation allows us to view and analyze the outcomes and the lessons learned to ensure the achievement of all the objectives of the project or program at the end of the project or program.



THE INDONESIAN FORUM

The Indonesian Forum is a monthly discussion activity on actual issues in the political, economic, social, legal, cultural, defense, and environmental fields. TII organizes these forums as media for competent resource persons, stakeholders, policymakers, civil society activists, academicians, and the media to meet and have discussion.

Themes that have been raised were the ones that have caught public attention, such as migrant workers, social conflicts, domestic politics, and local direct elections. The main consideration in picking a theme is sociological and political reality and the context of the relevant public policy at the time that the Indonesian Forum is delivered.

It is expected that the public can get the big picture of a particular event as the Indonesian Forum also presents relevant resource persons.

Since its inception, the Indonesian Institute is very aware of the passion of the public to get discussions that are not only rich in substance but also well formatted, which support balanced ideas exchanges ideas and the equal involvement of the different elements of the society.

The discussions, which are designed to only invite a limited number of participants, do not only feature idea exchanges but also regularly offer policy briefs (policy recommendations) to relevant policymakers and also summaries to the participants, especially the media people and the resource persons at the end of each discussion. Therefore, the discussions will not end without solutions.

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LOCAL COUNCIL TRAINING

The roles and functions of local councils in monitoring local governments are very important. They need to ensure that participative and democratic policies will be espoused. Members of provincial and regent local councils are required to have strong capacity to understand democratization matters, regional autonomy, legislative techniques, budgeting, local Politics, and political marketing. Thus, it is important to empower members of local councils.

In order for local councils to be able to response every problem that will come out as a result of any policy implemented by the central government or local governments, the Indonesian Institute invites the leaderships and members of local councils to undergo training to improve their capacity.

WORKING GROUP

The Indonesian Institute believes that a good public policy process can be held with some engagement and empowerment of the stakeholders. The Indonesian Institute takes a role as one of mediator agencies to facilitate some forums in which the Government, Council Members, Private Sectors, NGOs and Academicians can meet in interactive forums. The Indonesian Institute provides facilitation on working groups and public advocacy.

The Indonesian Institute takes the role of mediator and facilitator in order to encourage the synergy of public policy work between the stakeholders and policy makers and also to have a synergy with funding agencies (donors).



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Administration Officer

Maya Indrianti

Finance Officer: Rahmanita

IT Staff: Usman Effendy

Desain dan Layout

Siong Cen

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