

The Indonesian Update

Monthly Review on Economic, Legal, Security, Political, and Social Affairs



Main Report: The Analysis of Government Spending Policies in the Covid-19 Pandemic Period

Law

- Looking at the face of our law enforcement through the Tjandra and Masiku case ■
- Quo Vadis Post Revision of KPK? ■

Politics

- Factual Verification and the Hasty 2020 Regional Election ■
- Coklit and the Readiness of Voters Data ■
- Strategic Actor Leadership Serves the Public in the COVID-19 Period ■
- The Polemics over the Pancasila Ideology Bill ■

Social

- How to Strengthen Social Protection in the Era of New Normal? ■
- Postponement of the Discussion on the Anti-Sexual Violence Bill and Disregard of Gender Based Violence Data ■
- Improving Health Services in the COVID-19 Period ■

CONTENTS

FOREWORD	1
MAIN REPORT	
The Analysis of Government Spending Policies in the Covid-19 Pandemic Period	2
LAW	
Looking at the face of our law enforcement through the Tjandra and Masiku case.....	8
Quo Vadis Post Revision of KPK?	11
POLITICS	
Factual Verification and the Hasty 2020 Regional Election.....	14
Coklit and the Readiness of Voters Data.....	18
Strategic Actor Leadership Serves the Public in the COVID-19 Period	22
The Polemics over the Pancasila Ideology Bill.....	26
SOCIAL	
Improving Health Services in the COVID-19 Period	32
Postponement of the Discussion on the Anti-Sexual Violence Bill and Disregard of Gender Based Violence Data	37
Improving Health Services in the COVID-19 Period.....	43

INSTITUTIONAL PROFILE	48
RESEARCH PROGRAMS, SURVEY AND EVALUATION	50
PUBLIC DISCUSSION	54
TRAINING & WORKING GROUP FACILITATION ...	55

Contributors :

Arfianto Purbolaksono (Coordinator), Muhammad Aulia Y.Guzasiah,
Muhamad Rifki Fadilah, Nopitri Wahyuni, Rifqi Rachman, Vunny Wijaya.
Editor: Awan Wibowo Laksono Poesoro

FOREWORD

The July 2020 edition of the Indonesian Update raises a major report on government spending policies during the 2019 coronavirus disease pandemic (COVID-19). This topic has been chosen to respond to President Joko Widodo's anger, which was sparked by the low realization of government spending to overcome the impacts of the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19).

In the field of Law, the Indonesian Update discusses the face of law enforcement in Indonesia through the Djoko Tjandra and Harun Masiku cases. Both cases show how weak the legal system that has been built in Indonesia. In addition, we discuss the performance of the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) after the revision of the law and the inauguration of the leadership of the new Commissioners.

In the political field, the Indonesian Update discusses the factual verification of prospective pairs of candidates for the 2020 Regional Head Elections (Pilkada 2020). In addition to the factual verification stage, we also discuss the voter matching and research activities in the 2020 elections. Next, we discussed the leadership of strategic actors, consisting of various Ministries / Institutions (K / L) and Regional Government (Pemda) leaders who are being tested in the middle of a COVID-19 pandemic. We also discuss the polemics over the deliberation of the Pancasila Ideology Bill (RUU-HIP) and the interests in the discussion process, both from the government's and the DPR's perspective.

In the social field, the Indonesian Update raises a topic about strengthening social protection in the era of adaptation to new habits. In addition, we discuss the postponement of the Bill on the Elimination of Sexual Violence (RUU P-KS) in the 2020 National Legislation Program (Proglenas). We also discuss the improvement of health services in the COVID-19 period that is needed to be conducted through adaptation and innovation.

The monthly publication of the Indonesian Update with actual themes is expected to help policy makers in government and business institutions - as well as academics, think tanks, and elements of civil society, both at home and abroad, to get actual information and contextual analysis of economic conditions, political, social and legal aspects in Indonesia, and an understanding of public policy in Indonesia.

Happy Reading.

The Analysis of Government Spending Policies in the Covid-19 Pandemic Period

Closing mid-2020, the public has been shocked by the incidents of anger shown by President Joko Widodo, or Jokowi, to his cabinet ministers. Long story short, President Jokowi's anger has been sparked by the low realization of government spending to overcome the impact of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19). Departing from this, this paper is presented to examine government spending policies during the COVID-19 pandemic, starting from the theoretical level, empirical evidence of the realization of government spending, to several policy recommendations that can be taken by relevant stakeholders.

In principle, Indonesia has implemented a series of policies to overcome the effects of COVID-19 through fiscal policy stimulus. These include medical personnel incentives and spending on health care, social safety net, industrial support (taxes and import duties), and budget financing support. In summary, the realization of government spending until May 31, 2020 reached Rp843.94 trillion (32.29 percent of the ceiling). This figure is somewhat lower when compared to that in the same period in 2019, which reached Rp855.92 trillion. Meanwhile, in terms of state revenue, recorded state revenues have only reached Rp664.32 trillion (37.73 percent of the target). This figure is also somewhat lower when compared to the same period in 2019, which reached Rp730.14 trillion rupiah.

The Keynesian Model of Government Spending


Lower-income and greater expenditures are reasonable conditions when the country is faced with a crisis. Moreover, we know that the crisis during the COVID-19 pandemic has made the economic cycle experience disruptions from both sides, the supply and demand sides.

As a result, the market cannot work perfectly. Therefore, there is an important role of the government to reverse the economic cycle.

The role of government to stimulate the economy refers to the Kaleckian Model view, which is also included in the Post-Keynesian School. This view believes that in the short term, government spending (through state expenditure) can provide what is known as a multiplier effect. More clearly, this logic of thought has the view that to encourage economic growth, the government must intervene through fiscal policy instruments, specifically through state spending (Blanchard, 2014).

Additional government spending will encourage the demand side aggregate, which will ultimately have a positive impact on output increase. Therefore, this view has the conclusion that the role of government through fiscal stimulus with an instrument of increasing government spending will drive the economy (Blanchard, 2014). In the context of a pandemic such as COVID-19 which also has an impact on economic aspects, the role of the government in a certain period becomes crucial to restoring economic conditions.

Figure 1. Kaleckian Graphic Model




Source: Olivier Blanchard, 2014.

Several studies also support this view. For example, a study conducted by Wray (1989), which obtained evidence that the expansion of the state budget was able to explain variations of 295 percent of economic growth. Then, studies from Ikhsan and Basri (1991), Adjie (1995), Adjie (1996), Kuncoro (2000), Saleh (2002), and Kuncoro (2012) also tend to support the Keynesian paradigm for the Indonesian case.

Departing from this view, it is important for us today to look together at how government spending boosts the economy. The government through the Ministry of Finance (Ministry of Finance) has issued several fiscal policy mixes to deal with the COVID-19 pandemic. Until now, the government has issued 3 fiscal stimulus policy packages. First, in February 2020, the government issued a fiscal stimulus package volume 1 with a total budget of Rp 8.5 trillion, which was used to strengthen the domestic economy through government spending. Furthermore, along with the widespread of COVID-19, the government issued a volume stimulus package volume 2 of Rp22.5 trillion to maintain people's purchasing power and facilitate export and import.

Figure 2. COVID-19 Handling Budget



Source: Yustinus Prastowo, 2020.

Finally, the government issued a fiscal stimulus package volume 3 with a total budget of Rp405.1 trillion to provide support to the health sector, providing cash assistance to the poor, and support to affected companies. Over time, the budget in the stimulus package volume 3 has increased to Rp.695.2 trillion, with an additional budget in the health sector amounting to Rp85.77 trillion, and the National Economic Recovery (PEN) program of Rp607.65 trillion. It can be seen that in general, this set of policies seems to be quite in line to maintain the economic leverage (see Figure 2).

The Realization of Government Spending

According to the Ministry of Finance's media briefing dated July 8, 2020, the health sector's spending has only reached Rp4.48 trillion,

or only about 5.12 percent of the total budget of Rp85.77 trillion. This is due to the gap between financial and physical realization. From the note of the Ministry of Finance, incentives for health workers are still experiencing difficulties at a rigid administrative and verification level, so the process of channeling incentives is still constrained and cannot be channeled. Then, the patient care claim costs also still experience verification rates that tend to be slow in terms of billing. As a result, the health budget realization process was low. This situation seems to have dragged on from the previous months, and until now there has been no positive development to accelerate the budget realization process.

Furthermore, in the field of social protection, according to the Ministry of Finance's notes, only 36.19 percent of the fiscal stimulus for handling COVID-19 has been realized. This budget absorption is still low, especially for the Pre-Work Card, Direct Cash Assistance (BLT), and Village Fund programs. This is caused by problems in the field, such as error targets and overlapping data. Then, the Local Governments (Pemda) have also experienced something similar to the two previous fields. The uptake of fiscal stimulus in the sectoral and regional government sectors only reached 5.18 percent. The problems faced in the realization of sectoral and regional government budgets are caused by the stumbling of the regulatory settlement process on the part of the regional government, such as there are still many Regional Revenues and Expenditures (APBD) which still need to be revised.

Quoted from the daily *Kontan.co.id* (2020), although most local governments have reallocated and refocused the APBD in handling COVID-19, there are still a small number of regions that have not reallocated and refocused the APBD. One reason is the small budget. In addition to the small budget problem, contract issues have also become constraints to reallocation. Some regions have contracted several programs at the beginning of time. As a result, these conditions make it difficult for the local governments to reallocate.

Furthermore, for the progress of realization in the field of Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs), we will refer to the latest data released on June 24, 2020. The data show that the realization in the MSME sector has only reached 22.74 percent. This realization figure is supported by the placement of funds in the State-Owned Bank (Himbara) bank amounting to Rp30 trillion. Also, the distribution of People's Business Credit (KUR) interest subsidies has begun, although the development is still in the stage of

billing submission. Finally, incentives in the business sector has only reached 10.14 percent. This is still not optimal given that there are still many taxpayers who are eligible to take advantage of incentives but have not submitted applications.

It can be concluded that the realization of government spending is still not optimal. This can be seen from the overall realization of government spending is still below 50 percent of the target. Therefore, the government still has a big opportunity to boost the economy through the realization of government spending. In summary, the impact of the expansion of government spending on the economy is strongly influenced by various factors.

Among them: *first*, to what extent a proportion of government spending is absorbed back into the state treasury to repay debt obligations and loan interest. *Second*, to what extent is the proportion of government expenditure intended to finance routine expenditure and development expenditure. The financing of government spending will ultimately have a very strong influence in determining the direction of government policy in the field of taxation and foreign debt in the future.

One important thing that should be noted is that although the budgeting process in the Ministry of Finance is already quite large, if the realization process is still hampered, then the process of creating a multiplier effect from government spending will also be hampered. As a result, the economy will stagnate despite being supported by expansive government spending. Therefore, interagency coordination is needed to jointly make a positive impact from fiscal expansion into the economy.

Policy Recommendations

To answer the challenges above, there are several recommendations that the government can make, including:

1. Ministry of Finance must improve communication patterns and information delivery to the public by providing information on the progress of budget realization on a regular and continuous basis. This is intended to avoid asymmetric information between policymakers and other parties who need information.
2. Related to the validation and administration process, the Ministry of Health (Kemenkes) together with the regional Health Office (DHO) must act quickly to cut the validation and administration process which is still complicated at the lower levels. The utilization of communication technology can be used to accelerate the validation and administration of medical staff data.

3. The Ministry of Social Affairs (Ministry of Social Affairs) can work together with the Central Statistics Agency (BPS) to immediately update the social assistance data so that there is no overlapping data. Then, the Ministry of Social Affairs must also continue to act consistently with the scheduled disbursement of social assistance spending that has been scheduled. That way, there will be no delay in the process of distribution of social assistance to the public and the budget realization process can run well.
4. The Ministry of Finance together with the Ministry of Cooperatives and Small and Medium Enterprises (KemenkopUKM) must expand the social safety net that supports MSMEs. Expansion is also needed for financing that is placed outside state-owned banks, bearing in mind that many are also outside state-owned banks where MSMEs carry out working capital loans. The role of private and fintech banks should also be relied upon as an alternative to MSME financing.
5. The Ministry of Finance can also work closely with the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) and the Financial Supervisory Agency (BPK) to continue overseeing the budget realization process so that an accountable and transparent process occurs, as well as preventing budget misuse.

The role of government to stimulate the economy can be referred to the Kaleckian Model view, which is still included in the Post-Keynesian School. This view argues that in the short term, government spending (through state expenditures) can provide what is known as a multiplier effect.

- M. Rifki Fadilah -

Looking at the face of our law enforcement through the Tjandra and Masiku case

After being completely cheated by Harun Masiku, the suspect was a case of bribery of intermittent turnover of members of the House of Representatives (DPR) who were free to enter and exit Indonesia with fugitive status. The Republic seems to be being humiliated again, with the news of the entry of Djoko Tjandra, a convicted transferring the Bank Bali cessie who is also a fugitive since 2009 to Indonesia, without being detected by immigration officials at all.

Interestingly, he was even known to be able to access public service facilities, such as processing electronic citizen identification cards in the kelurahan with a lightning process, to go to the district court to conduct a review of his case on June 8, 2020 (*Kompas.id*, 8/07). So, who should be responsible for these negligence? The sequence of events certainly shows how dilapidated and random the legal system has been built. For this reason, the face, authority and honor of the country's legal institutions or officials should feel tarnished and stripped away.

Spaced Coordination

Unfortunately, the reaction is as if it seems unremarkable. Instead of immediately acting and taking tactical steps, the relevant officials are even more preoccupied with actions tossing information, rebuttal and responsibility.

For the Masiku case alone, for example, after his arrest from the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) arrest operation on January 6, 2020, the Minister of Law and Human Rights (Menkumham), Yassona Laoly, along with the Director General of Immigration Kemenkumham, Ronny Sompie, ensured that at least as of January 16, 2020, Masiku is still stated as not yet or not currently in Indonesia (*kompas.id*. 24/01).

But in fact, it was later spread and it was discovered that there were surveillance camera footage in Terminal 2F of Soekarno-Hatta Airport, which showed Masiku's return on January 7, or the day after he had fled abroad. This practically made the Directorate General of Immigration and then immediately revised and affirmed the fact of the existence, arguing to the extent that a technical, system or person error had occurred in his official press statement as of January 22, 2020 (*kompas.id*, 24/01).

Absurdly, responding to this miscoordination, the Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs (Menko Polhukam), Mahfud MD, even gave up his hand while stating that this was not the case of the Coordinating Ministry for Politics and Law (*Kompas.id*, 23/01). However, if viewed from its authority and main duties and functions, the stuttering and misinformation of the Ministry of Law and Human Rights about Masiku, it is certainly a matter of coordination which is under the Coordinating Ministry for Law and Security.

The same thing is also seen in the Tjandra case. Earlier, Attorney General Sanitiar Burhanuddin said that Tjandra had returned to the country at least three months ago (*kompas.id*, 2/07). However, that statement was immediately denied by Laoly. Instead of learning from the Masiku case, they are even more aggressive in giving permissive reasons.

Like the immigration system did not find data about the entry of fugitive cases of transfer of debt collection rights, because it was suspected to enter through the rat route or unofficial. Even if they enter through official channels, according to him, immigration will find it difficult to block or obstruct it, because his own name has not been included in Interpol's red notice or person search list (DPO) since 2014 (*assuming.co*, 3/07). No one knows exactly where the root of this problem began. Likewise, no one dared to go forward and put on a body to be responsible for this problem.

However, if traced, on May 5, 2020, there was a notification from Interpol's National Central Bureaus (NCB) Secretary that the red notice on behalf of Joko Soegiarto Tjandra had been deleted from the database system since 2014, because there was no further request from the Attorney General's Office. For this reason, the Directorate General of Immigration has followed up on this by removing his name from the crossing system on May 13, 2020. Absurdly, on June 27, 2020, the Attorney General's Office only once again

submitted a DPO request for Tjandra, so that his name was detected again with DPO status in the crossing system (*cnnindonesia.com*, 7/9).

Recommendation

These series of facts certainly look unusual. As if systematically planned. Even so, the portrait of the problem that can be captured in this case clearly shows the weak line of coordination between government institutions or more specifically towards law enforcement.

The fugitive's crossing should be through a process that involves the affairs of various institutions. For this reason, handling should not be as difficult as it is today, if there is a range of coordination that is more intense, harmonious, and transparent. For example, between immigration authorities and the prosecutor's office or the police, which of course not only has strong information related to people who are involved in legal issues, but also the competence to have the authority to detain them.

In addition, institutionally, the state also has intelligence agencies, such as the State Intelligence Agency (BIN) or the National Siber and Coding Agency (BSSN), so that all information should be available for immediate action. In this way, the pursuit or capture of fugitives who use cross-border mode should be dealt with together with an orchestral movement. Because, fugitives are not conventional criminal offenders, but rather have networks, resources, knowledge, skills, and access at national or other countries.

- Muhammad Aulia Y Guzasiah -

Efforts to catch up or catch fugitives who use cross-border mode, should be dealt with together with an orchestral movement. Because, fugitives are not conventional criminal offenders, but rather have networks, resources, knowledge, skills, and access at national or other countries.

Quo Vadis Post Revision of KPK?

After the revision of the law and the inauguration of the leadership of the new commissioners, the performance of the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) in the last six or seven months can be said to have almost no significance.

In fact, for some people feels so disappointing and does not meet expectations. Not a few of several institutions, such as Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW) or Transparency International Indonesia (TII), give a red report card to the KPK's performance. Likewise with the results of the Kompas daily R&D poll dated June 23, which showed the public's confidence in the KPK as if it was at its nadir.

Of the 687 respondents who participated in 33 provinces of Indonesia, only 44.6 percent were seen as still trusting and optimistic about the institutional image of the anti-rasuah commission. Meanwhile, those who expressed dissatisfaction with the KPK's performance in preventing and combating corruption, reached 56.9% percent. These figures can certainly be said to be the worst assessment points as far as the history of the KPK was established (*kom-pas.id*, 24/06).

So, where does all this come from? Shouldn't the revision of the regulation and regeneration of the leadership, should it be able to bring better logical consequences to the work of the KPK going forward? The following article is submitted to parse the anomaly.

Decadent Predictions

What undermines the KPK today is not something that happens without forecast. Since the beginning, when Law Number 30 Year 2002 concerning the Corruption Eradication Commission was revised with a substance of substance and a "miraculous" formation process at the end of 2019, it has been noted that many experts have at least voiced these decadent predictions.

Likewise, when a leader candidate from the beginning is highlighted and opposed because he has an inappropriate track record, he is elected and entrusted to hold the top office. In this case, the Government and the House of Representatives (DPR) which are authorized to propose and elect a Chairperson and four Deputy Chairmen of the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) according to Article 30 of the Corruption Eradication Commission Law, seemed to close their eyes and ears from the intense participation and loud public input at that time.

For this reason, it is not surprising that its productivity has declined so much and is reaping polemics. Instead of intensifying action, the KPK is now more preoccupied with various internal organizational problems. These included the forced return of investigators to the institution of origin, publication of termination of investigations, access to public information closed, internal position selection issues, and various other problems that were thick with political gimmicks (ICW, 2020).

For example, even though it has been vaguely heard, the public certainly can still remember how the former PDI-P legislative candidate Harun Masiku, who was a suspect in a bribery case against a commissioner of the General Election Commission (KPU), is still hanging and his whereabouts have yet to be found. Not to mention, related to the alleged violation of the KPK chairperson's ethics, which recently re-invited controversy because he was caught using luxury helicopter facilities. Likewise, the role and performance of the latest KPK structure, namely the Supervisory Board, has not yet demonstrated the significance of progression.

The same symptoms are also not excluded in terms of prevention. This can be seen from the lack of state institutions that comply with various preventive recommendations that have been submitted by the KPK. Call it a recommendation related to the increase in the contribution of the Social Security Organizing Agency (BPJS), the collection of social safety nets in handling COVID-19, and the Workers Card program that has not been fully implemented. Likewise with a variety of coordination programs and prevention supervision at the regional level that has not been optimal (*Transparency International Indonesia 2020*).

Forward Improvements

Please note, the value of the Indonesian Corruption Perception Index (IPK) can be said to be gradually improving. Although it is still perched at number 40 from a maximum score of 100. However, this achievement is at least slightly improved from the previous year, namely the score 38 with a ranking of 89th out of a total of 180. (TI, 2019).

The emergence of public perception that tends to worsen the image of the KPK over the past few months, will certainly have an impact on Indonesia's next CPI score this year. For this reason, so that this condition does not deteriorate and is increasingly experiencing segregation, the KPK certainly needs to improve immediately. The success of state commissions such as the anti-commission commission can at least be said to be highly dependent on 4M collaboration, namely man, momentum, media, and money (Phiffner and Presthus, 1960).

The KPK problem itself certainly does not lead to the budget side. However, it is on the issue of "man" or its leaders, the momentum that is allowed to disappear, and the lack of media support. Even so, this improvement certainly can not be done and borne by the KPK alone. It needs to be accompanied by political support and commitment that really takes sides in the corruption eradication agenda of the Government or in this case the President, and of course the parliament.

The KPK problem itself certainly does not lead to the budget side. However, it is on the issue of "man" or its leaders, the momentum that is allowed to disappear, and the lack of media support. Even so, this improvement certainly can not be done and borne by the KPK alone. There needs to be political support and commitment that really takes sides on the corruption eradication agenda of the Government or in this case the President, and of course the Parliament.

- Muhammad Aulia Y Guzasiah -

Factual Verification and the Hasty 2020 Regional Election

In accordance with the Regulation of the General Election Commission Number 5/2020 (PKPU 5/2020), the factual verification stage for independent prospective pairs of candidates for the 2020 Regional Election (Pilkada 2020) started since June 29. From that date, the stage lasted for 14 days until July 12, 2020.

The factual verification that was carried out by the Voting Committees (PPS) at the village and *kelurahan* level was interesting, because there were several adjustments formulated by the General Election Commission (KPU) relating to the outbreak of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) that are still ongoing.

Unfortunately, the adjustments that were presented in the factual verification stage do not seem similar for other stages. The need for fast-paced then make the implementations of the Pilkada 2020 is facing a risky ditch, because it is in race with the time that has been determined previously.

Direct Interactions: Not a Burden

Regulation from KPU Number 6 of 2020 concerning Implementation of Continued Simultaneous Election in Non-Natural Disasters Conditions COVID-19 (PKPU 6/2020) serves as a guide for PPS in carrying out factual verification from supporters of individual candidate pairs. In this stage, the factual verification process, which is generally carried out by meeting the supporters directly, is adjusted. When PPS officers are experiencing obstacles to carry out a direct verification process, PKPU 6/2020 provides an alternative online process.

This online verification process can be carried out, when PPS officers are faced with a number of situations, such as supporters who are not willing to be visited directly. In addition, the conditions of supporters who infected by COVID-19, as well as supporters who were carrying out isolation independently or in hospitals also be-

came situations that allowed the online verification process to be carried out by PPS officers.

All that can be done because the main purpose of the factual verification process does not shift. Voting Committees can still have a face-to-face online interaction, verified the photo on the electronic Resident Identity Card or Certificate with supporter faces, and having a conversation just like an offline factual verification process. The fulfillment of the verification process is imposed through online and real-time video calls.

The verification process does not stop at the video call. Voting Committees could also collect a non-supporting statement from supporters online. The individual may fill in annex BA.5-KWK Perseorangan, which is affixed with a statement of unwillingness to provide support.

Generally, annex BA.5-KWK is brought by PPS, and supporters can fill out the document directly during the factual verification process. However, if supporters do not wish to be visited directly, then filling out the attachment can be done online through two stages.

The first stage, the supporters concerned can download the attachment BA.5-KWK Perseorangan on the website of Provincial or Regency/Municipal KPU. After filling it with statements, the attachment can be sent online by supporters via electronic mail or online media.

Reflecting on the factual verification stage in the Pilkada 2020, it can be said that the KPU has made the necessary adjustments. This is certainly worthy of an appreciation, given the complexity of the demands for the KPU in carrying out the elections during this health crisis.

This is because two elements; namely, the fulfillment of the prerequisite regarding the Pilkada's stages and compliance with health protocols, become an unavoidable obligation. The lagging of one element will trigger a major health threat for voters, organizers, and participants, or can also make the quality of the election degraded.

Therefore, optimizing the use of information technology is a wise way taken by KPU in meeting those two needs. This is because the implementation of Pilkada's stages online minimizes the physical meetings of many parties. However, this also covers the needs of the KPU toward stages of the Pilkada 2020.

It will be much better if this method of fulfillment is also applied in other stages. Of course not at all stages, but only at realistic stages that could be shifted from manual to online. Regrettably, the opportunity to implement this has already passed, because the provisions regarding the regional elections in the period of a health crisis have been made.

Reflection from Tight Duration

Initially, at the time of writing, the PKPU draft on the Regional Head Election in Non-Natural Disaster Conditions COVID-19 was not enacted. These condition then made the KPU Circular Letter Number 20 of 2020 (SE KPU 20/2020) become a reference for election organizers at the Provincial and Regency/Municipal levels in carrying out a number of stages of the Pilkada 2020.

In that situation, the opportunity for those concerned about the election to continue voice out some of the necessary adjustments is actually still available. Such adjustments, for example, are linked to the principle of flexibility of implementation, as illustrated by the factual verification process. Although it must be admitted, the opportunity left at that time was very small. Considering the process of making PKPU 6/2020 only needs to be harmonized, before it is stipulated and promulgated.

When PKPU 6/2020 was promulgated on July 7, the possibility for a number of parties to provide advice finally turned into an opportunity to watching over each stage. Primarily with something that related to the implementation of health protocols, so that expectations on the flexibility of the provisions of the Pilkada 2020 must be replaced by expectations on the disciplined technical rules execution and in line with health protocols.

In fact, the illustration above is enough to generate a concern about how short and limited the time available to prepare and organize the Pilkada 2020. Not only for central organizers, but also Provincial and Regency/Municipal KPUs.

The emergence of SE KPU 20/2020 is a clear example of this pressing condition. In order to be in accordance with the implementation time stipulated in PKPU 5/2020, the factual verification stage finally proceeded without umbrella by PKPU Pilkada during the pandemic. Even though, the procedure referred by PPS in conducting factual verification is in the PKPU 6/2020.

This is not ideal to be carried out because the factual verification stage was carried out without the support of the available legal basis. However, this is experienced by the KPU in carrying out the factual verification stage before July 7, 2020. The General Election Commission finally can only give an appeal to the PPS to carry out the factual verification process through SE KPU 20/2020. The real thing can be avoided if the time available is not tight as it is now.

The story would be different when the duration of the postponement of the elections that the KPU had taken was still occurring. In a sense, December 9 did not become a new time for the implementation of the Pilkada 2020. That way, the KPU had more time to make preparations, including formulating all the legal basis needed to support the implementation of the elections in the pandemic more unimpededly.

Of course these conditions will also open up more extensive dialogue space, so that better schemes can be present and become an option. Then again it is worth mentioning, that the option to postpone the Pilkada 2020 needs to be kept alive. Given the limitations that will affect the readiness and quality of the election on December 9.

As a last note. If the Pilkada 2020 is postponed once again, then the logic of the calculation to determine the voting date needs to be changed. Determining the voting day beforehand, which is followed by adjusting the stages that follow is in make the preparation from organizer for the nearest stage with a rush. That is exactly what is happening right now. This method should be changed, by determining the nearest stage first. From there, the KPU then navigates the time for each stage, and gets the most ideal voting date at the end of the calculation.

In addition, in accordance with Government Regulation in Lieu of Law No. 2 of 2020 (Perpu 2/2020), the scheme can only be carried out if the postponement is agreed between the KPU, the Government, and the House of Representatives. This means that the involvement of other parties, each of which brings different interests, is also high in the decision to hold the elections. Hopefully KPU's spirit as an independent institution can be well-maintained and also not interchangeable.

- **Rifqi Rachman** -

The emergence of SE KPU 20/2020 is a valid example on how the 2020 Regional Election is being held in a rush. The factual verification stage finally took place without the umbrella of the PKPU Election during the pandemic. Even though, the procedure referred by PPS in conducting factual verification is in the PKPU.

Coklit and the Readiness of Voters Data

In addition to the factual verification stage, the implementation of matching and research (coklit) activity is also important to be monitored. This activity also requires a direct meeting between the officers of updated voters data (PPDP) and the voters in the 2020 Regional Election. Referring to Article 21 Paragraph (4) of the Election Commission Regulation Number 6 of 2020 concerning the Implementation of the Simultaneous Election of the Governor and Deputy Governor, the Regent and Deputy Regent, and/or the Mayor and Deputy Mayor in the Non-Nature Disaster Conditions in the Corona Virus Disease 2019 (PKPU 6/2020), one PPDP officer has the opportunity to conduct the coklit on almost 500 voters. This opportunity comes from the maximum number of voters in one polling station (TPS) for the 2020 Regional Elections.

One thing that needs to be concerned about is the method implemented in coklit. The process is not accompanied by an alternative similar to factual verification process, which is an online method. The PPDP must do the job by meeting the voters directly, working from the improvements from the neighborhoods, as well as additional voters. This is in accordance with the provisions stipulated in Article 23 paragraph (2) PKPU 6/2020. Meanwhile, Article 5 Paragraph (5) in the same PKPU has presented option by utilizing information technology to replace face-to-face meetings for all parties involved in any stages of 2020 Regional Elections.

Then, what really hinders the adoption of online coklit? Considering the health protocols present in Article 5 to Article 9 PKPU 6/2020 actually reflect efforts to reduce the opportunity to spread the corona virus disease 2019 (COVID-19) in the 2020 Regional Elections. Has the existence of health protocol only become a token that provides legitimacy for the implementation of the 2020 Regional Elections in a time of health crisis?

Voters Data: a Classic Problem

Voters data is a classic problem in two electoral regimes in Indonesia. This inevitable problem is the depiction of a poor activity of recording population events. This has impacts on many sectors, including the electoral sector.

The population data on potential voters (DP4) managed by the Ministry of Home Affairs (Kemendagri) is one example of managing the population data mentioned. The information submitted to the General Election Commission (KPU) ideally should not be synchronized through the *coklit* if the accuracy of the data has been met properly. Moreover, the Kemendagri itself states that DP4 is the accumulation of data obtained from the District/Municipal Population and Civil Registry Office (Disdukcapil), which is then consolidated, verified, and validated by the Kemendagri (*kompas.com*, 23/1). The process is also in accordance with Article 58 paragraph (2) of Law Number 10 Year 2016 concerning Second Amendment to Law Number 1 Year 2015 concerning Establishment of Government Regulations in Lieu of Law Number 1 of 2014 concerning Election of Governors, Regents and Mayors to Become Law (UU 10/2016).

At the extreme point, meeting the accuracy of voters data is very likely to change the role of the sub-district election committee (PPK), the voting committee (PPS). It is also likely to eliminate PPDP. On the other hand, the accuracy of voters data in DP4 will bring convenience and reduce the burden to election organizers.

Of course, the author also does not forget that the idealization presented above must be contextualized in a real condition. In fact, the accuracy of the data is still a problem. Even if the accuracy is improved, it is necessary to adjust the regulations at the level of UU. This activity is part of the preparatory stages of the elections, as stated in Article 5 paragraph 2 letter h of Law Number 8 of 2015 (UU 8/2015). This adjustment also needs to be done on PKPU 2 of 2017 concerning Data Updating and Preparation of Voter Lists in the Election of Governors and Deputy Governors, Regents and Deputy Regents, and/or Mayor and Deputy Mayor (PKPU 2/2017), amended by PKPU Number 19 of 2019.

The main requirement that must be presented is the accurate recording process of Disdukcapil, before it is finally submitted to the Kemendagri. Finally, the process of determining the Temporary Voter List (DPS) and Permanent Voter List (DPT) will undoubtedly run lighter.

However, if the explanation illustrates a dubious condition, and *coklit* is the best tool to present data accuracy, then true adjustments become an option that should be adopted during a pandemic. In accordance with Article 5 paragraph 5 of PKPU 6/2020, the opportunity to apply information technology in the election is precise. Moreover, the outbreak of COVID-19 since July 2020 has actually shown the number of daily cases that consistently increase more than 1,000 cases per day (*covid19.go.id, 11/7*). This is certainly a bad sign for the implementation of the *coklit*, which will be conducted from July 15 to August 13.

On the other hand, the challenge faced when trying to apply online methods in carrying out *coklit* is certainly related to the matter of trust in the voter data. This is intertwined with the reality of the accuracy of the data that was explained earlier. The poor internet connections in several regions will also complicate the *coklit* process carried out by PPDP in each polling station.

This issue should be encouraged by electoral stakeholders, including the Kemendagri and Commission II of the House of Representatives (DPR). Apart from the conditions of the pandemic, which should increase our awareness to limit meetings, the gradual transformation of the election stages to an online method should be done. However the factor of safety and protection of the people, as well as the prevention of the spread of COVID-19, must be the main foundation in carrying out the stages of the 2020 Regional Elections in the pandemic.

The urgency of transforming the ways of organizing the 2020 Regional Elections is also underpinned by the inclusion of health protocols in PKPU 6/2020, which still presents concerns, because the implementation of the stages of the 2020 Regional Elections shows opposing signs. Not only in the matter of the *coklit*, other stages such as determining the candidate number to the campaign still use manual methods, which were also accommodated by PKPU 6/2020. The power of the health protocol then questioned, especially since the transmission of COVID-19 is faster than the ability from the stakeholders to catch the potential damage of the virus towards election's quality.

The Effects of Health Protocol

The latest news from the Situation Report - 172 issued by the World Health Organization (WHO) on 10 July 2020 found the potential virus transmission through the air (*who.int, 10/7*). Of course this is

important to be supervised by many parties, including the KPU. Unfortunately, the potential for this significant threat emerged when the regulation regarding to the procedure for implementing the 2020 Regional Elections in the COVID-19 pandemic had been enacted. This is a dilemmatic situation, because the logic of conducting an election is attached with procedural and administrative provisions.

Although the opportunity to construct anticipatory actions in the implementation of the 2020 Regional Elections was available, the results in the form of health protocols in PKPU 6/2020 sound a bit discordant. The absence of online implementation options for many stages illustrates how the actual implementation of the 2020 Regional Elections was set in a rush and insensitive to the urgency of implementing health protocols and priority aspects of public safety during the pandemic.

Article 5 paragraph 4 of PKPU 6/2020 explicitly categorizes four direct activities as critical points for the spread of COVID-19, but such concerns seem to be pointless because the activities that are considered as critical points are actually still accommodated by the regulation.

This is certainly not an unfounded argument. If we read carefully the health protocol in Article 5, the provisions that still accommodate face-to-face meetings demonstrate the defeat of the health protocol to the prerequisites for conducting elections. Despite the fact that the element of public safety is often loudly expressed by stakeholders as a primary concern. However, by looking at how the intention was derived in the form of provisions, doubts have then become reasonable acts that cannot be avoided.

Therefore, the statement that a time of health crisis needs to be treated with an extraordinary initiative can only be interpreted as a tool to legitimize the holding of elections. The choice to implement these extra efforts is found out to be difficult by the KPU, because it has a potential to collide with the rules. The author finally presents a similar suggestion as stated in the article about factual verification: postponing the the 2020 Regional Elections.

- Rifqi Rachman -

KPU Regulation 6/2020 shows the defeat of the health protocol to the prerequisites for conducting the election. However, by looking at how the intention was derived in the form of provisions, doubts have then become reasonable acts that cannot be avoided.

Strategic Actor Leadership Serves the Public in the COVID-19 Period

The presence of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) has created a shock in work adaptations in the community. Governments in all infected countries also need to make various adaptations to policies that are able to sustain the lives of their citizens in this crisis. The leadership of strategic actors, consisting of various leaders of Ministries / Institutions (K / L) and Local Government (Pemda), in the era of good governance are also being tested. Evaluative and strategic steps also need to be taken to ensure the implementation of various policies to deal with the COVID-19.

Good Governance and a Leadership Reflection

Basically, the government consists of a number of leaders or strategic actors who have different academic backgrounds, different fields, and different interests. Having the abilities to work optimally, to serve the community, to make appropriate policies, and to make reform in the field of protection is a very dominant key factor. One of these, institutional reforms is manifested in the government's commitment to practice good governance.

The government's commitments can be shown by Government Regulation No. 101 of 2000. Good governance applies a number of principles; namely, democracy, accountability, transparency, efficiency, effectiveness, professionalism, and support from the community. In the concept of good governance, strategic actors in the K / L / Pemda bodies are required to collaborate, encourage involvement and to provide access so that other actors in the community can be more widely involved in government affairs.

Other actors include citizens as individuals, social organizations, the business sector, profit and non-profit organizations, the media, academics, and politicians, as well as trade unions. In dealing with various national problems that cannot be solved by the

government, strategic actors struggle with many limitations. In addition, strategic actors are also required to be able to manage uncertain situations. In the business sector, the uncertain situation is known to be volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguity or called “VUCA world”.

In dealing with VUCA situation, leaders are expected to be able to adapt or adjust. Organizational adjustments are made, among others, by constantly learning, generating new ideas, responding to changes productively, and innovating (*Kanter, 1983*). If you look at the current bureaucratic climate, there are quite a number of government strategic actors with the private sector background. This is part of the efforts to encourage the acceleration of good governance in Indonesia.

However, many obstacles are found in the practice of good governance in order to create better public services. A series of challenges and other irregularities still occur; for example, miscoordination and sectoral egos, corruption that occurs at the K / L / Pemda level, lack transparency or accountability, and other irregularities.

In addition, according to the survey by Kompas Research and Development on improving cabinet performance, 87.8 percent of the respondents expressed their dissatisfaction with ministerial performance, particularly in handling the COVID-19 pandemic (*national.kompas.com, 13 / 07*). The survey was conducted online from 7 to 11 July 2020, with 587 respondents from 23 provinces. A number of reasons related to preventive and curative efforts became the reasons for public dissatisfaction in handling COVID-19.

According to the Kompas Research and Development survey, in terms of providing health facilities, 7 out of 10 respondents (71.1 percent) claimed to be dissatisfied with the performance of relevant ministers. Dissatisfaction was also expressed by 75.1 percent of respondents on social assistance distribution that was not evenly distributed. In the economic sector, the public also claimed not to be satisfied with the performance of the relevant line ministers, particularly in providing stimulus to entrepreneurs and Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs).

Evaluative and Collaborative Steps

A good leader can be an oasis amid this uncertain pandemic. To strive for leadership based on good governance, a number of evaluative and collaborative steps need to be taken. The evaluative step is a foundation in improving the direction of good governance practices. The steps include the following.

First, evaluating the performance of government strategic actors. Regardless of whether there is a cabinet reshuffle or not, if the cabinet reshuffle is realized, the minister's performance evaluation needs to be done carefully first, again in accordance with the principles of good governance as mentioned earlier. Getting a better ministerial change amid the pandemic also requires more coordinated efforts. If the minister who replaces does not understand the problems, it will hamper existing strategic planning. The reshuffle also needs to be carefully thought out.

Second, the evaluation also needs to be done in an effort to evaluate the impact of budget reallocation on priority programs in K / L. The strategic actors of the pandemic government are indeed demanded to work extra hard, especially K / L included in the Task Force for the Acceleration of Handling COVID-19. The evaluation is expected to be the basis for improving the performance of K / L strategic actors to harmonize the balanced focus of prevention and handling COVID-19 with other priority programs or other public services that must be done. For example, amid the Ministry of Health's efforts to make various health guidelines and various prevention and other treatment measures during the COVID-19 period, the Ministry of Health also has other priority programs, such as stunting handling that also requires more attention.

In addition to evaluative steps, collaborative steps must also continue to be pursued. This step can be realized when strategic actors are able to work together and broaden the scope of collaboration with various parties as previously mentioned. Again, the state cannot solve this pandemic alone and the principle of good governance has provided a foundation for the importance of collaborating between strategic actors and other actors in a country.

The collaboration will be the key to accelerating the fulfillment of needs in the COVID-19 period. Of course, this should be fol-

lowed by a clear agreement scheme so that each party can really commit and play a maximum role in filling the various deficiencies; for example, in terms of meeting the needs of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) and so forth. In addition, financial support, facilities and infrastructure, incentives and other components also need to be provided to various K / L / Pemda research institutions, the private sector, and academics whose studies related to COVID-19. It is hoped that the support of the COVID-19 research network can give birth to various innovations that can be utilized to the maximum extent to support the acceleration of the handling of this pandemic.

The involvement of other actors, including community organizations or individuals who voluntarily work together is also good news amid the Government's limitations in accelerating the prevention and treatment of COVID-19. Mutual cooperation, which is social capital, needs to care for, without eliminating the space to participate to channel ideas and thoughts amid the life of a nation that is struggling to cope with COVID-19.

In addition, entering the era of Adaptation of New Habits that shows a significant increase in positive cases, good collaboration in the era of good governance can also be realized. One of them is when strategic actors prioritize the ideas of epidemiologists based on various studies that have been done up to the decision-making stage. Surely, this is a big challenge when the social and economic impact of COVID-19 is heightened.

- Vunny Wijaya -

Leaders who work based on the principle of 'good governance' can be an oasis amid this uncertain pandemic. To strive for leadership, several evaluative and collaborative steps need to be taken.

The Polemics over the Pancasila Ideology Bill

Recently, the Pancasila Ideology Bill (HIP) has been the subject of discussion in the community. The bill is a proposal of the Legislative Body of the Republic of Indonesia's House of Representatives (DPR-RI). The proposed bill was motivated by the absence of a legal basis governing the Pancasila Ideology Direction as a guide to the life of the nation and state (*kompas.com*, 25/6). In addition, this bill also aims to strengthen the legal basis for the establishment of the Pancasila Ideology Development Board (BPIP), which has been governed by presidential regulations (*wartakota.com*, 14/6).

As a draft policy, the HIP Bill has sparked polemics among stakeholders, both within government and outside government. These stakeholders have interests related to the HIP Bill. Therefore, it is very important to elaborate debate between actors in the discussion of the HIP Bill as a policy product.

The Polemics in the Community

The revolving discussion of the HIP Bill has sparked polemics in the community. Some social organizations are rejecting the Bill, which is the initiative of the DPR. The social organizations that are openly rejecting this Bill was the Nahdatul Ulama Executive Board (PBNU). PB NU assesses that the HIP Bill will open space for ideological conflicts. In line with PB NU, the Muhammadiyah Central Board (PP) has also requested that the discussion on the Pancasila Ideology Proposed Bill not be continued (*kompas.com*, 17/6).

In addition to being widely opposed by social organizations, academics have also been criticizing the bill. Constitutional law expert at the Jentera College of Law Bivitri Susanti said that the HIP Bill had many unusual articles, which were only statements, definitions,

and even political statements. In addition to Bivitri, state constitutional law expert at Gadjah Mada University (UGM) Zainal Arifin Mochtar also assessed many articles that contained multiple interpretations (*tirto.id*, 16/6).

Thus, it can be seen that the HIP Bill has sparked various polemics in the community, not only from among social organizations, but amongst academics.

Criticisms related to the HIP Bill have mainly revolved around the substance in the articles of the HIP Bill, which is considered controversial; for example, the concepts of Trisila and Ekasila in one of the articles. The Trisila and Ekasila concepts are suspected to open ideological conflicts in the community.

In addition, this Bill has been criticized for not including TAP MPRS XXV / MPRS / 1966 concerning the dissolution of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and the prohibition of spreading the ideology of communism / Marxism / Leninism in Indonesia. On the other hand, the discussion of the HIP Bill also faces a variety of conflicting interests in Senayan. The next section will discuss this further.

The Views of Factions in the DPR towards the HIP Bill

The intense debate in the discussion of the HIP Bill has taken place in the DPR. This was reflected in the decision-making meeting for the Drafting of the HIP Bill conducted on April 22, 2020. During the meeting, a number of factions gave their views on the HIP Bill. The PDIP faction, which is said to be the proponent of the HIP Bill, fully approves the HIP Bill with no conditions. Furthermore, Nasdem Faction as a ally of the PDIP coalition has also agreed to the full discussion of the HIP Bill without conditions (*republika.co.id*, 13/6).

Meanwhile, the Golkar Faction supports the discussion followed by a number of notes. Gerindra has also approved the draft with a note that the Bill was not merely to strengthen BPIP. In line with Golkar, the PKB Faction has approved the Bill to continue as an initiative of the DPR with a note to add the formulation of the 1945 Constitution as a consideration (*republika.co.id*, 13/6).

Meanwhile, the PKS Faction asked for the bill to be perfected before being submitted to the plenary session by strengthening the principle of the Almighty God and the inclusion of TAP MPRS XXV / MPRS / 1966 regarding the dissolution of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and the prohibition of the spread of the ideology of communism / Marxism / Leninism in Indonesia, as a consideration.

PKS also requested that the article on “Ekasila” in the bill be abolished (*republika.co.id, 16/6*).

Similar to PKS, the PAN faction has also considered the need for TAP MPRS XXV / MPRS / 1966 to be included as a consideration. Meanwhile, the PPP Faction has asked for some adjustments and asked for the position of BPIP to be aligned with other state institutions (*republika.co.id, 16/6*).

In contrast to the majority of the other factions, the Democratic Faction has withdrawn a membership from the committee because they felt the regulation was not urgently discussed when people were still having difficulties in facing the Covid-19 pandemic (*republika.co.id, 16/6*).

The factions’ views in the DPR towards the HIP Bill actually show a conflict of interests between the factions. The battle referred to here is the factions’ views emphasizing the interests of each political party.

The interests of each political party can be seen from Kaare Strøm’s approach to political party orientation. Strøm’s divides party orientation into three models; namely, policy seeking party, votes seeking party, and office seeking party (*Strøm’s in Mellaz and Kartawidjaja, 2018*).

Policy seeking party is a party which is oriented towards the resulting policy. The main aspect of this model is the orientation and priorities of the policies carried by the party. This policy includes programs and articulation of party ideology, including the focus on certain issues or party demands. In this category, PDIP as the bearer of the HIP Bill reflects the policy-oriented party.

The Votes-Seeking Party is a party that is oriented to maximizing its votes for winning the election. The basic orientation of the party model is the election win, while the party’s policy or position on issues is more flexible. This category reflects parties that represent the aspirations of the community, or in other words voters. These parties include PKB, PKS, PAN, and PPP. The views of the parties are trying to maintain their constituents. The majority of which are Muslims.

The Office-Seeking Party is a party that is oriented towards securing a position or position. This party model seeks to hold power, either alone or with others. Parties such as Golkar, Gerindra and Nasdem reflect parties oriented to this category.

The Government's Response

The Government through Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs (Menkopolhukam) Mahfud MD has announced the postponement of the discussion of the Pancasila Ideology (HIP) Bill (HIP) with the DPR. The government's reason for delaying is that first, the government is still focusing on tackling the Covid-19 pandemic (*kompas.com, 17/6*).

Secondly, the government considers that there are still problems in the substance aspect of the HIP Bill itself; for example, the substance related to TAP MPRS Number XXV of 1966. According to Mahfud, the TAP MPRS is a legal product regarding binding legislation. Therefore, the MPRS TAP cannot be revoked by state institutions or draft regulations issued by the DPR (*kompas.com, 17/6*).

Based on these reasons, the government has finally decided not to send a presidential letter (*surpres*) to the DPR to discuss the HIP Bill. Then, the government has asked the Parliament to hold a dialogue with the community component in order to get aspirations related to the HIP Bill (*kompas.com, 17/6*).

Responding to the government's response to the postponement of the HIP Bill discussion, Deputy Speaker of the Indonesian House of Representatives Azis Syamsuddin said the DPR would follow the government's decision to postpone the discussion of the HIP Bill (*kompas.com, 17/6*).

In line with Aziz, Deputy Chair of the Legislative Body (Baleg) of the DPR Achmad Baidowi said that with the government delaying the discussion, the DPR would automatically postpone the discussion. Baidowi also said that there was a chance that the HIP Bill would be stopped and withdrawn from the National Legislation Program (Prolegnas) because it has caused dynamics. However, it must be decided through a working meeting to evaluate the National Legislation Program. This depends on the views of factions in the DPR (*detik.com, 6/25*).

The attitude of the government to postpone the discussion of the HIP Bill is a middle ground in the dynamics occurring in the Parlia-

ment and in the community. This government's decision has also made the debate between the factions in the DPR and the community begin subside. Procrastination is the accommodation of the interests of all parties.

Actors' Different Interests

Seeing the above problems, the polemics over the discussion of the HIP Bill are due to differences in interests and understanding of the stakeholders in the policy-making process. This is certainly crucial for the policy-making process. William Dunn (1988) explains that policy making involves the interrelation of three elements; namely, public policy; stakeholders, and the policy environment.

According to Dunn's opinion above, one of the factors influencing the policy making process is the stakeholders, both the Government, the Factions in the DPR, and community organizations that certainly have a variety of interests in viewing the HIP Bill.

Differences in interests between actors lead to various points of view that are the focus of each actor. The stakeholders will try to influence the policy-making process in this case the HIP Bill in order to achieve its interests.

Interestplay in the discussion of the HIP Bill is very visible in the views of factions in the DPR as policy makers and the views of community organizations as pressure groups.

After the process of attraction between the stakeholders in the Parliament, the government emerged and pushed for a middle ground to compromise and accommodate various interests, both between factions in the DPR and from social organizations. The decision to postpone the discussion of the HIP Bill is an agreement or 'political resultant' of the stakeholders.

Closing

The discussion on the HIP Bill has sparked polemics in the community. This reflects the dynamics of attraction between actors in the DPR, which prioritize party orientations, which is then coupled with pressure from social organizations. The government's steps and decisions by delaying the discussion of the HIP Bill are a political resultant form by policy actors before producing implementative policies, specifically related to the HIP Bill.

The delay is the result of bargaining and short-term political compromises among stakeholders. However, it is possible that in the future if this Bill is discussed again, the bargaining process will not necessarily find a political resultant among the actors involved in the discussion process. If there is no agreement from the actors involved, then this Bill will again cause controversy.

- **Arfianto Purbolaksono** -

The decision to postpone the discussion of the HIP Bill is an agreement or 'political resultant' of the stakeholders. However, it is possible that in the future if this Bill is discussed again, the bargaining process will not necessarily find an agreement between the actors. If there is no agreement from the actors, then this Bill will again cause controversy.

How to Strengthen Social Protection in the Era of New Normal?

The issue of new normal at this time is synonymous with the return of the socio-economic activities of the community. Various health protocol rules have been put aside to allow workers to return to the office, children to return to school or shopping centers to re-operate.

Undeniably, the ongoing crisis experienced by Indonesia has urged every economic joint to re-lubricate itself. While looking at the horrific risks of a health disaster that is occurring, at the same time, the unemployment rate has been surging, and the poverty rate has been increasingly. The Ministry of Manpower noted that as of April 2020, around 1.5 million workers had been affected by COVID-19. According to the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, as of May 2020 there were already 6 million workers laid off.

Not only the formal sector above, the informal sector has also been hit by the crisis. A survey conducted by the Demographic Institute of the Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Indonesia (FEB-UI), the Ministry of Manpower and the Indonesian Institute of Sciences in the range of April 24 to May 5, 2020, showed that 40 percent of independent entrepreneurs experienced stagnation in business or stopped completely. 52 percent experienced a decrease in income, and another 35 percent had zero income.

The survey also showed that vulnerability was also experienced by freelancers. Around 55 percent of free workers did not get income in the period of the survey. According to the National Labor Force Survey data in 2019, there were 26 million independent business workers and around 26.5 million free workers. It can be predicted that around 10 million independent business workers and 15 million free workers will experience the threat of loss of income during this pandemic.

The above problem becomes more complex when reviewing the increasingly high levels of poverty. According to a simulation conducted by the National Development Planning Agency, the poverty rate will rise to 10.54 percent if the socio-economic crisis of the pandemic is left without intervention. In other words, there were at least an additional 3.63 million people trapped in poverty at the end of 2020. In addition, predictions from the Center of Reform on Economics (CORE) are far broader. Their study illustrates that there are about 66.7 million vulnerable people who are poor and near poor as a result of the crisis that continues to roll over time.

At the same time, the adoption of new customs adaptations has become an option for moving the wheels of the economy. However, this narrative has not yet accommodated the reality of people facing diverse vulnerabilities in different regions and economic structures, especially for workers who have been laid off as well as informal workers. This condition certainly makes social safety nets needed.

Social Protection during the New Normal

Seeing the situation above, the government is faced with the necessity to provide a social protection system for the people who are attached to the context of new normal. Learning from the context of the crisis faced during the New Order, many policies to overcome the economic crisis in 1997 and 1998 did not capture much vulnerability in vulnerable groups, even though the basic services provided were slowly able to lift 32 million people trapped in the vortex of poverty (*Asadullah, Aulia & Maliki, 2020*).

For example, the social security scheme provided at that time was still limited to officials and civil servants. There is no social insurance scheme even social assistance provided to vulnerable groups. Also, Social Security for Worker, which was far earlier launched in 1992, can only be felt by formal workers, while informal workers are still spared from social security.

In fact, up to now, the Manpower Social Security Organizing Agency (BPJS) which houses social security for workers, still has to face the same homework to accommodate informal workers who have not been accommodated in social security, either in the form of life insurance, work accident insurance or pension plan. The issue of targeting informal workers to enter into this scheme still requires a comprehensive strategy.

Still struggling with labor issues, the government's commitment to anticipate the increase in unemployment by the threat of layoffs and workers' housing through the Pre-Employment Card Program is still an issue. There is no certainty about the continuation of the opening of the fourth wave of participants of the Pre-Employment Card due to governance issues in the provision of services and the problem of prioritizing targeted beneficiary groups (*Liputan 6, 3/7*). This situation is also unfavorable for people who are unemployed and have not been accommodated with social programs, especially in situations when economic recovery during the adaptation period of new normal is intensively carried out.

Aside from the labor side, the current crisis should give a hard blow to thinking about how social protection is widely given to the poor. The existence of the Family Hope Program as conditional cash transfer that is regularly provided by the government can be a milestone in the provision of social protection for households with the lowest 40 percent income.

The program that captures vulnerability in the aspects of education, health for pregnant women and children under five, as well as social welfare for groups of people with disabilities and the elderly is the hope of slowly recovering the economy. During the pandemic, adjustments to the coverage of beneficiaries reached 10 million people, increasing the frequency of disbursements to each month and increasing the index of assistance per component to be one of the responses that was quite responsive in times of crisis.

Still in the scope of households, social assistance that is responsive to the crisis period is also realized with other social assistance. Food aid, Direct Cash Assistance Program, Village Funds, and Social Assistance for Greater Jakarta areas, as well as electricity discounts are all parts of the government program to provide social safety nets for vulnerable households in the short term.

However, in reality, the speed of realization of social protection is still far from expected. Note from the Ministry of Finance as of the beginning of July 2020, the realization of social protection is still in the range of 34.06 percent of the total budget prepared for Rp203.9 trillion. In addition to the problem of overlapping social assistance provision, the determination of beneficiaries also becomes one of the obstacles in distribution. This is certainly a re-record of how social protection actually reaches the target community.

In addition to the above notes, the new normal that is gradually being applied is the right moment to study the complexity of the needs and vulnerabilities of the community to restore the economy. Socio-economic impacts that can be examined based on aspects of socio-economic status, geography, gender, disability, etc. are the basis for formulating social protection programs that are no longer protective, but also help communities to adapt and encourage wider economic opportunities.

While ensuring the protective social protection mentioned above runs in accordance with the specified time span, social protection during the adaptation period of new normal should basically be able to encourage community resilience through various forms of economic opportunities. This requires a social insurance scheme in the form of unemployment benefits as well as access to credit and economic stimulus for informal groups. The formulation and introduction of equal economic opportunity for the informal sector are expected to be a strategy to restore the economy as the community has been able to position itself in the adaptation of new normal.

What Can Be Done

The unavoidable socio-economic impact of the COVID-19 situation urges the government to quickly identify broader community vulnerabilities and formulate social protection in accordance with the current transition phase.

At present, the provision of social assistance that has been carried out must necessarily be improved, both in terms of governance or the capacity of service providers, budget allocation and realization, as well as preparation and responding to obstacles in the field. The urge to conduct data enrichment simultaneously and open a space for complaints for the community becomes very necessary. In this case, various ministries / institutions who have the authority to distribute social assistance, such as the Ministry of Social Affairs, must improve to ensure that social assistance adjustments in times of crisis are running properly during the period of new normal.

Another note, the government is expected to provide certainty in social assistance programs for workers who are unemployed or laid off, as well as for informal workers. The presence of an anticipated economic recovery scheme for these community groups is needed during the adaptation of new normal, such as the Pre-Employment Card Program or other necessary schemes. At the same time, the government must also aggressively push for equal economic oppor-

tunities through various incentives for workers, opportunities to access credit and others.

Finally, a new normal means that governments and communities are prepared to turn the wheel of the economy back by ensuring that vulnerabilities to health risks can be reduced. In this case, new normal is also a very appropriate time to conduct studies, research and development of appropriate frameworks to provide social protection in times of crisis that are integrated with the ongoing disaster response. This is very much needed to improve the provision of social protection to fit the current context and similar crisis situations in the future.

- Nopitri Wahyuni -

In addition to ensuring social protection that is protective in nature, social protection during the new normal must encourage equal economic opportunities.

Postponement of the Discussion on the Anti-Sexual Violence Bill and Disregard of Gender Based Violence Data

The postponement of the discussion of the Draft Law on Anti-Sexual Violence in the 2020 National Legislation Program has disappointed many parties. The statement of Deputy Chairman of Commission VIII of the House of Representatives of the Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB) Faction, Marwan Dasopang, on 30 June was disappointing. He said that the delay was due to the discussion of the Bill considered difficult.

According to the Legal Aid Institute for the Association of Women for Justice (LBH APIK), the status of the Anti-Sexual Violence Bill is extremely unclear in the Parliament. As informed, Commission VIII had submitted the bill to the Legislative Body of the House of Representatives since March 2020. However, since it was determined as the 2020 Priority in National Legislation Program, it was not clear who will be the proposer of the bill. The above hanging position clearly showed the weakness of the House of Representatives' commitment to fulfilling the rights of victims of sexual violence and ignoring data on violence against women, which continue to increase from year to year.

As an illustration, according to a report from the National Commission on Violence Against Women (Komnas Perempuan) in 2020, the number of cases of violence against women reached 431,471 cases in 2019. Within 12 years, Komnas Perempuan recorded an increase in cases, reaching 792 percent, or equal to almost 8 times. This percentage actually showed that the conditions of women were still far from having the proper and safe space for violence.

In 2019, complaints directly handled by service provider partner institutions reached 14,719 cases. Of all the physical and psychological cases of violence, cases of sexual violence in the public sphere reached 2,091 cases (58 percent) and the private sphere reached

2,807 cases (25 percent). In the private sphere, the rise of cases of online gender-based violence, such as the threat of the spread of personal content and harassment in cyberspace, adds to the complexity of the forms of gender-based violence that occur. In 2019, there were 281 complaints of cases of violence in cyberspace, which had previously been in the range of 97 cases. The increasing number of cases has unfortunately also not been matched by the presence of laws that capture gender-based vulnerability in cyberspace.

Another important note regarding sexual violence is the high rate of violence against people with disabilities. In 2019, there were 87 cases of violence against women with disabilities reaching 69 cases, 69 of which were cases of sexual violence, especially rape. The characteristics of disabilities that are vulnerable to becoming victims are women with intellectual / mental disabilities, reaching 41 cases; hearing and speech -disabilities, reaching 19 cases and psychosocial disabilities, reaching 18 cases. The vulnerability of women with disabilities to the risk of sexual violence is even greater, especially with the conditions of most perpetrators difficult to be identified by victims (*Komnas Perempuan, 2020*).

However, of these figures, not many victims continue to the criminal level. Notes from the Victim and Witness Protection Agency (LPSK), until June 15, 2020, there were 501 victims, who were protected by LPSK from cases of sexual violence. This figure has increased from year to year. During 2016, there were 66 applications for the protection of witnesses and victims of cases of sexual violence. Then, it increased to 111 requests in 2017. In the following year, the number of requests reached 284 cases. In 2019, it touched 373 cases.


Excluding of the Anti-Sexual Violence Bill from the 2020 National Legislation Program Priority means violating the protection rights of victims of sexual violence. The need for victims of sexual violence to get rehabilitation and prevent sexual violence is delayed. Also, the complexity of cases of sexual violence from year to year is increasingly complicated. This has also been exacerbated by the legal process that has stalled due to lack of evidence and the limitations of legal norms. In addition, the issue of law enforcement officials who are not yet aware and gender sensitive, and does not take sides with the victim's perspective is one of the important concerns in the process of handling cases of sexual violence. This urgency is not even considered much in the existing policy process.

Anti-Sexual Violence Bill Delays on Amid Pandemic

The decision to restore in the midst of a pandemic has also rejected the reality of the rise of sex violence in society. In addition, in the current situation, violence based on gender has become one of the socio-economic aspects of the crisis.

According to the data from the Ministry of Women's Empowerment and Child Protection that entered the Online Information System for the Protection of Women and Children (SIMFONI PPA) from 1 January to 6 July 2020, there were 6,221 numbers of sex-based safety protection cases, of which 4,964 included women's help. Based on the types, there were 1,778 cases of physical violence of a total of 2,107 cases.

Graph 1. Types of Violence Experienced by Victims



Source: SIMFONI PPA per 6 July 2020.

The highest age range of female victims is dominated by adolescents and adults, with a percentage of 31.5 percent (13-18 years) and a percentage of 30.8 percent (25-44 years). Another significant percentage is in the age of girls (6-12 years), which reached 14.9 percent and the age of early adult women, who reached 10.2 percent. Of these figures, many female victims were described as students (33.5 percent), housewives (22.3 percent), and unemployed (14.5 percent).


In addition, boys also experience the same vulnerability to become victims. Based on the total number of cases, 1,236 victims were male, with the largest age range being 13-18 years (45.6 percent) and 6-12 years (30.2 percent). Most of the victims are elementary

school and senior high school students, whose violence is in the household / private area.

In addition, the relations between the perpetrator and the victim indicate that the conditions of social restrictions are quite influential. A total of 2,659 cases did occur in the household, while there were 3,540 victims indeed within the scope of the household. In addition, the relationships between the perpetrators and victims: 1,005 perpetrators were husbands / wives, followed by 827 perpetrators were girlfriends / friends.

So far, the services provided are still moving a lot on the complaint's platform. 2,412 services were provided in the form of complaints. Furthermore, the services provided are health with 1,629 services, followed by legal assistance with 1,044 services and social rehabilitation with 600 cases. The data can also illustrate that service facilities have not been evenly accommodated, starting from the level of complaints, health, legal assistance, to social rehabilitation.

Graph 2. Types of Services Provided



Source: SIMFONI PPA per 6 July 2020.

The situation of social restrictions that are still applied in various regions has also made it difficult to access psychosocial support and victim protection. Psychosocial support by relying on technological devices is a new challenge in a pandemic situation, especially considering that the context of victims of violence is in the age range of children and adolescents, which of course is hampered by information and access to services. This can be seen from the We Are Social data (2020), which states that only 64 percent or around 175.4 million people have used the internet. In addition, records from the

Central Statistics Agency (2018), show that internet users in Indonesia are still mostly concentrated in Java (55 percent), followed by Sumatra (21 percent). Meanwhile, other islands are still in the range of 5-10 percent.

This is also supported by data from SIMFONI PPPA which showed the number of cases of violence compared to poverty and unemployment data in 34 provinces in Indonesia. For example, the highest numbers of cases were in the provinces of East Java, Central Java and South Sulawesi. However, the DI Yogyakarta region actually showed a high case directly proportional to the population plus the percentage of poor and unemployed. The data above show that the context of violence cases is very diverse in terms of socio-economic aspects in each region. This needs to be an important concern for policy makers to ensure the availability of services in various regions of Indonesia.

The complexity of the problem of sexual violence in Indonesia as explained in the data above requires integrated legal certainty. The context of sexual violence can be very multi-layered with various other issues, such as socio-economic, geographical, gender, disability, and others. These issues need to get the attention of the government together to provide a legal ecosystem that protects victims of sexual violence ranging from treatment to recovery, as well as efforts to prevent sexual violence in an integrated manner.

Securing the Anti-Sexual Violence Bill

The postponement of the discussion on the Anti-Sexual Violence Bill is a hard blow to the efforts to fulfill the rights of victims by providing ecosystem services ranging from prevention to recovery. The current cases of sexual violence are not just about normal situations before being gender-based during a pandemic. The existence of a policy umbrella should be a commitment of the government to protect them, even before the pandemic situation occurs.

Various researches and data on sexual violence which are widely published should be a motor to encourage the urgency of the bill. Existing data can be used on an ongoing basis to encourage discussion and approval of the Anti-Sexual Violence Bill by various sectors, both civil society organizations and the media. In addition, relevant ministries and institutions, especially Ministry of Women's Empowerment and Child Protection and the Ministry of Law and

Human Rights can continue to oversee and make the Anti-Sexual Violence Bill an urgent legal plan to be discussed in the legislative process with the House of Representatives.

A clear policy umbrella can be an important gateway in developing and providing integrated services from various sectors, not only the government but also civil service provider institutions. This must be proven by ensuring that the current position of the Draft Anti-Sexual Violence Bill becomes a joint urgency in the Parliament in the 2020 Priority in National Legislation Program. This commitment must continue to be demanded because the substance of the bill is very much needed together.

The postponement of the discussion of the Anti-Sexual Violence Bill in the midst of a pandemic shows that there is much negligence in various contexts of sexual violence, adding to the complexity of the victims' vulnerability.

-Nopitri Wahyuni-

Improving Health Services in the COVID-19 Period

The Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic has made all countries start improving health facilities, infrastructure, and human resources (HR). This is one of the challenges for Indonesia as a developing country that still has shortages in facilities and infrastructure and inequality of medical personnel.

According to Kompas Research and Development (2020), there is still an imbalance in the number of medical personnel in handling COVID-19. The majority of medical personnel, around 98.9 percent, are in Java. Doctors and nurses on duty outside Java are only 1.1 percent, or 1,787 people. The number of doctors including general practitioners, lung specialists and internal medicine specialists in Indonesia is 19,649 people. However, only 893 people, or 4.5 percent of them, serve outside Java. 95.5%, or 18,756 people, are based in Java. Inequality also occurs among nurses (140,071 people). Almost all nurses in Indonesia work in Java, 99.4 percent, or 139,177 people. The number of nurses outside Java is only 894 people, or 0.6 percent.

The situation has prompted President Joko Widodo, or Jokowi, to announce the status of Public Health Emergency, which was conveyed in a video conference from Bogor Palace on 31 May. Facing this situation, what steps does Indonesia need to take to improve health services during the COVID-19 period?

Adaptation and Innovation amid the Pandemic

The COVID-19 pandemic has limited human and material mobility. The significant spread of COVID-19 has also made health facilities (hospitals, community health centers (Puskesmas), clinics and so on) have to adapt. However, health facilities as health care centers need to have more stringent vigilance protocols. This is to prevent the chain of transmissions, as health facilities have become

one of the most vulnerable places. Adaptation needs to be done to encourage the effectiveness of health facilities as one of the health institutions.

According to James Gibson (1998), the effectiveness of institutions or organizations is related to the adaptation / adjustment and development carried out. Development can take the form of increasing the capacity of Human Resources (HR) in order to provide better health services. If elaborated further, health services include administrative services, quality services provided by medical personnel, health facilities, and supporting infrastructure.

The presence of COVID-19 has also raised concerns for some people to visit health facilities, even though the health protocol, such as checking body temperature and COVID-19 examination, has been conducted. To overcome this, a number of health facilities have drive-through services to avoid transmission between patients. These include laboratory services at some hospitals. Some mobile Puskesmas also continue to work to provide certain health inspection services and education.

From the very beginning, watching the situation in Wuhan, a lesson learned is to prevent medical personnel from being overwhelmed by patients. In other words, health facilities need to make further efforts to prevent transmissions. When delivering drugs, health facilities should cooperate with third parties to cut shorten queues at health facilities or pharmacies. At present, many online pick-and-drop platforms can be partners.

Some examples are innovations that are developing rapidly in Banyuwangi regency. Prior to the pandemic, Banyuwangi had already had an Anticipation to Prevent Long Queue by Delivering Medicines to Homes (*Gancang Aron*) in order to solve the long queues. In practice, the innovation has been cooperating with online motorcycle taxi platforms to conduct drug delivery (*news.detik.com, 12/14/2017*).

Not just delivering or becoming a bridge between health facilities and patients, online motorcycle drivers are also given training as drug delivery couriers. According to Regent of Banyuwangi Abdullah Azwar Anas in the training of drug delivery to the poor population in Banyuwangi, medicines should be treated differently from other items. Drugs must remain safe, remain stable and must reach the patient quickly so they can be consumed (*news.detik.com, 12/14/2017*).

The existence of COVID-19 has also made the Central and Regional Governments add health facilities specifically handling COVID-19. Additional facilities has also been made through the transfer of functions of a number of government-owned buildings. For example, Wisma Athlete in Jakarta, which has been converted into a COVID-19 Emergency Hospital. Not only for patients, the Wisma Athlete's region has also been divided into three zones, namely the green, yellow and red zones, which are also intended for medical personnel. The use of robots to help health human resource activities has also been introduced at a number of health facilities. For example, the use of two robot units to help the handling of COVID-19 patients with mild to moderate symptoms at Pertamina Jaya Hospital Jakarta (*republika.co.id, 08/05*).

Amid the pandemic, innovation through the use of health applications has also increased despite the protection of user data security is still being debated. According to the Expert Staff of the Minister of Communication and Information Ministry, Henri Subiakto, according to Article 15 of the Electronic Information and Transaction Law (ITE Law), the responsibility for securing data lies with the platform or application as the organizer of the electronic system. The government or the state is just monitoring. This was stated by Henri in the Airlangga Webinar Conference Series on Disruptive Medical Technology After COVID-19, June 19.

Encouraging the Innovation Chain

In essence, various adaptations and innovations made by health facilities need to be continued considering that the pandemic has not ended yet and it still shows a significant increase. It is hoped that there will also be a chain of innovation practices, if one health facility innovates, other health facilities can adopt and adapt as needed. This is important to reduce the impact caused by a pandemic in health services.

There are two efforts that can be made to encourage innovation so that it gives birth to adaptations that are appropriate for the effectiveness of health services.

First, to build and maintain an innovation ecosystem. HR that has openness, leadership, and the ability to accept new ideas is one of the factors supporting innovation. This can be done by health facilities by increasing the capacity of human resources through various training programs. Furthermore, health facilities need to do an HR

analysis to find out the lack of needs and recruit HR who have the competencies needed in times of crisis.

The existence of supporting regulations, for example, a head decree (SK) or director of a health facility is also needed to support the development of an innovation ecosystem. For those who have been able to innovate, they also need to make plans in a sustainable manner so that the innovation climate that has been built can have a sustainable impact. One of them can be done through collaboration; for example, between health facilities, health institution, and universities. Currently, a number of universities are competing to make various innovations to create health support tools for handling COVID-19.

One of the tertiary institutions that have contributed its work is the Institut Teknologi Sepuluh November (ITS) with its Robot Medical Assistant ITS-Airlangga (RAISA). The existence of the robot is intended as an assistant to medical personnel to carry a maximum load of 50 kilograms and to help medical officers on duty in the Intensive Care Unit (ICU) and High Care Unit (HCU) equipped with Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) and disinfectants to sterilize the rooms (its.ac.id, 11/06).

In order to build and encourage innovation, the Ministry of Health (MoH) also has a number of efforts. Innovation is one of the points of assessment of health facilities in the framework of accreditation that has been running, for example, in hospitals and health centers. Every year an innovation competition accompanied by incentives is also held by the MoH. This is done to encourage health services that are more accessible and the quality of service and patient satisfaction.

Second, a commitment to make improvements through incremental and radical ways. Some innovations are difficult because they seem so radical and require complex management, so health facilities tend to avoid them. For example, the use of health applications is broader and difficult to ensure the safety of patient data. John Glaser (hbr.org, 2019) in an article titled “How to Ensure Your Health Care Innovation Doesn’t Flop”, said that basically, innovation would be more effective if it is through an incremental process, departing based on a commitment to do better work.

Adaptation and innovation are needed to improve health services in the COVID-19 period. Health facilities that have built a climate of innovation need to be maintained so that the impact is sustainable and significant for health services, especially in times of crisis. Meanwhile, for health facilities that are still in the early stages of innovation or have difficulty making changes, they can start with an incremental effort to leave based on a commitment to do the job better.

-Vunny Wijaya -

Improving health services in the COVID-19 period can be done through adaptation and innovation. However, particular efforts are needed to encourage a chain of innovations that can have a significant impact amid the pandemic.

**THE** **INDONESIAN INSTITUTE**
C E N T E R F O R P U B L I C P O L I C Y R E S E A R C H

The Indonesian Institute (TII) is a Center for Public Policy Research that was established on 21 October 2004 by a group of young, dynamic activists and intellectuals. **TII** is an independent, non-partisan, non-profit institution, whose main funding stems from grants and contributions from foundations, companies, and individuals.

TII has the aim of becoming a main research center in Indonesia for public policy matters and has committed to giving contribution to the debates over public policies and to improving the quality of the planning and results of public policy by promoting good governance principles and public participation in the policy processes in Indonesia.

TII's visions are public policies in Indonesia which highly uphold human rights and rule of law, as well as involve participation of various stakeholders and practice democratic good governance principles.

TII's missions are to conduct reliable research that is independent and non-partisan and to channel the research to the policy-makers, the private sector, and academia in order to improve the quality of Indonesian policy-makers.

TII also assumes the role of disseminating ideas to the society so that they are well informed about the policies that will have a good impact on the people's lives. In other words, **TII** has a position to support the democratization process and the public policy reform, as it will be involved in the process.

The scope of the research and review on public policies undertaken by **TII** includes economic, social, political, and legal affairs. The main activities which have been conducted by **TII** in order to achieve our vision and mission, are: research, surveys, facilitation and advocacy through training and working groups, public discussions, public education, weekly editorial articles ("*Wacana*" or Discourses), monthly analysis ("*Update Indonesia*" in Indonesian and "**The Indonesian Update**" in English), mid-year policy analysis ("Policy

Assessment”), annual policy analysis (“Indonesian Report”), and monthly discussion forum on policy issues (“The Indonesian Forum”).

Contact Details :

The Indonesian Institute, Center for Public Policy Research

Jl. HOS. Cokroaminoto No. 92,

Menteng, Jakarta Pusat - 10310

Ph. (021)315-8032

contact@theindonesianinstitute.com

www.theindonesianinstitute.com

RESEARCH ON ECONOMIC AFFAIRS

The economy tends to be used as an indicator of the success of the government as a policy-maker. Economy plays an important role as one of the fundamentals of national development. Limited resources have often caused the government to face obstacles in implementing economic policies that will optimally benefit the people. The increase in the quality of the people's critical thinking has forced the government to conduct comprehensive studies in every decision-making process. In fact, the studies will not be stopped when the policy is already in place. Studies will be continued until the policy evaluation process.

TII focus on economic issues, such as monetary policy and fiscal policy, as well as issues on sustainable development by using analysis which refer to economic freedom principles. Monetary issues will focus on the Indonesian Central Bank to maintain economic stability, both regarding inflation and exchange rate. Meanwhile, fiscal policy will focus on the discussions over the National Budget and infrastructure development both in the regions and in the cities. In relation to sustainable development, **TII** research is focusing on productivity, competitiveness, infrastructure development, and development gap. In addition, **TII** also upholds economic freedom principles in highlighting the importance of individual freedom and involvement of private sectors in increasing development and improving welfare in Indonesia.

The TII Economic Research Division is present for those who are interested in the conditions of the economy. The results of the research are intended to assist policy-makers, regulators, and donor agencies in making decisions. The research that TII offers: **(1) Economic Policy Analysis; (2) Regional and Sectoral Prospects; and (3) Program Evaluation.**

RESEARCH ON LEGAL AFFAIRS

According to stipulations in Law No. 12 Year 2011 on the Formulation of Laws and Regulations, every bill which will be discussed by the legislative and the executive must be complemented with academic paper. This stipulation is also confirmed in Law No. 15 Year 2019 on the Amendment of Law No. 12 Year 2011 regarding the Formulation of Laws and Regulations.

Therefore, comprehensive research is very important and needed in making a qualified academic paper. With qualified academic papers, the bills will have strong academic foundation both from academic and content aspects. Furthermore, academic paper also functions as an early tracking over possibilities of overlapping laws and regulations, so that revocation of local regulations or other related issues which can be caused by legal, economic, or political aspects in the future, can be minimized as soon as possible.

TII offers normative and legal research related to harmonization and synchronization of laws and regulations, especially in making academic papers, legal opinion on harmonization and synchronization of laws and regulations, and legislative drafting for the formulation of local regulations bill drafts or other laws and regulations. In addition, **TII** also offers openly research on other legal issues related to Constitutional Law and Public Administration, Human Rights, and Political Corruption.

RESEARCH ON THE POLITICAL AFFAIRS

The enactment of Law No. 23 Year 2014 on the latest regulation on the Local Government, has created different relations between the Central Government and the Local Government. Entering the era of Bureaucracy Reform, specification of division of affairs of the Central Government and the Local Government has increasingly demanded the implementation of good governance principles. The government is demanded to be adaptive and responsive towards public aspiration and services. Therefore, public policy research become more important for both the Central Government and the Local Government to analyse context and current issues in the regions. The government must also consider various actors whether political actors or bureaucrats, as well as public's aspiration and other non-state actor in policy processes.

In order to respond those needs, **TII** research in political affairs offer policy assessment on various policies which were already applied or will be implemented. **TII** will look at socio-cultural, economy, legal, and political aspects in assessing public policies. Our research will be useful to assist government in formulating policies which are in line with context, priorities, and people's aspiration. **TII** also offers various breakthrough of transformative policies according to existing contexts in particular and Open Government principles' implementation in general, in order to increase public participation in policy processes, particularly in the era of the openness of public information.

Political Research Division of **TII** provide analysis and policy recommendations in order to generate strategic policy in the strengthening of democracy and the establishment of good governance both at the national and local levels. Political research forms are offered by **TII** **(1) Public Policy Analysis, (2) Media Monitoring, (3) Mapping & Positioning Research, (4) Need Assessment Research, (5) Survey Indicator.**

RESEARCH ON THE SOCIAL AFFAIRS

Social development needs policy foundations that come from independent and accurate research. Social analysis is a need for the government, the businesspeople, academia, professionals, NGOs, and civil society to improve social development. Social analysis is important to identify strategic issues which are developing and to make the right stakeholders' mapping to promote significant change in the context of development, public policy, and democracy in Indonesia.

The Social Research Division is present to offer strong and valid recommendations to produce strategic, relevant, efficient and effective, and impactful policies, in addressing to existing various issues. For example, issues related to education, health, population, environment, women, children, and elderly. Social research that **TII** offers: **(1) Social Policy Analysis; (2) Explorative Research; (3) Mapping & Positioning Research; (4) Need Assessment Research; (5) Program Evaluation Research; and (5) Indicator Survey.**

PRE-ELECTION AND REGIONAL HEAD ELECTION

One of the activities carried out and offered by **TII** is a pre-election survey as well as a pre-election and regional head election. The reasons underlying the implementation of pre-election and regional head election surveys, namely: (1) A good election is a democratic process that can be arranged, calculated, and predicted in the resulting process; (2) Survey is one of the important and common discussions to measure, calculate, and predict how the process and results of the General Election and the Regional Head Election will take place, in accordance to the expectations of the candidates; (3) It is very important to win in the General Election and the Regional Head Election based on empirical, scientific, measurable and supportable data.

As one of the important aspects of a strategic candidate's election, the survey is useful for monitoring political power. In this case, the success team needs to conduct a survey for: **(1) mapping the candidate's position in public perception; (2) mapping voters' desires; (3) publishing the most effective political machinery used as voters; and (4) Looking for the most effective medium for the campaign.**

EVALUATION OF A PROJECT OR A PROGRAM

One of the activities that have been performed and experienced offered by **TII** is a qualitative evaluation of the projects and programs of non-governmental organizations and government. Evaluation activities are offered **TII** stages of mid-term evaluation of the project/program (mid-term evaluation) and also the final evaluation at the end of the project/program (final evaluation).

As we know, the evaluation is an important step in the implementation of a project or program. Mid-Term Evaluation of the project or program is intended to look at and analyze the challenges, the overall learning takes place during the project or program, and make recommendations for the continuity of the project or program. Meanwhile, the final evaluation allows us to view and analyze the outcomes and the lessons learned to ensure the achievement of all the objectives of the project or program at the end of the project or program.

THE INDONESIAN FORUM

The Indonesian Forum is a monthly discussion activity on actual issues in the political, economic, social, legal, cultural, defense, and environmental fields. TII organizes these forums as media for competent resource persons, stakeholders, policymakers, civil society activists, academicians, and the media to meet and have discussion.

Themes that have been raised were the ones that have caught public attention, such as migrant workers, social conflicts, domestic politics, and local direct elections. The main consideration in picking a theme is sociological and political reality and the context of the relevant public policy at the time that the Indonesian Forum is delivered.

It is expected that the public can get the big picture of a particular event as the Indonesian Forum also presents relevant resource persons.

Since its inception, the Indonesian Institute is very aware of the passion of the public to get discussions that are not only rich in substance but also well formatted, which support balanced ideas exchanges ideas and the equal involvement of the different elements of the society.

The discussions, which are designed to only invite a limited number of participants, do not only feature idea exchanges but also regularly offer policy briefs (policy recommendations) to relevant policymakers and also summaries to the participants, especially the media people and the resource persons at the end of each discussion. Therefore, the discussions will not end without solutions.

.

LOCAL COUNCIL TRAINING

The roles and functions of local councils in monitoring local governments are very important. They need to ensure that participative and democratic policies will be espoused. Members of provincial and regent local councils are required to have strong capacity to understand democratization matters, regional autonomy, legislative techniques, budgeting, local Politics, and political marketing. Thus, it is important to empower members of local councils.

In order for local councils to be able to response every problem that will come out as a result of any policy implemented by the central government or local governments, the Indonesian Institute invites the leaderships and members of local councils to undergo training to improve their capacity.

WORKING GROUP

The Indonesian Institute believes that a good public policy process can be held with some engagement and empowerment of the stakeholders. The Indonesian Institute takes a role as one of mediator agencies to facilitate some forums in which the Government, Council Members, Private Sectors, NGOs and Academicians can meet in interactive forums. The Indonesian Institute provides facilitation on working groups and public advocacy.

The Indonesian Institute takes the role of mediator and facilitator in order to encourage the synergy of public policy work between the stakeholders and policy makers and also to have a synergy with funding agencies (donors).

Executive Director

Adinda Tenriangke Muchtar

Research and Program Manager

Arfianto Purbolaksono

Board of Advisors

Rizal Sukma

Jaleswari Pramodawardhani

Ninasapti Triaswati

Debra Yatim

Abd. Rohim Ghazali

Saiful Mujani

Clara Joewono

Researcher of Economy Affairs

Muhammad Rifki Fadilah

Researcher of Law Affairs

Muhammad Aulia Y.Guzasiah

Researchers of Political Affairs

Rifqi Rachman

Researcher of Social Affairs

Nopitri Wahyuni

Vunny Wijaya

Program and Supporting Staff

Gunawan

Administration Officer

Maya Indrianti

Finance Officer: Rahmanita

IT Staff : Usman Effendy

Desain dan Layout

Siong Cen

Jl. HOS. Cokroaminoto No. 92,
Menteng, Jakarta Pusat - 10310
Ph. (021)315-8032
contact@theindonesianinstitute.com
www.theindonesianinstitute.com

