

The Indonesian Update

Monthly Review on Economic, Legal, Security, Political, and Social Affairs



Main Report:

Overcoming the COVID-19 Outbreak in Indonesia in the Study of the Relationships
between the Central and Local Governments

Economics

- COVID-19, Middle Income Trap, and Fiscal Efforts ■
- Questioning the Polemics over Sugar Price Increase ■

Law

- Legal Weaknesses in COVID-19 Handling ■
- Draft Law Job Creation and Marginalized Environments ■

Politics

- Public Communications during the Coronavirus Pandemic ■
- Public Participation, the Key to Breaking the COVID-19 Spread ■
- State Power Centralization in the Pandemic Period ■

Social

- Behind #Dirumahaja: COVID-19 Pandemic and Women's Vulnerability to the Risk of Domestic Violence ■
- The *Kartu Prakerja* Implementation amid the COVID-19 Pandemic ■
- Women and Socio-Economic Vulnerability in the COVID-19 Pandemic ■

CONTENTS

FOREWORD	1
MAIN REPORT	
Overcoming the COVID-19 Outbreak in Indonesia in the Study of the Relationships between the Central and Local Governments	3
ECONOMICS	
COVID-19, Middle Income Trap, and Fiscal Efforts	9
Exchange Rate Turmoil and BI's Triple Interventions	14
LAW	
Legal Weaknesses in COVID-19 Handling.....	18
Questioning the COVID-19 Prevention Steps.....	22
POLITICS	
Public Communications during the Coronavirus Pandemic	26
Public Participation, the Key to Breaking the COVID-19 Spread	32
State Power Centralization in the Pandemic Period	36
SOCIAL	
Behind #Dirumahaja: COVID-19 Pandemic and Women's Vulnerability to the Risk of Domestic Violence...	40
The <i>Kartu Prakerja</i> Implementation amid the COVID-19 Pandemic.....	45
Women and Socio-Economic Vulnerability in the COVID-19 Pandemic.....	48

INSTITUTIONAL PROFILE	52
RESEARCH PROGRAMS, SURVEY AND EVALUATION	54
PUBLIC DISCUSSION	58
TRAINING & WORKING GROUP FACILITATION ...	59

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FOREWORD

The April 2020 edition of the Indonesia Update raises a major report on the handling of the COVID-19 outbreak in Indonesia in the perspective of the relationship between the Central and Regional Governments. These polemics have arisen following the policies of some Regional Governments (Pemda) that have quarantined their territories. The decisions to quarantine the territories or not are the authority of the Central Government, as stated in Law No. 6/2018 on Health Quarantine.

On the economy, this time the Indonesian Update discusses Indonesia's macroeconomic outlook, which has been revised and made more realistic. As a result, Vision 2045, which targets Indonesia to become a high-income country will be difficult to achieve. In addition, we also discuss the fluctuation of the rupiah against the US dollar. Therefore, there is a need for coordination and cooperation between BI, OJK, and the Ministry of Finance in reducing the weakening of the rupiah.

In the field of law, we discuss a number of legal products issued by the Government that contain a number of weaknesses. For example, the provisions of PP Number 21/2020 and Perppu Number 1/2020. This shows that the Government is stuttering in responding to the COVID-19 pandemic problem in Indonesia. In addition, on legal affairs, we also discuss the steps to overcome the COVID-19 pandemic with physical distancing, which have not yet encountered developments and have the potential to escalate this epidemic if without being accompanied by force from the Government to the public.

On politics, the Indonesian Update discusses the issues of public communications by the government in handling COVID-19. The Government's public communications in handling COVID-19 are considered not yet effective. A straightforward and directional form of public communication is needed, and this should be followed by a commitment to implement it in the form of real policy. Next, we discuss PSBB Permenkes and the polemics over the handling at the local or regional level, which we criticize in the context of decentralization in Indonesia. In addition, we discuss the importance of public participation in the handling of COVID-19. Massive public participation is expected so that it will have a significant impact in on breaking the chain of the spread of COVID-19.

On social affairs, the Indonesian Update raises the issue of vulnerability faced by domestic violence victims during the COVID-19 social restriction policy, who need to get a response that is strict and gender-sensitive. Next, we also discuss the implementation of the Pre-Employment Card policy, which was carried out amid uncertain conditions due to the COVID-19 pandemic. In addition, we discuss the socio-economic impact of COVID-19 on inequality in society, including on women.

The monthly publication of the Indonesian Update with actual themes are expected to help policymakers in government and business institutions - as well as academics, think tanks, and elements of civil society, both at home and abroad, to get actual information and contextual analysis of economic conditions, political, social and legal aspects in Indonesia, and an understanding of public policy in Indonesia.

Happy Reading.

Overcoming the COVID-19 Outbreak in Indonesia in the Study of the Relationships between the Central and Local Governments

The Corona Virus Disease in 2019, or COVID-19, is increasingly endemic in Indonesia. According to the data from the Tasforce for the Acceleration of COVID-19 Handling, as of 9 April 2020, 3,293 people have tested positive for COVID-19. Furthermore, as many as 280 people were declared dead due to the virus that first attacked the Wuhan region, China. The good news is that there are 252 people in Indonesia who have been declared recovered from the virus, also known as corona (<https://www.COVID19.go.id/>, 9/4). Responding to the development of this global pandemic, the government has issued a policy of large-scale social restrictions (PSBB) in the community, and not regional quarantine.

According to Law (Law) No. 6/2018 on Health Quarantine Article 1 paragraph 11, PSBB is the limitation of certain activities of residents in an area suspected of being infected with disease and / or contaminated in such a way as to prevent the possibility of spreading disease or contamination. PSBB is a form of health quarantine as regulated in Article 15 paragraph 2 of the Act.

The PSBB policy is carried out in the context of mitigating risk factors in areas in the public health emergency situation as regulated in Article 49. These actions are carried out on the basis of epidemiological considerations; the magnitude of threats, effectiveness; resource support, operational and technical factors; economic, social, cultural considerations, and security. PSBB is part of the public health emergency response according to Article 59, with the aim of preventing the widespread spread of public health emergency diseases that are occurring among people in a certain area.

The impact of the PSBB policy is the limitation of activities in the community. These restrictions include three activities; namely, the

suspensions of schools and workplaces, restrictions on religious activities, and restrictions on activities in public places or facilities. The implementation of the PSBB is carried out in coordination and cooperation between a number of related parties in accordance with statutory provisions. In terms of implementation, the government will issue government regulations to determine the criteria and implementation of the PSBB activities.

The PSBB policy is considered by the government to be the best choice compared to taking the regional quarantine policy, or also known as lockdown. President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) revealed that regional quarantine would make people's economic activities decrease. Therefore, regional quarantine is not the main option chosen, although in Law No. 6 of 2018, regional quarantine is possible.

In line with this, President Jokowi has also emphasized that the regional quarantine policy is the authority of the Central Government not the authority of the Regional Government. This statement responds to the policy of the Regional Governments (Pemda) declaring quarantine in their territories, such as in Tegal City, Tasikmalaya City, and Papua Province.

Instead of protecting the regions from a pandemic, this has then led to polemics over the relationship between the Central Government and the Regional Governments in handling this COVID-19 pandemic.

Regional Autonomy and Decentralization in Indonesia

The 1945 Constitution (Article 18 paragraph 1) states that the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI) is divided into provincial regions, which are divided into districts and cities. Meanwhile, each province, district and city has a Regional Government. This is regulated by law. Furthermore, Article 18 paragraph 2 states that the provincial, regency and municipal governments regulate and manage their own government affairs according to the principle of autonomy and assistance tasks. Then Article 18 paragraph 5 states that the Regional Government exercises autonomy to the broadest possible extent, except for governmental affairs which by Law are determined as the affairs of the Central Government. Therefore, it can be interpreted that regional autonomy is a form of government decentralization.

Decentralization is the transfer of governmental authority by the Central Government to autonomous regions to regulate and manage government affairs within the framework of the Republic of Indonesia (Kumorotomo, 2008). Bryant and White (1987) state that

there are two forms of decentralization, which are administrative and political. Administrative decentralization is a delegation of implementation authority granted to central officials at the regional level. These officials work within the bounds of a predetermined plan and source of financing. However, they also have certain discretion, authority and responsibility in developing policies for the provision of services and services at the regional level. The authority varies, from the establishment of pro-formal regulations to more substantive decisions.

Furthermore, political decentralization is the authority to make decisions and control certain resources given to government agencies at the regional level. In Indonesia, both forms of decentralization are practiced with certain boundaries while maintaining the corridor of the unitary state. Although on the other hand, sometimes this limit is often considered to be interpreted as the return of centralization of power by the Central Government.

Decentralization is often interpreted as the antithesis of centralization. In fact, a unitary state is a matter that cannot be disputed. It will be complementary in a democratic state (*Lukman Hakim, 2012*).

The Relations between the Central Government and Regional Governments and Good Governance

The relationship between the Central and the Regional Governments is something that is much discussed, because these problems in practice often lead to efforts to attract interest between the those government units. Especially in a unitary state, the efforts of the central government to always be in control over various government affairs are very clear (*Huda, 2009*).

The Relationship Model between the Central Government and Local Governments according to Clarke and Stewart (1989) can be divided into three; namely, the relative autonomy model, the agency model, and the interaction model. The relative autonomy model provides relatively large freedoms to regional government while respecting the existence of the Central Government. The emphasis is on granting freedom of actions to regional governments within the framework of powers / duties and responsibilities that have been formulated by legislations (*Huda, 2009*).

The agency model is where the Regional Governments do not have enough power, so its existence is seen more as an agent of the Central Government, whose duties are to carry out Central Government

policies. Therefore, in this model, various detailed instructions in the legislation as a control mechanism are very prominent. In this model, local own-source revenues are not important, and the regional financial system is dominated by assistance from the Central Government. Then, the interaction model is a model in which the existence and role of regional governments is determined by the interactions that occur between the central government and regional governments (*Huda, 2009*).

According to Bagir Manan (2001), the relationship between the central and regional governments is determined by four factors; namely, the relationship of authority, financial relationship, supervisory relationship, and the relationship arising from the organizational structure of government in the region. Furthermore, to sharpen this authority, Enny Nurbaningsih (2011) states that the intended authority is the right to take actions within certain limits based on the provisions of the prevailing laws and regulations. The authority has a very important meaning in the administration of government because it is the main basis for every legal action at every level of government in a country. Without a legal basis, various legal actions and actions carried out by each level of government can be categorized as actions and actions that are contrary to the law and can also be categorized as violations of the principles of good governance (*Muhammad Ridwansyah, 2017*).

Referring to the definition of authority based on the opinion of Enny Nurbaningsih above, the regional heads who have carried out regional quarantine can be said to have violated the authority.

This violation of authority is reflected in Law No. 6/2018 on Health Quarantine. Article 49 paragraph 3 states that the Regional Quarantine is determined by a Minister who represents the Central Government. Furthermore, Article 55 paragraph 1 states that during the implementation of Quarantine Area, the basic living needs of people in quarantine areas are the responsibility of the Central Government. So what is the role of the local governments?

As stipulated in paragraph 2 of Article 55, the Central Government, in the implementation of Regional Quarantine as referred to in paragraph (1), shall involve the Regional Governments and related parties. Therefore, it is very clear that what the regional heads are doing violates an authority. Even if it refers to the opinion of Enny Nurbaningsih above, then the regional heads also violate good governance.

Good governance, if referring to the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) definition in 1997, is a process of good governance, by involving stakeholders in various economic and socio-political sectors and utilizing various resources, such as natural resources, finance, and people for the interests of the people carried out by adhering to the principles of justice, equity, equality, efficiency, transparency, and accountability.

Good governance actors are the government, civil society, and business actors. Good governance allows the alignment of roles between the three actors above. The main key to understanding good governance is understanding of the principles contained therein. In addition, the implementation of good and responsible governance will only be achieved if the implementation of political, economic and administrative authority of the three components of good governance has an equal network and interaction. Such interactions and partnerships can usually flourish if the principles of good governance are well implemented.

One form of implementing good governance is through the delivery of public services. Public services are a benchmark for the successful implementation of tasks and measuring government performance. Public service as a prime mover is also considered important by all actors from the element of good governance. Public officials, elements in civil society and the business world both have an interest in improving the performance of public services (*Neneng Siti Maryam, 2016*).

The regional quarantine policy, which was carried out without involving the community and business actors, will eventually make the preparations not mature. This can be seen by starting complaints in the community.

For example in Tegal City, the DPRD of Tegal considered that the implementation of quarantine areas in Tegal City a failure. This is due to the still minimal number of disinfectant booths and medical staff, as well as the lack of good cooperation with the Traffic Unit (Satlantas) Police City Police (Kapolresta) Tegal. This lack of cooperation has resulted in many who have passed the medical examinations (*inews.id, 30 / 3*).

In addition, traders have also complained about a decrease in their sales turnovers. A number of small traders in the informal sector in Tegal City have complained about the lockdown policy implemented by the local government. They claimed that they were economically hampered because the policy killed their businesses (*Serat.id, 1/4*). Seeing this, the “initiative” policy of the regional heads with regional quarantine ultimately have helped disrupt public services.

Conclusion

Indonesia is a unitary state that gives space to the local governments to carry out its government affairs and regional autonomy to the fullest extent possible according to the law. However, the policies made by the regional governments will be counter-productive if they do not synergize with the central government in handling the COVID-19 pandemic.

Therefore, synergy between the Central and Regional Governments is needed in overcoming the COVID-19 outbreak. The Central Government must strengthen coordination with the Regional Governments to stem the spread of COVID-19. On the other hand, the Regional Governments must also be given the freedom of innovation to break the distribution chain without having to bypass the authority of the Central Government. Thus, it is hoped that Indonesia will be able to perform well with the COVID-19 outbreak.

- Arfianto Purbolaksono -

Synergy is needed between the Central Government and Local Governments in overcoming the COVID-19 outbreak. The Central Government must strengthen coordination with the Regional Governments to stem the spread of COVID-19. On the other hand, local governments must also be given the freedom of innovation to break the distribution chain without having to bypass the authority of the Central Government.

COVID-19, Middle Income Trap, and Fiscal Efforts

“The global economic picture is looking bleak with a recession in almost every developed economy across the world.” Yes, this introductory sentence is in fact true. The escalation of the spread of COVID-19 will have a very significant impact on global economic growth. Late last March, a number of world economic institutions gave bad news.

JP Morgan began its forecast for global economic growth in 2020 with projected global economic growth would fall to -1.1 percent. Then, The Economist Intelligence Unit also predicted that global economic growth in 2020 would drop by -2.2 percent. Finally, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has not been able to provide projected economic growth. However, it does not change the conclusion that these three institutions’ projections that global economic growth will experience a contraction.

This also happened in Indonesia, Indonesia’s macroeconomic outlook scenario has been revised and made more realistic. From the previous 5.3 percent (APBN 2020), Indonesia’s economic growth target has been revised into two scenarios, 2.3 percent for the heavy scenario and -0.4 percent for the very severe scenario. This is a bitter pill to swallow. Like it or not, we must be prepared to face this nightmare.

Bitter consequences

The facts above have consequences that are not easy. Vision 2045, which targets Indonesia to become a country with high income reaching IDR 320 million per capita per year, is difficult to achieve. Because, to achieve this target, the Indonesian economy must grow at an average of at least 5.7 percent per year in the next 25 years.

With the current conditions, the target to grow 5.7 percent per year seems impossible. Also, we do not know how long COVID-19

will last. These conditions are also worsened by the economic performance of Indonesia, which in recent years has shown less encouraging results. From the records of the Central Statistics Agency (BPS), the average rate of economic growth in Indonesia in these two decades (1999 to 2019) is only 5.17 percent year on year / yoy. These conditions seem to be a big rock that prevents Indonesia from moving forward.

From a theoretical level, Molton and Khaw (2006) states that economic growth is a fundamental indicator for economic health. The growth rate of a country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is the economic growth which, according to Mankiw (2010), is a reason for a country to become richer and increase its standards of living. Therefore, the speed of economic growth becomes an important factor, considering that high-growth economy will have a positive impact on various welfare indicators.

The target of 5.7 percent must be achieved by Indonesia. If it fails, Indonesia might lose the opportunity to become a developed country. When it is 100 years old, Indonesia will continue to be trapped in the middle income trap. Because after that, Indonesia's population will begin to age, so it will be increasingly difficult to promote economic growth. If it fails to become a developed country in 2045, Indonesia will be growing old before being rich (*Kompas.id, 2020*).

The Short-term Fiscal Policy Focus

What can we do to mitigate the threat of Indonesia's failure to achieve Vision 2045? In the current pandemic situation, fiscal policy is a powerful weapon. There are at least two strategies that the government must take. First, the government must implement a short-term policy to reduce the spread of COVID-19. Despite the limited fiscal space conditions, the government must think of the right solution in the presence of these constraints.

One option that can be done now is to relocate government spending from activities that have low urgency to health spending to cope with the COVID-19 outbreak and social protections. As we all know, at present, Indonesia is faced with the problem of the lack of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) for health workers. This is an issue that must be addressed as quickly as possible. PPE is a protective weapon for medical personnel and can also be an incentive for medical workers to improve their performance.

In addition to the health sector, the government must also allocate funds for social safety nets. The impact of COVID-19 on the socio-economic conditions of the Indonesian people is not easy. The impact of non-operation of the business can indeed be felt directly by the workers. One example is the notes of the Work Meeting and Hearing Meeting of the Minister of Manpower. As many as 153 companies have been recorded as having laid off workers. As a result, there are about 9,183 workers laid off. Furthermore, there are around 56 companies that take action to lay off their employees. As a result, there were around 2,311 workers who did not receive Wages / Wages during and until the COVID-19 pandemic is over.

Of course, this problem will have complex consequences. In the first round, they will experience income shocks in the medium and long terms. This problem, if left unchecked, will lead to social vulnerability in the community. The short-term effect is the emergence of a desire to commit criminal acts by public elements. Forms of criminal acts that may occur are thefts, mugging, pickpocketing, bullying, looting, and even murders. Concrete examples of criminal actions due to the COVID-19 pandemic can be seen in various news media stories that have begun to occur in other countries, such as Italy, India, China, America. Even in Indonesia, crimes have begun to occur due to reduced economic income as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic (*Tempo.co, 2020*).

These things must be immediately mitigated by the government through the reallocation of social safety net spending. According to the author, the Direct Cash Assistance (BLT) scheme is still the most effective solution to prevent social unrest in the community. Behaviorally, Indonesian people still tend to feel “safe” and “comfortable” when they already hold cash directly.

That way, social vulnerability fluctuations can be overcome in the short term by providing liquid funds to the community to compensate for the losses of income and also to encourage people’s purchasing power.

By focusing the allocation of government spending on the health sector and mitigating social turmoil through the food expenditure budget the faster, the Indonesian economy can recover and return to balance.

Preparing for the Long Term

In addition to focusing on the short term, the government must immediately prepare itself for recovery strategies and must increase long-term economic growth. As explained above, Indonesia is currently also threatened by failing to achieve the Vision 2045 target of becoming a high-income country.

Indonesia's current economic structure is also not strong enough and cannot encourage economic growth of more than 6 percent, as the Indonesian economy is driven more by consumption, not investment. Furthermore, this fragile structure is also reflected in the low contribution of the manufacturing and export industries to GDP. In fact, the characteristic of developed countries is having strong industries and exports.

So far, Indonesia's economy has been supported more by natural resource wealth. The low capacity of the industry in the country makes natural resources cannot be processed optimally into products with high added value. This makes Indonesia's economic growth tend to be unstable because it is greatly influenced by commodity prices of natural resources.

To grow higher, Indonesia's dependence on natural resource commodities must be reduced. According to BPS data, in the period 2002-2016, exports of Indonesian manufactured products grew at an average rate of only 9.7 percent per year. This figure was lower than those in India and Thailand, especially compared to Vietnam, which grew at an average level of 116.5 percent per year.

Therefore, raw commodities are not exported directly but are processed first in the country so that the added value obtained by this nation will become greater. In addition to increasing added value, this method will also encourage domestic industrialization.

The industrialization performance will be more optimal if it is accompanied by efficiency and innovation. This means that the quality of Indonesia's human resources must be improved in order to be able to utilize technology to drive production and efficiency. To encourage the manufacturing industry, Indonesia needs capital or investment. One way that can be done is to attract foreign funds into Indonesia or increase investment financing in the country.

Furthermore, foreign funds withdrawn should be in the form of direct investment or foreign direct investment (FDI). If foreign funds are in the forms of short-term financial portfolios or hot money, then there will be risks of a sudden reversal or of a massive withdrawal of funds in a short time. These will make the rupiah exchange rate weaken significantly. Conversely, if they are in the form of FDI, the factories and the assets will remain in Indonesia no matter what.

In addition, a “standard fiscal stimulus” to encourage demand and production, such as relaxation of import taxes, can also be applied. According to the author, this policy should be applied to restore the economy in a long term rather than a short term. For the short term, it is very important to focus on the things that the author convey above.

As a result, various policy schemes to survive in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic and strategies to achieve economic targets are absolutely necessary. Both must be harmonized in order to achieve the vision of Indonesia going forward 2045.

- M. Rifki Fadilah -

In the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, Indonesia’s macroeconomic outlook scenario has been revised and made more realistic. As a result, Vision 2045z which targets Indonesia to become a high-income country, is difficult to achieve.

Exchange Rate Turmoil and BI's Triple Interventions

Not only has an economic crisis impacted the real sector in Indonesia, the COVID-19 pandemic has also managed to shake the financial sector. The rupiah exchange rate against the US dollar has weakened by 16.77 percent in the past month. Then, on a year-to-date basis, Rupiah depreciation has reached a level of 14.55 percent (*CNBC Indonesia, 26/03*). The weakening of the exchange rate is the deepest after the 1998 economic crisis (*Fadilah, 2020*). Of course the volatility of the exchange rate is a signal that Indonesia's economic stability is not okay.

Rupiah is fluctuating; what is going on?

There are two causes of the weakening of the rupiah; namely, the Government Securities (SBN) market with a contribution of 85 percent and the capital market with a contribution of 15 percent (*Investor Daily, 2020*). The contribution of the SBN market turmoil to the rupiah has been greater than that of the stock market. This has been caused by the accumulation of foreign ownership in bonds or Government Securities (SUN), which is quite large. According to the data collected by the author, as of September 17, 2019, the foreign ownership of Indonesian bonds has reached a level of 45.83 percent.

Theoretically, foreign ownership in debt securities has two sides. First, the large portion of foreign ownership reflects that the confidence of market participants in a country's economy is quite good. That is, the country is able to provide investment certainty, political stability, and also to promise returns to investors.

Conversely, if the country's economy worsens with the emergence of a negative sentiment, such as the disruption of economic fundamentals and political turmoil, these conditions will make investors feel uncomfortable. In the aftermath, the risk averse behavior will also make investors choose to release assets in the denomination of

the country's currency. As a result, there will be capital outflows / capital flights from a country (usually a developing country / an emerging market) towards developed countries, which are considered safe havens

At an empirical level, this has proven to be true, especially what has happened recently in Indonesia. After the outbreak of the COVID-19 case in Indonesia, the market behaviors have begun to show panic. As a result, investors have released their investments in the Indonesian financial market, both in stocks and debt securities, in search of safe havens from the worst possible COVID-19 pandemic. According to Bank Indonesia (BI) records, the flows of foreign capital out of Indonesia have reached IDR 105.1 trillion. The capital outflows consisted of IDR92.8 trillion of SBN and IDR8.3 trillion of shares as of Friday, March 30, 2020.

Unfortunately, the SBN purchased by foreign investors is usually in the form of rupiah. As a result, so many investors have sold their bonds, then exchanged the money into US dollars. The law of demand-supply has occurred. The demand for the dollar has increased, while the supply is assumed to be constant, causing the 'price' of the US dollar against the rupiah to increase. This is what causes the rupiah to fluctuate.

BI's Triple Interventions

To reduce the volatility of the Rupiah, Bank Indonesia (BI) has adopted a triple-intervention policy. First, by directly intervening in the spot market through the selling of foreign exchanges (forex). Second, the interventions in the Domestic Non Deliverable Forward (DNDF) market in the domestic foreign exchange derivatives market to direct the rupiah level in the medium term. Third, the interventions to purchase SBN released by foreign investors (accumulated SBN assets) to maintain SBN yield in order to withstand further weakening of the rupiah.

Recorded until last March, BI said that it had intervened by buying SBN on the secondary market year-to-date amounting to Rp103 trillion. This means that BI has spent an average of around IDR 35 trillion every month to calm the Rupiah while maintaining SBN yield, which has changed from 6.56 percent to 6.95 percent. Meanwhile, the cost of interventions in the spot market and the DNDF derivative market issued by BI are estimated to cost around Rp150-200 Trillion (*Investor Daily, 2020*).

There is an interesting thing that we can look at from this triple-intervention policy. It is as if BI facilitates investors' panic behavior. As a result, investors (speculators) are always happy because they know that BI will incur such large costs instead of maintaining the stability of the Rupiah. In a pandemic situation like this, according to the opinion of the writer, no matter what costs BI will incur will not be enough to face investors (speculators) to stabilize the exchange rate. The speculators actually use this momentum to continue to make profits with BI's policy to buy SBN on the secondary market.

It should also be noted that this policy has uneasy consequences. If we only rely on BI to intervene in the SBN market continuously, sooner or later foreign exchange reserves will diminish. This will only increase the vulnerability of the rupiah's turmoil in the future. BI data show that at the end of February 2020, Indonesia's foreign exchange reserves were recorded at US \$ 130.4 billion. This figure was lower compared to the position in January 2020, which amounted to US \$ 131.7 billion (BI, 2020).

The COVID-19 outbreak has also made the Indonesian economic team aware that the strength of the domestic economy and structural reforms was important to support economic efficiency and productivity, so Rupiah's exposure to foreigners has been reduced. Therefore, cross-authority coordination is needed in dealing with the rupiah turmoil in the midst of this complicated situation.

Coordination

It is time for other authorities, such as the Ministry of Finance and the Financial Services Authority (OJK), to be actively involved in stabilizing the rupiah in the long run. There are at least two priorities that can be done. *First*, deepening the SBN secondary market by involving more domestic and private corporate banks to participate in the secondary market. With this scenario, each shock can be absorbed at the domestic level.

Second, in the short to medium term, BI can also think about raising the benchmark interest rate. By taking the option of raising the benchmark interest rate, this will make the financial market competitive. As a result, the investors will transfer their assets to Indonesia. The next round is that the flows of funds will be greater and will make the Rupiah strong again.

Third, in the medium to long term, policy makers must strengthen Indonesia's manufacturing sector, especially export oriented indus-

tries. In addition, policy makers must also diversify export destinations; for example, by continuing efforts to target non-traditional partners, such as African countries, Latin America and Eastern Europe, without neglecting efforts to deepen exports to traditional trading partner countries.

An increase in exports will indirectly increase the strength of Indonesia's foreign exchange reserves (cadex) through the accumulation of DHE (Foreign Exchange Export Results). In the end, the coordination and cooperation between BI, OJK and the Ministry of Finance in reducing the rupiah will be more effective than BI's own actions through triple interventiona, which have already spent hundreds of trillions of rupiah.

- M. Rifki Fadilah -

The rupiah exchange rate against the US dollar has weakened by 16.77 percent in the past month. Therefore, there is a need for coordination and cooperation between BI, OJK, and the Ministry of Finance in reducing the weakening of the rupiah.

Legal Weaknesses in COVID-19 Handling

It must be admitted, the Corona Virus Disease-2019 (COVID-19) has caught the world's attention. In Indonesia, the situation is the same. The country is struggling against the spread of the virus that has killed as many as 240 people. There were 2,956 infected people as of 9 April 2020 (*kawalCOVID19.id*).

One of the efforts that has been taken by the Government of Indonesia is to initiate a policy of Large-Scale Social Restrictions (PSBB). This policy has then been followed by the issuance of several legal products, such as Presidential Decree (Keppres) Number 11/2020 concerning Determination of Corona Virus Disease-2019 Community Health Emergency (KKM COVID-19) and Government Regulation (PP) Number 21/2020 concerning Large-scale Social Restrictions in the Context of Accelerating Handling of Corona Virus Disease- 2019.

In order to anticipate the handling of costs and their impact on national stability and economy, the Government also did not forget to immediately change the design and relocate State Budget (APBN) posts, which was previously stipulated in Law Number 20/2019 concerning APBN Fiscal Year 2020. This change can be seen in Government Regulation in Lieu of Law (Perppu) Number 1/2020 concerning State Financial Policy and Financial System Stability for Handling Corona Virus Disease-2019 and/or in the Context of Facing Threats against National Economy and/or Financial System Stability.

Although it can be said to be too late to be published, but the issuance of several legal product packages is at least one thing that deserves appreciation.

Even so, some of the legal products still contain a number of weaknesses that show the Government's unpreparedness. The Presidential Decree that determines the status of KKM COVID-19, for

example, can be considered issued without going through the provisions of a Government Regulation, such as mandated by Article 10 paragraph (4) of Law Number 6/2018 concerning Health Quarantine. Likewise, a similar process can be seen in the issuance of PP No. 21/2020 and Perppu No. 1/2020, which will be discussed more in the next section.

The Weaknesses in PP No. 21/2020

PP No. 21/2020, which was issued on March 31, appears to be present merely as “formality”. At least there are some weaknesses that can be described in this paper. First, the title and designation seem incompatible with the intent of the Parental Law; namely Law No. 6/2018.

The PSBB policy itself is actually one of the four scenarios that can be applied in order to carry out risk factor mitigation actions in areas that have been determined as KKM. Three other policy scenarios are Home Quarantine, Regional Quarantine and Hospital Quarantine.

To be able to implement these four policy scenarios, Article 60 of Law No. 6/2018 states “Further provisions regarding the criteria and implementation of House Quarantine, Regional Quarantine, Hospital Quarantine, and Large Scale Social Restrictions are regulated by a Government Regulation”. This means that the formation of the Government Regulation referred to should still contain general provisions related to the four policy scenarios.

PP No. 21/2020 has provided specific provisions only on the choice of the PSBB scenario only. In terms of the title, in the theory of legislation, the words “with” and “in” in the clause of the article that determine the delegation of the formation of implementing regulations should be interpreted differently.

If what is written is the word “in”, then the implementing regulation may be given a different title from the provisions of the article delegating its establishment. Meanwhile, if what is written is the word “with”, then the title of the implementing regulation must be in accordance with the provisions that have been referred to rigidly in the delegation article. A concrete example of this can be seen in clause Article 60 of Law Number 6/2018.

Berkaca pada ketentuan itu, maka PP No. 21 Tahun 2020 jelas dapat dikatakan bukan merupakan PP yang sebagaimana dimaksud oleh

UU No. 6 Tahun 2018. Adapun jika dipaksakan demikian, maka konsekuensinya, Pemerintah harus membentuk PP baru lagi apabila di kemudian hari kembali terjadi pandemi yang mengakibatkan kondisi KKM. Hal ini tentu semakin menambah deretan permasalahan jumlah regulasi Indonesia, yang saat ini tengah mengalami “obesitas”.

Reflecting on that provision, PP Number 21/2020 can be said is not a PP as referred to in Law no. 6/2018. The consequence is that the Government must form a new PP again if a pandemic returns to the conditions of the KKM in the future. This certainly adds to the problem of the number of Indonesian regulations, which is currently experiencing “obesity”.

The second problem in this PP is the absence of coercive power that can ensure the effectiveness of the implementation of this PSBB. The Netherlands, which applies a similar policy scenario, has been enforcing fines (administrative fines) for each subject that violates the provisions of physical distancing. If the violator is a person, the Dutch authorities will impose a fine of up to 400 Euros. If the violator is legal entity, such as a company, the amount can reach 4000 Euros (*government.nl, 23/03*).

In Indonesia, the PSBB implementation has proven ineffective over the past two weeks. The Government should make a number of adjustments, such as the amounts of the fines, which should be determined proportionally based on the parameters of the background of the violator and what is the type of the violation. The violators can be poor people whose lives will actually be more difficult due to the imposition of fines.

The Weaknesses of Perppu Number 1/2020

Perppu Number 1/2020 also has a number of weaknesses that need to be addressed. The reason is that this Perppu seems to be more inclined to deal with “financial emergencies”, rather than health emergencies as critical as the COVID-19 outbreak.

If examined carefully, some of the articles seem to be unlimited, because they regulates the deficit limits beyond the 2023 fiscal year. In fact, as is known, the APBN Law itself is a type of law that is regulated periodically to keep up with economic developments and dynamics.

Some of the articles even replicate the provisions of the Omnibus Law Draft Bill (RUU) on Taxation, which has been rejected by various civil society coalitions. One example is Article 5 of this Perppu,

which reduces corporate income tax rates to 22% for 2020 and 2021, 20% in 2022, and 17% for domestic taxpayers listed on the stock exchange. In the draft Tax Omnibus Law Bill, similar incentives for this corporate income tax rate can be found in Article 3.

The rejection of this policy is certainly not without a reason. The provisions previously stipulated in this tax Omnibus law are considered problematic because there is no guarantee of decreasing corporate income tax will stimulate the economy directly, moreover guaranteeing that there will be no layoffs. The benefits of this incentive can be misused by corporations for other purposes; for example, tax evasion, from which Indonesia has suffered a loss of Rp 500 trillion in the last 10 years (*katadata.co.id*, 22/03/2016).

Article 16 of this Perppu gives Bank Indonesia (BI) the authority to provide funding to corporations by means of a Repurchase Agreement (Repo) of Government Securities. With this scheme, it is possible for BI to provide massive liquidity under the pretext of saving banks / companies during a crisis. This will provide opportunities for massive corruption, like the BI Liquidity Assistance (BLBI) in 1998, which became a mega corruption scandal with a total state loss of Rp4.58 trillion in the BPK version.

Another confusion is Article 27, which gives impunity to state officials from civil and criminal charges. All actions or decisions to implement this Perppu also cannot be considered objects of a lawsuit that can be submitted to the State Administrative Court. This clearly shows legal anomaly, which has clearly violated the principles of accountability in good governance and accountability of state finances.

Some Recommendations

From the notes above, the Government should review various legal products that have been published in connection with efforts to deal with COVID-19. In addition to streamlining PSBB options that are considered the “best course of actions” to prevent the spread of this pandemic, the Government also needs to ensure that there will be no one attempting to take advantage of this complicated situation. These two things need to be addressed so that Indonesia will not fall deeper. The victims should not suffer more from the additional financial disasters that are intentionally caused by persons who have lost their conscience in the midst of a pandemic situation.

- Muhammad Aulia Y Guzasiah -

The government needs to review various legal products that are issued to deal with COVID-19. In addition to streamlining PSBB options, which are considered the “best course of actions” to prevent the spread of this pandemic, the Government also needs to ensure that there will be no one attempting to take advantage of this complicated situation.

Questioning the COVID-19 Prevention Steps

The spread of Corona Virus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) is getting faster. Until March 30, 2020, the number of people from 199 countries of the world who had tested positive for the disease had touched a level of 722,196 people (*kompas.com*, 30/03).

In Indonesia alone, the number of positive cases exposed had reached 1,285 people. 114 people had died, while only 64 people had recovered (*COVID19.go.id*, 29/03). These figures were This number, indeed is quite lame when compared to the number that is on a global worse than those in the world, where scale, where 152,065 people had recovered, while 34,009 people had died (*worldometers.info*, 30/03).

In neighboring countries, such as Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand, the numbers of victims who died and who recovered can be more controlled. The cases can be seen in the following table:

Country	Total cases	Total Number of Deaths	Total Number of Recovered Patients
Malaysia	2.470	35	388
Thailand	1.660	7	229
Singapura	844	3	212

Source: *worldometers.info*, 30/03.

Interestingly, these countries are not countries that have recently announced their first COVID-19 cases. Long before Indonesia announced its first case on March 2, 2020 (*bangkokpost.com*, 2/03), Thailand had already announced it on January 13, 2020 (*scmp.com*, 1/13), followed by Singapore on January 23, 2020 (*thejakartapost.com*, 01/23), and Malaysia on January 25, 2020 (*dunia.tempco.co*, 01/25).

The control over the numbers the victims who died and of those who recovered is certainly inseparable from the firm actions of their respective governments to be prompt in taking appropriate preventive measures. This is clearly not easy. It requires an in-depth study, a rigorous evaluation, a courage to sacrifice, and putting aside some vital aspects, such as economics and politics.

Half-hearted precautionary steps

While the spread of COVID-19 has increasingly penetrated and taken its toll, the Indonesian Government seems to have a half-hearted attitude. After nearly two months of denying the risks, even making jokes and anti-science narratives about this pandemic, the Government has not shown a serious and progressive attitude at all.

Instead of evaluating while taking a precise attitude, the Government today is still gambling with social or physical distancing instructions. The failure to encourage physical distancing during the first 14 days has now been followed by the next uncertain step: Large-scale Social Restrictions (PSBB), which are made possible by establishing Civil Emergency Status. This was heard directly from the statement of President Joko Widodo, who on Monday, March 30, 2020 yesterday gave a statement to the press (*cnnindonesia.com*, 30/03).

Both of them clearly depart from the different legal basis and indicators. The PSBB policy departs from Law Number 6/2018 concerning Health Outrage, while the Civil Emergency Status of the Government Regulation in Lieu of Law Number 23/1959 concerning Dangerous Conditions. The first policy, of course, still has direct relevance to the current situation, where considerations related to the Law clearly state the possibility of emergence of health problems and diseases that have the potential to spread rapidly, which will lead to extraordinary health emergency conditions.

This correlation seems negligent from the purpose of the second policy, because the history of the formation of the legal basis is not intended to overcome the extraordinary circumstances caused by health problems or certain diseases, but by rebellion, riots due to natural disasters, the danger of war, and the dangers of special circumstances that can endanger the life of the country.

Fortunately, the second step was then canceled. There was a wave of demands to immediately establish the state of Public Health Emergency, as an initial step that should have been taken from the beginning. This step was finally taken on March 31, 2020 through

Presidential Decree No. 11 of 2020 concerning Determination of Corona Virus Disease Public Health 2019. This was also followed by the issuance of Government Regulation Number 21 of 2020 concerning Large-Scale Social Restrictions in the Context of Accelerating Handling of Corona Virus Disease 2019.

Nevertheless, the steps taken are certainly still not believed to be optimal enough to reduce the increasingly alarming level of the spread of COVID-19. The Government Regulation as issued above forgets the essential substance that should be regulated if indeed the chosen physical distancing steps are to be carried out effectively; namely, the absence of measurable enforcement power that can ensure the effectiveness of norm implementation.

This can at least be realized in the form of granting authority to be able to provide fines (administrative fines) to violators. The amount must be determined proportionally based on the parameters of the violating subject and what are the violations, violators are poor people whose lives will actually be more difficult due to the imposition of fines. It could also be that the violator is a rich fool, or an entity not a person in this case a legal entity *rechtspersoon*.

Reflecting on the Approaches of Other Countries

Just for comparison, the Netherlands, which is one of the countries that implemented similar preventive measures, still allows people to leave their houses, but not more than three people at a time. If ignored, the authority can immediately impose fines on offenders, whose amounts can reach 400 euros for people and 4000 euros for companies (*government.nl*, 3/23).

In addition to fines, another thing that can be learned from the application of physical distancing in the Netherlands is a matter of access to information, along with its speed and accuracy. This can be seen not only in constant and real-time case monitorin. The information continues to be evaluated responsively on the *rivm.nl* site. In addition, the website contains almost every information related to the number of patients positively exposed, who have been treated in hospitals, who have died, epicenter maps, and so on.

In Indonesia, this seems to still be a serious problem. Although the official online site has been launched, transparency, completeness, accuracy, and speed still seem doubtful. There is limited capacity of examinations, which can only be done 1,000 people per day with a record high of 1,439 on March 27, 2020 (*Kompas.id*, 31/03). This

is clearly lagging far behind the capacity of South Korean examinations, which can carry out 10,000 tests per day.

Not surprisingly, in the midst of the limitations and the slow handling of this pandemic, many experts have actually criticized that the physical distancing step was chosen again. Long before the Presidential Decree and Government Regulation above were issued, there were many recommendations that flooded the Government to immediately conduct local lockdown or quarantine limited to certain areas with a minimum time period of 14 days. At least, this should be conducted in areas that are clearly the epicenter of the outbreak, such as in Jakarta, Bogor, Depok, Tangerang, South Tangerang, and Bekasi.

This can be seen from countries that have succeeded in reducing and breaking the chain of transmission of COVID-19 through this step, like China and Malaysia. For this reason, the Government should also think about other progressive measures after continuing to bet on the implementation of physical distancing, which has proven ineffective in the past two weeks.

If not, it is not impossible that the Indonesian people will face the worst case scenario. An example is the prediction of Iqbal Elyazar, a biostatistics researcher at the Eijkman-Oxford Clinical Research Unit, which estimates COVID-19 transmission will reach 71,000 by the end of April 2020 in Indonesia, or far worse: 2.5 million by mid-month May 2020. The predicted number of patients who died is 240,244 people according to a research from the Faculty of Public Health, University of Indonesia (FKM UI), dated March 27, 2020.

The government should also think about other progressive steps after continuing to gamble with the implementation of physical distancing, which has proven ineffective in the past two weeks. If not, it is not impossible that the Indonesian people will face the worst case scenario.

- Muhammad Aulia Y Guzasiah -

Public Communications during the Coronavirus Pandemic

Before the outbreak of COVID-19 emerged, governments in all countries had their windows of opportunity to anticipate the effects of this virus. Some countries have responded earlier by giving information seriously, ranging from campaigning a physical distancing to announcing a lockdown policy.

However, there were also those who chose to be unresponsive because they thought that this virus did not have a chance to infect their countries, like Indonesia. As a result, responses from stakeholders before the coronavirus outbreak hit in Indonesia were filled with controversial statements. In fact, the government has delivered its public communications without seriousness. As a result, the urgency of the information broadcast has failed to be captured by the public.

This is well illustrated by the conditions of the people who have not succeeded in shifting their orientation towards preventing the spread of the virus. Almost like in Italy before the lockdown, Indonesian people are still mobilizing and doing social interactions. Even when the campaigns to maintain physical distancing are called for, many people still continue to do activities in the crowds.

Bad Public Communications and Impacts

Before the first two cases of the coronavirus emerged on March 2, 2020, communications carried out by stakeholders were never packaged properly. The nuance of perpetuating situations was arising and was not followed by anticipatory policy options. The lack of seriousness of public officials' statements, which were also amplified by the mass media, had then become the dominant public conversations.

In an online forum entitled "Calamity for the Word: Political Communication Blunder of Jokowi's Cabinet in the Pandemic Era", LP3ES Center for Media and Democracy Director Wijayanto not-

ed that there were 37 controversial statements about COVID-19 made by government officials from the Cabinet of President Joko Widodo. The statements were divided into three periods: 13 statements during the pre-crisis, four statements during the initial phase of the crisis, and 20 statements during the crisis.

In fact, what is really needed by communities in facing uncertainty is straightforward statements from the government as an authoritative institution. Of course at that time the public needed to know more about the potential distribution of coronavirus in Indonesia, rather than hearing the assumptions without evidence presented as a reason about why COVID-19 had not yet entered Indonesia.

At this point, there was something the government had missed. Even though, the element of public health is a priority in a pandemic situation, the state also has its credibility in governing at stake. Not just a matter of resilience in the economy during and after the pandemic, there should also be the government's ability to respond and cope with the spread of virus.

Public communications by Indonesian officials are quite contrast when compared to leaders of other countries. The difference is seen in the clarity of the messages conveyed. British Prime Minister (PM) Boris Johnson, through national television broadcasts in the UK, did not only convey the call for restrictions on interactions, but also explicitly stated the reasons why the restrictions were vital. He stated, *"if too many people become seriously unwell at one time, the NHS (National Health Service) will be unable to handle it - meaning more people are likely to die, not just from coronavirus but from other illnesses as well."*

In addition to giving reasons about the importance of an action, conveying how to implement advice appropriately is also important for the government. New Zealand PM Jacinda Ardern has given a solid example, telling all people in New Zealand to *"act like you have COVID-19."* Followed by an explanation that every move made by someone can endanger others (*theguardian.com*, 25/3).

Those two forms of communications above are different from the controversial statements that have been sent in Indonesia. This is an example of inaccurate government responses when faced with threats that have the potential to impact the society.


Ideally, several alternative policies should be prepared earlier in the face of few possibilities. If in the early days of a pandemic the calculation is difficult to carry out, so all policy options appear blurry, then the choice to include citizens in providing inputs can be a real option.

This was done by public health experts in Norway. In 2007, three public health experts named Kristiansen, Halvorsen, and Gyrd-Hansen conducted a study of public perceptions of the threat of influenza pandemic that might afflict the Norwegian population. Assessments are assisted by survey instruments, which are carried out online. The findings of this survey then illustrate the level of preparedness and preventive measures that will be taken by the community in facing the possibility of a virus outbreak there.

Widening participation, for example through public perception surveys, in the face of a pandemic is an excellent option. The data collected can then be used as a guide and a calculation material for the government in providing policy options for dealing with a threatening virus pandemic.

Also, the information obtained is important to be shared with the public. Because after all, the information that has been collected is related to the lives of many people, so it can be considered as public information. With this logic, the consequences that follow, namely transparency and accountability, must be applied by the government.

More anticipatory schemes, such as what mentioned above, were not actually taken by the Indonesian government. Reality shows different things, and in the end it has an impact on the way people perceive potential impending danger. The calls for restrictions of interactions have also not been internalized in the minds of the people. This can be seen through a number of actions taken by people during the pandemic.



Source: Coronavirus Resource Center, John Hopkins University and Medicine.

In the middle of March 2020, a fluctuating increase in corona cases per day was followed by actions that illustrated lack of knowledge from most of the people. This could be seen from tourist sites, such as beach in Banten Province, which were still full of tourists on weekends (*kompas.com*, 18/3). The actions become inappropriate, because the coronavirus cases started to increase consistently every day in the second week, from March 8 to 15.

Even after the consistent increase in the number of coronavirus cases reached a level of above 100 cases per day, citizen mobilization continues. The complexity is becoming high because the 'homecoming' activities carried out by residents in Jakarta have the potential to be a factor that accelerates the spread of COVID-19 to other Indonesia regions. Although on the one hand, a number of local governments have taken initiatives to play their part in efforts to ward off the spread of this virus, such as Yogyakarta, which issued prerequisites to travelers (*tirto.id*, 27/3).

However, such significant restriction measures have only emerged sporadically in a number of regions. While the central government, with its role as a national level authoritative institution, has not yet issued a straight forward policy (such as a 'half-hearted' homecoming policy), which can limit movements, and therefore can also limit the spread of the virus.

State-Citizens Interactions

The use of public communication instruments then shifts as coronavirus cases continue to grow. The Government spokesperson for the handling of COVID-19 was appointed. Meaning that the government has understood its important position as the main source of communities' reference. On the other hand, this could also be considered as a form of the seriousness from the government after responding to the issue with jokes and controversial statements.

The flows of communications then build up in a vertical form, where the government is the party that provides information services to the public. In the academic article written by Chadwick and May (2003), this form of communication is called the managerial model. The focus of this model is on the efficient delivery of government information to citizens assumed to be 'users'.

An interesting note from Chadwick and May in defining this model is a matter of the logic of its constituents. The managerial model holds that accelerating the provision of information will automatically "open" the government. This means that transparency and accountability are automatically attached to information that is quickly conveyed to the public.

In fact, information dissemination is also based on certain calculations of the consequences. As stated in Article 2 paragraph 4 of Law Number 14/2008 concerning Public Information Openness (UU KIP), which states that some information can be excluded to be conveyed to the public. The action was carried out based on the protection of a greater interest, so the closure of public information is legal.

This form of interaction becoming our nearest challenge in the pandemic era. Because there are never guarantees and exact calculations related to which interests can then be considered 'greater' according to the KIP Law. We can do two things if confronted with the current model of state and citizen interaction. First, to conduct public supervision, which is also a basic principle of the KIP Law, in the administration of the state. Second, to hope that the government will immediately announce all information that have impacts on the lives of many people in the corona pandemic.

Chaotic conditions have become one of the potential burdening factors of the imposition of transparency and accountability of information. The Government's competence can be put into ques-

tion, if it is reluctant to open information thoroughly when the community is receiving real threats that are often not recognized.

If there are things that must be sacrificed in decision making, then this paper is positioned to make citizens' safety a priority compared to other fields. For this reason, a straightforward and directed form of public communication is needed, and this should be followed by a commitment to implement it through policies.

- Rifqi Rachman -

Although public health is a priority in a pandemic situation, the state also has its credibility at stake. Not just a matter of resilience in the economy during and after a pandemic, there should also be the government's ability to respond and cope with the spread of virus.

Public Participation, the Key to Breaking the COVID-19 Spread

A number of efforts to anticipate the spread and treatment of the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) have been carried out by various countries with quite different strategies. In Indonesia, taking into account the direction of the World Health Organization (WHO), the Ministry of Health (MoH) as mandated, has issued a preparedness document, including a simulation of handling, which is faster than a number of other countries.

An irony is that the preparedness is not in line with the availability of Human Resources (HR) and health facilities. Not many laboratories can test patient specimens. Test kits are also still available in small numbers. Isolation at home is recommended because of the limitations of the health facilities in treating patients. Since it was announced on March 2, the number of positive patients has continued to grow. Indonesia has lost its golden time in the early detection of patients. This has prompted President Joko Widodo, or Jokowi, to determine the status of a health emergency on March 31.

Several policy scenarios have been made by the Central Government in preventing the spread and in suppressing the economic impacts. These include the Policy of Large Scale Social Restrictions (PSBB), including Physical Distancing and Staying at Home; the accelerated registrations of the Pre-employment Card program; the relaxation of Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) loans; the Direct Cash Assistance (BLT) for underprivileged communities etc. Without the support of the public and community involvement, especially in efforts to prevent the spread, it would be impossible to break the COVID-19 spread.

Encouraging Public Participation

According to John Hopkins University data, the percentage of deaths in Indonesia compared to a number of countries infected

with the virus is fairly high, 8.9 percent (*Kompas.com*, 30/03). This figure exceeds the percentage in China by 4 percent of deaths. Until April 3, 2020, through the COVID-19 Info Center website, Indonesia has shown a significant increase in the number of deaths; that is, as many as 170 people from 1790 positive patients. This is certainly very worrying.

Breaking the COVID-19 spread requires a spirit of mutual cooperation. The Central Government with its capacity will not be able to handle this outbreak alone. The Central Government and Local Governments (Pemda) should have good coordination or communication. In these circumstances, the community needs to be encouraged to participate and to become frontline actors in breaking the spread. The awareness and commitment to contribute will be the key to the success of public participation.

In the Deddy Corbuzier video uploaded on March 17, 2020, Achmad Yuriawan, the Spokesperson for the Government in handling COVID-19 said that the management of news related to COVID-19 was carried out by the Government because of the unpreparedness of the community in responding to news. This is intended to prevent panic or chaos in the community. However, the conditions have led to public unrest.

There will also be news hoaxes. In fact, the Taskforce for the Acceleration of Handling COVID-19 has launched the portal www.COVID19.go.id as an official source of information. Encouraging people to be frontline actors needs to be supported by transparency, including accurate data from the Government. The government is also committed to implementing open government. Transparency or openness must remain accountable whether the community is ready or not. Openness will also create public trust, as the Central Government is expected as the highest authority in Indonesia.

Reflections and Recommendations

Observing the existing conditions, news management in the context of management of public behavior is not entirely wrong, however, it cannot be justified either. Facing an outbreak like this, ideally, the public already understands the correct prevention measures. One example is the Clean and Healthy Lifestyle (PHBS), or better known as the Healthy Living Movement (GERMAS) program, such as sneezing and cough ethics, what are hand sanitizers and how are they used, when to wear masks, and so on.

The fact is that in Indonesia, inequality in access to knowledge or education and the internet has caused many people to not get the same information and find it difficult to understand the importance of being involved in breaking the COVID-19 spread.

When an appeal was made for physical distancing and staying at home, those who have already heard about the appeal actually keep attending mass gatherings, going back to hometown, and so on. In fact, there are also a number of people who reject the funerals of the bodies in their neighborhoods. These are very sad conditions. This illustrates that some members of the public do not understand and do not support the Government's policy of suppressing the spread of COVID-19.

The Government's lack of aggressiveness in providing information needs to be improved immediately through the Taskforce for the Acceleration of Handling COVID-19; for example, the information dissemination of SehatPedia application, as one of the MoH media that provides various features of COVID-19, including efforts to reduce anxiety.

However, a number of existing policies also need to be reviewed to be realistic, for example the PSBB policy. Local governments need to provide clear guidelines and what steps need to be taken so that the community can anticipate the practice of the policy. In addition, the Central and Local Governments also need to ensure that all information needs to be disseminated to the public via SMS and official websites. They should also conduct risk management measures such as ensuring the supplies of basic needs.

As a nation that upholds the spirit of gotong royong or mutual cooperation, various forms of mutual commitment need to be developed and carried out. The Government of Indonesia through the COVID-19 Cluster has registered 15,250 volunteers. According to data entered as of April 1, 2020, the 15,250 volunteers were divided into 2,529 volunteers for medical and 12,721 for non-medical affairs (*bnpb.go.id, 02/04*). Until now, the volunteer registration is still open through the *deskrelawanpb.bnpb.go.id/COVID-19* site.

In addition to human resources, contributing in the form of donations is also necessary. A number of Local Governments as well as various organizations or movements in the community are raising

funds to be distributed to both medical workers, affected communities and others. However, the most important thing is to stay at home, wearing masks if outside the house, physical distancing, leaving the house only for urgent matters, and so on.

The community is also expected to not provide stigma to health workers and patients. Amid hoaxes, sharing positive and accurate news and also motivating others will create a better atmosphere. In essence, massive public participation will have a significant impact on preventing, managing, and breaking the COVID-19 spread.

- **Vunny Wijaya** -

Indonesia has lost the golden time in the early detection of COVID-19. Some concerns need to be addressed by the Central and Local Governments. In addition, massive public participation is expected so that it will have a significant impact on breaking the COVID-19 spread.

State Power Centralization in the Pandemic Period

“The health quarantine policy, including territorial quarantines, is within the authority of the central government, not regional administrations.” President Joko Widodo

The excerpt above is the culmination of the confusion that occurred between the Central and regional governments regarding the COVID-19 pandemic anticipation that occurred in Indonesia. Soon after that, the statement was followed by the emergence of the Minister of Health Regulation Number 9 of 2020 concerning Large-Scale Social Limitation Guidelines in the framework of Accelerating Anticipation of COVID-19 (Permenkes PSBB). Such regulation has a centralistic nuance, with the Minister of Health (Menkes) as the central point of validity of its implementation. In the Permenkes PSBB itself, there are several things that need to be underlined. Few of them are about a matter of authorities and procedural matters that give regions no other available options.

However, is the one-door centralization of anticipation model through the Permenkes PSBB for many regions in Indonesia effective? Is the model in line with needs for quick actions? This paper tries to examine Permenkes PSBB in regards with the anticipation at the regional level in Indonesia.

The Centralized Characteristics of the PSBB Policy

Permenkes PSBB manifests a very clear form of concentration of authority. It is proven by facts that actors that have a very important role in providing validity PSBB implementation are the Indonesia's COVID-19 Task Force and a team that examines the feasibility of imposing PSBB in an area. The team has also been formed by the Minister of Health.

Furthermore, there are procedures for regions for implementing PSBB in their areas. Article 6 from Permenkes PSBB states that regions that wish to implement PSBB must submit a request letter to the Minister of Health first. This letter should be completed by other supporting documents, such as the number of cases and the distribution of cases, local transmission events, and regional readiness from several aspects.

Such a detour still has to face another challenge; namely, the duration consumed from the request phase to the stipulation of the PSBB. The time spent starting from the request to the implementation in regions can reach up to five days. The breakdown of the total time comes from several stages:

1. Two additional days for a Regional Government to re-submit the application to the Minister of Health, when the supporting data in the initial application are considered incomplete.
2. One day to review and provide recommendations to the Minister of Health, conducted by Indonesia's COVID-19 Task Force and the Minister of Health's assessment team.
3. Two days after the application has been received from a region, the Minister of Health has to decide whether or not PSBB is imposed in that region.

Even for the district and municipal level, this bureaucratic stage needs to be added by arrange a consultation with the governor in their area. However, there are no further explanations about the outputs expected from the consultation carried out by the regents or mayors to the governors. This regulation states that the letter submitted by the regency or municipal to the Minister of Health must be forwarded to the governor.

Apart from Permenkes PSBB, regional governments are actually helped by the presence of Government Regulation in Lieu of Law Number 1 of 2020 concerning State Financial Policy and Financial System Stability for Anticipate COVID-19 Pandemic and/or in the Context of Facing Threats that Endanger the National Economy and/or Financial System Stability (*Perppu 1/2020*). Article 3 paragraph 1 from this regulation gives regional governments the authority to prioritize the use of budget allocations for certain activities (refocusing), changes in allocations, and the use of APBD.

Nonetheless, as of this writing created, the Minister of the Home Affairs (Mendagri), Tito Karnavian, has not made a Permendagri that regulates the terms of prioritizing the use of budget allocations as stipulated in Article 3 paragraph 1 of Perppu 1 of 2020. It is this characteristic of centralization of power that then sacrifices the responsiveness of the Regional Government in the current crisis. Even though, Article 4 of Law Number 6 of 2018 regarding Health Quarantine itself states that the responsibility for protecting public health rests with the Central Government and also regional governments.

The Central Government is Not Reaching Out

There is one fundamental problem; namely the policy implementation accuracy, if governance in times of crisis is carried out centrally by the government. Problems faced by an area are based on specific needs, so they are very likely to be different from those in other regions. Of course the differences are arising from the empirical facts that exist in a particular region.

This gap will then cause dissonance in dealing with the corona virus spread in Indonesia. We also remember the lockdown policies that were independently adopted by several regions, such as City of Tegal, City of Tasikmalaya, to Papua Province (*kompas.com*, 29/3). However, with the existence of regulation such as Permenkes, all regions finally have to make decisions within the legal corridor prepared by the central government, which is PSBB.

The rules of the game provided by the Central Government have then forced regional governments to take a detour in overcoming corona cases in their own territories. Moreover, PSBB still has a weakness in its reach. This rule only accommodates the affected areas, so areas without cases that want to apply PSBB as an effort to prevent the virus spread face difficulties.

Limitations toward local governments like this are unfortunate, because the pandemic should be handled with the principle of subsidiarity. This principle is the placement of independence in smaller authorities, such as local governments, to make decisions. This is based on an understanding of the closeness of an entity to the effects caused, such as an area for the potential spread or local transmission of virus.

The centralized authority during crisis has not only be found in the

case of corona in Indonesia. During the swine flu pandemic in the UK in 2009, according to Chambers, Barker, and Rouse (2012), the central government also did an intervention when dealing with the swine flu outbreak in Birmingham. From the experience that they wrote in an academic article, it was noted that the application of central policy had no sensitivity to empirical reality on the ground. They argued that the Central Government saw England “as a single epidemiological unit, rather than synchronised the policy approach to the spatiality of the disease.”

The discrepancy then made Chambers, Barker, and Rouse put 12 key principles for the management of emerging infectious disease events. These principles are related to the development of surveillance systems and the use of analog methods in collecting data. These are then followed by ensuring that the epidemiological data submitted are able to encourage strategic and operational responses.

The next principle is to isolate and provide early treatments, to use established systems to provide operational responses, to ensure a balanced strategy in the local and national levels, and to be prepared to modify or to stop responses according to current condition. Authors also agree on the importance of providing education to the community, using limited representative advisory groups to inform and provide recommendations to stakeholders, encourage transparency, communicate effectively, and promoting public health perspectives.

Those principal points are a good precedence, which are very likely to be adopted by the Indonesian Government in carrying out management during a pandemic. This view must be put forward, rather than making a bureaucratic coordination between the central and the regional governments in the midst of a crisis.

Additionally, what needs to be remembered as *raison d'être* of managing a health crisis is a quick yet accurate treatment so that people are protected from the infection possibility. Therefore, the effectiveness, flexibility, and proportionality should be applied in the forms of contextual, responsive, and not centralized policies.

Finally, the Central Government should also provide leeway for the regional governments to be more optimal in anticipating corona cases. The Central Government must be able to provide more trust and autonomy to the regions.

Raison d'être for a health crisis management is a quick treatment so that the community is protected from possible infection of the disease. Therefore, the effectiveness, flexibility, and proportionality should be implemented in the form of contextual, responsive, and not centralized policies.

Behind #Dirumahaja: COVID-19 Pandemic and Women's Vulnerability to the Risk of Domestic Violence

Everyone may be enjoying social distancing mechanism by doing work or learning from home. Apparently, carrying out all activities from home is able to suppress the spread of the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. However, if it is examined more closely, behind the walls of self-isolation at home, women face great vulnerability, especially related to domestic violence.

Reporting from the Guardian (28/3), the lockdown policy in various cities in the world has sounded a warning alarm to vulnerable groups, especially women. In the COVID-19's hometown, Hubei Province, the number of reports of domestic violence cases to the police has tripled in only one area during the lockdown in February. According to statistics there, the number has increased from 47 cases last year to 162 cases this year. As many as 90 percent of the causes of violence in that period have indeed been related to the COVID-19 pandemic.

This pattern has later been recognized globally. In France, there was an increase in the number of cases, reaching 32 percent for one week after the lockdown policy. In the city of Paris itself, the increase has reached a level of 36 percent (*Euronews*, 28/3). In other parts of the world, Brazil; for example, domestic violence has risen by 40-50 percent during the COVID-19 isolation period. Then, in the Cataluña regional government, the number of reports through the helpline search channel has increased by 20 percent on the first day of the quarantine period. Likewise in Cyprus, the number of reports via the helpline has reached 30 percent for one week after the first confirmed COVID-19 case in the area.

Furthermore, Singapore's civilian organization, AWARE's Women's Helpline has noted an increase in calls for assistance for domestic violence cases by 33 percent in February (*Channel News Asia*, 26/3). Then, in the UK, the number of calls to the helpline has reached 65 percent during the week after lockdown, where most

of the cases were related to domestic violence. In fact, in Chicago, United States, there were 90 calls in one day that entered the Illinois Domestic Violence Hotline when the quarantine policy was implemented (*Herald Review, 19/3*).

In addition, as reported by CNN Indonesia (30/3), there was a surge of up to 75 percent in the Google search related to the services of providing domestic violence assistance during the termination of non-public government services in Australia. The charity for victims of domestic violence in the state of New South Wales, Women's Safety, revealed that there was more than a 40 percent increase in the number of clients, a third of which occurred during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The warning through the increase in numbers only illustrates cases where women were able to seek help. In many situations, many victims could not report because they were helpless, afraid of being heard, or prevented from leaving the house by their spouse.

Civil organizations dealing with women in Italy have reported that the reporting rate via the helpline channel has fallen sharply. Unfortunately, there are many texts and e-mails that describe the helplessness of the victim in these situations. In fact, many women also do not have many options to have access to the provision of aid services in developing countries. Seeing these conditions, the issue of women's vulnerability to potential domestic violence needs to be a common concern in Indonesia during the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic.

The Risks of Violence against Women during the COVID-19 Pandemic

Gender-based violence is getting worse when there are humanitarian tragedies and health disasters like today. Let us look at the history of the Ebola and Zika epidemics in the African continent a few years ago.

Many reports have proven that the level of sexual and domestic violence occurred during an outbreak. The economic impact of the 2013-2016 Ebola epidemic in West Africa placed women and children at the risks of exploitation and great sexual violence. For example, in Guinea, almost 92 percent of women experienced domestic violence, and 95 percent of girls experienced circumcision (female genital mutilation) (*Davies & Bennett, 2016*).

Another research conducted by Korkoyah & Wreh (2015) shows that gender-based violence is vulnerable during the Ebola crisis. As many as 22.9 percent of the research respondents above revealed that cases of gender-based violence occurred in various forms, domestic violence, sexual violence, rape and others. 32 percent of respondents were in urban areas and 24 percent are in rural areas.

Looking at the situation, Lewis (2020) in his article in *The Atlantic*, revealed that the level of violence in the domestic area will get worse in the lock-down period, both in developed and developing countries. Various factors, such as stress levels, alcohol consumption and economic hardship are the causes of violence at home. In the quarantine period adopted by various countries today, that number can increase up to three times.

Quarantine policies are also used as coercive tools and controlling behavior by offenders, as well as closing access to support and security for victims. Another problem is that as this policy is implemented, victims do not receive the attention they should, especially from the authorized institutions, although domestic violence figures always show a trend that is getting worse during emergency situation of natural disasters or health disasters.

If it is examined deeper, the high level of domestic violence in a pandemic situation is suspected for several reasons. Hingorani (2020) in his commentary on Channel News Asia, revealed that during a pandemic crisis everyone lost control. This situation triggers perpetrators of violence to control victims with the aim of taking control of the situation that is happening. The problem is that in an abusive relationship, the level of violence can be worse.

Economic shocks can also create the risks of violence. A study of violence in the personal sphere and the global economic crisis in the United States found that unemployment rates and economic difficulties at the household level are positively related to abusive behaviors. The study also showed that unemployment will increase male control behavior over their partners.

The danger is that if the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic further threatens global economic conditions, it will be increasingly difficult for victims to abandon abusive relations. The victims will face the powerlessness to build independent financial conditions, especially if the victims come from households with low income levels. In Indonesia, a study by The Smeru Institute (2018) captures the fact

that women from low-income households were reluctant to report their domestic violence cases due to financial and time constraints and lack of confidence in accessing aid services.

Not to mention, the quarantine situation makes everyone have difficulty interacting with each other. When barriers between one another occur, psycho-social support for victims will be hampered. In this case, family, friends and parties who have full attention to the eradication of gender-based violence are needed to make the above rules remain accessible to their assistance seeking efforts.

Domestic Violence in Pandemic Situations and its Handling

Statistically, the number of domestic violence in Indonesia during the social distancing is unknown. However, in general, domestic violence cases in Indonesia are indeed very high. Komnas Perempuan's report in the Year End Note (Catahu) of 2020 shows that domestic violence has reached 11,105 cases in 2019 out of 14,719 reported cases.

Of the total cases, 59 percent (6,555 cases) were violence cases against wives and 21 percent (2,341 cases) were violence cases against girls. The most of the perpetrators were husbands, biological fathers, stepfathers/ fosters and uncles (Catahu Komnas Perempuan, 2020). Looking at the figures above, a house can be a vulnerable place for women and girls during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The policy of social distancing makes vulnerable groups more limited in seeking assistance services. According to reporting from the National Commission on Violence against Women (2020), in a pandemic situation like this, service providers handling victims of violence also reduce the types of services provided, how to access services, and operational hours.

With the spread of COVID-19 in various regions in Indonesia, the level of vulnerability to domestic violence is even more alarming. In this case, the institutions providing assistance to victims of violence, both formally and civil institutions, especially in the regions, should open up the widest possible information space related to the complaint mechanism for cases of violence and the stipulated operational hours. In addition, relevant authorities, such as the police, should strengthen access to services for victims of violence as the potential for increased domestic violence reporting increases during the crisis and post-pandemic COVID-19.

Then, the Task Force for the Acceleration of COVID-19 Handling should also be challenged to place a gender element in the handling of COVID-19. Related to the risks of violence, access to information and services that are inclusive of women, disabilities and the elderly is needed. The Task Force must also pay attention to aspects of psychosocial service support as an important service to support families vulnerable to mental health problems during and after the COVID-19 pandemic.

The vulnerability faced by domestic violence victims during the COVID-19 social distancing needs to get a response that is strict and gender sensitive.

In the socio-economic aspect, the risks of violence can also be reduced through social protection mechanisms for vulnerable groups and workers in the informal sector. With the large-scale social distancing that is being implemented right now, some economic problems can occur and ignite the risks of violence. Social protection is expected to be in the forms of social assistance for informal workers as well as utilization of the budget for social assistance in various regions for vulnerable groups.

Finally, although many reports say that the level of gender-based violence, especially domestic violence, is getting worse in a health disaster situation, cases like this are still not shared by everyone. Throughout the literature search, very few studies have dealt specifically with the above. As a result, there have not been many appropriate responses or follow-ups to be used as a basis for handling gender-based violence in a pandemic situation. Going forward, there needs to be clear data management by including gender elements as a basis for looking at projected policy responses and the handling of violence in similar situations in the future.

- Nopitri Wahyuni -

The Kartu Prakerja Implementation amid the COVID-19 Pandemic

The Kartu Prakerja, or the Pre-employment Card, was launched by President Joko Widodo, or Jokowi, on March 20, 2020. It was supposed to be launched in early January 2020. Through Presidential Instruction (Inpres) Number 4/2020 on Re-focusing Activities, Budget Reallocation, and Procurement of Goods and Services for the Acceleration of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19), this card was finally launched.

The Commencement of the Kartu Prakerja

The Kartu Prakerja is one of the programs targeted to be launched by President Jokowi in the second period of his leadership. This card is a derivative of the main Human Resources (HR) development project; namely, the development of vocational education and training. The card aims to reduce unemployment by targeting participants, including graduates of Vocational High Schools (SMK), graduates of High Schools (SMA) and laid off (PHK) workers.

As this program was planned, controversy grew because participants had the opportunity to get incentives. Many people protested why unemployment might even be paid. The use of the word incentives in the Kartu Prakerja program is not quite right. As it goes into efforts to realize social security, the word aid will be more appropriate.

In Indonesia, the participants of the Kartu Prakerja program will receive Rp. 3,550,000 for training costs and incentives (Kompas.com, 08/04). Participants will receive the money in stages from before the work training is completed. Since the beginning, the Ministry of Finance (Ministry of Finance) has budgeted funds of Rp 10 trillion for this program.

According to *finance.detik.com* (31/03), towards the selection of participants in the Kartu Prakerja, the budget was doubled to Rp 20 trillion. From the target audience of 2 million people, now, the number audience has also increased to 5.6 million. Participants will also get money to find work from around Rp. 650 thousand to Rp. 1 million per month for four months. This consideration was taken because of the COVID-19 situation in Indonesia.

According to the agenda, this April prospective participants can already register through the site that has been provided, *prakerja.go.id*, even though the Implementation Team and the Managing Management or Project Management Office (PMO) are still in the formation stage.

Notes on the Implementation of the Kartu Prakerja

According to the site *prakerja.go.id*, the types of training that can be taken in this program are online-based, because offline or face-to-face training will conflict with the policy of Large-Scale Social Restrictions (PSBB). A number of training partners or digital platforms have also joined, including Tokopedia, Bukalapak, Skill Academy by Ruangguru, MauBelajarApa, HarukaEdu, PijarMahir, Sekolah.mu and the Employment Information System (Sisnaker).

According to *Tempo.co* (04/04), the Minister of Manpower, Ida Fauziyah, said that there were 153 companies that had laid off 9,183 workers because of the impact of the economic slowdown due to COVID-19. As of April 1, 2020, 2,311 people had been laid off from 56 companies. Observing this situation, the Practice of Kartu Prakerja will prioritize workers affected by layoffs. The following recommendations need to be considered and carried out quickly.

First, the formation of an Implementation Team and Management Implementation is based on competence. Referring to Presidential Regulation Number 36/2020 concerning Work Competency Development through the Kartu Prakerja Program, an Executing Team and Implementing Management are needed. The team will be tasked with managing HR, finance, technology, data and infrastructure; aligning training programs in ministries / institutions; implementing partnerships with business actors; implementing cooperation with the Digital Platform; providing labor market information; implementing training product development; and developing business processes and operating systems.

Observing various functions that will be performed, this team will be the key to the success of the Kartu Prakerja practice. It will play a strategic role in the implementation of the Kartu Prakerja, so the preparation of this team needs to be done carefully by paying attention to its members' competencies. The selection of a team of professionals is also highly desirable. They should have networks amongst many large and small industries and make significant contributions to the development of the business world, including creating competent HR.

It is also hoped that through this team there will be good coordination and synergy, including with the Regional Government (Pemda). It should also increasingly reach the business world and digital platforms or conduct careful data collection for institutions that have joined the training, improving employment opportunities.

Second, ensuring the registration scheme and stages until the completion of training through clear guidelines. The existence of guidelines will make prospective participants understand well what must be prepared and done before and when they graduate. The guideline is also expected to prepare participants to be committed to supporting the success of this program.

Third, the development of a more integrated prakerja.go.id site. Some information and policies related to the Kartu Prakerja have been shared through the site, however, various developments are still needed. Candidate registration site for Civil Servants (CPNS); or sscn.bkn.go.id for example, can be used as best practice. Other menu items, such as registration, helpdesk, Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ), and a list of hoax news related to the Kartu Prakerja, are needed. This requires collaboration in particular with the Ministry of Communication and Information Technology (Kominfo) in monitoring the hoax news that appears during the implementation of this card.

Fourth, the digital platforms involved also need to finalize the curricula, training designs, and applications to be used and assessment methods to be provided.

-Vunny Wijaya -

The launch of the Kartu Prakerja has been carried out amid uncertain conditions due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Some concerns need to be addressed for the success of the Kartu Prakerja.

Women and Socio-Economic Vulnerability in the COVID-19 Pandemic

The COVID-19 pandemic has immediately led everyone to do activities from home. At this time, not only anyone has to deal with a health disaster crisis whose end is unknown, the economic portrait also looks increasingly bleak. When normal activities are suddenly held back for three months or more with a large-scale social distancing policy, the risks of a decrease in income or loss of work feel imminent.

At present, the gap is seen widening as the socio-economic impact of COVID-19 is raging. Working from home during social distancing, in many cases, is only experienced by middle and high income groups of people. Many low-income workers cannot work from home.

In a review of the economic impact of COVID-19 on the Bruegel website, even those with lower incomes will face higher financial difficulties. They do not have the ability to borrow or even save, which will ultimately make them experience income shocks in the medium to long term.

This group of people is very vulnerable to declining income or even losing their jobs as the pandemic crisis peaks. As a result of economic uncertainty caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, the International Labor Organization (ILO) predicts that there will be 25 million jobs lost (*World Economic Forum, 2020*). This triggers a very significant socio-economic vulnerability.

According to a study conducted by the Pew Research Center (2020), the risks of job loss for workers in the United States are very high. From these data, the greatest risk occurs in the category of young adults (25-44 years), with a percentage reaching 44 percent in all industries and 40 percent in the industry with the highest risk. What is meant by a high-risk industry is employment in the culinary industry, hospitality, child care services, retail, and transportation

services (*World Economic Forum, 2020*).

From a gender perspective, men have a risk of 53 percent in all industries and 49 percent in high-risk industries. Conversely, in the all industry category, women had a lower risk of job loss by 47 percent, but higher in the more vulnerable industry category, which was 51 percent. It can be concluded that women working in high risk industries will be rolled up by the COVID-19 pandemic. At its worst risk, many women workers are more vulnerable to losing their jobs. This challenge has also sparked a discussion of gender inequality in the COVID-19 socio-economic context.

COVID-19 Socio-Economic Impacts and Women's Vulnerability

Women face high socio-economic vulnerability due to the COVID-19 pandemic. In a scientific article by Alon et al (2020), the socio-economic consequences of COVID-19 move disproportionately to women. *The first* eroded sectors are sectors dominated by women workers, especially the service industry. Women who occupy the service sectors or the frontline health workers handling COVID-19 will certainly experience greater vulnerability.

In Indonesia, many women occupy three service sectors, with a percentage of more than 60 percent. The sectors are health services and social workforce, with the percentage reaching 67.5 percent, other service sectors reaching 62.3 percent, and the education service sector reaching 61.1 percent (BPS, 2016). Women will face difficulties in accessing social protection and facing a disproportionate burden in the economic sector, as social distancing creates closure of schools and social service systems (*ILO, 2018*).

Second, there are still many women involved in part-time work and informal work (*International Labor Organization, 2018*). When the policy of working from home during social distancing is imposed, it affects the economic welfare conditions of female workers, especially female informal workers and domestic workers. When women have income on a daily basis, the policy of working from home certainly makes them lose income during the implementation of this period.

According to data from the Central Statistics Agency (BPS) in 2017, female informal workers occupied 61.37 percent of the total workforce in Indonesia. Most of the informal sector female workers were in rural areas with a percentage of 77.61 percent, and the rest were in urban areas. According to ILO records (2020), informal

workers will be hit by the economic impact of COVID-19 because most of them do not have adequate access to existing social protection mechanisms and other forms of income support.

Specifically, vulnerability is also faced by workers in the domestic sector. At present, there are at least 4.2 million domestic workers or domestic workers who are responsible for taking care of all the employer's domestic work. Unfortunately, the rules about social distancing certainly do not apply to them very much. In fact, domestic workers will work longer hours than usual. This certainly worsens the condition of those who are also constrained by long working hours, low wages or no days off due to unclear employment contracts and their weak bargaining position with the employer.

Furthermore, with the obligation to be fully working during periods of social distancing, domestic workers are vulnerable to exploitations and abuses by the employers. Anxiety experienced by the family increases the risks of verbal, physical and sexual violence against domestic workers who are trapped in abusive situations (*Al Jazeera*, 5/4). In addition, they also must be exposed to the risks of COVID-19 transmission because they are not equipped with personal protective equipment and clear instructions.

The problem is that the socio-economic difficulties faced by domestic workers above will be related to their ability to access social protection in the form of health services and access to education for their children who are currently more dependent on the internet while learning from home (*The Jakarta Post*, 18 / 3).

Third, when the social distancing is implemented, women are forced to stop working and are charged with doing maintenance work at home without being paid more than usual. At the same time, women face difficulties in improving income conditions after the pandemic ends.

This could be seen in the Ebola crisis in Africa in 2014, Zika in 2015-2016 and the SARS outbreak several years ago. Based on these experiences, everyone's economic conditions are indeed affected by the Ebola outbreak in West Africa, but the men's incomes that were reached before the outbreak would recover faster than the women's incomes (*The New York Times*, 12/3). Undeniably, gender inequality in socio-economics continues to occur.

Relevant Social Protections

The socio-economic shocks caused by the COVID-19 pandemic have prompted the government to adopt a mix of social protection policies for women workers. Short-term steps taken by the government to provide social protection programs for low-income groups and informal workers need to be encouraged properly.

At present, the Government through the Ministry of Social Affairs has allocated a budget of up to Rp110 Trillion, which will be distributed to 10 million families in the *Program Keluarga Harapan* and 15.2 million families in the Program Sembako. In addition, the Ministry of Manpower with the *Program Kartu Pra-Kerja*, with a budget of Rp20 trillion, is also expected to reach 5.6 million laid-off workers, informal workers and MSME owners.

To implement the above policy, several things need to be considered to optimize the process of providing assistance. *First*, the process of providing assistance must provide equitable and inclusive access for vulnerable groups who are most entitled to social protections, especially groups that are constrained by literacy and information related to providing assistance or public services. In this case, families belonging to low-income community groups and families with the elderly and with disabilities should be the main concerns.

Second, the process of providing assistance must also pay attention to gender impacts and efforts to reduce gender inequality. In this case, the design of social protections must pay attention to beneficiaries, including women informal workers, who have been crushed by COVID-19 in vulnerable sectors. In addition, paying attention to the impact of gender in providing assistance can be realized through data management and evidence-based policy development to anticipate and mitigate the impact of gender on similar incidents.

To recover long-term shocks, the social protection program above must also be complemented by supporting programs that can safeguard the activities of these community groups in the long term, especially investments in health and education. The two fields are expected to help community groups to have resilience to the dynamics of socio-economic recovery due to the impact of COVID-19 in the medium and long terms.

- Nopitri Wahyuni -

The socio-economic impact of COVID-19 has caused inequality in the society, including against women. To respond to this, there must be relevant social protections to reduce the vulnerability faced by the shock.

**THE** **INDONESIAN INSTITUTE**
C E N T E R F O R P U B L I C P O L I C Y R E S E A R C H

The Indonesian Institute (TII) is a Center for Public Policy Research that was established on 21 October 2004 by a group of young, dynamic activists and intellectuals. **TII** is an independent, non-partisan, non-profit institution, whose main funding stems from grants and contributions from foundations, companies, and individuals.

TII has the aim of becoming a main research center in Indonesia for public policy matters and has committed to giving contribution to the debates over public policies and to improving the quality of the planning and results of public policy by promoting good governance principles and public participation in the policy processes in Indonesia.

TII's visions are public policies in Indonesia which highly uphold human rights and rule of law, as well as involve participation of various stakeholders and practice democratic good governance principles.

TII's missions are to conduct reliable research that is independent and non-partisan and to channel the research to the policy-makers, the private sector, and academia in order to improve the quality of Indonesian policy-makers.

TII also assumes the role of disseminating ideas to the society so that they are well informed about the policies that will have a good impact on the people's lives. In other words, **TII** has a position to support the democratization process and the public policy reform, as it will be involved in the process.

The scope of the research and review on public policies undertaken by **TII** includes economic, social, political, and legal affairs. The main activities which have been conducted by **TII** in order to achieve our vision and mission, are: research, surveys, facilitation and advocacy through training and working groups, public discussions, public education, weekly editorial articles ("*Wacana*" or Discourses), monthly analysis ("*Update Indonesia*" in Indonesian and "**The Indonesian Update**" in English), mid-year policy analysis ("Policy

Assessment”), annual policy analysis (“Indonesian Report”), and monthly discussion forum on policy issues (“The Indonesian Forum”).

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RESEARCH ON ECONOMIC AFFAIRS

The economy tends to be used as an indicator of the success of the government as a policy-maker. Economy plays an important role as one of the fundamentals of national development. Limited resources have often caused the government to face obstacles in implementing economic policies that will optimally benefit the people. The increase in the quality of the people's critical thinking has forced the government to conduct comprehensive studies in every decision-making process. In fact, the studies will not be stopped when the policy is already in place. Studies will be continued until the policy evaluation process.

TII focus on economic issues, such as monetary policy and fiscal policy, as well as issues on sustainable development by using analysis which refer to economic freedom principles. Monetary issues will focus on the Indonesian Central Bank to maintain economic stability, both regarding inflation and exchange rate. Meanwhile, fiscal policy will focus on the discussions over the National Budget and infrastructure development both in the regions and in the cities. In relation to sustainable development, **TII** research is focusing on productivity, competitiveness, infrastructure development, and development gap. In addition, **TII** also upholds economic freedom principles in highlighting the importance of individual freedom and involvement of private sectors in increasing development and improving welfare in Indonesia.

The TII Economic Research Division is present for those who are interested in the conditions of the economy. The results of the research are intended to assist policy-makers, regulators, and donor agencies in making decisions. The research that TII offers: **(1) Economic Policy Analysis; (2) Regional and Sectoral Prospects; and (3) Program Evaluation.**

RESEARCH ON LEGAL AFFAIRS

According to stipulations in Law No. 12 Year 2011 on the Formulation of Laws and Regulations, every bill which will be discussed by the legislative and the executive must be complemented with academic paper. This stipulation is also confirmed in Law No. 15 Year 2019 on the Amendment of Law No. 12 Year 2011 regarding the Formulation of Laws and Regulations.

Therefore, comprehensive research is very important and needed in making a qualified academic paper. With qualified academic papers, the bills will have strong academic foundation both from academic and content aspects. Furthermore, academic paper also functions as an early tracking over possibilities of overlapping laws and regulations, so that revocation of local regulations or other related issues which can be caused by legal, economic, or political aspects in the future, can be minimized as soon as possible.

TII offers normative and legal research related to harmonization and synchronization of laws and regulations, especially in making academic papers, legal opinion on harmonization and synchronization of laws and regulations, and legislative drafting for the formulation of local regulations bill drafts or other laws and regulations. In addition, **TII** also offers openly research on other legal issues related to Constitutional Law and Public Administration, Human Rights, and Political Corruption.

RESEARCH ON THE POLITICAL AFFAIRS

The enactment of Law No. 23 Year 2014 on the latest regulation on the Local Government, has created different relations between the Central Government and the Local Government. Entering the era of Bureaucracy Reform, specification of division of affairs of the Central Government and the Local Government has increasingly demanded the implementation of good governance principles. The government is demanded to be adaptive and responsive towards public aspiration and services. Therefore, public policy research become more important for both the Central Government and the Local Government to analyse context and current issues in the regions. The government must also consider various actors whether political actors or bureaucrats, as well as public's aspiration and other non-state actor in policy processes.

In order to respond those needs, **TII** research in political affairs offer policy assessment on various policies which were already applied or will be implemented. **TII** will look at socio-cultural, economy, legal, and political aspects in assessing public policies. Our research will be useful to assist government in formulating policies which are in line with context, priorities, and people's aspiration. **TII** also offers various breakthrough of transformative policies according to existing contexts in particular and Open Government principles' implementation in general, in order to increase public participation in policy processes, particularly in the era of the openness of public information.

Political Research Division of **TII** provide analysis and policy recommendations in order to generate strategic policy in the strengthening of democracy and the establishment of good governance both at the

national and local levels. Political research forms are offered by TII **(1) Public Policy Analysis, (2) Media Monitoring, (3) Mapping & Positioning Research, (4) Need Assessment Research, (5) Survey Indicator.**

RESEARCH ON THE SOCIAL AFFAIRS

Social development needs policy foundations that come from independent and accurate research. Social analysis is a need for the government, the businesspeople, academia, professionals, NGOs, and civil society to improve social development. Social analysis is important to identify strategic issues which are developing and to make the right stakeholders' mapping to promote significant change in the context of development, public policy, and democracy in Indonesia.

The Social Research Division is present to offer strong and valid recommendations to produce strategic, relevant, efficient and effective, and impactful policies, in addressing to existing various issues. For example, issues related to education, health, population, environment, women, children, and elderly. Social research that TII offers: **(1) Social Policy Analysis; (2) Explorative Research; (3) Mapping & Positioning Research; (4) Need Assessment Research; (5) Program Evaluation Research; and (5) Indicator Survey.**

PRE-ELECTION AND REGIONAL HEAD ELECTION

One of the activities carried out and offered by **TII** is a pre-election survey as well as a pre-election and regional head election. The reasons underlying the implementation of pre-election and regional head election surveys, namely: (1) A good election is a democratic process that can be arranged, calculated, and predicted in the resulting process; (2) Survey is one of the important and common discussions to measure, calculate, and predict how the process and results of the General Election and the Regional Head Election will take place, in accordance to the expectations of the candidates; (3) It is very important to win in the General Election and the Regional Head Election based on empirical, scientific, measurable and supportable data.

As one of the important aspects of a strategic candidate's election, the survey is useful for monitoring political power. In this case, the success team needs to conduct a survey for: **(1) mapping the candidate's position in public perception; (2) mapping voters' desires; (3) publishing the most effective political machinery used as voters;**

and (4) Looking for the most effective medium for the campaign.

EVALUATION OF A PROJECT OR A PROGRAM

One of the activities that have been performed and experienced offered by TII is a qualitative evaluation of the projects and programs of non-governmental organizations and government. Evaluation activities are offered TII stages of mid-term evaluation of the project/program (mid-term evaluation) and also the final evaluation at the end of the project/program (final evaluation).

As we know, the evaluation is an important step in the implementation of a project or program. Mid-Term Evaluation of the project or program is intended to look at and analyze the challenges, the overall learning takes place during the project or program, and make recommendations for the continuity of the project or program. Meanwhile, the final evaluation allows us to view and analyze the outcomes and the lessons learned to ensure the achievement of all the objectives of the project or program at the end of the project or program.

THE INDONESIAN FORUM

The Indonesian Forum is a monthly discussion activity on actual issues in the political, economic, social, legal, cultural, defense, and environmental fields. TII organizes these forums as media for competent resource persons, stakeholders, policymakers, civil society activists, academicians, and the media to meet and have discussion.

Themes that have been raised were the ones that have caught public attention, such as migrant workers, social conflicts, domestic politics, and local direct elections. The main consideration in picking a theme is sociological and political reality and the context of the relevant public policy at the time that the Indonesian Forum is delivered.

It is expected that the public can get the big picture of a particular event as the Indonesian Forum also presents relevant resource persons.

Since its inception, the Indonesian Institute is very aware of the passion of the public to get discussions that are not only rich in substance but also well formatted, which support balanced ideas exchanges ideas and the equal involvement of the different elements of the society.

The discussions, which are designed to only invite a limited number of participants, do not only feature idea exchanges but also regularly offer policy briefs (policy recommendations) to relevant policymakers and also summaries to the participants, especially the media people and the resource persons at the end of each discussion. Therefore, the discussions will not end without solutions.

LOCAL COUNCIL TRAINING

The roles and functions of local councils in monitoring local governments are very important. They need to ensure that participative and democratic policies will be espoused. Members of provincial and regent local councils are required to have strong capacity to understand democratization matters, regional autonomy, legislative techniques, budgeting, local Politics, and political marketing. Thus, it is important to empower members of local councils.

In order for local councils to be able to response every problem that will come out as a result of any policy implemented by the central government or local governments, the Indonesian Institute invites the leaderships and members of local councils to undergo training to improve their capacity.

WORKING GROUP

The Indonesian Institute believes that a good public policy process can be held with some engagement and empowerment of the stakeholders. The Indonesian Institute takes a role as one of mediator agencies to facilitate some forums in which the Government, Council Members, Private Sectors, NGOs and Academicians can meet in interactive forums. The Indonesian Institute provides facilitation on working groups and public advocacy.

The Indonesian Institute takes the role of mediator and facilitator in order to encourage the synergy of public policy work between the stakeholders and policy makers and also to have a synergy with funding agencies (donors).

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