

The Indonesian Update

Monthly Review on Economic, Legal, Security, Political, and Social Affairs



Main Report:

Omnibus Law and Threat of Centralization

Economics

- Anticipating the Impact of Coronavirus on Indonesian Tourism ■
- Questioning the Increase in Ojek Online Tariff ■

Politics

- Gerontocracy and Regional Leadership ■
- Political Corruption in the Case of the Red-Handed Operation (OTT) to Arrest a Commissioner of the KPU RI ■
- Identity Reconstruction of Indonesian Ex-ISIS Citizens ■
- The Relocation of the National Capital, How about the Jakarta's Fate? ■

Social

- Mental Health as a Regional Issue ■
- Conducting Economic Valuation of Unpaid Care Work ■
- Observing the Polemics over Evacuating Indonesian Citizens from Hubei to Natuna ■

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Contributors :

Arfianto Purbolaksono (Coordinator), Muhammad Aulia Y.Guzasiah,
Muhamad Rifki Fadilah, Nopitri Wahyuni, Rifqi Rachman, Vunny Wijaya.
Editor: Awan Wibowo Laksono Poesoro

FOREWORD

The February 2020 edition of the Indonesia Update raises a major report on the polemics over the preparations of the Omnibus Law. The Omnibus law itself will not only have an impact on the policies of the Central Government, but also have an impact on the policies that have been formulated by the regional governments. If it is not formed through a transparent process, and involving all policy makers from the central to regional levels, then the Omnibus Law is feared to add to policy problems in Indonesia.

In the economic field, this edition of the Update discusses the anticipation of the impact of the coronavirus on Indonesian tourism. The decline in the number of tourists from China and the loss of foreign exchange earnings will also be felt by the Indonesian tourism industry. Boosting the tourism demand from within the country is one solution that can be done. In addition, we also discuss plans to increase online motorcycle (ojol) taxi rates. The government is evaluating ojol tariffs and plans to increase again. The evaluation process should indeed be carried out, but it does not merely require that each evaluation result in a decision to raise tariffs.

In the political field, the Indonesian Update discusses the impeded regeneration of leadership in Indonesia due to the continued dominance of the older generations, also known as Gerontocracy. In addition, we discuss political corruption in the case of the arrest operation (OTT) of the former KPU Commissioner of the Republic of Indonesia, Wahyu Setiawan. Next, we discuss the polemics over the repatriation of Indonesian Citizens (WNI) who have become followers of ISIS. Then, we also discuss the planned relocation of the National Capital and the fate of Jakarta after the relocation.

In the social field, the Indonesian Update raises mental health issues that have not received much attention from local governments. In addition, we discuss the valuation of unpaid care work associated with improving social protection systems and other policies. Next, we discuss the evacuation of 238 Indonesians from Hubei to Natuna. Miscoordination between the Central Government and the Regional Government of Natuna raised polemics in the community.

The monthly publication of the Indonesian Update with actual themes is expected to help policymakers in government and business institutions - as

well as academics, think tanks, and elements of civil society, both domestic and foreign, to obtain actual information and contextual analysis of economic conditions, politics, social, and law in Indonesia, as well as an understanding of public policy in Indonesia.

Happy Reading.

Omnibus Law and Threat of Centralization

The simplification of rules as well pruning of laws and regulations need to be done to meet the challenges, changes, and needs that are growing. The number of laws and regulations has been considered too many.

In many forums, this situation has been expressed by many policy makers, including President Joko Widodo himself. They have been voicing that the number of laws or regulations is too high. In 2017 alone; for example, the number of regulations passed according to Jokowi was approximately around 42,000 (*nasional.kompas.com*, 9/10/2017).

These regulations overlap and negate one another. This certainly will not only impact on the limited spaces, movements and freedom of the people, but will also slow down the pace of the economy and national development.

For this reason, Jokowi has on several occasions ordered the efforts to deregulate laws and regulations. One of the ministers has to revoke 40 similar regulations (*nasional.kompas.com* 11/11/2019).

Another thing that has been introduced is a new concept of laws and regulations that is considered to be the ultimate solution to the chaotic problem of regulations; namely, omnibus law. In the list of National Legislation Program (Prolegnas) Medium Year 2020-2024, this new concept looks to have been applied in several draft bills (RUU). Among them are the Bill on Taxation Facilities to Strengthen the Economy, the Bill on the Development of the Financial Sector; the Bill on the Employment Creation; the Pharmacy Bill, the State Capital Bill.

Interestingly, one of the two bills, Cipta Lapangan Kerja, has been circulated and has been considered problematic in terms of the substance. The problems start from the formulation of the Bill that reduces the welfare of workers to the opportunity to restore the political configuration that is centralized in the relationship between

the Center and the regions. Seeing that, how exactly are the characteristics and characteristics of the concept of the omnibus law? And what is its influence on the relation between the Central Government and the regions?

The Concept of Omnibus Law

Etymologically, “omnibus” comes from Latin, which means “all” or “for all.” The 9th Edition of Black Law Dictionary, Bryan A. Garner (2009), states that “omnibus is related to dealing with numerous objector items at once; including many things or having various purposes.” In free translation, the omnibus can be interpreted as something related to or dealing with various objects or items at once; including many things or having various goals.

In practice, omnibus law is actually better known as the omnibus bill in the tradition of the common law legal system. In regulation-making, an omnibus bill is generally formed by making a new law to amend several laws at once. As the opinion of Marc Bosc and André Gagnon (2017), which explains it as a law that aims to amend, revoke, or stipulate simultaneously (merge) a law consisting of several related initiatives (rules) that were previously separate and independent.

Thus in general, the omnibus law can be understood as a method or concept of making regulations that combines several rules whose substance varies from several regulations into a large regulation that functions as a legal umbrella (Umbrella Law / Umbrella Act). With such a method of drafting, the law will automatically include several regulatory substances from various different regulations, being invalidated in part or in whole.

For this reason, the concept of the omnibus law is not infrequently used to overcome overlapping regulations and to simplify legislations. This is because the substance of the regulation can target the substance of the regulation in other laws and regulations. Both horizontally in the sense of the same ranks of the law, as well as vertically down to every level of legislation whose hierarchy is regulated according to Article 7 of Law Number 12 of 2011 concerning Formation of Legislation (UU P3), or which are indirectly arranged in a hierarchy based on Article 8.

Omnibus Law and Intersection towards Centralization

The omnibus law will not only have an impact on the policies of the Central Government but also have an impact on the policies that

have been formulated by autonomous regional governments. If it is not formed via transparent, open processes that involves all policy makers from the central to the regions, then the concept, which is believed to be a panacea for the chaotic conditions of the current regulations and regulations, could be disastrous.

People have started to worry; particularly, about the Employment Copyright Bill, which previously could not be accessed directly by the public, but suddenly it has been surprisingly circulating. Some of its articles are detrimental and have been criticized by many parties.

One of them is the authority of the President and the Minister of the Interior (Minister of Home Affairs), which is also regulated in Article 520 and Article 521 to dismiss a head or deputy regional head who does not implement the national strategic program agenda. This should not be a problem if it is associated with the Local Government Act, the principle of the unitary state, and a state administrative law doctrine. The author has previously discussed this in the article “Questioning the Dismissal of Regional Heads” (*theindonesianinstitute.com*, 3/01).

More serious problems can actually be found when the Bill limits the formation of regional regulations (*perda*) and regional head regulations (*perkada*) with one of the provisions whose arrangements cannot be found in UU P3, which is the main regulation of all legislative regulations. In Article 523 paragraph (1), local regulations and local regulations, are said to be prohibited from conflicting with the Central Government’s policies, the provisions of higher laws, public interests, and/or decency.

The Central Government’s policies themselves are further explained in Article 523 paragraph (1a), as the President’s policies are decided in a cabinet meeting or a limited meeting or implementation of the Presidential Instruction, which can take the forms of: the implementation of development programs; b. licensing and ease of doing business; c. services; and/or d. charging fees for services. There are no more detailed explanations related to what is the forms of the Central Government policies referred to this.

It does not stop there, as this provision can also be considered contrary to the 1945 Constitution (1945 Constitution). These provisions indirectly restrictive the authority of broad regional government administrators, which have previously been handed over to government affairs according to the principles of decentralization according to Article 18 paragraph (5) of the 1945 Constitution.

Closing

As a concept that can have a systemic impact, the preparations of a bill that uses the concept of the omnibus law must be made transparently and accountably. The various article formulations as described above, if not immediately revoked or removed from the bills, can certainly be a way to return to the abyss of centralization. For this reason, the omnibus law needs to be reviewed, involving all sectors of policy makers as well as the community.

This is not only necessary but also mandatory. Considering the nature of a law itself, the law gives restrictions and limits to the human rights of citizens. Thus, none of any drafting and forming a law can escape the processes that promote transparency, accountability and community participation.

- Muhammad Aulia Y. Guzasiah -

Omnibus law will not only have an impact on central government policies alone, but also an impact on the policies that have been formulated by the government of the autonomous region. If it is not formed through transparent, open processes that involve all policy makers from the central to the regions, then the valuable concept, which is expected to become a panacea for the chaotic conditions, could be disastrous.

Anticipating the Impact of Coronavirus on Indonesian Tourism

Entering the beginning of 2020, the world was horrified by the emergence of a Coronavirus outbreak in Wuhan, Hubei Province, China that has killed more than 400 people (CNN Indonesia.com, 04/02). To prevent a wider spread of the virus, the Chinese government has banned its citizens from traveling abroad including to Indonesia. Vice versa, the Indonesian government has temporarily suspended permits for all airlines heading to or from China (*Med-com.com*, 03/02).

The climax was that recently the Indonesian government temporarily revoked the policy of visa-free visit and visa on arrival (*CNN Indonesia.com*, 02/02) for all Chinese citizens. The ban also applies to foreign nationals who have traveled to China in the past 14 days.

It is undeniable that the outbreak of this virus has brought tremendous impact to countries in the world. The Indonesian tourism industry has also been affected.

If we look at the numbers of of foreign tourists (tourists), those from China rank second largest with a total of 2.07 million foreign tourists, or 12.86 percent of the total number of foreign terrorist. (*republika.com*, 03/02). The average number of foreign tourists visiting per month reaches 175,000 foreign tourists.

Overall, the number of foreign tourists visiting Indonesia during 2019 reached 16.11 million. The number is up 1.88 percent compared to that in 2018, which amounted to 15.81 million visits. One of the biggest increases occurred in the visits of foreign tourists from Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia, which grew at the levels of 26.65 percent, 19.78 percent and 19.07 percent, respectively.

Quoted from the website of the Ministry of Tourism and Creative Economy (Kemenparekraf) 2018, foreign tourists' Average Spending Per Arrival (ASPA) is US \$ 1,220. Meanwhile, the projected expenditures of foreign tourists from China in the global market reach an average of US \$ 1,139 per trip, which is equivalent to Rp15.9 million at the exchange rate of Rp13,940. This is certainly a good reference to reap foreign exchange (*Tempo.co*, 03/01/2019).

Of course, this policy will have a direct impact on the decline in the number of Chinese tourists coming to Indonesia and have a domino effect on the tourism industry in Indonesia.

The Impact has Begun

Some complaints have been made by entrepreneurs who are engaged in the accommodation sector. One of them was conveyed by the Indonesian Hotel and Restaurant Association (PHRI). The decline in Chinese tourist visits has already been felt in Manado and Bali. In Manado, on normal days the total number of tourist arrivals from the 'State of the Panda' could reach 70 percent. Currently, it has decrease to a level of aroud 30 percent (*Media Indonesia*, 04/02).

Quoting from the same source, the impact of coronavirus has also been felt by hoteliers in Bali. In the Low Season period as it is now, three-star hotel entrepreneurs should still get 40 percent of tourist visits. However, tourist arrivals are currently below 30 percent.

A number of hotels affected have now reduced the number of daily workers due to the lack of visitsm This is to avoid bankruptcy hotels because of the closure of flights to and from China.

Boosting Domestic Tourists

To overcome the weak demand for foreign tourists, especially from China, the authors provide recommendations that can be considered. One way is to boost tourism demand from within the country.

At present, the number of domestic tourist trips in 2018 grew 12.37 percent , or 303.4 million times, compared to the number of trips in 2017, which reached 270.82 million trips. In terms of expenditures, the total amount of domestic tourist expenditures in 2018 reached 291.02 trillion, up 17.89 percent from the realization of the total expenditures in 2017 valued at Rp253.45 trillion (*Katadata.co.id*, 03/07/2019).

The increase is due to the economic conditions of Indonesia, especially the people's per capita income, which is getting better. In addition, easy accessibility to tourist destination areas, such as the availability of road infrastructure, and adequate accommodation also encourage local tourists to travel.

Considering the huge potential for domestic tourism demand, it is expected that all parties involved in the tourism industry are keen to see this market niche. The tourism industry stakeholders, both government and private parties, need to make various incentives to encourage domestic tourism demand amid the weakening international tourism demand.

One of the incentives is to make discounts on airplanes or hotels and accommodations at tourist attractions. With a lower price incentive, local tourists will be increasingly interested in traveling within the country.

Coronavirus problem is indeed not good. Nevertheless, we must immediately mitigate it readily and carefully to fend off any losses that might result from it. Integrated cooperation and massive protection efforts are also needed for economic sectors that are very vulnerable to external shocks.

- M. Rifki Fadilah -

Coronavirus has successfully shocked the world. The decline in the number of foreign tourists from China and the loss of foreign exchange earnings have been felt by the Indonesian tourism industry. Boosting tourism demand from within the country is one solution that can be done.

Questioning the Increase in Ojek Online Tariff

Some time ago, there was a demonstration by online transportation (ojol) drivers regarding the evaluation of tariffs. Then, the Ministry of Transportation (Kemenhub) followed up on the demands of the drivers to review ojol tariffs. One of the replies was an increase in Jabodetabek tariffs. It is planned that the government will increase the ojol tariff to Rp2,500/ kilometer (*Kontan, 23/01*).

In accordance with the rules and regulations, the evaluation of the ojol tariff is in accordance with the Minister of Transportation Regulation No. 2 of 2019 concerning the existence of an evaluation of the quarter-ojol tariff. However, it is surprising that the tariff assessment has led to a recommendation to increase the ojol tariff.

The Role of Ojol Today

According to research from Alvira with 600 respondents in several major cities in Indonesia, 75.7 percent of respondents have used online transportation services. The survey results illustrate that there has been a shift in the choice of modes of public transportation from conventional transportation to online transportation.

In the Play Store alone, the go-jek application has reached 50 million downloads, while the Grab application has reached 100 million downloads. From this, it can be illustrated how large the number of users of online transportation services.

Not only that, according to research conducted by the Demographic Institute of the University of Indonesia, in 2018 the project contributed 8.2 trillion rupiahs to the driver's income, and 1.7 trillion rupiah to the UMKM partner's income. Meanwhile, according to research conducted by CSIS and Southeast Strategics, in 2018 Grab's contribution to the Indonesian economy amounted to 48.9 trillion rupiah.

This sizeable contribution shows that online transportation services have a significant influence on Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and household consumption in Indonesia.

The impact of an increase in online transport tariff

The increase in ojol tariffs will have a long domino effect. First, the increase in ojol tariffs without taking into account the willingness to pay of consumers will have an impact on demand for ojol.

Increasing ojol tariffs can have an impact on the decline in people's purchasing power. Declined public purchasing power can lead to reduced consumption. In the short term, the demand for ojol is inelastic. However, in the long run the demand for ojol will turn elastic as the substitution of ojol is discovered.

This assumption is true. Last year, when there was an increase in ojol tariffs, according to research by the Research Institute of Socio-Economic Development (RISED) in May 2019, there was a 75 percent decrease in orders in five cities; namely, Jakarta, Bandung, Surabaya, Makassar and Yogyakarta. It is not impossible with the increase in tariffs this year, the above events will also be repeated. The decline in demand for ojol will have an impact on the income of partners. As a result, the increase in the ojol tariff, which is intended to bring an increase in the income of ojol drivers, will actually backfire for drivers.

The two largest online transport service providers not only provide transportation services but also many other services. Goods purchasing and package delivery, as well as food delivery services, are services that are commonly used by the community, especially in big cities.

According to Singapore Nielsen research, in 2019, of 1000 respondents in Jakarta, Bandung, Surabaya, Balikpapan, Medan and Makassar, 95 percent of respondents said they had bought ready-to-eat food in the last three months. As many as 58 percent of respondents have used applications, such as Go-food and Grab-food. The results of this research indicate that food delivery services have a very large role in people's lifestyle today.

The increase in ojol tariffs will also have an impact on the increase in other service costs. This will in turn have an impact on the decrease in demand for online food purchases or services. In this case, it is not only the drivers and consumers whom are affected, Go-food and Grab-food partners will also experience the negative effects.

Finally, the ojol tariff increase will also have an impact on an increase in inflation. Moreover, the Central Statistics Agency (BPS) has also officially included ojol tariffs as a basis for calculating inflation or the Consumer Price Index (CPI). Data updating is carried out along with changes in consumption patterns of Indonesian people who have now begun to switch to digital lifestyle.

Recommendations

Seeing the enormous impact, the government may consider various possibilities that will occur. The government should not let the policy of raising tariffs actually conflict with the government's need to increase household consumption.

As a recommendation, the government needs to make a policy that does not damage the market price. The evaluation process should indeed be carried out, but it does not require that every evaluation result in a decision to raise tariffs. When the market situation allows for a reduction in tariffs, the government can take that step.

In addition, there are more important things that the government should be able to resolve. Among them are personal data protection and consumer protection for digital wallet users, which have recently become easy targets of cybercrime perpetrators.

If the government has set the upper and lower tariffs, in theory this will have the potential to damage market prices. This will actually lead to what is called deadweight loss, which is the costs borne by the community because the market does not work efficiently.

- M. Rifki Fadilah -

The government is evaluating ojol tariffs and plans to increase again. The evaluation process should indeed be carried out, but it does not merely require that each evaluation result in a decision to raise tariffs.

Gerontocracy and Regional Leadership

Introduction

The leadership in the executive domain that is dominated by the older generations is important to be highlighted these days. Rapid changes, as an excess of global and national growth in the era of technology and information, require understanding, flexibility, and an agile response to them. Meanwhile, limitation often occurs in the executive leadership, which is currently dominated by the older generations. They have difficulties in capturing the reality of expeditious changes as a whole.

In 2020, the opportunity for regeneration in the local executive leadership is present in the form of Regional Head Elections (Pilkada). Although it will take place in September 2020, the younger generations' involvement in them has slowly begun to form as a public discourse. So, will the participation of young people in practical politics encourage older generations to end their dominance?

Gerontocracy as Political Reality

The leadership model by the elder is called gerontocracy. This has been a long time phenomenon since the classical Greek era in its *polis*, and it still continues in the form of state (Suryajaya, 2016). In the Indonesian context, the prerequisites to hold public positions are also applied in the form of the minimum age required. This applies from the national level, such as presidential candidates, to the regional level. However, the minimum age varies from one another.

It is stated in Article 7 paragraph (2) letter e of Law Number 10 Year 2016 concerning Pilkada (UU Pilkada) that a citizen must be 30 years old to become a Candidate for Governor (Cagub) or Candidate for Deputy Governor (Cawagub). Meanwhile, to become a Candidate for Regent (Cabup) or Deputy Regent Candidate (Cawabup) and Candidate for Mayor and Deputy Mayor Candidate, the minimum age is 25 years old.

Does this regulation affect the age of regional leaders? This paper calculates the average age of the current governors. In January 2020, the average age of 34 governors (including the acting governors) is 57 years old. While the average age of 30 deputy governors (four provinces do not have deputy governors) is 53 years old.

As a trend, those numbers look quite far from the age of the younger generations. The definition of youth itself, referring to Law Number 40 of 2009 concerning Youth, is a maximum age of 30 years. If the perspectives used are more specific, a variety of meanings will appear. For example, the process of leadership regeneration in the Special Region of Yogyakarta certainly cannot be as fast as those in other regions, with no general elections for the governor. The privilege factor has then made Hamengkubowono X as the oldest governor, at 73 years old, out of 33 other active governors.

The existence of gerontocracy in the regional leader post has then led us to the next question: what is the real problem if the leadership is led by older generations? Some common beliefs perceive that wisdom and understanding of the world come with old age (*Sefa Dei, 1994 in Onebunne and Obasi, 2017*).

Pathology

The continuity of gerontocracy has been widely studied by a number of scholars. One of them states that the presence of the elder domination in leadership automatically becomes an opposition to the discourse of *juvenocracy*, which is the leadership by the younger generations (*Onebunne and Obasi, 2017*). Therefore, gerontocracy logically impedes the process of youth empowering, which indeed must be prepared as leaders after the era of older generations end.

In addition to the obstacles in the younger generations' empowering process, another diseases arising from the older generation leadership is presentism; which is a behavior in responding the past that is dominated by the style and experience of the present. Presentists, as the subjects who implement presentism, apply a perspective that has a focus on the present. Therefore, Thomas M. Crisp (2005) states that presentism is a "thesis about what there is, a thesis about the range of things to which we are ontologically committed."

Another problem has arisen. This is mainly related to the bias of the presentists in formulating policies that are also not sensible with the future (*Thompson, 2010*). Policies that do not support environmental sustainability are a clear example of how the orientation of

policy formulation in the present does not encompass the damage that is produced, and will be very difficult to repair in the future. Andy Green's (2017) writing also gives prominent arguments about how gerontocrats are unaware with the future. The older generations, in accordance with Green, want to enjoy the remnants of what they have and to focus on shorter horizons. Meanwhile, the younger generations have the tendency to invest in their futures.

Presentists will eventually become anachronic, because the basis used as the foundation of policy formulation is not appropriate in defining reality. Of course, we still remember the policy from the Mayor of Depok Mohammad Idris on traffic jams in his region. He played a song that he sang himself at crossroads, arguing the song was intended to reduce driver stressness (*kompas.com*, 1/9/2019). There were criticisms, because the definition of reality and what steps needed to be taken are anachronic.

The formation of dynasties is a further problem of gerontocracy. This awareness is based on an understanding of the limitations of powers by tenure in the context of democracy; *government pro tempore* (Thompson, 2010). Where any absolute power will meet the end.

Then, gerontocracy does not really end when the process of leadership regeneration is also infiltrated by the interests to extending the powers by the elderly. This phenomenon is very massive in Indonesia, and the regional executives are also inseparable from it. If it is not becoming a concern, then the leadership transition process will only be quasi-regeneration: young-faced with outdated ideas and characters.

Notes in the Pilkada 2020 Context

A total of 270 regions in the 2020 Simultaneous Elections (9 provinces, 224 districts and 37 cities) illustrate the magnitude of the opportunities for regional leadership regeneration to occur. However, established powers will undeniably contribute to this electoral process. Therefore, efforts to reduce the minimum age to register as a regional head candidate cannot be seen as a final solution for intergenerational inequality in the realm of regional leadership in Indonesia.

The awareness of the importance of maintaining power, supported by large resources, can actually extend the powers of the older generations and hijack the leadership tenure of the younger generations. Therefore, there are some notes. *First*, the imbalance of re-

sources of the younger generations makes it difficult to make meaningful participation. Moreover, the significance of electoral battles in Indonesia is very much dependent on the use of money. Kinship factors also make the path to practical politics increasingly steep for young people who want to begin a career in politics.

Because parties are unmoved by the demand for implementing merit system in regeneration and nomination, the young generations must be able to consolidate themselves and transform into a massive new force. Simultaneously, of course, this consolidation must avoid short-term political desires as happened in the labor movement, where the moment of strengthening ceases when the union leaders are decided to serve the established elite.

Second, the consensus that arises from the consolidation of the younger generations then creates a solid platform that is primarily related to the younger generations, especially about what they really need. If it is organized and has collective resources, taking part in the contestation can then become an option. This choice is certainly better than being bound in the old forces of regional gerontocrats who are no longer relevant in producing policies. In short, this process becomes crucial because it determines whether the regeneration of leadership really stops the old forces, or instead helps them to transform into another form.

- **Rifqi Rachman** -

If the gerontocracy is attached to a political dynasty, a leadership transition process will only be quasi-regeneration; that is young-faced with outdated ideas and characters.

Political Corruption in the Case of the Red-Handed Operation (OTT) to Arrest a Commissioner of the KPU RI

The Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) conducted an arrest operation (OTT) on the suspect Wahyu Setiawan who was none other than a Commissioner of the General Elections Commission (KPU) on 8 January 2020 ago. This case began when a member of the House of Representatives (DPR) elected from the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP), namely Nazarudin Kiemas, died in March 2019.

Article 426 paragraph (1) letter a of Law (Law) Number 7 of 2017 concerning Election states that the replacement of elected candidates for members of the DPR, Regional Representative Council (DPD), Provincial Regional Representative Council (DPRD), and Regency / City DPRD is implemented if the selected candidates have passed away. The replacement it is also regulated in the same article paragraph (3), which states that elected candidates for DPR members who have died are replaced by the KPU with candidates from the list of permanent candidates (DCT) of the same Election Contesting Political Parties in the electoral district (Dapil) based who have the second highest number of voters (*beritasatu.com, 11/1*).

On the basis of these laws and regulations, the KPU has appointed Riezky Aprilia as an elected member of the DPR from the electoral district of South Sumatra I at the Plenary Meeting of Seats and Elected DPR Candidates at the KPU Office, Jakarta, on August 31, 2019. Aprilia replaced the majority vote winner Nazaruddin Kiemas, who has passed away (*beritasatu.com, 11/1*).

However, one of the members of the PDIP Central Leadership Council (DPP) filed a lawsuit to the Supreme Court (MA) so that DPP will be allowed to determine PDIP member who will occupy the seat in the House of Representatives to replace Nazarudin. The

Supreme Court granted the suit. The ruling of the Supreme Court then became the basis of the PDIP to name Harun Masiku as Nazarudin's replacement in the DPR (*detik.com, 22/1*).

However, the Commission through a plenary meeting set Riezky as a replacement for Nazarudin. This was where allegedly bribery took place. The KPK then conducted OTT on January 8, 2020. In the OTT, the KPK named four suspects; namely, Wahyu Setiawan, Agustiani Tio Fridelina, Harun Masiku, and Saeful (*detik.com, 22/1*).

Wahyu Setiawan himself was eventually sentenced to a permanent dismissal from his position as a member of the Indonesian KPU by the Election Organizer Honorary Council (DKPP). This decision was taken after the DKPP held a trial for alleged violations of the code of ethics against Wahyu Setiawan as KPU Commissioner, Thursday, January 16, 2020 (*kompas.com, 17/1*).

Political Corruption

Seeing the names of officials and politicians who are dragged in this case, we can increasingly understand that power has great potential to be abused. As the opinion of anti-corruption experts from the United States, Robert Klitgaard (2000), which states that corruption can mean using positions for personal gains.

The abuse of power in this case illustrates for how frequent officials and political actors have been involved in political corruption. The definition of political corruption itself is simply defined as corruption committed by people or parties who have political positions (*Alko-star, 2007*). The forms can be in the forms of perpetuating political dynasties, trading positions, bribery, and others (*mediaindonesia.com 23/01/17*). In the case of the suspect Wahyu Setiawan, political corruption was carried out in the form of bribery.

Bribery is defined as an abuse of power and authority in return for personal gain. Abuse of power and authority can be done in two ways, namely, first, the abuse of power and authority to speed up procedures in accordance with the law. Second, the abuse of power and authority to accelerate procedures that are contrary to the law (*Aktan, 2015*).

The impacts of political corruption are as follows. *Firstly*, it is further reducing the level of public confidence in political parties and the Election Organizing Agency. *Second*, it destroys democracy in Indonesia because currently corrupt practices are carried out by

utilizing power in the democratic system. *Third*, lowering the quality of state institutions in this case the KPU in carrying out its role. Then the fourth, reducing legal compliance in the eyes of the community.

Recommendations

Looking at corruption cases involving leaders and officials of high state institutions, anti-corruption policies are needed to tackle the increasingly systemic corruption in the country. Therefore, *first*, there should be revision of Law No. 20 of 2001 concerning changes to the Law 31 of 1999 concerning Eradication of Corruption Crimes. The revision is intended to provide a deterrent effect against the perpetrators of criminal acts of corruption; for example, by increasing the sentence for corruptors.

Second, to encourage political parties to strengthen their commitment to eradicating corruption. This can be done by firing party-members and leaders who are involved in a corruption case. Third, public officials are required to report and publish the Report of State Organizers' Assets (LHKPN) periodically. LHKPN should be reported at the first time in office, before a change in position, promotion and retirement. LKHPN should also be reported regularly every year during his tenure.

- **Arfianto Purbolaksono** -

The abuse of power in the case involving Wahyu Setiawan shows how frequent public officials and political actors have been involved in political corruption.

Identity Reconstruction of Indonesian Ex-ISIS Citizens

The repatriation of Indonesian citizens (WNI) does not only revolve around the Corona virus. A report from BBC in early February 2020 has also caused a stir because it contains an interview of a child who has been brought by his parents to join a terrorist organization, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). In the interview, the girl named Nada Fedulla has expressed her desire to return to Indonesia (*bbc.com*, 6/2).

A variety of responses have emerged. The rejection of Nada and other WNI involved in ISIS to return to Indonesia has become the dominant voice. In fact, the Governor of Central Java Province who is also very populist, Ganjar Pranowo, also has voiced rejection to the discourse of repatriation. Governor Ganjar has explicitly said he is not willing to accept Indonesian citizens from Central Java who has been involved in the banned organization (*cnnindonesia.com*, 7/2).

The government has finally responded to the wave of refusal by emphasizing that they will not repatriate the ex-ISIS citizens to Indonesia. Previously, this discourse was reviewed in the forms of two drafts: repatriating and not repatriating ex-ISIS citizens. However, the statement from Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs (Menkopolhukam) Mahfud MD about the considerations of repatriating the children of ex-ISIS WNI has created another new debate (*kompas.com*, 11/2). How can these children come back and be accepted into a society that has already had a set of perceptions toward groups that have been involved in terrorist organization?

The Debate on Citizenship

One general narrative that has previously been discussed in relation to this case is that these ex-ISIS individuals from Indonesia have automatically lost their citizenship when they have joined ISIS. International law expert Hikmahanto Juwana, who referred to Article 23 letter d and letter f of Law Number 12 of 2006 concerning

Citizenship (Citizenship Act), stated that the Indonesian citizenship would be lost by being involved in foreign military service (*tempo.co*, 5/2).

However, what also needs to be remembered is that the Citizenship Act does not recognize the concept of stateless individuals. This is based on the obligations of the government, which must provide maximum protection for each citizen. Moreover, ISIS is not a country that will not make individuals from Indonesia become stateless. Such conditions have made the regulation and the interpretation counterproductive.

On the other hand, there were also different arguments in interpreting the citizenship status of ex-ISIS individuals. One argument related to the citizenship of these ex-ISIS individuals from Indonesia has been brought by Komnas HAM. Komnas HAM Commissioner Choirul Anam said that the status of Indonesian citizens could not be eliminated. He refers to Law No. 5 of 2018 concerning Terrorism. This is based on the understanding that ISIS is an international terrorism organization, not a state (*tirto.id*, 8/2). Logically, this means that revocation of citizenship can only be done if a citizenship from another country has been obtained by the individuals.

Finally, the two narratives have presented an incomplete discourse about the citizenship of ex-ISIS individuals from Indonesia, including groups of children who may be repatriated by the government. In fact, the repatriation process does not stop when the children have arrived in Indonesia. Eliminating stigma so that children can grow up in a social environment is also important to note, because there is potential for the exclusion of this group.

The Shift of Identity of the ex-ISIS Individuals

The public rejection to the discourse of returning ex-ISIS to Indonesian can be examined using the concept of boundaries proposed by Joel S. Migdal (2004). Boundaries explained by Migdal lead to a vision of a significant point that causes something change into something else, which in turn presents a distinction between 'us' and 'them'. Then, these differences present barriers in the forms of acceptance and rejection of certain actions (*Migdal, 2004*).

So, what makes the children of ex-ISIS Indonesian citizens become 'they' to 'us', the other Indonesian citizens? Derived elements from boundaries are tools in executing the separation. The two separating elements are checkpoints and mental maps.

The checkpoints carry out actual and virtual monitoring toward a subject, either to strengthen identity or to contrast differences. The things monitored include visas and passports in the context of actual monitoring, the type of clothing and language in the context of virtual monitoring. The emergence of similarities, affection, and a sense of acceptance will be placed on a same mental map.

This has become a real challenge for the children of ex-ISIS if they are returned to Indonesia. Similarities, affection, and the sense of acceptance toward individuals who have carried out terrorist activities actually contrast the differences with other Indonesian citizens who detect and find these differences. The existence of different identifications among ex-ISIS children will then effect their place on the mental map. Finally, the construction of this identity has made ex-ISIS children alienated from other Indonesian citizens who had never been involved in terrorist activities.

Closing Notes

The formation of identity is actually a dialectical process that continues to live. This is in line with the notes from Benedict Anderson (1983) regarding the print capitalism of the elite of Indonesian intellectuals who spread ideas about nationality through their writings. Hence, identity has the potential to be reconstructed again. That is why this process needs to be well considered by the central government if the option to return the children of ex-ISIS is to be implemented.

In analyzing the costs and benefits of each case from ex-ISIS children, the re-establishment of their identity as Indonesian citizens must be derived in an operational form. Surely, the continuance to carry out the process of de-radicalization as the most vital part of the stage should also be taken place simultaneously.

The emergence of equality, affection, and also a sense of acceptance toward the ex-ISIS children, is expected to be able to put them back on the same mental map as other Indonesian citizens. This is the main goal of the identity reconstruction processes. Of course this can be done if finally the central government chooses to repatriate the ex-ISIS children to Indonesia.

- Rifqi Rachman -

The formation of identity is a dialectical process that continues to live. This means that identity has the potential to be reconstructed again. This process then needs to be well calculated by the central government if the option of returning Indonesian ex-ISIS children is to be realized.

The Relocation of the National Capital, How about the Jakarta's Fate?

The relocation of the capital city has been stated in the National Medium-Term Development Plan 2020-2024. Now, the Draft Law (RUU) of the National Capital (IKN) has entered the National Legislation Program (Prolegnas) and is awaiting the approval of the House of Representatives (DPR). The target of moving the capital city is quite short. The Central Government as the main actor is improving efforts the relocation of the capital city in order to suppress the various impacts that will be caused. Nevertheless, how about the Jakarta's fate?

Development of Capital Relocation

Not a few who reject and support the planning of relocating the capital. Amid the pros and cons, it is important to keep in mind what the meaning of the capital of a country is. According to Gottmann and Harper (1990), a capital city, ideally, is a conducive place to support the effectiveness of government performance and efficiency in decision-making.

Schatz (2004) states that the relocation of the capital requires the transfer of all central state apparatus. In other words, the relocation of the capital city requires very thorough preparations. It needs not only the readiness of human resources but various technical things, including rules and regulation.

The Minister of National Development Planning or Head of Bappenas, Soeharso Manoarfa, said that the construction phase of the new capital will begin in 2021. Meanwhile, other supporting buildings will be built in 2023 (*Liputan6.com*, 04/02). The existence of the IKN Bill is one of the many legal bases that will underlie the relocation and construction of a new capital city. Based on the draft that has been submitted, the IKN Bill contains 39 articles.

The contents of the IKN Bill include explaining the position and scope of the IKN region, the form and structure of the IKN government, financing and funding, spatial planning and disaster management, and other matters (*Bahasan.id*, 29/01). Deputy for Regional Development of the National Development Planning Agency (Bappenas), Rudy Suprihadi, said that the IKN Law was planned to be issued in mid-2020 (*Tempo.com*, 22/01).

An authority body was formed through the drafting of a presidential regulation (Perpres) in preparations for the organization to prepare the move the capital city. Last December, the Ministry of PUPR also named Nagara Rimba Nusa as the winner of the IKN Regional Design Idea Competition (*Kompas.com*, 12/23/2019).

Further contests related to building designs will also be held this year. This is in view that the existence of a master plan is targeted for completion this year as well. The physical construction is targeted to be completed in 2024 (*Antaraneews.com*, 11/06).

The Importance of a Jakarta Preparatory Study Without Capital Status

Considering the current development of Jakarta with its increasing number of residents including migrants, the relocation of the capital city is a hope for the economy of the people to be better. In addition, the poverty rate is expected to decrease further. It is hoped that very bad traffic problems can be also overcome. Basically, various conditions have become the reasons for the relocation of the capital city, including for Indonesia's development to become more equal. Now, the development is still centered on Java.

Some economists believe that Jakarta will become a special economic region. In a meeting with the House of Representatives' Finance Commission at the Parliament Complex, Jakarta on February 4, 2020, Suharso said that Jakarta would still have a special area status even though the country's capital had moved to East Kalimantan (*Tempo.com*, 04/02). He said that it might take the form of a special industrial area or a certain special area. This indicates that the direction of development of Jakarta is not yet certain after not being a capital city.

Various preparations for relocating the capital are being carried out by the Central Government with Bappenas as the leading sector. Among them is the making of a legal base, the establishment of an

authority as an implementing agency, and studies including regional conditions and so on. The plan of moving the capital has caught the attention of the Central Government. Unfortunately, studies on preparations for Jakarta with non-capital status have not been carried out.

A Jakarta preparatory study should be the basis for preparations so that the Provincial Government (Pemprov) of Jakarta can be more focused in managing Jakarta's development. There should be studies related to provincial Spatial Planning (RTRW) and city / regency RTRW.

Jakarta should not become another Lagos city, Nigeria. Nigeria has relocated its capital from Lagos to Abuja. One reason was because Lagos was considered unable to provide adequate urban infrastructure and facilities (Botka, 1995; Doxiadis, 1965). After not being a capital city, Lagos grew rapidly with a population of 22 million. As a result, the quality of facilities and infrastructure has declined significantly. The number of houses located in slums and informal settlements on the outskirts of the city has also increased (wri-indonesia.org, 04/02).

With the relocation of the capital city, automatically the role of the governor will also become very significant. The functions and duties of the governor and his staff will also be increasingly focused, because so far the Central Government has had a very large intervention in the Jakarta program, which often creates conflicts of interests. This is mainly due to differences in missions and targets between the Central Government and the Jakarta Government.

The existence of the policy of relocating the capital city will be the first step for the Jakarta Provincial Government to begin restructuring and reviewing government management and development. However, if the discourse of making Jakarta a special area is decided, the alignment with the Central Government will continue. Ideally, various coordinations will also be carried out. The Jakarta Provincial Government can strengthen the functions of the Governor's Team for the Acceleration of Development (TGUPP) as a connector with the Central Government.

- Vunny Wijaya -

As the main actor, the Central Government needs to regulate the relocation of the national capital. However, it is also necessary to conduct a preparatory study on Jakarta without the capital status to anticipate various undesirable impacts.

Mental Health as a Regional Issue

Does the region have serious attention to mental health issues? This question is certainly difficult to answer. Reporting from *Tempo* (8/10/19), mental health issues at the regional level were less of a concern due to constraints in terms of budgeting and institutional structure. Mental health issues have also escaped the spotlight because they collided with legislation that is incomplete.

In fact, it is clearly written in Law Number 18/2014 on Mental Health, mental health efforts are part of the responsibilities of the Local Government. Mental health efforts referred to in the above rules include promotional, preventive, curative and rehabilitative efforts. As far as we know at present, regional efforts are believed to have been carried out through the umbrella of the Community Mental Health Guidance Team (TPJKM).

However, the above efforts still have many shortcomings. The mental health budget is still general. It has not been dissected into the four mental health efforts listed in the regulation. It cannot be denied that the efforts are still focused on curative and rehabilitative efforts. They have not targeted the basic problems in terms of promotion and prevention. In the end, these obstacles have made the issue of mental health in the area still marginalized.

Local Government on Mental Health Issues

Mental health problems at the regional level need to get the most attention. This can be seen by examining data related to the prevalence and characteristics of cases, the number of health facilities in the area, and existing mental health resources. Various data related to this indicate that mental health also urges to be part of important regional issues.

For example, if seen from the Basic Health Research (Riskesdas) in 2018, 8 out of 10 provinces with the highest prevalence of house-

hold members with schizophrenia / psychosis were mental disorders located outside Java.

Of the 10 provinces, 3 of them were on Sulawesi Island; namely, Sulawesi at number 6, followed by West Sulawesi at number 9, and Central Sulawesi at number 10. The three highest provinces are Bali, the Special Region of Yogyakarta, and West Nusa Tenggara. The prevalence levels in those provinces above were higher than the prevalence of schizophrenia in Indonesia, which reached a level of 7 percent.


Likewise, the prevalence of depression by province. There were 8 of the 10 highest provinces with the highest prevalence of depression in population aged ≥ 15 years. The largest island that had the highest prevalence was still on Sulawesi Island with three provinces (Central Sulawesi at number 1, Gorontalo at number 2 and South Sulawesi at number 10).

The data were also not much different from the provinces with the highest levels of prevalence of mental emotional disorders. The provinces above were higher than the prevalence level in Indonesia, which was above 6.1 percent for depression and above 9.8 percent for mental emotional disorders.

In addition to prevalence, mental health problems are also related to the lack of mental specialists or psychiatrists in Indonesia. Data from the Association of Indonesian Psychiatrists (PDSKJI), the number of psychiatrists is currently only 987 people.

With this amount, one psychiatrist must handle more than 250 thousand inhabitants, if it is assumed that the entire population of Indonesia reaches 250 million. This figure certainly does not meet the standards of the World Health Organization (WHO), which idealizes that a psychiatrist serves a maximum of 30 thousand residents.

Also, the distribution of psychiatrists is still a lot in Java. In fact, 228 of them are in DKI Jakarta. At present, there are 69 percent of psychiatrists in Java, followed by Sumatra with 11 percent and Sulawesi with 6 percent. The following graph is the percentage of psychiatrists based on the islands:

Figure 1. Percentage of Psychiatrists by Island

Source: Association of Indonesian Psychiatrists (PDSKJI), 2019 (prepared by the author)

According to the data from the Ministry of Social Affairs, several provinces in the eastern islands of Indonesia, such as Gorontalo, West Papua, West Sulawesi, North Maluku and North Kalimantan, do not yet have a psychiatrist. In fact, as described previously, these areas have a fairly high prevalence of mental health problems, such as schizophrenia, depression and mental emotional disorders.

In addition to psychiatrists, another problem is the number of mental hospitals and mental health services at the Community Health Centers. Until 2018, the Ministry of Social Affairs noted that Indonesia only had 48 mental hospitals (RSJ), which were divided into 32 state-owned mental hospitals and 16 privately owned. Until now, there are still 8 provinces that do not yet have a mental hospital; namely, the Riau Islands, Banten, West Sulawesi, North Maluku, Gorontalo, NTT, West Papua, and North Kalimantan. In fact, if you look at Article 52 paragraph 1 of the Mental Health Act, each province has at least one mental hospital.

In addition, out of 1,678 public hospitals registered, only around 2 percent have mental health services. In fact, of the 9000 Community Health Centers spread throughout Indonesia, only 13.7 percent or around 1,235 Community Health Centers provide mental health services. In addition, the number of clinical psychologists is still around 451 people. These data indicate that mental health facilities and resources are still far from the expected standard.

The lack of regional attention is also reflected in the absence of local regulations related to mental health issues. At present, it is only West Java Province that has a regional regulation related to the implementation of mental health which is a follow-up to the Mental Health Law; namely, the Regional Regulation of West Java Province Number 5/2018 on the Implementation of Mental Health. Other regions only have governor regulations, which are still specific in terms of curative and rehabilitative efforts. Thus, regional attention on these issues needs to be re-evaluated, starting from the existing systems and policies at the local level.

Recommendations

Along with mental health issues that are increasing in Indonesia, there is an urgency to encourage system improvement and strengthen policies that underpin mental health efforts nationally. It should be emphasized again that mental health is not only the responsibility of the Central Government, as there should be synergy with local authorities to initiate mental health efforts.

It needs to be explained again that the Local Government has an important role to create conditions that encourage community mental health. The importance of caring for the psychosocial well-being of the local community will certainly encourage them to reach their potential and better livelihood. The intervention was not only targeted at the most vulnerable individuals or groups but also at mental health problems at the community level. In addition to interventions that target individuals, community-based interventions can help reduce the prevalence of vulnerability to mental health problems and encourage mental health in general.

This is related to mental health efforts that must emphasize promotive and preventive efforts. In this case, public literacy regarding mental health, especially at the regional level, is important. Training health workers on mental health literacy is urgently needed in addition to encouraging community initiatives and non-governmental organizations in various provinces to pursue community-based health literacy.

In addition, the big homework now is of course how to complete the regulations derived from the Mental Health Act. Related to mental health facilities, there is a mandate of government regulations related to the provision of human resources (HR) in the field of mental health starting from the level of health centers to hospitals.

The issue of the disputes in Natuna is not only a matter of Indonesia's sea territories. If we look further, this conflict will also affect the problems in the Southeast Asian region.

In addition, other LGs can learn from the provinces that have issued mental health regulation (West Java) as an effort to construct a structured mental health effort framework in the regions. With these efforts, it is hoped that the issue of mental health can become one of the priorities in encouraging overall community welfare at the regional level.

- Nopitri Wahyuni -

In addition to the Central Government's responsibility, mental health efforts are the responsibility of the Regional Governments.

Conducting Economic Valuation of Unpaid Care Work

Many discourses about unpaid care work have surfaced. In Indonesia, the challenge to discuss these issues can start by capturing a picture of inequality at the level of work participation. According to data from the 2018 National Labor Force Survey by Center Statistic Bureau, female labor force participation was much lower than men, which was at a level of 51.88 percent, compared to a level of 82.69 percent.

Then, according to the average wage per month earned by women, the value is also lower. Women earn an average wage of Rp.2.4 million per month, compared to men who reach Rp3.06 million. Also, there are only 35.05 percent of women working in the formal sector. The rest are still trapped in the informal sector.

In a study released by the Women's Journal in 2018, the topic of women and care work became one of the crucial issues. One article that discusses public perceptions of care work presents some interesting findings in a national survey of housewives in 34 provinces. From 2,041 housewives surveyed, it can be seen that the average length of time for housewives to do unpaid care work is 13.5 hours per day. This figure is higher if compared to the average length of time women spend on unpaid care work in the Asia Pacific (*Journal of Women, 2020*).

Interestingly, from 9 categories of care work -- ranging from cooking, cleaning the house, taking care of children and the elderly, to gardening activities -- as many as 21 percent of housewives said that the compensation that could be given for all these jobs reached around 2-3 million per month.

The problem is that if the compensation from the care work reaches Rp.2 million per month and is allocated to pay domestic workers or babysitters, then the compensation value is lower than the national average wage of female workers, which reaches Rp.2.2 mil-

lion. Also, an average domestic worker in Indonesia only gets 25-35 percent of the regional minimum wage. This fact indicates that care work is still often marginalized.

Gender Analysis and Unpaid Care Work Valuation

Discussions on unpaid care work are indeed very complicated. The reason is that this is inseparable from the construction of the society that care work or domestic work is still perceived as part of women's responsibilities in the household. In fact, even in the labor market, women are still considered as a reserve workforce. Consequently, as quoted from the *Women's Journal* (2020), care work by housewives or female family members tends to be considered as non-economic activities that ultimately do not qualify for wages.

If we look at gender norms and constructions that place care work as the domain of women, women will continue to be expected to spend their time every day doing domestic work and reproductive roles. Ultimately, this will create a double burden on women when they have paid work together.

Sadly, unpaid care work illustrates gender inequality in the socio-economic context. Report from the International Labor Organization (ILO) in 2018 globally, women spend three-fourths, or around 76.2 percent of the total hours each day doing unpaid care work. In fact, in Asia, the figure reaches 80 percent of total hours every day. And sadly, none of the countries show an equal division between men and women to do the work.

Then, women dedicate 3.2 times more on average than men doing unpaid care work. This figure is equivalent to 4 hours 25 minutes per day, which is certainly in contrast to men who only spend 1 hour 23 minutes per day. If added together in one year, women have 201 working days, assuming 8 hours of work every day. Meanwhile, men only work 63 days. The comparison above shows a disproportionate picture between women and men.

Moreover, Oxfam International found that globally, men have 50 percent wealth compared to women. This is demonstrated by studies that focus on measuring the impact of unpaid or underpaid care work on the prospects for women's welfare and its effect on global inequality. The study is titled *Time to Care: Unpaid and underpaid care work and the global inequality crisis (2020)*.

Interesting findings from the study reveal that the valuation of unpaid care work performed by women over the age of 15 reaches \$ 10.8 trillion a year. This value is very significant, which is comparable to half of the annual gross domestic product from the USA (which last year totaled \$ 21.54 trillion). This value is also three times greater than the valuation of the technology industry globally (which reaches \$ 3.2 trillion).

Generally, women are often burdened with the responsibilities of unpaid care work, such as finding firewood and water, cooking and washing, caring for the elderly and children. The value of the care work is equivalent to 12.5 million hours of unpaid care work. Sadly, the work leaves women 15 times poorer and ultimately women are unable to meet their basic needs and have difficulty participating in socio-political activities.

Oxfam also said that 42 percent of women of working age were unable to keep their jobs because they have unpaid care work, compared to men who only reach 6 percent. In addition, the impact will be even worse when the lowest income households, such as in Uganda, Zimbabwe, India, the Philippines, and Kenya, where women spend 40 minutes every day looking for water and firewood. Women who are more involved in the work will also have lower attendance rates.

Recommendations

The issue of maintenance work is very significant going forward. The ILO in its report in 2018 stated that there were 2.1 billion people who needed care in 2015, including 1.9 billion children under 15 years and 200 million elderly people. By 2030, people who need care will be projected to reach 2.3 billion, affected by the addition of 200 million elderly and children. At the same time, there will be 269 million new care jobs created if investments in education, health and social work are multiplied.

In addition, from year to year, the increase in the number of nuclear families and single households globally, as well as increased participation of women in the labor market, will have implications for increasing demand for care workers. If not handled properly, there will be a lot of deficits that accumulate both in quantity and quality in the sector, as well as worsening gender inequality in the workplace.

In the context of public policy, the challenge to unpaid care work is to recognize, reduce and redistribute. The challenge also applies to creating decent work for domestic workers and migrant workers.

In its strategy, change interventions need to be carried out by starting to formulate economic indicators for valuing unpaid care work on a macro-economic basis. In addition, improvements to the social protection system and improving the implementation of labor and migrant worker protection policies must also be improved.

In Indonesia, efforts to improve care work must also be improved by providing qualified infrastructure. The infrastructure must be well distributed in the form of providing key resources in rural areas, such as water resources, then increasing accessibility to child care services and basic health services, as well as improving education for women. Through these efforts, gender inequality in the socio-economic context in Indonesia can be resolved systematically and thoroughly.

- Nopitri Wahyuni -

Change strategies are needed to do the valuation of unpaid care work, as well as improving social protection systems and other related policies.

Observing the Polemics over Evacuating Indonesian Citizens from Hubei to Natuna

After going through quite tough processes, the Chinese authorities gave permission to the Indonesian government to evacuate Indonesian National Citizens (WNI) in Hubei. This is in line with the statement of the World Health Organization Committee (WHO) that the novel Coronavirus outbreak (2019-nCoV) was a global emergency on Friday, January 31 in Geneva. Upon returning from Hubei, WNI were quarantined first in Natuna. However, the return of WNI has created pros and cons in the society. Some Natuna people have questioned why Natuna was chosen as a quarantine place.

Responding to Coronavirus Outbreak

Since news on coronavirus broke out, various efforts have been made by the Ministry of Health (MoH). However, news on coronavirus has caused a lot of public concern. The Director General of Disease Prevention and Control of the Ministry of Health, Anung Sugihantono, said that early prevention had been carried out since hearing information on December 19, while other countries did the same in early 2020 (*Katadata.co.id, 31/01*).

The Ministry of Health as the lead agency of health services in Indonesia continues to take a series of steps in accordance with the direction of the WHO. Before the coronavirus outbreak was declared a global emergency or the Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC), the Circular on Preparedness Guidelines for Novel Coronavirus Infection (2019-nCoV) was issued by the MoH on January 28.

Preparedness Guidelines for Novel Coronavirus Infection (2019-nCoV) infection have also been developed. The guidelines refer to the guidelines that have been prepared by WHO. As directed by

the WHO Emergency Committee in Geneva (31/01), all countries should be prepared for containment, including active surveillance, early detection, isolation and case management, contact tracing, and prevention of onward spread of novel coronavirus infection, and the sharing of full data with WHO. The official channels of the MoH and the Ministry of Communication and Information Technology (Kominfo) are also increasingly active in reporting and suppressing the circulating hoaxes related to coronavirus. The coronavirus hotline is also provided by the MoH to provide more accurate information services.

A number of Coronavirus referral hospitals have also conducted patient simulations. Screening carried out by airport health office (KKP) officers has also been increased. Until now, a number of evacuation capsules were also placed at airports and international ports to evacuate passengers suspected of having coronavirus to be taken to the nearest hospitals.

The Urgent Decision to Choose Natuna as a Quarantine Place

Before the evacuation is carried out, a quarantine place and scheme has been prepared to conduct a review of the conditions of Indonesian citizens for 14 days. Case management efforts were also carried out by the Ministry of Health. Indonesian citizens who will be evacuated not only get medical services, but also psychosocial support by involving psychiatrists and psychologists.

What the MoH has done refers to WHO directives and is according to the Law on Health Quarantine, which was established on August 7, 2018. Unfortunately, there was a delay in providing information that Natuna would be used as a temporary health observation or quarantine. This has certainly caused public unrest. In fact, Article 54 Paragraph 1 of the Law on Health Quarantine has stated that health quarantine officials must provide an explanation to the society in the local area before implementing a regional quarantine.

Natuna Regent, Abdul Hamid Rizal, said that a mis-coordination took place between the Central Government and the Regional Government (Pemda) in relation to the quarantine processes for WNI who were evacuated from Hubei, China (Kompas.com, 04/02). Hamid explained that the Natuna Regional Government had just received information that Natuna would be the location of WNI observation from Hubei one day before the evacuation was carried out.

Biak and Morotai were also considered as other options (*Nasional.kompas.com, 03/02*). The Central Government was only given 1x24 hours by the China authorities to evacuate Indonesian nationals. Natuna is closer to China compared to the other islands. Government administration expert from the University of Indonesia, Roy Valiant Solomon (2018), said that basically public policies issued by government institutions resulted in the emergence of compulsory compliance. The Pemda and the community inevitably have to accept the Central Government's decision.

Improving Public Communications

Basically, the decision to evacuate of WNI was a very appropriate step. The Pemda should have known. The Pemda have the right to obtain all information on policies adopted by the Central Government.

Ideally, every decision-making should be also based on stakeholder mapping. In this case, the Central Government and Pemda are the main actors. The existence of stakeholder mapping becomes a very important foundation to build good communications between the Central Government and Pemda.

Even if decisions have been made, the Central Government should deliver and coordinate information dissemination to the Natuna community. In accordance with the mandate of the Health Quarantine Law, the preparation could have been done better to suppress the worries of local society.

The mis-coordination that occurred can be an important lesson for the Central Government. In the midst of a crisis or pressure, involving the Pemda early on must be prioritized. The Pemda also has the right to obtain all information on policies adopted by the Central Government. Currently, quarantine still continues. Various efforts to ward off coronavirus continue. Collaborative efforts must continue to be improved.

- Vunny Wijaya -

A series of decisions were quickly taken by the Central Government to ward off coronavirus. The miscoordination that occurred between the Central Government and Pemda of Natuna has become an important lesson. Involving Pemda early must be prioritized.

 **THE** **INDONESIAN INSTITUTE**
C E N T E R F O R P U B L I C P O L I C Y R E S E A R C H

The Indonesian Institute (TII) is a Center for Public Policy Research that was established on 21 October 2004 by a group of young, dynamic activists and intellectuals. **TII** is an independent, non-partisan, non-profit institution, whose main funding stems from grants and contributions from foundations, companies, and individuals.

TII has the aim of becoming a main research center in Indonesia for public policy matters and has committed to giving contribution to the debates over public policies and to improving the quality of the planning and results of public policy by promoting good governance principles and public participation in the policy processes in Indonesia.

TII's visions are public policies in Indonesia which highly uphold human rights and rule of law, as well as involve participation of various stakeholders and practice democratic good governance principles.

TII's missions are to conduct reliable research that is independent and non-partisan and to channel the research to the policy-makers, the private sector, and academia in order to improve the quality of Indonesian policy-makers.

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Assessment”), annual policy analysis (“Indonesian Report”), and monthly discussion forum on policy issues (“The Indonesian Forum”).

Contact Details :

The Indonesian Institute, Center for Public Policy Research

Jl. HOS. Cokroaminoto No. 92,

Menteng, Jakarta Pusat - 10310

Ph. (021)315-8032

contact@theindonesianinstitute.com

www.theindonesianinstitute.com

RESEARCH ON ECONOMIC AFFAIRS

The economy tends to be used as an indicator of the success of the government as a policy-maker. Economy plays an important role as one of the fundamentals of national development. Limited resources have often caused the government to face obstacles in implementing economic policies that will optimally benefit the people. The increase in the quality of the people's critical thinking has forced the government to conduct comprehensive studies in every decision-making process. In fact, the studies will not be stopped when the policy is already in place. Studies will be continued until the policy evaluation process.

TII focus on economic issues, such as monetary policy and fiscal policy, as well as issues on sustainable development by using analysis which refer to economic freedom principles. Monetary issues will focus on the Indonesian Central Bank to maintain economic stability, both regarding inflation and exchange rate. Meanwhile, fiscal policy will focus on the discussions over the National Budget and infrastructure development both in the regions and in the cities. In relation to sustainable development, TII research is focusing on productivity, competitiveness, infrastructure development, and development gap. In addition, TII also upholds economic freedom principles in highlighting the importance of individual freedom and involvement of private sectors in increasing development and improving welfare in Indonesia.

The TII Economic Research Division is present for those who are interested in the conditions of the economy. The results of the research are intended to assist policy-makers, regulators, and donor agencies in making decisions. The research that TII offers: **(1) Economic Policy Analysis; (2) Regional and Sectoral Prospects; and (3) Program Evaluation.**

RESEARCH ON LEGAL AFFAIRS

According to stipulations in Law No. 12 Year 2011 on the Formulation of Laws and Regulations, every bill which will be discussed by the legislative and the executive must be complemented with academic paper. This stipulation is also confirmed in Law No. 15 Year 2019 on the Amendment of Law No. 12 Year 2011 regarding the Formulation of Laws and Regulations.

Therefore, comprehensive research is very important and needed in making a qualified academic paper. With qualified academic papers, the bills will have strong academic foundation both from academic and content aspects. Furthermore, academic paper also functions as an early tracking over possibilities of overlapping laws and regulations, so that revocation of local regulations or other related issues which can be caused by legal, economic, or political aspects in the future, can be minimized as soon as possible.

TII offers normative and legal research related to harmonization and synchronization of laws and regulations, especially in making academic papers, legal opinion on harmonization and synchronization of laws and regulations, and legislative drafting for the formulation of local regulations bill drafts or other laws and regulations. In addition, TII also offers openly research on other legal issues related to Constitutional Law and Public Administration, Human Rights, and Political Corruption.

RESEARCH ON THE POLITICAL AFFAIRS

The enactment of Law No. 23 Year 2014 on the latest regulation on the Local Government, has created different relations between the Central Government and the Local Government. Entering the era of Bureaucracy Reform, specification of division of affairs of the Central Government and the Local Government has increasingly demanded the implementation of good governance principles. The government is demanded to be adaptive and responsive towards public aspiration and services. Therefore, public policy research become more important for both the Central Government and the Local Government to analyse context and current issues in the regions. The government must also consider various actors whether political actors or bureaucrats, as well as public's aspiration and other non-state actor in policy processes.

In order to respond those needs, TII research in political affairs offer policy assessment on various policies which were already applied or will be implemented. TII will look at socio-cultural, economy, legal, and political aspects in assessing public policies. Our research will be useful to assist government in formulating policies which are in line with context, priorities, and people's aspiration. TII also offers various breakthrough of transformative policies according to existing contexts in particular and Open Government principles' implementation in general, in order to increase public participation in policy processes, particularly in the era of the openness of public information.

Political Research Division of TII provide analysis and policy recommendations in order to generate strategic policy in the strengthening of democracy and the establishment of good governance both at the

national and local levels. Political research forms are offered by TII **(1) Public Policy Analysis, (2) Media Monitoring, (3) Mapping & Positioning Research, (4) Need Assessment Research, (5) Survey Indicator.**

RESEARCH ON THE SOCIAL AFFAIRS

Social development needs policy foundations that come from independent and accurate research. Social analysis is a need for the government, the businesspeople, academia, professionals, NGOs, and civil society to improve social development. Social analysis is important to identify strategic issues which are developing and to make the right stakeholders' mapping to promote significant change in the context of development, public policy, and democracy in Indonesia.

The Social Research Division is present to offer strong and valid recommendations to produce strategic, relevant, efficient and effective, and impactful policies, in addressing to existing various issues. For example, issues related to education, health, population, environment, women, children, and elderly. Social research that TII offers: **(1) Social Policy Analysis; (2) Explorative Research; (3) Mapping & Positioning Research; (4) Need Assessment Research; (5) Program Evaluation Research; and (5) Indicator Survey.**

PRE-ELECTION AND REGIONAL HEAD ELECTION

One of the activities carried out and offered by TII is a pre-election survey as well as a pre-election and regional head election. The reasons underlying the implementation of pre-election and regional head election surveys, namely: (1) A good election is a democratic process that can be arranged, calculated, and predicted in the resulting process; (2) Survey is one of the important and common discussions to measure, calculate, and predict how the process and results of the General Election and the Regional Head Election will take place, in accordance to the expectations of the candidates; (3) It is very important to win in the General Election and the Regional Head Election based on empirical, scientific, measurable and supportable data.

As one of the important aspects of a strategic candidate's election, the survey is useful for monitoring political power. In this case, the success team needs to conduct a survey for: (1) mapping the candidate's position in public perception; (2) mapping voters' desires; (3) publishing the most effective political machinery used as voters; and (4) Looking for the most effective medium for the campaign.

EVALUATION OF A PROJECT OR A PROGRAM

One of the activities that have been performed and experienced offered by TII is a qualitative evaluation of the projects and programs of non-governmental organizations and government. Evaluation activities are offered TII stages of mid-term evaluation of the project/program (mid-term evaluation) and also the final evaluation at the end of the project/program (final evaluation).

As we know, the evaluation is an important step in the implementation of a project or program. Mid-Term Evaluation of the project or program is intended to look at and analyze the challenges, the overall learning takes place during the project or program, and make recommendations for the continuity of the project or program. Meanwhile, the final evaluation allows us to view and analyze the outcomes and the lessons learned to ensure the achievement of all the objectives of the project or program at the end of the project or program.

THE INDONESIAN FORUM

The Indonesian Forum is a monthly discussion activity on actual issues in the political, economic, social, legal, cultural, defense, and environmental fields. TII organizes these forums as media for competent resource persons, stakeholders, policymakers, civil society activists, academicians, and the media to meet and have discussion.

Themes that have been raised were the ones that have caught public attention, such as migrant workers, social conflicts, domestic politics, and local direct elections. The main consideration in picking a theme is sociological and political reality and the context of the relevant public policy at the time that the Indonesian Forum is delivered.

It is expected that the public can get the big picture of a particular event as the Indonesian Forum also presents relevant resource persons.

Since its inception, the Indonesian Institute is very aware of the passion of the public to get discussions that are not only rich in substance but also well formatted, which support balanced ideas exchanges ideas and the equal involvement of the different elements of the society.

The discussions, which are designed to only invite a limited number of participants, do not only feature idea exchanges but also regularly offer policy briefs (policy recommendations) to relevant policymakers and also summaries to the participants, especially the media people and the resource persons at the end of each discussion. Therefore, the discussions will not end without solutions.

LOCAL COUNCIL TRAINING

The roles and functions of local councils in monitoring local governments are very important. They need to ensure that participative and democratic policies will be espoused. Members of provincial and regent local councils are required to have strong capacity to understand democratization matters, regional autonomy, legislative techniques, budgeting, local Politics, and political marketing. Thus, it is important to empower members of local councils.

In order for local councils to be able to response every problem that will come out as a result of any policy implemented by the central government or local governments, the Indonesian Institute invites the leaderships and members of local councils to undergo training to improve their capacity.

WORKING GROUP

The Indonesian Institute believes that a good public policy process can be held with some engagement and empowerment of the stakeholders. The Indonesian Institute takes a role as one of mediator agencies to facilitate some forums in which the Government, Council Members, Private Sectors, NGOs and Academicians can meet in interactive forums. The Indonesian Institute provides facilitation on working groups and public advocacy.

The Indonesian Institute takes the role of mediator and facilitator in order to encourage the synergy of public policy work between the stakeholders and policy makers and also to have a synergy with funding agencies (donors).

Executive Director

Adinda Tenriangke Muchtar

Research and Program Manager

Arfianto Purbolaksono

Board of Advisors

Rizal Sukma

Jeffrie Geovanie

Jaleswari Pramodawardhani

Hamid Basyaib

Ninasapti Triaswati

M. Ichsan Loulembah

Debra Yatim

Irman G. Lanti

Indra J. Piliang

Abd. Rohim Ghazali

Saiful Mujani

Jeannette Sudjunadi

Rizal Mallarangeng

Sugeng Suparwoto

Effendi Ghazali

Clara Joewono

Researcher of Economy Affairs

Muhammad Rifki Fadilah

Researcher of Law Affairs

Muhammad Aulia Y. Guzasiah

Researchers of Political Affairs

Rifqi Rachman

Researcher of Social Affairs

Nopitri Wahyuni

Vunny Wijaya

Program and Supporting Staff

Gunawan

Administration Officer

Maya Indrianti

Finance Officer: Rahmanita

IT Staff : Usman Effendy

Desain dan Layout

Siong Cen

Jl. HOS. Cokroaminoto No. 92,
Menteng, Jakarta Pusat - 10310
Ph. (021) 315-8032
contact@theindonesianinstitute.com
www.theindonesianinstitute.com

